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Removal, Morality, and “Natural” Processes 
 
 
 In his 1835 travel narrative, The Rambler in North America, Englishman and future 
British colonial official Charles Joseph La Trobe wrote that one of the aims precipitating his 
1832-33 travels in the “New World” had been “to be a guest in the lodges of that race, of whom 
men speak as doomed speedily to disappear from the face of the earth.”1 Traveling in the early 
years of the Jackson administration’s Indian removal policy, La Trobe apparently believed the 
pronouncements of removal proponents, such as Secretary of War Lewis Cass, that the 
government’s policy “to remove” the eastern American Indian peoples west of the Mississippi 
River was a benevolent, just, and necessary policy. Given that “common observation alone” 
apparently enabled anyone to predict the American Indians’ “utter extinction before the lapse of 
many years,” La Trobe had “been led at length to admit” that the “white man and the Indian 
cannot be near neighbours.”2 At first glance, La Trobe’s support for the Jacksonian’s Indian 
removal policy seems surprising. As a Moravian Christian, committed to the civilizing mission 
among “native” peoples, and as a man with self-proclaimed Tory sensibilities inimical to 
Jacksonian-style egalitarianism, La Trobe had more in common with the proto-Whigs who in 
1829 and 1830 led a concerted but ultimately unsuccessful campaign to block the passage of the 
                                                
1 Charles Joseph Latrobe, The Rambler in North America, 2 vols., vol. 1 (New York: Harper & Bros., 1835). 17. 
2 Ibid., 130,34. 
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Indian Removal Bill through Congress.3 Yet La Trobe’s writings on removal, and his subsequent 
adoption of removal-style policies towards indigenous peoples in New South Wales, suggest that 
“removal” – as a discursive concept and coercive practice – was not confined within the borders 
of U.S.-claimed territory. 
 Despite similarities between “Indian removal” in the U.S. and policies adopted by the 
British in their settler colonies, scholars have generally regarded government-sponsored efforts 
“to remove” indigenous peoples from their homelands as a specifically U.S.-centered 
phenomenon.4 Undoubtedly historical narratives of Indian removal in the United States tell 
important stories regarding the republic’s national historical legacy. Most of these works focus 
on the intensive efforts of the Jackson administration and the southern states against the “five 
civilized” southeastern nations – the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Seminoles 
– who struggled to retain their sovereignty in the face of intensive coercive pressure from U.S. 
citizens eager to appropriate their lands.5 Yet even from the perspective of nationally bounded 
                                                
3 After intense debate in Congress, the Indian Removal Bill passed the Senate in May 1830. See Ronald N. Satz, 
American Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era  (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002). 19-31. On the 
proto-Whig “antireomovalists” see Francis Paul Prucha, "Introduction," in Cherokee Removal: The "William Penn" 
Essays and Other Writings, ed. Francis Paul Prucha (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1981). For the 
involvement of women in the antiremoval campaign: Mary Hershberger, "Mobilizing Women, Anticipating 
Abolition: The Struggle against Indian Removal in the 1830s," Journal of American History 86, no. 1 (1999); Alisse 
Theodore Portnoy, ""Female Petitioners can Lawfully Be Heard": Negotiating Female Decorum, United States 
Politics, and Political Agency, 1829-1831," Journal of the Early Republic 23, no. 4 (2003). On the politics of the 
second party system see, for instance, Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: the Transformation of 
America, 1815-1848  (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); Charles Grier Sellers, The Market 
Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).  
4 Cf scholars of “settler colonialism” who see removal as part of a geographically and temporally wider phenomenon 
in which indigenous peoples faced similar patterns of coercion as invading settlers attempted to appropriate their 
lands in places such as British North America (and subsequently Canada and the United States), Australia, and New 
Zealand. See for example, Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: a Theoretical Overview  (Basingstoke, 
Hampshire, UK ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). This scholarship will be discussed in more detail below. 
5 See Grant Foreman, Indian Removal: the Emigration of the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians  (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1953); Michael D. Green, The Politics of Indian Removal: Creek Government and Society in 
Crisis  (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1982); Tiya Miles, Ties that Bind: the Story of an Afro-Cherokee 
Family in Slavery and Freedom  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005); Michael Paul Rogin, Fathers and 
Children: Andrew Jackson and the Subjugation of the American Indian  (New York: Knopf : distributed by Random 
House, 1975); Satz, American Indian Policy; Anthony F. C. Wallace, The Long Bitter Trail: Andrew Jackson and 
the Indians  (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993). 
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U.S. histories, few scholars have focused on government-sponsored efforts to remove American 
Indian peoples further north in the region of the Great Lakes or “Old Northwest.”6 Reorienting 
our gaze to this region brings into view crucial dynamics relating to the so-called “removal” of 
indigenous peoples in the U.S. and British empire.  
 The political dynamics of the U.S.-British border region in the Great Lakes had a 
particular impact on the formulation of U.S. Indian policy. Indeed, in the 1820s two major 
proponents of Indian removal in the U.S. – Lewis Cass and Thomas McKenney – framed their 
views on Indian policy as much in light of Great Lakes U.S.-Indian diplomacy and the proximity 
of the British as they did with respect to the escalating conflict between the Cherokees and 
Georgia. For Cass in particular, the perceived threat of the British loomed large. As governor of 
the Michigan Territory and the territory’s ex officio superintendent of Indian affairs (1813-1831), 
Cass’s Detroit residence lay, for instance, about 15 miles south of the British fort at 
Amherstburg. With the War of 1812 a fresh memory, and the Native American and First Nations 
people who allied with the British constantly crossing a border whose delineation had ostensibly 
little to do with their nations’ sovereignty, a significant part of Cass’s Indian policy aimed to end 
what he perceived as “the influence acquired by the British Agents” over “the Indians.”  This 
influence had, he wrote to the U.S. Secretary of War in 1816, “been uniformly exerted to hostile 
                                                
6 Regional or tribal studies of the Great Lakes era, which include the first half of the nineteenth century, however, 
discuss the impact of the U.S. government’s removal policy: see for example, Robert E. Beider, "Sault Ste. Marie 
and the War of 1812: A World Turned Upside Down in the Old Northwest," Indian Magazine of History 95, no. 1 
(1999); James A. Clifton, The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Indian Culture, 1665-1965  
(Lawrence: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977); James McClurken, "Ottawa Adaptive Strategies to Indian Removal," 
Michigan Historical Review 12(1986); James M. McClurken, Our People, Our Journey: the Little River Band of 
Ottawa Indians  (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2009); Lucy Eldersveld Murphy, A Gathering of 
Rivers: Indians, Métis, and mining in the Western Great Lakes, 1737-1832  (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
2000); Elizabeth Neumeyer, "Michigan Indians Battle Against Removal," Michigan History 55, no. 4 (1971); David 
Lee Smith, Ho-Chunk Tribal History: The History of the Ho-Chunk People from the Mound Building Era to the 
Present Day  (Nebraska: David Lee Smith, 1996). Older local history narratives, particularly those in the Wisconsin 
Historical Collections, also give accounts of the removal era in the Great Lakes region: for example, Reuben Gold 
Thwaites, "The Wisconsin Winnebagoes: An Interview with Moses Paquette," Wisconsin Historical Collections 
12(1892). 
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and insiduous [sic.] purposes.”7 As Cass managed, in the 1820s, to master the diplomatic 
conventions of Great Lakes politics – with its fictive-kinship designation of the U.S. President as 
the “Great Father in Washington” and his representatives as “father” to his Indian “children” – 
he intensified his efforts to abrogate what he saw as the ongoing influence of the British over the 
peoples of the region. For Thomas McKenney (U.S. Superintendent of Indian Trade, 1816-1822, 
and Superintendent of Indian Affairs, 1824-1830), the paternal language of Great Lakes 
diplomacy itself had an especially significant bearing on how he conceptualized all relations 
between the U.S. government and American Indian peoples. That both Cass and McKenney were 
heavily influenced by this regional politics points to the broader North American transnational or 
(perhaps more fittingly) trans-imperial significance of the U.S. government’s Indian removal 
policy.  
 Moreover, across this U.S.-British defined border, and stretching out more widely in the 
British empire, the term “removal” had a linguistic currency not limited to the significations 
given by U.S. citizens such as Cass and McKenney. In addition to Charles La Trobe, two British 
officials – each of whom had a stint as lieutenant governor of Upper Canada (present-day 
Ontario) – used the term to define their government’s policies towards indigenous people. 
Francis Bond Head, while lieutenant governor of Upper Canada from 1836 to 1837, attempted to 
implement a policy “to remove” all the Province’s First Peoples to Manitoulin Island in Lake 
Huron. George Arthur, firstly as lieutenant governor of Van Diemen’s Land (present-day 
Tasmania, Australia) from 1824 to 1836, oversaw the “removal” off the island of the Van 
Demonian indigenous people who had survived a bloody war against their colonial invaders. 
                                                
7 Francis Paul Prucha and Donald F. Carmony, "A Memorandum of Lewis Cass: Concerning a System for the 
Regulation of Indian Affairs," Wisconsin Magazine of History (1968): 41. Both Cass and McKenney (despite his 
Quaker upbringing) fought in War of 1812: Willard Carl Klunder, Lewis Cass and the Politics of Moderation  (Kent, 
Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1996). 8-15; Herman J. Viola, Thomas L. McKenney: Architect of America's 
Early Indian Policy, 1816-1830  (Chicago: Sage Books, 1974). 4. 
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Then as lieutenant governor of Upper Canada (1838-1842), Arthur dealt with the regional 
ramifications of both Head’s and the U.S. government’s removal policies.  
Although used in disparate contexts, the term “removal” had a shared meaning in the 
United States and British empire. During George Arthur’s administration in Van Diemen’s Land, 
Francis Bond Head’s in Upper Canada, and Charles La Trobe’s in the Port Phillip district of New 
South Wales (1839-1854), British colonists used the term “removal” to refer to policies similar 
to those adopted in the United States towards Native American peoples; they used “removal” to 
label efforts aimed to expatriate “native” peoples from their homelands, and to expropriate these 
territories for the British Crown for the exclusive use of the British settler population. Though in 
the British settler colonies of Van Diemen’s Land, Upper Canada, and New South Wales, the 
colonial administrations never adopted an explicit, statutorily enacted “removal” policy as the 
Jackson administration did in the United States, colonial officials nevertheless used the same 
term to refer to what were, in both design and effect, very similar policies.  
This adoption of analogous policies towards distant and otherwise unconnected peoples 
in no way implies that indigenous peoples in Van Diemen’s Land and First Peoples in Upper 
Canada, for instance, were intrinsically similar. Indeed, even the different racialized labels that 
U.S. citizens and British colonists gave – “red” for Native people in North America and “black” 
for indigenous people in Australia – highlight that each local context had its own contingent (and 
always unstable) racial regimes. Yet Non-Native people in the United States and Britain (and its 
empire) nevertheless also commonly subsumed all indigenous peoples under the (generally 
derogatory) category of “savage,” which they contrasted with their own self-labeled “civilized” 
societies. In many cases, U.S. citizens and British colonists imposed very similar pre-conceived 
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ideas about “savagery” onto people racialized as “red,” “Indian,” or (increasingly in the 1830s) 
“Aborigine” in North America and “black” or “Aborigine” in Australia. 
This dissertation follows the stories of five white men – all in positions of administrative 
authority in either the U.S. or British colonies – who either advocated for or presided over efforts 
“to remove” indigenous peoples from their homelands. For Lewis Cass, Thomas McKenney, 
George Arthur, Charles La Trobe, and Francis Bond Head, the existence of indigenous people on 
land claimed, or at least earmarked, for settlement by U.S. citizens or British subjects represented 
a situation that gave rise to a “moral” problem or duty. Although La Trobe’s political and 
cultural sensibilities seemingly differed from Cass’s Jacksonianism, they were less dissimilar to 
those of the Quaker-born Methodist Thomas McKenney. As a whole-hearted supporter, from the 
mid-1820s, of a federal policy “to remove” eastern American Indian peoples to the west of the 
Mississippi, McKenney saw removal as the only way for the U.S. government to discharge its 
moral duty to protect Native Americans from harm at the hands of non-Native people, and to 
impart to them the apparently fundamental human imperatives of “civilization” and Christianity. 
Both La Trobe and George Arthur (an evangelical Anglican) also believed in the absolute 
necessity of saving indigenous peoples, not only from the physical violence of settler-colonist 
attacks but also from what they saw as the degradations of savagery and heathenism, through 
programs to “civilize” and convert them to Christianity. Francis Bond Head in contrast – heavily 
influenced by Romanticism – viewed First Nations people as noble savages, whose pristine 
“natural” way of life needed to be preserved by removal from the path of a malevolent 
“civilization.” Yet like Cass, who had by 1830 disavowed the possibility of “civilizing” and 
Christianizing American Indians, Head also framed the need for removal as a moral imperative.  
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Though these men each based their justifications on ostensibly different ideologies, they 
nevertheless all supported removal policies as a way to discharge what they defined as their 
respective regime’s “moral” duty towards the indigenous peoples whose homelands lay in the 
path of U.S. or British expansion. While in reality, these instances of expansion represented 
human-made acts of territorial appropriation, these men – like many other U.S. and British 
commentators at the time – represented them as the predestined and inevitable spread of 
“civilization.” For these men, “civilization” referred to their self-defined view of their own 
society as the epitome of a progressive modernity. They presented removal as a way of 
discharging their moral duty to indigenous people, who would otherwise be swept aside by the 
inevitable and unstoppable march of advancing “civilization.” As La Trobe wrote in The 
Rambler in North America, the Jackson administration’s removal policy apparently represented 
the benevolent policy of a government towards a people facing an obvious and imminent 
demise.8 
In one sense, such appeals to morality and inevitability can be understood as covers for 
what were actually starkly coercive and malign policies. While all these men represented 
removal as an ultimately benevolent plan, their policies not only attempted to justify extensive 
territorial dispossession, they also projected segregationist visions that aimed to severely restrict 
the spaces of indigenous people’s residence and movement. At their core, moreover, they held 
the intensely ethnocentric supremacist presumption that U.S. or British officials had both the 
right and duty to dictate indigenous peoples’ futures. Such a presumption necessarily involved 
large-scale denials of indigenous peoples’ political personhood and sovereign claims to their 
lands. Even in North America, where U.S. and British governments at least to some extent 
implicitly recognized indigenous peoples’ sovereignty and political personhood through the 
                                                
8 Latrobe, Rambler in North America, 1: 130. 
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enactment of land-surrender treaties, treaty making nevertheless became part of their intensified 
coercive efforts to extinguish Native peoples’ land title and to control their movements.9 
 Yet the writings and governing activities of these five white men reveal that their appeals 
to morality did not merely obscure these violent practices; their discursive constructions of 
morality in fact represented a crucial cultural dynamic that underpinned removal policies. 
Integral to all these men’s discursive and interpersonal treatments of indigenous people was a 
shared brand of paternalist morality. Central to the way they sought to exercise authority, they 
based this paternalism on visions of their own ethno-racial and masculinist difference from the 
indigenous people with whom they interacted and about whom they wrote. Within the scope of 
this self-referential moral order, they could coherently portray as just, necessary, and natural, 
their presumed prerogative to exercise authoritarian control over indigenous peoples. Moreover, 
when expounded as a means to save indigenous peoples from the alleged decay and doom 
inflicted upon them by forces outside human control, these men’s representations of removal 
took the guise of morally righteous and heroic attempts at salvation.  
But underpinning all these appeals nevertheless lay a shared brand of paternalism, which 
manifested in these men’s attempts to subordinate indigenous peoples to their dictates. Through a 
shared paternalist construction of morality they justified, in the name of benevolence, justice, and 
righteous necessity, the expatriation of indigenous peoples and the expropriation of their 
homelands. While to some extent explanations of U.S. and British expansion onto indigenous 
lands in North America and Australia in the 1820s, 30s, and 40s can be explained in terms of 
broad economic and demographic trends, the dynamics of paternalism, shared among those 
exercising authority at the highest levels of U.S. and British administrations, help explain why 
                                                
9 This is not to say that treaties have not made a difference. The lack of treaties in Australia has had huge legal 
ramifications for indigenous peoples in Australia, who cannot, unlike American Indian tribes and First Peoples in 
U.S. and Canada, litigate based on nineteenth-century treaty-recognized resource rights and land title. 
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indigenous peoples in locations as remote and dissimilar as southeastern Australia and the Great 
Lakes region of North America faced such similar patterns of subjugation. 
 
Morality and “the Tide of Emigration” 
 
 In their justifications for removal, these five men referenced a trope – commonly 
expounded in the nineteenth-century Anglophone world – that contact between “savage” and 
“civilized” societies inevitably led to the extinction of the “savage” people. As Stephen Conn 
notes about representations of Native Americans in U.S. historical thought, “extinction became 
such a constant and familiar refrain in the literature of the nineteenth century that it is almost not 
worth quoting. It was a conviction, rather than a prediction, and it was such a ubiquitous belief 
that it did not exist so much in the realm of empirical observation as in the world of unquestioned 
assumption.”10 Indeed, commentators often drew on metaphors of nature to convey the 
supposedly unquestionable character of this conviction. In these renderings, U.S. citizens’ and 
British subjects’ expropriation of indigenous homelands became a “wave of civilization” or “tide 
of emigration,” which swept aside “native” peoples as unstoppably as the waves and tides of the 
sea.   
 Such analogies functioned to represent British and U.S. expropriations of indigenous 
peoples’ sovereign territories as something occurring outside human control, and therefore 
unstoppable by human endeavor. The Jacksonian press in the United States, in particular, infused 
reports of the implementation of the government’s Indian removal policy with references to this 
sense of the inevitability of U.S. territorial expansion. For instance, in September 1836 the 
Chicago Democrat reported from Mackinac that over 4,000 Anishinaabeg had assembled on the 
                                                
10 Steven Conn, History's Shadow: Native Americans and Historical Consciousness in the Nineteenth Century  
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). 31. 
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island to ratify the recent Senate changes to the treaty negotiated by their leaders and U.S. 
government agents in Washington. Putting words in the mouth of the Anishinaabeg, the 
Democrat related that “[t]he Indians do not contemplate removing from their old hunting 
grounds without many regrets. They, however, as well as the government, could not but see that 
the tide of emigration was pressing upon them so rapidly, notwithstanding our highly penal laws 
against encroachments by the whites, that either a peaceful cession, or a long continued war and 
their ultimate extirmination [sic], must be the result.”11 According to this account, the assembled 
Ottawas and Ojibwes apparently recognized the futility of resisting the unstoppable “tide of 
emigration” that would imminently be pressing upon them, and thus agreed to “be removed 
farther west where land equally good will be provided an[d] guarantied [sic] to them.” This 
attribution to the Anishinaabeg of an accordant realization of the need to remove westwards was 
more rhetorical flourish than representation of reality. While the Anishinaabeg had a variety of 
reasons for entering into this treaty with the U.S., they did not so neatly correlate with the 
conviction, prevalent in such Anglo-American representations, that some natural “tide of 
emigration” would inevitably doom their existence in Michigan and require their expatriation 
beyond the Mississippi River.12 In fact, the treaty did not require removal, and its Indian 
signatories were never removed. 
 Similarly, many British agents, most of whose politics differed considerably from the 
republican Jacksonians’, referred to the trope that “the Aborigines” in the British settler colonies 
seemed somehow to fade from contact with the expanding British settler society. As Alan Lester 
notes, such representations evinced a “conception of European influence working indirectly 
                                                
11 Chicago Democrat, 17 September 1836. 
12 For a discussion of Ottawa reasons for entering into this agreement, see McClurken, "Ottawa Adaptive Strategies 
to Indian Removal," 31-37. 
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rather than systematically to ‘diminish’ Aborigines.”13 For instance, at the 1836 hearings of the 
House of Commons Aborigines Select Committee – instigated by the Whig M.P. Thomas 
Buxton, leader of the influential “Clapham Sect” of evangelicals – Bishop Broughton, the 
Archdeacon of New South Wales, told of the decimation of indigenous people around the 
colonists’ settlement of Sydney. When asked whether indigenous people had “gradually retired 
before the progress of civilization,” he answered: “I am afraid to say they do not so much retire; 
they seem to me to wear out, from some cause; wherever Europeans meet with them, they appear 
to wear out.”14 Seemingly making an implicit reference to the very real devastation wrought by 
European-transmitted diseases in Australia, Broughton’s “observation” nevertheless projected 
such destruction into the future, as if unseen malevolent forces would, like disease, continue 
inevitably to spread to all facets of indigenous peoples’ existence. He thus articulated his 
conviction “that within a very limited period, those who are very much in contact with 
Europeans will be utterly extinct; I will not say exterminated, but they will be extinct.”15  
Though such depictions attributed indigenous peoples’ (prophesied) doom to contact with 
Europeans or non-native Americans, because they presented this contact as brought about by 
inevitable processes, they rarely questioned the ultimate right of U.S. citizens or British colonists 
to claim or invade indigenous homelands. By framing the alleged doom of indigenous peoples 
and the expropriation of their homelands as part of some natural and unstoppable spread of 
“civilization,” these representations therefore created a discursive moral order in which the 
British and U.S. governments and their people held no general culpability for indigenous 
                                                
13 Alan Lester, "Humanitarians and White Settlers in the Nineteenth Century," in Missions and Empire, ed. Norman 
Etherington (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 73. 
14 Aborigines Select Committee, Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements): Together 
with Minutes of Evidence  (London: House of Commons, 1836). 17. Cited in Aborigines Select Committee, Final 
Report from the Select Committee on Aborigines (British Settlements)  (London: House of Commons, 1837). 10-11. 
See also Lester, "Humanitarians and White Settlers," 73. 
15 Aborigines Select Committee, 1836 Report: 17. Cited in Aborigines Select Committee, 1837 (Final) Report: 10-
11. See also Lester, "Humanitarians and White Settlers," 73. 
 12 
dispossession. Expunged from this discourse was the fact that attempts to dispossess indigenous 
peoples actually involved systematic human exertions. Lewis Cass, Thomas McKenney, Charles 
La Trobe, and Francis Bond Head, in particular, emphasized this trope of inevitability in their 
writings. While they labored hard, as part of their administrative duties, to dispossess indigenous 
peoples of their homelands and abrogate their cultural institutions, in their writings these men 
represented themselves as acting merely in the shadows of forces outside their control. 
 
The Demographics of Inevitability 
 
Reverberations of this trope can easily creep into contemporary historical analyses of 
nineteenth-century U.S. and British territorial expansion. Even with the advantages of hindsight, 
the sheer scope of these nations’ economic and demographic growth can seem to imbue their 
territorial expansion – and the congruent “removal” of indigenous peoples – with a sense of 
inevitability. In his book, Replenishing the Earth: the Settler Revolution and the Rise of the 
Anglo-World, 1783-1939, James Belich brings the long nineteenth-century of U.S. and British 
territorial expansion into a single historical frame, documenting its unprecedented scope. 
Defining the British Isles and the original thirteen U.S. colonies as “two great Anglophone 
settling societies,” Belich describes how, after 1783, these “two Anglo metropolises emitted a 
vast stream of settlers into the American West and the British Dominions or settlement 
colonies.”16 He terms the British Dominions – listed as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
(“with some hesitation”) South Africa – as “a water-linked ‘British West,’” which combined 
with “Old Britain . . . to comprise ‘Great Britain’, the white, un-coerced part of the British 
                                                
16 James Belich, Replenishing the Earth: the Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-world, 1783-1939  
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 57,70. 
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Empire.”17 After 1815, he argues, both British and American “Wests” experienced a series of 
economic booms that fueled, and in turn were fueled by “explosive colonization.”18 Using the 
term “colonization” in this context as “the reproduction of one’s own people through far-
settlement,” he describes this phenomenon not simply as rapid “economic and demographic 
growth and development,” but also as “a process of societal reproduction, territorial expansion, 
and the sweeping aside of precursors, which was often bloody.”19 Belich notes that from 1828, 
Australasia, for instance, “underwent a prodigious bout of explosive colonization,” so that by 
1841, “when the boom ended, the settler population had increased to about 210,000, quadrupling 
in fourteen years.”20 
In this account of Anglophone expansion, the “sweeping aside of [indigenous] 
precursors” seems predominantly to emerge as a phenomenon determined by the forces of boom 
and bust economics detached from human endeavor. Belich attributes this “sweeping aside” to 
the effects of “explosive colonization.” Acknowledging the alternative meaning of the term 
“colonization” as a descriptor for “the subjugation of distant peoples,” he combines the word’s 
two significations by stating that indigenous peoples had previously “all displayed . . . resilience 
and adaptability” to “normal European colonization,” but that “explosive colonization . . . proved 
too much for them.”21 For instance, writing about the “Black War” in Van Diemen’s Land 
(between indigenous peoples and their British invaders), Belich argues that while “[t]here was 
some increase in conflict in 1824-6 . . . real war broke out in 1827 with the beginning of the 
[economic] boom.”22  
                                                
17 Ibid., 70. 
18 Ibid., 177-85. 
19 Ibid., 178-79. 
20 Ibid., 261. 
21 Ibid., 180-81. 
22 Ibid., 274. 
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 While boom and bust economics, with its concurrent fluctuations in the levels of British 
and American demand for land, can no doubt help to explain intensifications and diminutions of 
indigenous-invader conflict over land, it can never fully elucidate the contingencies involved in 
such conflicts. In Van Diemen’s Land, for example, though the colonist-created documentary 
archives record an increase in the intensity of conflict from 1827 to 1831, by this time most of 
the island’s indigenous people had been killed. As James Boyce notes, “[t]he 12-volume 
collection of Colonial Secretary Office records pertaining to Aborigines, first collated on the 
orders of [George] Arthur, largely relates to this time. Furthermore, it was not until martial law 
was declared in late 1828 – effectively providing legal immunity for killing Aborigines – that 
much of the killing began to be reported.”23 Although, in colonist-defined terms, the “real war” 
broke out in 1827, given the ongoing nature of the dispute and the huge number of previous 
deaths, it is highly disputable whether the indigenous people would have seen 1827 as a turning 
point for a more “real” conflict. While tracking the peaks and troughs of boom and bust 
economics might help identify broad trends, such an approach can therefore obscure a complex 
array of local contingencies. Moreover, in the example of Van Diemen’s Land, although greater 
colonial demand for land occurred in the context of an economic boom, this does not explain 
how and why the British administration ultimately adopted a policy “to remove” the surviving 
indigenous people from the island at the end of the war. 
 Similarly, literature on “settler colonialism,” though useful, also tends to explain U.S. and 
British expansion in broad sweeps, and thus to infuse it with a similar sense of inevitability. Like 
Belich’s analysis, this category provides a way to bring within a single analytical frame the 
                                                
23 James Boyce, Van Diemen's Land  (Melbourne: Black Inc., 2010). 196. For works treatments of this conflict see 
N.J.B. Plomley, The Aboriginal / Settler Clash in Van Diemen's Land, 1803-1831  (Hobart: Queen Victoria Museum 
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seemingly similar phenomena of large numbers of people spreading to distant lands and 
subordinating erstwhile distant indigenous peoples. From the perspective of generalized accounts 
of “settler colonialism,” removal can be understood as the discursively logical endpoint of 
European and Euro-American systemic expropriations of indigenous land. For example, 
Australian historian Patrick Wolfe – a major proponent of the idea of settler colonialism – 
identifies a common impulse in settler societies which he labels the “logic of elimination”; the 
connecting thread of cultural logic underlying the attempts of the colonizers “to replace 
indigenous society with that imported by the colonisers.”24 Yet theorists of settler colonialism 
tend to overemphasize similarities in the structures of settler-colonial power in different 
locations, and thus oversimplify or misread the significance of local contingencies. For instance, 
in order to emphasize similarities, Wolfe reads Cherokee removal in the 1830s as resulting from 
the agency of “not some state instrumentality but irregular, greed-crazed invaders who had no 
intention of allowing the formalities of federal law to impede their access to the riches available 
in, under, and on Indian soil.”25 In emphasizing the direct role of frontier settlers in indigenous 
dispossession, such accounts tend to posit agency onto a collective and seemingly unstoppable 
land-hungry mass, without close attention to the political and cultural context in which these 
dispossessions occurred.  
 In focusing on the writings and governing activities of five white men, I have chosen to 
track more closely the human dimensions of indigenous dispossession in the 1820s, 30s, and 40s, 
specifically that overtly labeled “removal.” These five men all consciously reflected on how and 
                                                
24 Patrick Wolfe, "Nation and Miscegenation: Discursive Continuity in the Post-Mabo Era," Social Analysis, no. 36 
(1994): 93,96. See also Veracini, Settler Colonialism; Patrick Wolfe, Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of 
Anthropology: The Politics and Poetics of an Ethnographic Event  (London and New York: Cassell, 1999); Patrick 
Wolfe, "Land, Labor, and Difference: Elementary Structures of Race," American Historical Review 106, no. 3 
(2001). 
25 Patrick Wolfe, "Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native," Journal of Genocide Research 8, no. 4 
(2006): 391. 
 16 
why they believed it necessary “to remove” indigenous peoples from their homelands. Their 
stories – along with those of the indigenous peoples whom they wrote about, interacted with, and 
attempted to subjugate – provide windows into more contingent narratives about how and why 
the starkly segregationist and subordinating impulses of “removal” could be portrayed as both 
necessary and just, and also into the actual outcomes of attempts to impose these policies. This is 
not a “top down” history, which assumes that the dictates of these U.S. and British government 
officials controlled the course of events. Indeed, for all the stark and dehumanizing implications 
of these men’s policies, indigenous people – as individuals and sovereign peoples – continued to 
act according to their own political and cultural imperatives, albeit amidst intensifying webs of 
British or U.S. coercion. While the five white men did not have mythical powers to control the 
course of history, they nevertheless had considerable military and economic resources at their 
disposal. They were, moreover, part of the larger movements identified by scholars such as 
Belich, whose work highlights the massive demographic and economic scope of the expansion 
that these men, in their administrative capacities, were responsible for overseeing. But their 
stories also act as a reminder that behind these movements lay human endeavor, including the 
cultural work necessary to maintain supremacist systems of human subjugation as if they 




Implicit in these men’s representations of U.S. or British territorial expansion as the 
inevitable spread of civilization was the invocation of the term “civilization” as a casual (and 
vague) descriptor of the make-up of U.S. and British societies. Contrasted against what they 
defined as indigenous peoples’ undeveloped or natural state of “savagery,” “civilization” 
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represented the epitome of an advanced modernity. Religious men with (what would become 
known as) humanitarian sensibilities, such as George Arthur, Charles La Trobe, and Thomas 
McKenney, believed that representatives of British or American “civilization” had a duty to 
spread the blessings of Christianity and “civilized” manners to the “native” people in contact 
with their expanding societies. Francis Bond Head, in contrast, saw “civilization” as a 
malevolent force, and believed that any contact with agents of “civilization” – including 
missionaries aiming “to civilize” and Christianize – inevitably doomed the (so-called) pristine 
and noble “savage man” to extinction.26 Although abhorring such Rousseauian sensibilities, even 
modified as they were by romantic doom, Lewis Cass by 1830 shared Head’s (later) assessment 
that it was impossible “to civilize” American Indians, conjuring a discursive “Indian character” 
that was inherently immune to the (self-proclaimed) benefits of “civilization.”27 These men 
therefore constructed indigenous peoples’ difference in a dichotomous opposition to the 
apparently self-evident characteristics of their own “civilized” society.  
 In both the United States and Britain (and its settler colonies), proponents of “civilizing” 
and Christianizing indigenous people represented their policy as the humane alternative to 
avaricious policies such as “removal” or the prevailing ad hoc, and often-violent practices 
involved in settler-led colonization. In the early republic U.S., Thomas Jefferson had envisioned 
that as his idealized republic of yeomanry expanded westwards onto ever-more Native American 
lands, the American Indians would themselves become “civilized” independent farmers and 
assimilate into the U.S. polity. Jefferson even suggested that those who preferred to continue a 
hunting-based economy could move to the west of the Mississippi, to the recently acquired lands 
                                                
26 See, for example, Francis Bond Head, "The Red Man," Quarterly Review 66(1840). For a discussion of Head’s 
romantic views see Theodore Binnema and Kevin Hutchings, "The Emigrant and the Noble Savage: Sir Francis 
Bond Head's Romantic Approach to Aboriginal Policy in Upper Canada, 1836-1838," Journal of Canadian Studies 
39, no. 1 (2005). 
27 Lewis Cass, "Removal of the Indians," North American Review 30, no. 1 (1830). 
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of the Louisiana Purchase (1803) – and that any whites in that territory could relocate to the 
eastern states.28 When former Jeffersonians such as Jackson and Cass proclaimed the (now) 
apparent impossibility of “civilizing the Indians” in their present locations, their pronouncements 
coincided with appeals of U.S. citizens, most loudly in the Southern states, to completely 
“remove” Indian nations from within the borders of the states. Although both Presidents James 
Monroe and John Quincy Adams had supported “removal” policies (which Thomas McKenney 
attempted to implement in the late 1820s), in its Jacksonian guise as a congressionally enacted 
law, the policy met with huge opposition, not only from American Indians, but also from a vocal 
coalition of non-Native evangelical Christians. These “antiremovalists” argued that the 
government should both honor its treaty commitments to American Indian nations, and continue 
its policy “to civilize” and Christianize American Indian peoples.29  In the context of this 
political struggle, the lines of battle in the non-Native political arena were drawn between those 
who wanted a policy aimed at “civilizing” Native Americans in their current locations, and those 
who wanted all the eastern peoples “to remove” west of the Mississippi river. McKenney, who 
continued to support removal as an integral component of a broader “civilization” policy, was a 
notable outlier in a political landscape marked by a removal-civilization dichotomy. 
 In Britain, an apparently dichotomous political divide also marked discussions, 
precipitated by evangelical Christians, regarding the administration of the settler colonies. On 
one side were the evangelical Christians who wanted to treat “the Aborigines” more humanely 
by civilizing and Christianizing them, and on the other were the apparently materially-driven 
                                                
28 Conn, History's Shadow: 31; Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resistance: the North American Indian Struggle 
for Unity, 1745-1815  (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). 117-22; Anthony F. C. Wallace, Jefferson 
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29 Jeremiah Evarts and Francis Paul Prucha, Cherokee Removal: the "William Penn" Essays and Other Writings  
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1981); Satz, American Indian Policy: 13-14. 
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settlers, from whose abuse the humanitarians wanted to protect the colonies’ indigenous 
people.30 Alan Lester, for instance, notes that, “apart from the anti-slavery movement, the most 
celebrated struggles between missions and secular forces were fought from the late 1820s to the 
mid-1840s, when missionaries and their allies posed their model of Christian humanitarian 
imperialism as an alternative to the practices prevailing in the settler colonies.”31 Mobilizing 
predominantly in protest to British actions in the Cape, the humanitarian’s efforts included the 
hearings of the Aborigines Select Committee, and its final report, which “supplied the definitive 
humanitarian, missionary-informed, analysis of the evils of settler-led colonialism.”32 The report 
thus articulated these humanitarians’ absolute commitment to the idea that the British held a duty 
to bring Christianity and civilization to all those who came with the reach of their expanding 
empire. 
 These dichotomies between the (self-proclaimed) more humane policy of “civilizing” and 
Christianizing indigenous people, and other apparently more venally inspired policies, such as 
removal, marked a partisan divide within the political contexts in which they arose. Yet focusing 
only on the differences between these policies can obscure the fact that similar presumptions 
underpinned both. Even those who mooted questions about the morality of expropriating 
indigenous lands – for instance the evangelicals involved in the British Aborigines Select 
Committee or the American proto-Whigs who supported Cherokee national sovereignty – still 
assumed that virtuous agents of “civilization” (be they either British colonists or U.S. citizens) 
needed to guide and tutor indigenous people. Indeed, evangelical humanitarians often proclaimed 
                                                
30 See Zoë Laidlaw, "'Aunt Anna's Report': The Buxton Women and the Aborigines Select Committee, 1835-37," 
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 32, no. 2 (2004); Zoë Laidlaw, Colonial Connections, 1815-
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this civilizing mission as the only hope to save indigenous people from the doom apparently 
unleashed by settler-colonial expansion. And though in certain circumstances they spoke out 
against settler violence towards indigenous people and the wholesale expropriations of 
indigenous lands, they nevertheless presumed – albeit to varying degrees – that British colonists 
or U.S. citizens, as representatives of “civilization,” had a right and duty to enter indigenous 
homelands and dictate indigenous peoples’ movements and lifestyle. Moreover, their 
presupposed alternatives of salvation through civilization, or death threw extinction, left little 
conceptual space for indigenous people as separate political actors, with rights to control their 
own destinies outside the adoption of “civilization” and conversion to Christianity.  
 As the stories of George Arthur, Charles La Trobe, and Thomas McKenney also 
highlight, a commitment to this brand of humanitarianism did not preclude either the concurrent 
promotion or adoption of removal policies. As practiced by these men, the policies were 
mutually constitutive. The arenas of partisan politics nevertheless make up part of their stories. 
In the United States, McKenney – in contrast to Lewis Cass – attempted to navigate what he saw 
as a moderate political position in the polarized controversy over the Indian Removal Bill. Cass 
instead threw his full support behind the Jackson administration; his pronouncements therefore 
fell cleanly on the Democratic side of the nascent U.S. second party system’s formal political 
divide. In the sphere of British governmental politics, Francis Bond Head’s views on Indian 
policy fell outside the administrative mainstream. But it was not his advocacy of removal per se 
that made him such an outlier. In the years before Head’s arrival in Upper Canada, Indian 
Department officials had mooted a plan to remove the Province’s First Peoples to Manitoulin 
Island as part of their broader civilization policy. Head’s promotion of removal caused 
controversy because he justified it by appealing to Romantic views ostensibly incommensurable 
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with the prevailing humanitarian commitments of the colonial office. Although for Head, as for 
Cass, removal represented a marked retreat from civilization policies, for both Arthur and La 
Trobe – whose views were more in harmony with those of the colonial office – as well as for 
McKenney, removal policies did not represent a dichotomous alternative to their declared 
civilizing mission. 
These latter men never precisely delineated the characteristics of “civilization” that 
indigenous people needed to assume to become “civilized”; their writings instead generally 
presumed that, beyond vague descriptions of indigenous people becoming sober, settled, farmers, 
such practicalities were self-evident. When they mobilized the term however, they generally 
implied that by transforming into “civilized” Christians, indigenous people would become docile 
and controllable members of British or American society. But as Charles La Trobe by 1848 came 
to realize, the civilizing mission he and others espoused was founded on the presumption that 
“the Aboriginal Natives” would submit to British guidance. While La Trobe by then viewed this 
presumption as the “main error” of “schemes devised at a distance for the protection and 
reclamation of the Aborigines,” he nevertheless foresaw no other possible future for indigenous 
people than to become “civilized” Christians.33 Similarly, at the height of the removal crisis in 
the United States, Thomas McKenney had been unable to image a future for U.S.-Indian 
relations other than one in which American Indians “voluntarily” followed the dictates of their 
benevolent American “fathers” and removed west of the Mississippi where, away from 
malevolent forces, they could continue along the path to becoming “civilized” Christians.  
Like George Arthur, McKenney and La Trobe had held a dream that indigenous people 
would reinvent themselves to conform to their image of what it meant to be fully human; in other 
words, to become “civilized” Christians. For these men of deep religious conviction, such hopes 
                                                
33 La Trobe to Edward Deas Thomson, 18 November 1848, PROV, VPRS 16, Unit 6, File 48/1148. 
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were similar to the “missionary dream” that Catherine Hall describes in the context of the post-
emancipation British Caribbean, whereby missionaries imagined that manumitted slaves would 
present themselves as a docile labor force and congregation; “a dream which,” Hall writes, 
“fragmented as the missionaries came to realize, to a greater or lesser extent, that they could not 
control the destinies of others.”34 In contrast to the post-abolition British Caribbean, these men 
never established exact economic schemas for indigenous peoples’ “civilized” lives. Yet during 
their respective governmental tenures they would similarly be reminded that they were not in 
control of indigenous peoples’ destinies. Their committed effort to keep trying, nevertheless, 
contributed greatly to the invasive regimes of coercion that indigenous peoples faced. For 
underpinning all these men’s policies towards indigenous peoples – which includes the three 
committed to the civilizing mission as much as the two who disavowed it – was the same 
paternalistic presumption: that U.S. or British agents had the right to shape indigenous peoples’ 
present and future existence. 
For indigenous peoples, partaking in “civilization” did not, of course, mean what men 
such as Arthur, La Trobe, and McKenney intended. In North America in particular, nations chose 
to adopt so-called “civilized” lifestyles as, amongst other factors, a way to control their own 
destinies and continue to exist as sovereign peoples. As Tiya Miles shows in The Ties that Bind, 
from the late eighteenth century some people in the Cherokee Nation began to adopt so-called 
“civilized” ways, including holding slaves, not to assimilate into the U.S. population, but to 
buttress their nation’s sovereign independence in the face of American encroachments.35 
Similarly, Catholic Ottawas in Michigan, and their kin who moved to Wikwemikong on 
Manitoulin Island (on the British side), chose to adopt the general form of “civilized” life – in 
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settled villages, with men undertaking farm labor – as part of their plans for their futures.36 
Ojibwe leaders in Upper Canada, most notably the Methodist ministers Kahkewaquonaby (Peter 
Jones) and Shahwundais (John Sunday), also adopted the appearance of a “civilized” life. Like 
the Cherokees, this was not, as men such as Jefferson had intended, about assimilating into the 
invading American or British societies. For these people, adopting the trappings of so-called 
“civilization” never implied forfeiting their sovereign independence.  
 But as the Cherokees found out, adopting “civilized” trappings did not ensure that their 
sovereign independence would be respected. While their non-Native evangelical allies partly 
supported their resistance to removal on the basis of Cherokee “civilization” and Christianity, 
men such as Cass and McKenney denied that that any of the southeastern peoples had achieved 
any significant semblance of a “civilized” existence. Indeed, the concept of “civilization” was 
malleable enough to mark indigenous peoples’ difference in a variety of different ways. 
Generally used without reference to any delineated empirical criteria, opinions regarding 
indigenous peoples’ lack of so-called “civilization” could be mobilized, whatever the material or 
political reality, to deny their right of continued existence in their sovereign homelands. In the 
end, the idea of “civilization” was more a mechanism for American or British control than a 
descriptor of any lived reality. 
 
Comparisons, Connections, Law, and Religion 
 
This project is trans-imperial in its scope and both comparative and transnational in its 
methodology. In telling an interconnected story of U.S. and British imperial expansion, this 
narrative identifies important, but hitherto unexplored, inter-imperial connections between the 
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U.S. and British empires. It responds, for instance, to Antoinette Burton’s recent appeal that 
histories of the British empire must begin to take up a “multi-axial approach” that goes beyond 
comparison and seeks “‘actual historical connections and disconnections between different sites 
of empire’ between and across empires, as well as inside the dominant one.”37 Particularly in 
light of the recent disciplinary trend towards “global” history, Burton calls attention to the fact – 
not yet often acknowledged by scholars – that the British empire was always embedded “in a 
world of interdependent trans-colonial footholds, economic concessions, territorialized 
encounters, and ‘international frontiers.’”38 Indeed, by similarly treating the expansionist United 
States as an empire that needs to be understood in a global context, though more limited in range 
than the British, this project takes up the challenge of connecting various sites of empire between 
and across empires. The Great Lakes region of North America, in particular, provides a site of 
analysis from which to highlight U.S. and British imperial power as connected and mutually 
constituted through the circulation of people and information. But in also branching out across 
the Pacific to sites in Australia, this project also shows the more global reach of trans-imperial 
connections. 
Methodologically, this project is comparative in sense that it moves between some very 
different contexts, where similar patterns of colonial subjugation emerge. Chapter One, for 
instance, begins in Van Diemen’s Land, where George Arthur attempted to ameliorate the 
escalating indigenous-colonist conflict by “conciliating” the island’s indigenous peoples with 
“benevolence” and subjection to the English common law. The narrative then moves to the 
western Great Lakes where, during the same years, American Indian peoples in the western 
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Great Lakes faced American efforts, mostly made by Lewis Cass, to bring them within the 
jurisdiction of U.S. law for violent crimes against non-Indian “U.S. citizens.” Other themes 
emerge in the ensuing chapters as a result of bringing different locations into a single historical 
frame, such as the importance of diplomacy and diplomatic missteps – not just in North America 
but also in Van Diemen’s Land and the Port Phillip district of New South Wales – as well as the 
fundamental importance of evangelical Christianity for these men’s restrictive projections 
regarding indigenous peoples’ futures. In another example, while all five men justified removal 
policies (at least partly) on the basis of the alleged “moral” dangers faced by indigenous peoples 
from contact with “civilization,” the stories of Arthur, Thomas McKenney, Charles La Trobe, 
and Francis Bond Head all reveal instances that suggest more personal, ego-centric reasons – 
centering on their understandings of their own masculinity – for why they advocated for such a 
starkly segregationist policy. But given the variety of different local contingencies within which 
these men operated, this comparative approach never assumes that the material effects of these 
men’s efforts were the same. This project instead uses a comparative framework to explore the 
possibilities that emerge when reading dynamics in light of conjectured global patterns of Anglo-
American imperial designs.  
 Within a narrative told around the stories of five men, such patterns nevertheless emerge 
within webs or networks of connections. This project therefore takes up a transnational 
methodological approach in the sense that it explains similarities by following people and ideas 
that move across national or imperial borders. The theoretical framework owes much to recent 
scholarship in the humanities and social sciences that has sought subjects of study beyond the 
confines of national boundaries, particularly histories of the British empire that represent 
imperial power as constituted through “webs” or “networks” of people, ideas, and 
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commodities.39 Tony Ballantyne, for example, conceives of “the British empire as a ‘bundle of 
relationships that brought disparate regions, communities and individuals into contact through 
systems of mobility and exchange.”40 Indeed, many examples of such circulations and 
connections emerge within the spaces of the British empire touched on by this project. The most 
prominent example is George Arthur who, in his career with the colonial office, circulated 
through London to posts in British Honduras, Van Diemen’s Land, Upper Canada, and Bombay. 
Though Francis Bond Head and Charles La Trobe did not have as highly exalted careers in the 
colonial service, like Arthur they had connections to networks of patronage, family, and 
friendship, as did the many others, such as Methodist and Moravian missionaries, with whom 
they crossed paths. Following the movements of these people and their ideas highlights what 
other scholars have noted: that British constituted their imperial power through interconnected 
webs or networks. 
In addition to these intra-imperial links, connections and exchange also existed between 
British and U.S. agents. Charles La Trobe – a prime example of someone involved in this 
cultural exchange – travelled through North American in 1832 and 1833. In the context of this 
project, his travels through Indian Country are particularly revealing in light of his subsequent 
indigenous policy as a British colonial official in New South Wales. The U.S.-British defined 
frontier zone or “borderlands” of the North American Great Lakes region is another crucial site 
that connected U.S. and British agents. American Indian and First Nations people’s constant 
movement across this border (which they had not been part of creating), in particular, made this a 
zone of interconnected Native, British, and American diplomacy. Moreover, the U.S-British 
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proximity meant that each government formulated its Indian policy – at least to some extent – 
taking into account either the other’s policy or its perception of the other’s policy. For instance, 
while governor of Michigan Territory, Lewis Cass formulated his Indian policy in light of the 
British in Upper Canada and his perception of the threat of their influence over the peoples in the 
region.41 And during Head’s and Arthur’s tenures as lieutenant governors of Upper Canada, they 
oversaw Indian policy regarding the delivery of presents to “visiting Indians” from the U.S. side, 
and – particularly in Arthur’s case – dealt with the regional impact of the U.S. government’s 
removal policy.  
 This project could also not have been conceptualized without scholarship that 
interrogates the mechanisms of colonial or imperial power.42 In line with such work, I consider 
British and American law, for example, as culturally specific sets of practices, and as instruments 
through which British and American agents sought to subjugate indigenous peoples. As Sally 
Merry highlights in her 1991 review of (then) recent literature on “law and colonialism,” 
European-derived law needs to be conceptualized as an avenue through which colonial agents 
attempted to define and control the people they sought to subjugate.43 My finding that during the 
1820s, colonial officials attempted to bring indigenous people within the ambit of their legal 
institutions, also links to the scholarship of historian Lisa Ford. In her 2010 book, Settler 
Sovereignty: Jurisdiction and Indigenous People in America and Australia, 1788-1836, Ford 
traces and compares legal cultures in the U.S. state of Georgia and the British colony of New 
South Wales, and argues that during the 1820s both the Georgian and New South Wales courts 
                                                
41 See, for instance, Prucha and Carmony, "A Memorandum of Lewis Cass: Concerning a System for the Regulation 
of Indian Affairs." 
42 For example, John Comaroff, "Reflections on the Colonial State, in South Africa and Elsewhere," Social Identities 
4(1998); Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History  (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2005); Greg Dening, Islands and Beaches: Discourse on a Silent Land: Marquesas, 1774-1880  
(Carlton, Vic.: Melbourne University Press, 1980); Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's 
History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things  (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995). 
43 Sally Engle Merry, "Law and Colonialism," Law & Society Review 25, no. 4 (1991). 
 28 
began to define jurisdiction territorially in order to bring indigenous crime within the ambit of 
the settler state and, at the same time, to assert exclusive sovereignty over indigenous peoples’ 
homelands. Ford therefore highlights British and American legal constructs as constitutive 
elements of efforts to dispossess indigenous people.44 Though in the 1820s western Great Lakes 
Native American peoples would ultimately frustrate some of Lewis Cass’s attempts to assert 
jurisdiction over them, his actions – assessed in light of Ford’s findings – nevertheless link to 
broader trends within Anglo-American legal cultures.   
 In making sense of the five men’s motivations and cultural worlds, works that posit the 
centrality of evangelical Christianity to the early nineteenth century have been particularly 
influential. The paternalist attitudes that jump from the pages of the men’s writings about 
indigenous peoples seem particularly infused with the influence of the late eighteenth- and early 
nineteenth-century transatlantic revivals. For instance, in The Age of Atonement, Boyd Hilton 
outlines the fundamental influence of evangelical beliefs on British politics and business in the 
early nineteenth century.45 In particular, the correspondence of George Arthur – who had close 
ties to the influential Clapham Sect, about whom Hilton writes – is saturated with 
pronouncements of his faith in the earthly workings of providence. Some of his letters in the 
aftermath of the “Black Wars” in Van Diemen’s Land, for example, seem barely to conceal a 
worried conscience being prayed away by affirmations of his faith in the Atonement on the 
Cross.46 McKenney, a Methodist, and La Trobe, a Moravian, were similarly deeply influenced by 
their need to reconcile their actions with the demands of their conscience.47 Moreover, U.S. 
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historians have shown, evangelical religion had a huge impact on U.S. society and politics during 
the Jacksonian and antebellum eras, especially in both shaping the growing middle class and 
underpinning some of the crucial political divides of the second party system.48 Even Head and 
Cass, though not religious to the extent of the other three, infused their writings with religious 
language, conveying the sense that they lived in a culture in which providence was everywhere. 
 But most importantly, focusing on the significance of evangelical Christianity during this 
period is a reminder that these men did not inhabit a secular, culturally relativistic world. For 
Arthur, La Trobe, and McKenney, there was only one true and proper path that human beings 
could follow: to live as “civilized” Christians. Though they might have referred to their 
intentions as “benevolent,” such benevolence was confined within the scope of transforming 
indigenous people into their image of humanity. They therefore perceived converting indigenous 
people to Christianity as an imperative duty. Like the less religious Cass and Head, they lived in 
a world of absolutes. In their pronouncements on Indian policy, both Cass and Head 
differentiated Native people from U.S. citizens or British subjects on more overly stark lines. In 
1830, Cass based his claim to paternalist supremacy over American Indians on the basis of their 
alleged inherent incapacities to become “civilized,” while Head based his on a romantic vision of 
a world starkly divided between nature and civilization. Yet the paternalism of Arthur, La Trobe, 
and McKenney – who so earnestly wanted to admit indigenous people into the proper “civilized” 
and Christian body of humanity – was absolutist in the more programmatic sense of aspiring to 
dictate to indigenous people how they lived their lives, and to dispossess them completely of 
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their cultures. Though different in their conceptual makeup, all these paternalisms can be 
understood as making a shared framework for paternalist control, by which these men projected 
a supremacist presumption that U.S. or British agents had the right (and even for most, the duty) 
to control indigenous people’s lives and dictate their futures.  
 A particularly interesting phenomenon occurred when some of these men’s paternalist 
views met with the linguistic metaphors of Great Lakes diplomacy. As Richard White reveals in 
The Middle Ground, from the seventeenth century, peoples in the Great Lakes integrated the 
French (and subsequently the British and Americans) into their political and diplomatic systems 
by extending to their officials the fictive-kin title of “father,” who they viewed as representatives 
of the “Great Father”: the king of France or Britain or, in the case of the U.S., the President.49 
Rather than in any way implying subordination to the will of a patriarch, such a system 
functioned around an indigenous moral economy in which a “father” held duties to treat his 
“Indian children” generously and mercifully. For the literally minded McKenney, however, the 
linguistic conventions of American Indian leaders asking their American “fathers” to pity them 
met with his evangelical Christian sense of paternalism to produce a view of U.S-Indian relations 
as rigidly and necessarily conforming to a strict paternalistic relationship. In McKenney’s view, 
American Indian “children” were thus obliged to follow the benevolent dictates of their 
American “fathers.” Head likewise enjoyed playing the role of “father” to his “Indian children” 
during his short tenure in Upper Canada. Like McKenney, he was never fully aware of the 
cultural meanings behind the First Peoples’ diplomatic conventions, instead interpreting the 
language in line with his own paternalist presumptions. The theater of Great Lakes diplomacy 
therefore provided these men with a stage on which to perform their paternalism. 
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 Indeed, apart from Cass, all the men exhibited a remarkable lack of diplomatic astuteness 
in dealing with indigenous peoples. In a world made up of absolutes, with indigenous people 
conceptually confined within these men’s fixed relational schemas, they either failed fully to 
grasp the metaphoric nature of diplomatic conventions (in North America), or even to recognize 
the need to deal with indigenous people under the auspices of official diplomacy (in Australia). 
While Cass used his grasp of Great Lakes diplomatic protocols to maneuver American Indian 
peoples into submitting to U.S. jurisdiction in the 1820s, the politically naïve McKenney took 
the Great Lakes conventions literally, with disastrous consequences, for example, on a mission to 
the more southern Creek nation in 1827.50 And while Cass machinated in North America, 
Arthur’s failure to recognize an indigenous diplomatic mission to Hobart no doubt contributed to 
the escalation of the indigenous-colonist conflict in Van Diemen’s Land. La Trobe would make 
similar diplomatic missteps in Port Phillip in the late 1830s and early 1840s. All these men – 
apart from Cass, whose pronouncements always contained strong suggestions of reactive (and 
perfomative) realpolitik – continued to hold remarkably entrenched and limited views about the 
indigenous people with whom they interacted. Confined within the scope of their paternalist 
relational schemas, these men seem to have been remarkably incapable of viewing indigenous 





My first chapter explores American efforts in the Great Lakes in the 1820s, and 
simultaneous British attempts in Van Diemen’s Land to impose legal jurisdiction over 
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indigenous people, and the consequent push back from indigenous people, who asserted different 
legal cultures. In chapter two I focus on rituals and ceremonies held in the late 1820s in the Great 
Lakes, showing a shift in both British and American Indian policy towards a new brand of 
paternalism. In chapter three I draw out the meanings of specific encounters between the officials 
and indigenous people, highlighting instances of perceived moral danger, which these American 
and British men curiously failed to focus on explicitly, even as they advocated for removal as the 
solution to a so-called “moral problem.” In chapter four I focus on the discursive logic these 
removal proponents created through their explicit advocacy for removal policies. My fifth 
chapter highlights the removalist underpinnings of British protectionism in the 1830s and 1840s. 
And finally, in chapter six, I tell a transnational history of indigenous removal in North America, 




Chapter One   




 In 1821, the Ho-Chunk leader Nawkaw Carimine travelled south from his village at Big 
Green Lake (between Green Bay and the Portage, in present day Wisconsin) to attend the Circuit 
Court in Belleville, Illinois, where two young Ho-Chunk men stood trial, charged with the 
murder of two American soldiers on Rock Island in 1820. Following the prescribed procedures 
and rules of evidence of the U.S. justice system, the court found the men guilty and sentenced 
them to death. Having witnessed the court proceedings against the two young men from his 
nation, who were dangerously emaciated after a year of incarceration in an American jail without 
enough food and water, Carimine condemned the entire process. Addressing the court after the 
verdict, Carimine concluded, “I came here to see justice, but I find none.” One of the men died 
before the date of execution. The other was scheduled for execution on 21 July 1821.51 
In 1825, approximately 10,000 miles away in the British penal colony of Van Diemen’s 
Land, the British administration executed two indigenous men for murder. Musquito – originally 
from the Australian mainland – and Black Jack, a local man, were part of a group who had 
carried out raids on settler homesteads, as conflict intensified between indigenous people and the 
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settlers who were invading a corridor of their land north of the main settlement town of Hobart. 
The previous year’s arrival of the colony’s new lieutenant governor George Arthur had coincided 
with the escalation of the conflict. Arthur hoped that the execution of Musquito and Black Jack 
would act as a deterrent to other indigenous peoples and therefore curb the “depredations” 
against the settlers. Arthur was not a savvy politician in this regard. The condemned Musquito 
saw the folly of British attempts to use his and Black Jack’s execution as an example. After his 
sentence, Musquito reportedly told his jailor Mr. Bisdee that “[h]anging no good for black fellow 
. . . Very good for white fellow, for he used to it.”52 In this statement Musquito not only denied 
the legitimacy of his subjection to British law, he also seemingly questioned the utility of using 
the public spectacle of execution as a means of imposing the colonists’ notions of law and order 
on those who saw themselves as outside that system. Though executions might make the “white 
fellow” conform to the edicts of the British law, this was only because it was something they 
were “used to.” It would not work in the same way on the “black fellow” who was not 
accustomed to these rituals of justice. 
 Though these executions occurred in geographically disparate locations, under two 
different occupying forces, they nevertheless highlight similar dynamics. Both occurred in the 
context of expansionist Anglophone societies, and in response to the problem of how to deal with 
the violence of so-called “native” people living in territory either being settled, or earmarked for 
settlement. Although Illinois – where the killings that lead to the Belleville trial took place – had 
achieved statehood in 1818, it was, like the Michigan Territory, very much part of the 
contemporaneous United States “West.” A similar “British West” of settler expansion lay across 
the border to the north in Upper Canada. Moreover, in addition to the territories in British North 
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America, as Jamie Belich states, by the late eighteenth century the “schizoid British West had 
another branch.”53 In 1788 and 1803 respectively, the British had founded the penal colonies of 
New South Wales, on the eastern seaboard of the Australian continent, and Van Diemen’s Land - 
the present-day island of Tasmania – lying off the southeast corner of the same continent.54 By 
the early 1820s, the population of both these Australasian colonies was beginning to experience 
significant growth, with the emigration of free settlers from the British Isles supplementing the 
population of prisoners and freed prisoners.  
 During the 1820s, at both these sites, colonial officials attempted to bring indigenous 
people within the ambit of their legal institutions. In Van Diemen’s Land, the British passed and 
carried out the death sentence on four indigenous men, including Musquito and Black Jack.  In 
the Great Lakes area, U.S. officials had, for a time, some success bringing Native Americans to 
trial for violence against non-Indians, including passing the death sentence on at least four men. 
Though U.S. government agents in the Great Lakes region needed to pay heed to the still 
pervasive diplomatic conventions of the region, they managed, in some cases, to maneuver to 
bring Native American people within the full ambit of the federal legal system. Before the 1821 
Belleville trial, for instance, the Ho-Chunks had surrendered the two men to the U.S. as part of 
diplomatic negotiations. Carimine’s outrage at the trial suggests that the treatment his 
countrymen received at the hands of the Americans did not adhere to the terms under which the 
Ho-Chunk leaders had agreed to the surrender. 
Though not part of the surrender negotiations in the Belleville case, Cass at this time was 
involved in similar cases. Returning from a treaty council in 1821, he had to decide whether to 
pardon two Native American men – a Menominee man named Kewabiskim, and an Ojibwe man 
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named Ketauka – who had been sentenced to death after each being convicted of murder. In 
deciding whether to issue an executive pardon, Cass considered issues relating to security, as 
well as the legal issues raised in Kewabiskim and Ketauka’s cases. In terms of security, Cass 
worried that British officials would use the executions to incite Native American violence 
against U.S. citizens. In terms of legal questions, he considered whether malice aforethought 
should be required in the case of “savages” charged with murder. Ultimately however, Cass 
found neither consideration persuasive enough to grant mercy, deciding that the evidence was 
too clear to allow for executive interference and that the law should be allowed to take its 
course.55 Both men were executed by the U.S. regime in Detroit at the end of December 1821. 
In his 1826 North American Review article on the “Manners and Customs of the Several 
Indian Tribes,” Cass mentioned the Belleville trial as an example of what he described as the 
general characteristic of Indians to gallantly surrender after committing an act of “murder.” 
Though he did not mention either Ketauka or Kewabiskim, he did mention a case that had, at the 
time he drafted the article, come to occupy a central concern in his diplomatic dealings with the 
Ojibwes, that of the seven Ojibwe men accused of killing U.S. citizens on the shores of Lake 
Pepin in 1824. In his article Cass wrote about Native American surrenders as if they were a 
convenient behavioral facet of the “Indian character,” which would aid these peoples’ inevitable 
subjection to U.S. legal jurisdiction and control. Yet as shown by the difficulties he experienced 
in bringing the Lake Pepin seven within the ambit of this justice system, while Cass publically 
proclaimed the inevitable supremacy of U.S. institutions and practices over the Michigan 
Territory, forcing Native American people to surrender to the jurisdiction of the U.S. law 
required intensive diplomatic efforts. Despite his attempts to display to the Lake Superior 
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Ojibwes the apparent might of the U.S. government through staged military displays, Cass’s 
inability to bring the Lac du Flambeau Ojibwes within the reach of U.S. jurisdiction instead 
highlighted that – in spite of earlier successes closer to the western shores of Lake Michigan – 
U.S. sovereignty in the western Great Lakes was more imaged than real.56  
 From the earliest days of his tenure as Michigan territorial governor, Cass had a strong – 
albeit disapproving – comprehension of the diplomatic culture of the Great Lakes and the rituals 
that had cemented the alliance between the British and their Indian allies in the War of 1812. 
Similarly, no British official posted to the Canadas who had even cursory dealings with First 
Peoples could be ignorant of these obligations. Yet such was not necessarily the case in dealings 
with the “natives” in other parts of the British Empire. For instance, when Arthur arrived in Van 
Diemen’s Land in May 1824, he came armed only with the best of benevolent intentions towards 
the “Native Aborigines,” without any conception that he may need to court them diplomatically. 
As an evangelical Anglican, Arthur felt a strong sense of duty to redeem the “natives” from their 
so-called “savage” state and to reveal to them the light of Christianity. This program left no room 
for viewing indigenous people as diplomatic emissaries.   
 For Arthur, as for Cass, the common law was the necessary arbiter of justice in cases of 
violence between the “natives” and non-natives. While for Arthur, this presumption was based 
on an utter failure to recognize the need to enter into diplomatic relations with indigenous 
people, Cass and other U.S. agents in the Great Lakes region used diplomatic methods as part of 
their attempts to bring Native Americans within the jurisdiction of the U.S. law and the control 
of the U.S. government. In their respective (disparate) locations, these officials therefore 
employed different means aimed at similar ends. They imposed their own laws, which they 
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packaged as a system of universal and natural justice, over incidents of indigenous people’s 
violence towards non-indigenous people. Only these claims to automatic and natural jurisdiction 
could mask the fact that the indigenous men executed in North American and Van Diemen’s 
Land had been hanged by a foreign power, for killing foreign intruders on their land. 
 
Benevolence, Conciliation, and Justice 
 
 In May 1824, George Arthur arrived in Van Diemen’s Land to an atmosphere of growing 
fear among the colonists. The colonists’ consternation related to the activities of a group of 
Oyster Bay people said to be under the control of Musquito, an Aboriginal man from Sydney 
who had taken to the bush after being vilified by the “prisoner population” for the services he 
had rendered the authorities in the capture of the bushranger Michael Howe.57 In the months 
leading up to Arthur’s arrival, violence between the Oyster Bay group and the European invaders 
had resulted in the death of two colonists. Unlike the local newspaper, which blamed Musquito 
and his side-kick Black Jack, the newly arrived lieutenant governor sought a policy of 
conciliation with “the Natives of this Island,” to address the violence he blamed on the settlers. 
In June 1824, he therefore publically proclaimed his administration’s policy of promoting “the 
utmost Forbearance towards the Aborigines,” and appealed “especially to Stock-keepers in their 
several Districts” to treat them “on all Occasions with the utmost Kindness and Compassion.” 
Arthur intended “to support and encourage all measures which may tend to conciliate and 
civilize the Natives of this Island; and to forbid and prevent, and when perpetrated to punish, any 
Ill-treatment towards them.”58 
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Arthur’s apparent belief that the conflict could be solved through the implementation of 
humanitarian ideals made him blind to the diplomatic intent of the Oyster Bay people late that 
year. In early November 1824, a delegation of Oyster Bay people travelled to Hobart Town. 
Most likely the group sought to open diplomatic relations with the government regarding the 
source of the conflict between themselves and the Europeans, such as settler violence and the 
scarcity of food due to the encroachments on their hunting grounds. They most likely also 
intended to negotiate for the release of Musquito and Black Jack, who had been captured early in 
August 1824. Arthur immediately provided the group of sixty or so people with food and 
clothing and on the second night had them conducted to the road men’s hut four miles from 
town.59 However, on the third day the delegation left town, apparently displeased with the 
treatment they had received. Arthur’s benevolent designs did not fit the Oyster Bay people’s 
diplomatic mission.  
In 1824 Arthur seemed only able to view the island’s indigenous peoples as wretched 
natives destined to receive his benevolence and to be redeemed from savagery through 
“civilization” and Christianization. Arthur also had an unswerving faith in the English common 
law as an impartial institution of universal good. During his first three years in Van Diemen’s 
Land, he combined appeals for benevolent conciliation with “the Native Aborigines” with 
attempts to use the common law to ameliorate the escalating conflict between the indigenous 
peoples and the colonists. In this time, Arthur’s administration enacted the death sentence on 
four Aboriginal men, including Musquito and Black Jack. For a time, Arthur’s administration 
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therefore defined indigenous people’s actions as individual criminal acts against the persons and 
property of the colonists.  
  
Arthur’s posting to Van Diemen’s Land in 1824 had provided him with the opportunity to 
build on the humanitarian achievements of his previous post in Honduras. Like the slaves in 
Honduras, Van Diemen’s Land’s convicts and “native” people presented causes through which 
to cultivate God’s moral order. In this, Arthur shared the beliefs and outlook of London’s 
Clapham Sect, an influential group of evangelical moderates who had campaigned for the 1807 
abolition of the slave trade and would, in 1833, achieve the passing of the Slavery Abolition Act 
in the British Parliament. In his previous post as Superintendent of Honduras, Arthur’s efforts on 
behalf of slaves had found him favor with influential members of this group, including William 
Wilberforce, Thomas Fowell Buxton, James Stephen, and Earl Bathurst. Arthur developed his 
convict policy to satisfy these shared humanitarian concerns.60 In an 1828 letter to Wilberforce, 
for example, he concluded his discussion of the Van Diemen’s Land penal system by stating that 
“the result of my experience of these wretched Beings, is – that the Heart is desperately wicked, 
but that even the vilest can be and are occasionally softened & reclaimed.”61 Arthur therefore 
shared beliefs, common among British evangelicals such as members of the Clapham Sect, that 
policies of benevolence should be adopted towards all people, in the hope that they too could be 
brought within a society in which each person lived by the dictates of Providence. 
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When Arthur arrived in Van Diemen’s Land in May 1824, he took up a position as head 
of what he himself would describe as “an extensive Gaol to the Empire.”62 His arrival also 
coincided with the immigration of an increasing number of free settlers to the island. First 
colonized by the British as a penal settlement in 1803, Van Diemen’s Land’s European 
population only began to increase rapidly after 1817. Fueled by an increase in both convict 
transportation, and the beginnings of free migration from the British Isles, the 1817 population of 
3,114 Europeans rose to 12,643 in 1824.63 During this seven year period before Arthur began his 
tenure as Lieutenant-Governor, 4,000 of the European arrivals were free immigrants. By 1830, 
when Arthur was half way through his tenure, the population had reached 23,500, 6,000 of 
whom were free settlers.64 Drawn by the promise of available land with which to realize capital 
investment in the pastoral industry, many of these free immigrants were, like Arthur, former 
military officers from the Napoleonic war, or younger sons of the landed gentry of England, 
Scotland, and Ireland, or sons of Colonial Office officials.65  
Although Arthur was therefore in a sense the head “gaoler” of a penal colony, his arrival 
at a time when Van Diemen’s Land was also growing as a free settlement meant that he had to 
administer a colony with two purposes.66 In a dispatch to Earl Bathurst at the colonial office in 
London in 1826, Arthur noted the duel designation of the colony, stating that “[t]he work of 
regulating a Penal Settlement would be easy were not Your Lordship contemporaneously laying 
the foundation of a free Colony.”67 In order to integrate the two purposes, Arthur built on the 
policy implemented by his predecessor William Sorell and oversaw a system by which convicts 
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worked for “respectable” free settlers, thus providing a source of unpaid labor, and a system of 
master-servant tutelage. The duel designation of the colony therefore allowed Arthur to solve, in 
a practical way, what he saw as the moral problem presented by the existence of convicts.  
The existence of “natives” in Van Diemen’s Land represented a different moral challenge 
to Arthur. He believed he could solve this problem by implementing benevolent policies aimed 
“to conciliate” the island’s indigenous peoples. Arthur’s visions of conciliation were dictated by 
proscribed presumptions about the only possible future for the island’s indigenous peoples: 
Christianization and “civilization.” In the proclamation Arthur issued in June 1824, he attempted 
to co-opt the help of the British population of the island in the implementation of these 
benevolent designs. The proclamation opened with the statement that “it has been represented to 
HIS HONOR the LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR that several setters and others are in the Habit of 
maliciously and wantonly firing at, injuring, and destroying the defenceless NATIVES or 
ABORIGINES.” He appealed “especially to Stock-keepers in their several Districts,” evincing a 
belief that the conflict could be blamed on the immoral conduct of convict and ex-convict stock-
keepers. He appealed to these people to reform their behavior towards the “natives of 
Aborigines” so that they might help the government’s efforts “to conciliate and civilize the 
Natives” of the island.68 
Arthur saw the equal extension of the British law to the “Native Aborigines” as central to 
his policy of benevolence. He viewed the British judicial system as an important vehicle through 
which to administer a just society, believing that it protected those who adhered to its just 
dictates, and punished those who chose to violate them. In his proclamation of 23 June 1824, for 
instance, he stated that “[t]he Natives of this Island being under the Protection of the same Laws 
which protect the Settlers, every Violation of those Laws, in the Person or Property of the 
                                                
68 Arthur, “Proclamation,” 23 June 1824, Hobart Town Gazette, 25 June 1824 & 16 July 1824. 
 43 
Natives, shall be visited with the same Punishment as though committed on the Person or 
Property of any Settler.” Arthur thus used the threat of British justice as a means to gain the 
colonists’ compliance with his plans to “civilize the Natives.” He further stated that anyone 
caught “firing at, killing, or committing any Act or Outrage or Aggression on the Native People . 
. . shall be prosecuted for the same before the Supreme Court.” 
 Arthur published this June 1824 appeal to convict and ex-convict stock-keepers amidst 
the ongoing escalation of violence. The same week that he published the proclamation, Arthur 
received a letter from Charles Rowcroft, a settler on the Clyde River, which stated that “the party 
of natives headed by Musquito a black native of Syndey, continue to infest the district of Murray 
& the parts adjacent.”69 Rowcroft attributed two deaths, three assaults, and the destruction of a 
stock hut to Musquito’s party. These attacks had begun the year before. On 15 November 1823, a 
group of Oyster Bay people, purportedly led by Musquito and Black Jack, had allegedly killed 
two stock-keepers and injured another at Grindstone Bay, and two incidents of death and one of 
assault were reported in the following February, March and April respectively.70 The Hobart 
Town Gazette (“the Gazette”) reported two of these incidents as the death of the stock-keeper 
James Doyle at Blue Hills in March and the servant James Taylor at Old Beach in April, and also 
reported the death of stock-owner Matthew Osborne in July 1824.71 Arthur’s arrival in Van 
Diemen’s Land, and his early articulation concerning his native policy, therefore occurred in the 
context of an increase in the number of confrontations between the Oyster Bay people and their 
European invaders. 
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Like Rowcroft, the Gazette – Hobart’s only newspaper at the time – attributed these 
violent incidents to Musquito, aided by his companion Black Jack.  Musquito in particular came 
to represent the belligerent outsider, whose grievances had led to a life of crime, in which he 
corrupted otherwise innocent and peaceful local people. Transported as a convict to Van 
Diemen’s Land from New South Wales in 1813, Musquito worked for the government as a 
tracker and was instrumental in the apprehension of various notorious bushrangers, though he 
never received the promised repatriation to Sydney for these services.72 According to an early 
historian of Tasmania, “Musquito was instrumental in bringing to justice many of the most 
notorious of the marauders; but no sooner was this accomplished, than the prisoner population 
insulted and jeered him for the services he had rendered the Colony . . . he took to the bush.”73 
Much less is recorded of Black Jack, except that he was native to the island. When the Gazette 
reported on 2 April 1824 that James Taylor had been “speared by the Natives,” they attributed 
the occurrence to the influence of Musquito and Black Jack. The report stated that although 
neither Musquito nor Black Jack were seen with the offending party, “there is reason to believe 
they must have been near the spot, from the circumstances of the Natives having been, with one 
or two instances only excepted, entirely harmless, until these two Blacks have lately appeared 
among them.”74 In blaming the growing conflict on a belligerent outsider and his companion, the 
colonists attributed the unrest to individual criminals with personal grievances. This left open the 
hope that once the colonists arrested Musquito and his side-kick Black Jack, peace would return 
to the district. 
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Yet by the time Musquito had been captured, these hopes had begun to diminish. 
Musquito was arrested in early August 1824 by an Aboriginal teenager named Tegg and an adult 
colonists named Gotfried Hanskey, both members of a pursuit party constituted especially for the 
purpose of Musquito’s capture.75 A week before the capture, the Gazette offered an alternative 
analysis of the causes of the unrest, ascribing the recent “mischievous disposition” of the “poor 
untutored Natives . . . to the unprovoked aggressions that have long since been perpetrated upon 
them by stock-keepers and others;  of which, it appears to us, they are now becoming sensible, 
owing perhaps in a great measure to the knowledge which they must have gained from Musquito 
and other blacks, who have been brought up amongst Europeans, lately joining them.” As Arthur 
had done in June, the Gazette blamed convict stock-keepers for initiating the conflict, asserting 
that the recent deaths of stockmen proved “the imprudence of molesting the Natives, who have 
always been considered the most harmless race of people in the world; and have consequently 
never been known to show their revenge until within these last few months.”76 In October, when 
a group of Oyster Bay people, now without Musquito and Black Jack, attacked the house and 
stock-yard of James Hobbes in York Plains for the second time, the Gazette went even further in 
their analysis of the cause of the conflict: “We are not however surprised that the Eastern 
Marshes should be so much infested, as they form the Natives’ best hunting grounds, from which 
of course, they are anxious to expel the Settlers, by making attacks on their stockmen and 
cattle.”77 
 Although Arthur similarly blamed “lower-class” convict stock-keepers for initiating the 
violence, he did not seem to grasp any such systemic causes of the conflict. Arthur seemed to 
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base his hope for Van Diemen’s Land’s peaceful and prosperous future on the presumption that 
the island’s indigenous peoples should, and would, give up their land as Europeans continued to 
claim it for purposes inconsistent with the co-existence of the indigenous people. For Arthur, the 
fact that groups such as the Oyster Bay people would be unavoidably pushed off their hunting 
grounds through the colonists claiming sole rights to the land did not seem to present itself as an 
underlying problem that undermined his attempts to broker peaceful relations. Rather, Arthur 
seems only to have been able to see the Oyster Bay people’s actions as the natural response of 
“savages” when provoked. The solution, in addition to attempting to reform the behavior of the 
lower-class colonists, was to transform the indigenous people from a “savage” to a “civilized” 
state; to stop them wandering, to make them settle, to teach them industry, and above all, to lead 
them to the truth of Christianity. In 1824 his policy for dealing with the conflict was to proclaim 
the jurisdiction of the English common law over the those “committing any Act of Outrage or 
Aggression on the Native People,” and to extend a benevolent hand towards the indigenous 
people themselves, thus bringing them under the protection of the British crown.78 
 This summation of the state of the conflict, and the extrapolations he therefore made for 
its solution, left Arthur blind to an opening for diplomacy, even when it fell in his lap. As noted 
above, in early November 1824, a week after the second attack on Hobbe’s station, a delegation 
of Oyster Bay people came to Hobart Town, most likely to open diplomatic channels after the 
capture of Musquito and Black Jack. On 5 November, the Gazette reported that “no fewer than 
sixty-four Aborigines came into town on Wednesday, of their own accord, and in a pacific 
manner well calculated to conciliate even those who had been most prejudiced against them. No 
sooner was their approach discovered, than our humane Lieutenant Governor advanced to meet 
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and welcome them.”79Although on their arrival Arthur immediately provided them with food and 
old clothes – as had become the custom in Van Diemen’s Land – for the second night he had 
them conducted to the road men’s hut four miles from town.  On that same day he wrote an order 
requesting “that the utmost Kindness may be manifested towards them, until some Arrangement 
can be made by the Government for providing for their Accommodation, and removing them to 
some proper Establishment.”80 Yet according to the colonist William Parramore, on the third day 
the Aboriginal people “were rather sullen and refused to sing the Kangaroo song, and moved off 
early the next morning.”81 In receiving this group as subjects of his philanthropic native policy, 
Arthur thwarted the delegation’s ability to meet its diplomatic mission, and it seems, caused 
them serious offense.  
Confined within the scope of his “benevolent” intentions, Arthur conceptualized 
conciliation in terms of what he saw as his moral obligation to promote the welfare of an inferior 
“savage” people. In leaving town so quickly, and in making their displeasure known, it appears 
that the Oyster Bay delegation had in some way been insulted by this condescending 
benevolence. Indeed, to a people whose tactics could, and would, continue to jeopardize the 
viability of the pastoral economy, Arthur had taken a seriously miscalculated approach. At the 
height of the “black war” in the late 1820s and early 1830s, the Oyster Bay people helped create 
an atmosphere in which colonists’ well founded fear of attack and death meant that they could 
either stay and defend their property, or abandon it without hope of any return on their 
investment.  
In 1824, Arthur seemed to be only able to view the island’s indigenous peoples as a 
population destined to receive his benevolence. In the days following the delegation’s premature 
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exit from Hobart Town in November 1824, Arthur and other reform-minded Christians held a 
meeting to plan an “Institute for the Civilisation and Instruction of the Aborigines of the Island,” 
which they proclaimed as a “great Cause of Benevolence.”82 The philanthropists ultimately 
failed to follow through with their stated mission, despite deciding on arrangements such as how 
charitable contributions could be made to the institute. Arthur’s attempts to found a native 
institution the following year also failed, with his attentions being taken up by an outbreak of 
crimes committed by convict bushrangers.83 Yet the people who were to be the subjects of their 
charity continued their previous activities. On 24 December 1824, the Gazette reported that “the 
tribe of Aborigines, who recently visited town, and were treated by His HONOR the LIEUTENANT 
GOVERNOR with particular kindness, attempted the other day beyond the Big River to spear a 
poor man that came up with them by chance.”84 Benevolence, it seemed, was not the answer.  
 
The “Common Law of Mankind” 
 
Though the Oyster Bay delegation may have intended to discuss the fate of Musquito and 
Black Jack during their visit to Hobart Town in November 1824, Arthur did not view these men 
as prisoners of war for whom repatriation was possible. Rather, he allowed the colonial judiciary 
to treat both men’s actions as individual crimes to be punished to the full extent of the British 
law; they were tried and hanged. Only once more after these executions would Arthur’s 
administration attempt to fix the “unbending arm of justice” on indigenous people for crimes 
against the British law in Van Diemen’s Land with the 1826 case of Jack and Dick. On the day 
of Jack’s and Dick’s execution, Arthur wrote a public notice, confirming that he would impose 
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the British justice system on all those – both colonist and Aboriginal person – who violated this 
“common law of mankind.” Yet as Musquito had lately been aware, despite Arthur’s 
universalistic claims, the common law was merely the law of the “white fellow,” and would have 
no discernable effect, beyond the infliction of violent deaths by hanging, on the escalating 
conflict. 
Musquito and Black Jack first entered the ambit of the colonists’ legal system in 
December 1824. During his capture Musquito had been shot in the groin by his Aboriginal 
apprehender Tegg.85 He stayed in the Colonial Hospital until 3 September, when he was removed 
to the County Gaol.86 The colonial administration tried both Musquito and Black Jack on 1 Dec 
1824 for the murder of William Hollyoake and Mammoa (a Tahitian servant). Through this 
process, the colonial administration therefore held both men individually accountable for the 
actions of the entire group. At the December trial Musquito was found guilty of being present 
with “divers other persons whose names are as yet unknown . . . at the time of the murder . . . 
aiding helping abetting comforting assisting and maintaining” the murder of Hollyaoke. Black 
Jack, acquitted on this occasion, was tried again on 21 January 1825 for the February 1824 
murder of Patrick Macarty, and was found guilty of aiding and abetting the murder, on the same 
terms as Musquito in the Hollyoake and Mammoa case.87 Though held individually responsible 
for these crimes, the judge’s reports of these trials made it clear that these were not individual 
acts of murder. Similarly, the Gazette’s report of the trial, which included more particulars of the 
alleged crimes, stated, for instance, that Mammoa and Musquito “were at the other side of the 
creek, coming towards the hut; when they came opposite they got over. The other natives were 
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by the hut door, so that now the whole body was assembled.”88 At least on this occasion then, 
Arthur’s administration had managed to fit the escalating conflict – albeit roughly – into the 
pretexts of justice and individual responsibility as defined through the workings of the English 
common law. 
The colonial authorities executed Musquito and Black Jack on the morning of Friday, 25 
February 1825. In the eyes of the crowd of colonists that witnessed the execution, Musquito and 
Black Jack were, on this morning, the unfortunate participants in a well established British ritual 
of justice. They shared the scaffold with six other convicted criminals. When they climbed onto 
the platform they were expected to show humility and express their remorse for their sinful 
crimes, then request the presiding cleric to address the spectators on their behalf. On this 
morning, the Reverend Mr. Bedford, who had been part of the group of philanthropists 
temporarily intent on creating an “Institute for the Civilisation and Instruction of the Aborigines 
of the Island,” addressed the crowd. Bedford stated that the condemned men “entreat in this their 
last hour that you will turn from the error of your ways to the Lord your GOD, for he will have 
mercy. Yes, my brethren, these poor unhappy fellow-worms whose lives have become forfeited 
to the laws of violated justice and humanity, implore you all to shun the path that leads to death – 
to avoid bad company – to be industrious, sober, and slow to anger – to be obedient, honest and 
religious.”89  
On their day of execution, Musquito and Black Jack were even less likely to have 
adhered to these sentiments than their fellow condemned. As we have seen, Musquito saw 
himself as an outsider to the customary law of the “white fellow” under which he would be 
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executed, and did not think that his death would convey a customary example to others, namely 
other “black fellows.”  
 Although the execution of Musquito and Black Jack proved to have no discernable 
deterrent effect, Arthur’s administration again attempted to use colonial legal institutions to deal 
with indigenous people whose actions they viewed as criminal. After the apprehension of 
Musquito and Black Jack, the Oyster Bay and Big River people intensified their raids on stations 
in the settled districts, as colonists continued to attack indigenous groups, destroy native food 
sources and exclude indigenous people from the lands vital to their economy. In April 1826 the 
colonial authorities apprehended two men who allegedly speared the stock-keeper Thomas 
Colley at Oyster Bay the previous month.90 These two men, known as Jack and Dick, were 
charged with the murder of Colley, who had died of his wounds fourteen days after the 
encounter.91 Their case was heard in front of a military jury in the Supreme Court at the end of 
May 1826. Chief Justice Pedder appointed an interpreter and two attorneys to act pro bono for 
the accused, but barred Dick and Jack from giving evidence because, not being Christian, they 
could not take an oath on the Bible.92 Nevertheless, a military jury found them guilty, mostly on 
the evidence of convict stock-keepers, with Jack held to have thrown the spear causing the 
mortal wound, and Dick found guilty of “aiding abetting helping comforting assisting and 
maintaining” Jack in the crime. Despite not being allowed to given evidence because they were 
not Christian, the verdict imbued Jack and Dick’s actions with a decidedly Christian cosmology. 
The court held that both men, “notwithstanding the fear of god before their eyes but being moved 
and seduced by the instigation of the Devil . . . feloniously willfully and of their malice 
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aforethought did kill and Murder” Thomas Colley.93 Chief Justice Pedder sentenced both men to 
death. 
Though at this stage Arthur remained committed to imposing British law on the conflict 
between the colonists and the island’s indigenous people, the trial of Jack and Dick produced a 
notable critique from the press on the function of the common law in this context. The Colonial 
Times (“the Times”), a Hobart newspaper that began circulating in 1825, questioned the 
applicability of British criminal law to “these unhappy men.” The Times argued that, as relates to 
“these poor creatures, it was by no means clear that Van Diemen’s Land was English ground.” 
The newspaper noted that if British forces had taken possession of the country “by the right of 
conquest” then “these poor Blacks” would, according to the international law jurisprudence of 
Vattel, Grotius and others, “instead of being subject to our Law, we, the invaders would have 
been subjected to theirs!”  That the rights of conquest did not apply, the Times suggested, was 
because these “poor wretches” were “little better than ‘feræ naturæ’” and were therefore 
believed to have no laws. Given this view, the Times argued “surely it would almost be as just to 
subject any other description of wild animal to the operation of the British Law!” After this 
exposition, the Times made a stand against Jack and Dick’s death sentence, stating that “we hope 
that there are those here who will use their influence ty [sic] prevent these poor creatures 
becoming victims to a breach of law which they understand not; and their responsibility to which 
is questionable by the very highest authority.” The Times also questioned the utility of imposing 
the death penalty in this context, stating that “[a]s example, their execution will be worse than 
useless. For to whom will such be made? Not to the Aboriginal Tribes, because none of them 
will be present to witness it, and their scattered habits of life prevent even the possibility of their 
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hearing it.”94 Though sharing Arthur’s characterization of the island’s indigenous peoples as 
“poor wretches,” the Times’ editorial questioned the humanity and Christian nature of using the 
death sentence in these circumstances. 
 In contrast, Arthur continued his proclaimed commitment to bringing the conflict within 
the ambit of the British law. On the morning of Jack and Dick’s deaths, the colonial secretary’s 
office released a government notice on behalf of the lieutenant governor. The notice, dated 13 
September 1826, declared that it was the lieutenant governor’s hope that this “extreme Sentence 
of the Law” would act as an “Example . . . not only to Prevent the Commission of similar 
Atrocities by the Aborigines, but to induce towards them the Observance of a conciliatory line of 
Conduct, rather than harsh or violent Treatment; the latter being but too likely to produce 
Measures of Retaliation, which have their Issue in Crime and Death.” By this time Arthur had 
evidently reached the belief that “it may at present be found difficult, and impractical” to 
improve the “moral Condition” of “this ignorant race,” nevertheless “forebearance and kindness 
may do much towards lessening aggression on their Part, and rendering them comparatively 
harmless.” Furthermore, the notice made clear Arthur’s public commitment to imposing the 
justice of “the common Law of mankind” equally to both sides of the conflict. He stated that 
while “a manifestly wanton and direct Violation of the common Law of mankind, such as was 
perpetrated by the Two Individuals who suffered this Day, will assuredly be visited with the 
same Punishment, the Lieutenant Governor is determined to Protect the Aborigines of the 
Colony from injury or annoyance, and on Offenders in this respect, the severest penalties which 
the Law may prescribe, will be inflicted without the slightest interposition of Mercy.”95 
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 Though as Musquito had suggested, what Arthur viewed as the universally applicable 
“common law of mankind” was in fact the customary law of the invading “white fellow.” 
Violent encounters in the settled districts, such as those for which the colonial authorities 
arrested Jack and Dick, suggest the application of other customary laws. In warning colonists 
against behavior that would produce “Measures of Retaliation,” Arthur’s 13 September notice 
implied a wrong done to Jack and Dick. As Arthur’s conciliator George Augustus Robinson 
would learn on one of his “friendly missions” in 1831, the death of Thomas Colley had happened 
in the context of close inter-personal interactions. A man named Stansfield, who had witnessed a 
disagreement between Jack and Colley (a convict-servant), related to Robinson that Colley had, 
one evening on returning home and seeing “the natives” nearby, become “displeased” with Jack 
and “flogged him with [his] bullock whip.” Some time later, Colley returned to the area after a 
spell at the convict settlement on Maria Island. Upon seeing Jack again, Colley asked the 
indigenous man whether he remembered him, to which Jack apparently replied yes, he 
remembered Colley as “the ---- that flogged him.” The account gives no further explanation 
except to say that after this conversation, “the natives killed” Colley.96 Colley, however, did not 
die of his spear wound until two weeks after the retaliation attack, so it is not clear that “the 
natives” intended to kill him.97 If Jack did in fact spear Thomas Colley, as the military jury 
found, he likely understood his assault as a legal retaliation for the earlier assault by whipping 
under his people’s laws. Once captured, Jack never admitted to committing a crime.98 
As Arthur’s notice of the same day declared, on 13 September 1826 Jack and Dick 
experienced the “extreme sentence” of British law. Though Arthur represented the “common law 
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of mankind” as an agent of good, the imprisonment and execution of Jack and Dick highlight the 
extreme violence entailed in the colonial law’s retributive function. Dick’s health rapidly 
declined upon incarceration. An old man with leprosy, or some leprosy-like skin condition, he 
was quarantined from the other prisoners and, according to the newspaper, was only able to 
move about the prison by crawling on his hands and knees, with only a loose piece of blanket 
covering his body.99 Although executed with five European men, Jack and Dick seem to have 
been the main subjects of interest on the scaffold that day. When reporting on the public 
spectacle of the executions, the Times noted that Dick “screamed out most bitterly, apparently 
fully sensible of his impending fate; and, notwithstanding he could climb up the ladder to the 
platform, he refused, when he was carried up by the Executioner. Being placed on the platform, 
he would not stand up along with the rest of the unhappy sufferers; he was therefore placed upon 
a stool, which dropped with him when the awful moment arrived which plunged them into 
eternity.” He reportedly “died very hard,” which meant that as his neck did not break with the 
drop, he would have strangled to death slowly and painfully. The report also suggested that Jack 
did not die instantly, as the cord tying his hands behind his back slipped up to his elbow, and “he 
reached up his hand to his neck, and bled profusely from the nose.”100 Like Musquito and Black 
Jack, Jack and Dick experienced the “full extent” of the British common law, becoming subjects 
in the public enactment of a foreign theater of justice. 
Arthur’s benevolent and humane intensions towards the indigenous people of Van 
Diemen’s Land did not lead him to show mercy to these four men. Arthur’s “benevolent” native 
policy, in this context, was not benign. To Arthur, benevolence meant providing the natives with 
the only possible future for them – that they given up their “wandering” life, and become 
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“civilized” Christians. When Aboriginal people did not respond positively to this intended 
kindness and committed “outrages” and “atrocities” against the settlers and their property, Arthur 
let the procedures of the English common law take over. For Arthur, this law was the “common 
law of mankind,” and breaches of it were therefore breaches of humanity. While he expressed a 
desire to prevent the “atrocities” of both colonists and indigenous people, his administration 
never managed to prosecute any colonists for violence against indigenous people.  
For the four men who met the “full extent” of this law, this system of justice was not only 
foreign to their laws from before the initial British invasion in 1803, it also ran counter to the 
relatively peaceful culture of exchange that had developed since the colonists arrived.101 In 
hindsight it is easy to see that the colonists’ legal system, despite its claims to the administration 
of a universal and impartial judgment, was merely a foreign customary system.  For instance, the 
“common law of mankind” said nothing about the destruction of hunting grounds, or the 
invasion of land and sacred places.102 Yet for Arthur, the common law represented the only 
possible system through which to impose moral order on the colony. These presumptions would, 
however, be shaken as Arthur presided over seven years of intensifying conflict between the 
colonists and the island’s indigenous peoples. Historian N. J. B. Plomely posits 1824 as the year 
that marks the start of this conflict; a conflict which by the 1830s became known amongst the 
colonists as the “Black War.”103 In dealing with this conflict, Arthur would ultimately find it 
necessary to suspend the common law, and institute martial law. 
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Surrenders to “Justice” 
 
 Unlike Arthur, British officials in North America, along with their republican neighbors 
to the south, could not be blind to the need for diplomatic negotiations with the “native 
aborigines.” While the British had invaded Van Diemen’s Land at the site of Hobart Town 
without negotiating any terms of surrender with the indigenous owners of the land in North 
America, U.S. and British officials in North America entered into official treaties to extinguish 
Indian title to the land. They recognized the politic need to negotiate with Native peoples, even 
if, like Lewis Cass, they ultimately hoped to usurp American Indian and First Nations 
sovereignty. Cass used his firm grasp of Great Lakes diplomatic customs as a tool in his quest to 
control American Indian peoples, to extinguish their land titles, and to abrogate the perceived 
subversive threat of the British. His attempts to assert U.S. jurisdictional sovereignty therefore 
formed part of his efforts to achieve American Indian subjection to the U.S. government, and to 
gain control of the land that he imagined as part of the U.S. nation’s geo-political future. Backed 
by the 1817 Act “for the punishment of crimes and offences committed within the Indian 
boundaries,” Cass and other U.S. agents attempted to deal with Indian violence against non-
Indians through recourse to the institutional framework of the U.S. legal system.104 Although 
jurisdiction was not assumed to operate in such a blanket way as the British assumed in Van 
Diemen’s Land, Cass and other U.S. agents worked hard to achieve the surrender of Native 
Americans in order to prosecute them in U.S. courts for purported crimes against U.S. citizens, 
both within and outside Indian Country in the Great Lakes region. In this way, they attempted to 
make the pretentions of U.S. jurisdictional sovereignty over Native Americans, as represented by 
the 1817 Act, into a reality.  
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Yet in his public discourse, Cass condensed the complexities and difficulties encountered 
in achieving these surrenders into generalizations about the “Indian character.” In July 1825, 
Cass was in Prairie du Chien finalizing preparations for a treaty council, at which he hoped to 
expand U.S. influence in the region by defining boundaries and brokering peace between the 
peoples of the Upper Mississippi region. At the same time that he undertook these practical, 
diplomatic measures to assert U.S. sovereignty and jurisdiction (partly against the perceived 
threat of the British to the north), Cass sought to intervene in the transatlantic discourse on North 
American Indian relations. Outraged by an essay in the most recent London Quarterly Review, 
he penned a response for the next issue of the North American Review.105 In his response article, 
Cass expounded, at length, his self-proclaimed knowledge about the “Indians of North America,” 
including the so-called “Indian character.” One character trait apparently shared by all American 
Indians was their bravery in submitting to retribution when they had “been guilty of murder.” 
According to Cass, even those Indian men who killed U.S. citizens generally “freely delivered 
themselves” for trial, including, he stated, “[t]he Winebagoes convicted at Belleville . . . and the 
seven persons now confined at Mackinac, for the murder of four American citizens upon Lake 
Pepin, in August [sic] 1824.”106 In this account, such an apparent behavioral tendency of the 
“Indian moral character” complemented the seemingly natural and inevitable extension of U.S. 
jurisdiction over American Indian peoples, even to “crimes” committed within Indian Country. 
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Yet even Cass’s own rhetoric suggested the atmosphere of coercion in which these 
surrenders had taken place. He stated that the men who surrendered had “freely delivered 
themselves to our authority, as necessary offerings for their own guilt, and to exonerate their 
tribes from suspicion or injury.”107 On the one hand, Cass therefore represented Native American 
surrenders as an example of the strangeness of the “Indian character,” and on the other, as the 
“free” response to threats of collective retribution. Indeed, the Ho-Chunk men convicted at 
Belleville and the seven Ojibwes held at Mackinac surrendered in response to U.S. threats. In 
both these cases, U.S. officials held councils with the relevant leaders to press for the surrender 
of the perpetrators.  
 The two Ho-Chunk men brought to trial at Belleville in June 1821 stood accused of the 
murder of two U.S. soldiers on Rock Island in March 1820. According to Major Marson, the 
commanding officer stationed at Fort Armstrong on Rock Island, on 29 March 1820, Seargeant 
Blettenberger and Private Rigg, of the 5th infantry, “passed out of the garrison unarmed, [and] 
were shot, scalped, and otherwise mangled in a most shocking manner.” This was, Marson 
declared, the most recent “consequence of the hostility of the Winebagoes and the smallness” of 
his command.108 Marson’s letter, printed in the Daily National Intelligencer in May 1820, 
confirmed earlier reports that the deaths had been “perpetrated by those vile and detestable 
Winebagoes.”109 In June, Major Leavenworth, the commandant of Fort Crawford in Prairie du 
Chien, held a council with Ho-Chunk leaders at the Prairie. The Ho-Chunk leaders reportedly 
“disclaimed and denounced the act, and said it was done by two fools, who had covered the 
whole nation with shame.” They made it clear that they had no wish or intention to go to war, 
and they gave over five leaders to act as human collateral for nine days, until they delivered up 
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the perpetrators.110 In the fall after their surrender, Colonel Leavensworth delivered 
Chewacharah and Whorajinkah – the two men accused of the killings – to the civil authorities at 
Edwardsville, from where they were transferred to Belleville jail to await their trial before the 
circuit court.111 
The Ho-Chunk leaders most likely surrendered these two men to the U.S. military forces, 
most likely, as a politic maneuver, not an admission that their people should be subject to U.S. 
law. The leaders surrendered their countrymen in the expectation that the Americans would treat 
the accused in line with the region’s diplomatic protocols. Instead, as Carimine expressed at the 
men’s trial, the Americans had breached these just expectations. After the judge had pronounced 
the sentence of death on the two men, the Ho-Chunk leader reportedly stated: “When I came 
down here, I had hoped to find that Che-wa-cha-rah and Wo-rah-jin-kah had been better treated, 
but my heart is oppressed at the cruelty that they have received. I did hope that pity would have 
been found for them, and that mercy would have been shown them.”112  
In condemning this display, Carimine referred not only to the lack of mercy shown by the 
passing of the death sentence, but also to the treatment that Chewacharah and Whorajinkah 
received while incarcerated. By the time the U.S. civil authorities brought Chewacharah and 
Whorajinkah to trial in May 1821 they were weak and emaciated. The Illinois Intelligencer 
reported that Colonel Leavenworth, on seeing great difference in Chewacharah and 
Whorajinkah’s appearance since he had delivered them over to the civil authorities the previous 
fall, “considered it his duty to enquire into the cause,” which he did in the presence of Major 
Biddle of the army and “a number of the most respectable citizens of this town.” According to 
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the report, in response to their interrogation, Chewacharah and Whorajinkah “complained very 
much of their treatment while at Belleville.” During the previous winter they had no fire or 
bedding, and were thus compelled to lie on the hard floor with only a blanket for covering. By 
way of food, they had generally received “only a small piece of corn bread of the size of a small 
biscuit, and half that quantity of meat; and at one time, for three days and nights, received 
neither food nor water.”113 As suggested by the editors of the Illinois Intelligencer, who reported 
Carimine’s speech directly after expounding these details of Chewacharah and Whorajinkah’s 
treatment, Carimine’s complaint that his fellow countrymen had suffered injustice was 
understood by U.S. citizens.  
 Yet in condemning Chewacharah and Whorajinkah’s treatment at the hands of the U.S. 
authorities, Carimine also made a much larger point about the incompatibility of this treatment 
with the his beliefs about the terms on which the surrender had been negotiated. Ever the 
diplomat, Carimine immediately tempered his statements about the cruelty Chewacharah and 
Whorajinkah had received by stating “[b]ut, let peace be between us. I look to our Great Father 
as I do to the Great Spirit for protection.” Rather than a submission to the power of the U.S. 
executive, this statement was an appeal that attempted to remind the Americans of the terms of 
the surrender of the men; an effort to remind Judge Pope – the “Father” representing the 
President (the Great Father) – of his obligation to take pity of his Indian “children” and show 
them mercy. Carimine therefore concluded:  “My Father – I came here to see justice, but I find 
none – Cah-rah-mah-ree is honest – he speaks what he thinks – he shakes you for the last time by 
the hand.”114 For Carimine, the system to which Chewacharah and Whorajinkah had been 
subjected after their surrender – their treatment while incarcerated and their impending execution 
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– did not meet the tenants of the diplomatic codes through which the U.S. officials had 
negotiated the men’s surrender. 
The treatment of Chewacharah and Whorajinkah at the hands of the U.S. justice system 
took an immediate toll on one of the men. Though the court had scheduled the execution for 14 
July that year, the men received a last-minute presidential reprieve of one month, during which 
time one of the men died. Published reports do not state which man died in custody, or whether 
the appeals for permanent reprieve were successful. It is also unclear whether the execution of 
the surviving man took place after the expiration of the one-month respite, though presumably if 
it did, it occurred in front of a crowd similar to the disappointed large group of onlookers who 
had flocked to see the “Indian-hanging” the month before.115 A widely published report 
announced that the man had “seemed to regard his approaching end with apparent unconcern” 
though no other details were given.116 
Much fuller details circulated regarding the execution of two other Native American men 
in Detroit later that year. On 27 December 1821, an Ojibwe man named Ketaukah (or 
Ketawkah), and Kewabiskim, a Menominee man, were executed in front of a crowd of “very 
numerous” spectators for separate murders.117 On May 12 1821, Ketaukah had fallen in with a 
party of Americans on their second day of travel from Green Bay, which included Dr. William 
Madison, the U.S. military surgeon stationed at Green Bay. Two hours later, near Manitowoc, 
Ketaukah shot Madison from his horse, and the Doctor died soon after.118 Ketaukah’s Ojibwe 
community delivered him to the U.S. authorities in Detroit on 1 June.119 Fewer details circulated 
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in the press about Kewabiskim’s actions, except that he had killed a “French” trader named 
Charles Ulrick at Green Bay earlier in 1821.120 A circuit hearing of the territorial Supreme Court 
convicted the two men in Detroit in October 1821.121 According to the reports of their 
executions, the men met their deaths gallantly and bravely. They “walked firmly to the gallows, 
and . . . ascended the steps of the drop in a manner peculiarly firm – after which, they asked 
through the interpreter, the pardon of the surrounding spectators, for the crime they had 
committed. They then shook hands and gazed for a few minutes on the assemblage and on the 
heavens, when their caps were drawn over their faces, and they were launched into eternity.”122 
The press reports of the dual execution and its lead-up presented Kataukah and 
Kewabiskim’s subjection to the U.S. justice system as both legitimate and natural. According to 
a reprinted article emanating from Detroit, both Kataukah and Kewabiskim had allegedly 
acknowledged the legitimacy of their impending punishment: “[t]he Indians, since their trial, 
often acknowledged that they deserved the punishment to which they were sentenced – and, in 
their own way, had prepared themselves to meet their fate.” The men also followed what the 
reporters represented as customary “Indian” preparations for their impending deaths. For the 
several weeks before to their execution, the men collected “tobacco, pipes, & c” to offer “to the 
Great Spirit on the day of their death.” They also acquired red paint, which they used to paint the 
walls of their cells and their blankets with “numerous figures of men, quadrupeds, reptiles, & c.”, 
and one man painted a picture of “an Indian hanging by the neck” on his blanket. Then, the night 
before their execution, the men used an improvised drum to accompany “their solemn death 
dance,” which they did until late into the night, and resumed early on the morning of their 
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executions.123 By stating that the men had admitted to the justice of their impending fate, this 
report presented Kataukah and Kewabiskim’s deaths at the hands of the U.S. legal system as 
fundamentally righteous. By including details of their preparations, it fortified Euro-American 
presumptions about the U.S. legal system being universal in its distribution of justice; that it 
accommodated rather than usurped American Indian customs. 
 While these reports from Detroit gave an unequivocal account of the guilt of the men and 
the justice of their fate, earlier articles had reported issues raised at trial about problems inherent 
in trying to bring Native Americans within the ambit of U.S. criminal law. Both trials, held at 
Detroit before the Territorial Supreme Court, were reported together; but Kewabiskim’s case was 
referred to only briefly without details of the proceedings, while Kataukah’s received lengthy 
treatment. On his arraignment, counsel for Kataukah, “Messrs. Doty and Witherell,” both of 
whom would become eminent judges, had immediately challenged the jurisdiction of the court in 
the matter. According to one report, Doty and Witherell argued that “the Courts of the United 
States could not take cognizance of crimes committed in the Indian country – that the 
Winnebago and Chippewa nations were both sovereign and independent, exercising exclusive 
jurisdiction over all offences committed within their respective territorial limits, &c.”124 A report 
of the trial in Washington’s Daily National Intelligencer noted that “[t]he principle involved in 
this trial relative to the sovereignty of the Indians tribes, was somewhat similar to that in the case 
of Tommy Jemmy, the Indian who was tried in New-York.”125 The court rejected Doty and 
Wetherell’s arguments challenging the jurisdiction of the court, including the contention that 
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Ketaukah was a member of an independent nation, as defined by writers on the laws of nations, 
which had exclusive jurisdiction over “all offences committed within the limits of its territory.”  
Ketaukah therefore faced trial before a jury, and was found guilty and sentenced to be executed 
on 27 December 1821.126 But his trial revealed that even among the U.S. legal fraternity, the 
legitimacy of extending U.S. sovereignty into Indian Country was not an unquestioned 
presumption. 
 Despite petitions to reprieve Kataukah and Kewabiskim from the scaffold, Cass decided 
to let the law – as it had played out in the trials – “take its course.”127 Curiously, although he had 
been directly involved in Ketaukah and Kewabiskim’s execution, he did not mention either case 
in his 1826 North American Review article. In spite of his executive prerogative, he did not 
reprieve them from the fate that other U.S. agents had dealt to Chewacharah and Whorajinkah, 
whom Cass mentioned as the “Winebagoes convicted at Belleville.”128  
 
Escape from Mackinac 
 
But Cass’s supremacist posturing about American Indian submission to U.S. law in the 
pages of the North American Review was premature. By the time his article appeared at the 
beginning of 1826, the Ojibwe men, whose surrender he also mentioned, had escaped from 
Mackinac and made their way back to their Ojibwe villages in the Lac du Flambeau area (south 
of Lake Superior). The deaths at the center of this controversy occurred in early July 1824, when 
four men travelled by canoe from Prairie du Chien northwards on the Mississippi River towards 
Fort Snelling. The men worked for Jean Brunet, an Indian trader based in Prairie du Chien. Lead 
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by an American named John Findlay, the group also included three other boatmen (or voyageurs) 
named Crawford, Depous, and Bennett.129 One night they set up camp on Lake Pepin; the place 
where the Chippewa River enters the Mississippi and a common camp site for travelers. On the 
same night a group of about thirty Ojibwe men camped nearby. The men all conversed; at least 
one of Brunet’s men spoke Anishinaabe. The Ojibwe men reportedly helped themselves to the 
traders’ provisions, and asked if the four men had seen a Dakota (Sioux) party nearby. Sometime 
soon after, some of the Ojibwe men killed and scalped the four traders.130  
The four bodies were soon after found by a U.S. military party, and reports of the 
incident then proliferated in U.S. newspapers and correspondence between U.S. officials.131 In 
these accounts, the four non-Ojibwe men were generally referred to either as “white” or as 
American citizens. Such descriptors, used loosely in the Upper Great Lakes at that time, marked 
certain people as culturally and politically distinct from the majority of the area’s population who 
self-identified – and were identified by others – as belonging to an American Indian nation, such 
as the Ojibwes or Dakotas. At other times American officials might have referred to the three 
voyageurs as “Canadiens,” or even derogatorily as “mixed breeds.”  
Over the next three years after the deaths on Lake Pepin, Lewis Cass led concerted U.S. 
government efforts to subject the Ojibwe perpetrators to the U.S. criminal justice system. He 
referred to the four dead men as “our citizens,” and to their deaths as a “flagrant murder” or 
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“outrage,” and drawing on overly masculinist tropes, framed the Ojibwe violence as an attack on 
“U.S. citizens” which affronted the “honor of [the U.S.] government.”  On Cass’s advice, the 
War Department in Washington directed – or rather approved the efforts Cass had already 
instigated – for U.S. civil and military officials in the western Great Lakes to use every means, 
short of open hostilities, to obtain these Ojibwe men. He believed it necessary to subject these 
men to U.S. “public justice” in order to demonstrate the potency of U.S. power to the region’s 
peoples.132 For Cass, the imperatives for such demonstrations were never divorced from the 
specter of British influence. As he wrote to Secretary of War Barbour in 1825, he believed the 
Lake Superior Ojibwes held an ongoing “attachment . . . to the British, and,” he continued, “they 
are so remote that it will be long before foreign influence can be wholly destroyed.”133 Cass 
believed, however, bringing the Lake Pepin killers within the jurisdiction of the U.S. law would 
be a good start. 
Claims to U.S. sovereignty and jurisdiction in the “remote” Lake Superior region, though 
largely fanciful, served Cass’s very real political aim of strengthening U.S. authority and 
influence in the region. As a practical and astute politician, Cass understood the political context 
in which the Lake Pepin killings had occurred. Like the newspaper reports of the incident, he 
interpreted the deaths as collateral damage in the ongoing conflict between the Ojibwes and the 
Dakotas.134 As historian Michael Witgen has recently shown, traders such as those who died on 
Lake Pepin in July 1824 worked in a political and economic system dominated by “the ongoing 
struggle between the Anishinaabeg and the Dakota for control of the transcontinental trading 
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system.” This struggle, according to Witgen, “shaped the daily lives of everyone, Native and 
non-Native, in the western interior of North America from the seventeenth century until the later 
part of the nineteenth century.”135 Indeed, Cass saw the Lake Pepin incident as an opportunity for 
U.S. agents to gain a foothold – and what he hope would potentially be a controlling influence – 
in the region’s political economy. These same imperatives drove his diplomacy at the Treaty of 
Prairie du Chien the next summer, where (in July 1825) he attempted to impose boundary lines 
between the Ojibwes and the Dakotas, in the hope that an American-brokered détente would 
enlarge U.S. influence. 
By the time Cass arrived at Michillimackinac in June 1825, en route to the Prairie du 
Chien treaty council, five of the Ojibwe perpetrators of the Lake Pepin deaths had surrendered 
themselves to U.S. agents. They had surrendered in response to U.S. threats of force against their 
nation, and on the assurances of ultimate impunity, which they had received from local Métis 
traders and U.S. Indian agents, with whom they had kinship ties.136 They also most likely 
expected only temporary incarceration. Their surrender did not, in any way, imply absolute 
submission to the dictates of the U.S. criminal justice system. 
But Cass wanted to subject these Ojibwe men to the full extent of U.S. criminal law. He 
wrote to the Secretary of War that the “condemnation and the execution of some of [these men]” 
would “produce an immediate and decisive effect.” For Cass, this was an opportunity to 
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demonstrate the so-called “power and authority” of the United States. He also suggested the 
organization of a military excursion to the Fond du Lac area for the ostensible purpose of 
tracking down two of the men believed “most guilty” for the Lake Pepin deaths – including the 
leader Kewaynokwut – who had not yet surrendered. And even if the fugitives did not 
consequently surrender, Cass argued that – in any case – “the display of an armed force at the 
extremity of Lake Superior would produce the most salutary effects upon the Indians.” He 
surmised to the Secretary of War that “the Indians of that country are restless & dissatisfied” 
because “[t]hey do not know the strength of the government, nor do they respect its office or its 
requisitions.”137 
 Indeed, the Ojibwe men’s subsequent escape from Mackinac in October 1825 highlighted 
this lack of so-called “respect.” The incarcerated men presumably received word that U.S. 
officials intended to try and then likely execute at least some of them. The jailer at Mackinac, as 
well as several of the (so-called) “French” prisoners, advised the Ojibwe inmates that they 
should break out. The Ojibwe men subsequently cut through a log wall, and escaped under the 
cover of darkness to Ottawa point, where they embarked on a twenty-two day journey back to 
their villages in the Lac du Flambeau area.138 Although a report in the Detroit Gazette decried 
the escape and proclaimed ignorance about how it had been achieved, most people in the region 
would have understood what had most likely occurred.139 In a situation that invoked precedents 
begun in the days of the French – those that Richard White identifies in The Middle Ground – the 
jailer, the local traders, and the prisoners had followed a familiar pattern of protocols that had 
originally grown out of “creative misunderstandings” between Native Americans and the 
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French.140 To acknowledge, at least ostensibly, the authority of their “Great American Father,” 
the accused Ojibwe men surrendered and submitted to temporary incarceration. But in order to 
avoid the potential repercussions of actually executing the accused, local officials and traders 
then helped to facilitate the prisoners’ escape. 
While local officials and traders maintained this convention, Cass continued his attempts 
to impose a different customary legal regime – that of the U.S. criminal law. Though the deaths 
on Lake Pepin in July 1824 occurred deep in Indian Country, because Cass claimed those killed 
were “U.S. citizens,” he continued to insist that justice demanded that the Ojibwe perpetrators be 
subject to trial for murder under U.S. criminal law.141 In May 1826, Cass made plans to travel to 
Fond du Lac to hold a follow-up council with the Ojibwes, as had been stipulated in the treaty of 
Prairie du Chien the year before. The escape of the Lake Pepin suspects loomed large in Cass’s 
plans for this council. He saw the upcoming treaty as a chance to exhibit “the physical force” and 
“power and authority” of the U.S. government in a region apparently “subject to British 
influence.” He believed such a display might begin to persuade the Ojibwes of American 
supremacy so that when the Americans commanded them to do something, such as surrender the 
perpetrators of the Lake Pepin deaths, the Ojibwes would be more likely to obey and submit.142 
In an attempt to impress this upon the Ojibwes, when Cass and his fellow commissioner Thomas 
McKenney travelled to Fond du Lac that summer, they were accompanied by 62 men from the 
2nd Infantry.143 
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With Cass unwell during the negotiations, McKenney took charge of the matter. After all 
the parties had signed the treaty, McKenney demanded that the Ojibwes surrender “the 
murderers.”144 In response, four men from the Lac du Flambeau area attempted to defer the 
demand, informing McKenney that they did not have the power to effect the surrender: “Fathers, 
- We four speak as one man. Have patience. Fathers, - we have no young men attached to us. It 
is very difficult for us to make an answer to you.” But McKenney, determined not to be 
sidetracked, said that if the men were not surrendered, their “father” would “put out his strong 
arm,” and “by the time the traders come in, in the spring . . . destruction will fall on your women 
and children.” So, to temporarily appease McKenney, the Ojibwe spokesman told his American 
“fathers” that “[n]ext spring, you may look for those young men who committed the murder.”145  
 Ultimately, however, neither displays of power nor threats impressed the Ojibwes into 
submission. Though McKenney and Cass included the demands for surrender in an addendum to 
the Fond du Lac treaty, early in the summer of 1827 the leaders of the five principal villages of 
Lac du Flambeau held their own council, and resolved to end the matter without surrendering 
their countrymen. Delivering the speech in the name of all the leaders, the senior chief 
Mozobodo presented five strings of wampum to the local agent George Johnston and stated the 
council’s resolution – both of which were delivered to Cass at a treaty council at Butte des 
Morts, later that summer of 1827.146 
 In conformity with Great Lakes diplomatic protocols, Mozobodo expressed the council’s 
resolution as a request, made to his American “Father,” asking for forgiveness, on behalf of his 
children, who had “been foolish” and “done wrong.” “Pity and forgive them, for this time,” he 
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stated “and give us once more quietness. Our five villages, under my direction make this request, 
and we give you our hands in friendship with all our hearts.” The alleged murderers then got up 
and presented two strings of wampum, also to be delivered to Cass along with their speech, in 
which they said, “Listen to us, Father! We cannot resolve to redeliver ourselves up. We have not 
the resolution of going again to prison. Your arm is strong and heavy – your punishment too 
severe. We tremble at your name.”147 Rather than acquiesce to U.S. agents’ assertions of 
American legal jurisdiction, these men from the five Lac du Flambeau villages instead asserted 
their region’s existing justice regime for homicide cases. With the wampum ceremony they 
fulfilled the necessary requirements to “cover the dead,” and thus put an end to the cycle of 
deathful retributions. Using proper diplomatic etiquette, they couched their message as a request 
that their American “Father” accept this peace offering. In reality though, this was more 
pronouncement than request. In refusing U.S. agents’ demands, the Ojibwes from Lac du 
Flambeau sent a clear message: they did not accept the validity of U.S. jurisdictional claims, and 
would therefore not submit their countrymen to the customs of the U.S. criminal justice system. 
 Their message was also a reproach to Cass and other U.S. agents who had flouted the 
region’s legal and diplomatic customs by continually insisting that the perpetrators of the Lake 
Pepin killings be subject to the full extent of U.S. law. In saying to their American Father “[y]our 
arm is strong and heavy – your punishment too severe,” the suspected murderers – along with the 
council of Ojibwe leaders – admonished Cass for contravening the bounds of legitimate fatherly 
behavior. The Ojibwes implicitly asserted that those claiming the title of father in this 
diplomatic-fictive-kinship relationship were expected to behave towards their so-called 
“children” with generosity, mercy, and forgiveness. 
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 But this role of “father” meant something very different to Cass. The paternalist authority 
that Cass aimed for, as representative of the United States, was supremacist and absolutist. It 
required that the Ojibwes recognize the U.S. government as their sovereign ruler, and that upon 
request they would consequently submit, in full, to unilateral U.S. legal jurisdiction. In other 
words, for Cass, this was a zero sum equation of sovereignty: for cases where he deemed that 
U.S. legal jurisdiction applied, he required the full and absolute submission of American Indian 
people. In this construction of political “reality,” any acts which Cass and other U.S. agents 
deemed as aberrant were framed as affronts to the rightful authority of the United States. 
Interestingly – and tellingly – Cass represented the killings on Lake Pepin as an insult to the 
“honor” of the U.S. government; he described the efforts of U.S. agents to bring the Ojibwe 
suspects to trial as attempts to gain satisfaction for this insult, and thus “vindicate the honor of 
[the] government.” These representations evinced a different conception of masculinist authority 
to that asserted by the Lac du Flambeau Ojibwes in their reproach to Cass. Although Cass 
ostensibly played the role of diplomatic “father” to his Indian “children,” he did not do this to 
conform to the existing political culture of the region. Instead he maneuvered and machinated to 
achieve an absolutist, dictatorial authority over American Indian peoples.  
But in the case of the Lake Pepin deaths, Cass was frustrated in his attempts to achieve 
even just the appearance of a subordinating control over the Ojibwes. The trial and execution of 
the Lake Pepin perpetrators was to have displayed the apparent submission of the Ojibwes to the 
dictates of a supreme sovereign. But in seeking to manufacture this display of authoritarian 
potency, and then failing, he instead highlighted the impotence of U.S. authority. In reality, these 
claims of U.S. sovereignty and legal jurisdiction could only be maintained by coercing Ojibwe 
cooperation. Yet Cass had offended against the region’s existing diplomatic and legal customs by 
 74 
his heavy-handed tactics, causing the Ojibwes to respond by reasserting their expectations for 
fatherly behavior.  
    
Conclusion 
 
 In the 1820s, British officials in Van Diemen’s Land and U.S. officials in the North 
American Great Lakes regions made similar efforts to bring indigenous peoples with the ambit of 
their legal systems for violent crimes against (those they defined as) non-indigenous. Though in 
both locations the most senior local government officials – George Arthur and Lewis Cass – 
respectively represented such actions as the expansion of universal codes of justice, as both 
Musquito and Nawkaw Carimine pointed out, this was not justice as indigenous people 
understood it. Instead, the executions of indigenous people in both places signified the 
impositions of foreign legal rituals and were part of broader British or American attempts to 
impose their government’s exclusive sovereignty in indigenous territories earmarked for 
expropriation by the British Crown or U.S. government.   
 Both Arthur and Cass used paternalist language in their attempts to bring indigenous 
people within the scope of their government’s legal jurisdiction. For Arthur, belief in the 
common law as the natural arbiter of the escalating indigenous-colonist conflict combined 
closely with his humanitarian beliefs in the need to “civilize” and Christianize the island’s 
indigenous people. Indeed, he seemed incapable of viewing indigenous people as anything other 
than “wretched” people needing British guidance. In the immediate wake of Musquito’s capture, 
his failure to recognize the need to deal with indigenous peoples as diplomatic envoys seemingly 
had immediate negative consequences. With the conflict apparently escalating further, Arthur 
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gave up his dreams of ameliorating it with “justice” and “benevolence,” and instead declared 
martial law over the widespread indigenous-colonist violence. 
In contrast, officials in North America, such as Cass, dealt with indigenous peoples using 
well-established diplomatic customs. Cass, in particular, used the paternal language of these 
protocols and imbued them with his own paternalistic ideas about U.S. supremacy. These 
conventions made it impossible even to envision a blanket implementation of the common law, 
as Arthur had done in Van Diemen’s Land. Cass instead had to legitimate his imposition of U.S. 
notions of justice through diplomatic negotiations for the surrender of American Indians accused 
of crimes under U.S. law. While Cass and other U.S. agents paid lip service to the protocols of 
indigenous diplomacy in order to achieve these surrenders, once surrendered, the American 
Indians were to be subject, in full, to the dictates of the U.S. justice system, even for acts 
committed in their own country. Such practices were, as Nawkaw Carimine and the Lac du 
Flambeau Ojibwes made clear, a bastardization of the codes of Great Lakes indigenous 
diplomacy, and an attempt to impose a foreign regime of “justice.” 
In fall 1828, Lewis Cass and William Clark (Superintendent of Indian Affairs for 
Missouri) travelled to Washington at the behest of Thomas McKenney and the new Secretary of 
War, Peter Porter, charged with the task of drawing up a set of regulations for the whole Indian 
Department. Porter had explained to Cass that he needed to enumerate “[a] system which shall 
explain and establish the nature of the relations hereafter to exist between the United States and 
these dispersed and unfortunate people.”148 By February the next year, Cass and Clark had 
completed a report that ordered and codified U.S. statutory law relating to Indians, including a 
set of regulations to govern the agents of the Indian Department in carrying out those laws. 
Porter submitted the report to Congress on 9 February 1829, recommending its enactment. 
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Although this bill itself never passed Congress, its provisions made up the bulk of the Indian 
Intercourse Act of 1834, which Cass submitted to Congress as Secretary of War. The 1829 report 
thus gives a telling insight into Cass’s thinking about the intersection between American Indians 
and the operation of the U.S. law.149  
Cass and Clark pieced together most of the fifty-six sections of the bill’s first part from 
the exact wording of previous laws.150 Section 45, for instance, was the first section of the Indian 
Country Crimes Act of 1817.  Using the wording of the 1817 Act, section 45 declared that “any 
Indian or other person or persons” would be held liable for an act that would be considered a 
“crime, offence, or misdemeanor . . . if committed in any place or district or country under the 
sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the United States,” when the act was committed “within the 
United States, and within any town, district, or territory, belonging to any nation or nations, tribe 
or tribes of Indians.”151  
Cass and Clark included a new section – one not drawn from any previous laws – to 
assist in the practical application of the prosecution of crimes in Indian Country. In section 48 of 
the proposed Bill, they stated  
 
it shall be the duty of Superintendents, Agents, and Subagents, to endeavor to procure the 
arrest and trial of all Indians accused of committing any crime, offence, or misdemeanor, 
either by demanding the same of the chiefs of the proper tribe, or by such other means as 
the President may authorize: and the President may direct the military force of the United 
states to be employed in the apprehension of such Indians, and also in prevent or 
terminating hostilities between any of the Indian tribes. 
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This represented what Cass and Clark either believed, or at least posited to be, the status quo in 
bargaining strengths between the United States and the Native American peoples in negotiating 
the consequences of violence between Native and non-native Americans in Indian Country. The 
report Porter submitted to Congress in February 1829 included Cass and Clark’s commentary on 
each of the fifty-six sections. In their annotations on section 48, they stated that “this authority 
has not heretofore been granted by our laws” but that there were “powerful reasons . . . why it 
should be exerted.” One of the reasons they gave was that “[t]he relations of the Government of 
the United States to the Indian tribes is, in many respects, a paternal one, founded upon the 
strength and intelligence of the one party and the weakness and ignorance of the other.”  
 To further convince Congress of the imperative to delegate to Indian agents a militarily 
backed power to negotiate for the delivery of accused Indians and to broker peace between 
Indian tribes, Cass and Clark represented an Indian society and politics that posed an inevitable 
threat both to themselves and the U.S. citizenry. “The Indians,” they stated, “are broken into little 
independent communities, jealous, vindictive, and warlike.” They then gave an account of an 
Indian culture in which young men could not find societal inclusion unless they undertook war-
path “deeds of valor to recount” at “their great war dances.” According to Cass and Clark, this 
contributed not only to “the miseries which environ” the Indians themselves, but also threatened 
the personal security of U.S. citizens: “It is disgraceful for a war party to return without success: 
but one scalp will redeem them from this reproach. If an enemy cannot be found, it is often taken 
from a friend: and thus our citizens are always ex-posed when travelling in the vicinity of their 
war-paths.”  
It is unsurprising that Cass and Clark’s 1828 report contained a new provision to provide 
Indian agents with delegated executive authority to undertake a practice that had become 
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customary: the negotiation for the surrender of Indians accused of the killing of U.S. citizens. In 
his 1826 article in The North American Review, Cass had represented the U.S. legal system as 
the ultimate, natural, and impartial arbiter of justice in cases of violence between Native 
Americans and U.S. citizens. Yet it took the force of arms, diplomatic maneuverings, and threats 
of collective retribution – sometimes only very thinly veiled by the rhetoric of paternal obligation 
– to get the peoples of the Great Lakes to submit, even partially, to assertions of U.S. 
sovereignty.  
Although unacknowledged in his more public discourse, Cass nevertheless conceded – in 
attempting to draft an effective legal regime – that successfully extending U.S. jurisdiction into 
Indian Country for violent crimes between Native Americans and others required negotiating – 
albeit in a heavy-handed manner – with Indian leaders to achieve the surrender of their accused 
countrymen. In other words, while he used the U.S. legal system as a tool in his attempts to 
abrogate Native American sovereignty in the area, he still opaquely acknowledged the need to 
adhere to indigenous protocols in order to gain the appearance of American Indian subjection to 
U.S. sovereignty. 
Yet for all Cass’s exertions and McKenney’s threats at Fond du Lac in 1826, U.S. agents 
never managed to force the Lake Pepin killers to play the ill-fated roles forced upon 
Chewacharah, Whorajinkah, Kataukah, and Kewabiskim in the early 1820s. Cass and McKenney 
travelled to Butte des Morts (in present-day Wisconsin) the following year (1827) to effect a 
treaty they hoped would finalize boundaries between the Ojibwes, Menominees, Ho-Chunks, and 
immigrant “Stockbridge” Iroquois. They most likely anticipated, along with the press, the 
surrender of the Lac du Flambeau men. According to a June 1827 report of Cass and 
McKenney’s departure from Detroit for the Buttes des Mortes council, it was generally 
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“expected that at this council the murderers of Lake Pepin [would] be surrendered, agreeably to 
the promise of the Indians made at the treaty of Fond du Lac.”152 But before the council got 
underway, news reached both Cass and McKenney that a group of Ho-Chunk men had attacked 
residents in Prairie du Chien. As will be discussed in the next chapter, after the panic finally died 
down and the treaty was concluded, and with the Ojibwe and now Ho-Chunk “murderers” still at 
large, Cass improvised his own, extra-legal punitive ceremony to punish an American Indian 
man who attacked his mother-in-law, and to display, to the thousands of American Indians in 
attendance, the “power and authority” of the United States.
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Chapter Two 




In the late summer of 1828, Ho-Chunk leader Hootshoapkau (Four Legs) traveled from 
his village on Lake Winnebago in the Michigan Territory to Drummond Island to confer with the 
British and to receive their presents. While there, Hootshoapkau asked his “Father,” the British 
commanding officer, to send a message to his “Great Father.” “The country I came from,” stated 
Hootschoapkau, “has been several years enveloped in a dense cloud . . . My Father, the black 
cloud is so weighty that it has nearly crushed me.” When asked what he meant by the “black 
cloud,” Hootshoapkau responded that he had “been bent down (in great trouble) for two years by 
the Americans,” and that he cried for many of his “young men who are imprisoned by the 
Americans (& one of them is since dead).” He related how the previous summer, Red Bird – the 
man who had died in an American prison – had led an attack on some residents in Prairie du 
Chien and then, a few days later, became embroiled in a drunken shoot-out with a steamboat full 
of U.S. soldiers further up the Mississippi River. In explaining the source of this “black cloud,” 
Hootschoapkau named only one man: Lewis Cass. When the Ho-Chunk leaders met Cass for the 
treaty at Butte des Morts, then ten days later at Green Bay, the Governor threatened to 
“annihilate the Winibago Nation” if the “murderers . . . were not immediately given up.” 
Although Hootshoapkau conceded that openly fighting with “the Big Knives” (Americans) 
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would be ill advised, he and other Ho-Chunk leaders were anxious to hear “news” from the 
British that might “disperse the cloud that hangs over them.”153 
British intelligence about the tensions between the Ho-Chunks and the Americans had 
similarly placed Cass at the center of the controversy. Captain Thomas Anderson, clerk and 
interpreter for the Indian station on Drummond Island, had written in August 1827 to Colonel 
Givins, Superintendent of the Indian Department for Upper Canada, relating “the reports which 
are in circulation regarding disturbances that are said to exist betwixt the Western Indians and 
the American Governor Cass.” Anderson’s account of the Ho-Chunk men’s attacks, although 
confused chronologically, nevertheless evinced pithy insight into the underlying causes of the 
tensions; the Ho-Chunks very clearly understood Cass’s designs on their homelands. “The 
Winebagoes,” he wrote, “who are not blessed with much spirit of forbearance, openly declared 
their determination not to attend the treaty [at Butte des Morts], alleging that they had been 
repeatedly deceived, . . . that they had long resisted their importunities to purchase their lands, 
and were in future determined to keep clear from such meetings; upon which his Excellency 
[Cass] appears to have talked big, and even threatened to annihilate them.”154  
It is unclear whether the British officers on Drummond Island in the summer of 1828 told 
Hootshoapkau and his fellow Ho-Chunk leaders any “news” that might have dispersed the cloud 
that hung over them. Though their Indian allies kept the British Indian Department informed 
about U.S.-Indian relations, the lasting peace between the British and the Americans coincided 
with a noticeable shift in British thinking on Indian policy. British leaders had begun to re-
conceptualize the dictates of paternal benevolence, and thus to change the way they thought 
about their alliance with the peoples of the Great Lakes region. Born more in the conversion 
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experiences of the trans-Atlantic revivals – later called the Second Great Awakening in the 
United States – than in the customs of Great Lakes diplomacy, these new ideas involved the 
subjection of apparently helpless children to the protection of a wise and authoritarian father who 
would teach them the proper and necessary moral order of human society.  
On the United States side of the border in Detroit, the movement of thousands of Native 
American people across the river into Upper Canada to receive gifts from the British continued 
to cause local unease among the Euro-American population during the 1820s. In July 1826, for 
instance, the Detroit Gazette reported that “[t]he Indians from this peninsula, and, indeed, even 
from the Mississippi, have for three weeks past, been flocking ‘in pairs and singly,’ and by 
dozens – ‘on horseback and on foot,’ and in canoes, to Malden, to receive their annual gifts from 
their great father, ‘over the water;’ and to renew their annual pledge of love to his people and 
devotion to his interest.” Though this devotion to a foreign power somewhat troubled the writers 
of the Gazette, their main concern was the disorderly conduct that always ensued as the travelers 
crossed back through Detroit: “We have not learnt that any depredations have yet been 
committed on our settlers by the Indians who are on their return from Malden; but some of the 
usual drunkenness and fighting, which this annual visit never fails to produce, have been enacted 
in our streets.”155 The main issue raised by the annual migration of the Indians therefore 
concerned the nuisance to local law and order, rather than the potential threat of their allegiance 
to a foreign power. 
By the second half of the 1820s, Cass also no longer seemed as concerned by Native 
Americans visits to British stations across the border. In 1819, when he launched his campaign to 
stop the movements, Cass had argued to the secretary of war, John Calhoun, that the visits 
compromised U.S. sovereignty through the influence of a foreign power on the Indians, who had, 
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in the recent war, been a formidable military force.156 Yet within a few years, Cass seems to have 
eased his concerted efforts to stop the crossings. In addition to reports from his agents as far 
away as the Mississippi about the diminishing signs of any British influence, Cass appears to 
have become more confident about the security of U.S. sovereignty in the area.157 While he 
continued to mobilize the specter of British influence in the western reaches of the Territory in 
order to justify to the secretary of war strategic diplomatic ventures, such as with his 1826 
military-supported voyage to meet the Ojibwes at Fond du Lac, he no longer made concerted 
overt attempts to stop Native American trips to parley with their British father, and receive 
British presents. He had successfully developed more covert means – such as scheduling treaties 
during summer – to forestall many such trips. For instance, when asked by the British at 
Drummond Island in 1828 why he had not come to receive presents for the past four years, 
Hootshoapkau replied, “the Americans have placed great guns to oppose our passage,” which 
included the 1825 treaty at Prairie du Chien, and the 1827 treaty at Butte des Morts.158 
Cass nevertheless remained hostile to the British. In another anonymously penned article, 
appearing in the North American Review in 1827, Cass maligned the British for its relations with 
“the Indians,” and defended U.S. Indian policy against what he defined as the hypocrisy of 
British critiques.159 Again responding to an article in the London Quarterly Review, which stated 
that “it has always been the boast of American policy that ‘the Indians shall be made to vanish 
before civilization, as the snow melts before the sunbeam,” Cass put forward the U.S. 
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government’s treaty-making practices and its “civilization” program as the epitome of 
enlightened Indian policy.160 In contrast, the “actual relations” of “the Indians” with the British 
could, he wrote, “be emphatically stated in few words. They were useful, and were used, in war 
to fight, and in peace to trade.”161 And yet, while Cass criticized the British for predominantly 
courting the Indians for strategic military and economic purposes, the British government had 
begun to shift towards new Indian policy priorities. 
In Upper Canada British officials who knew the weight of their obligations to their First 
Nations allies had to contend with a push from London to reduce the costs of the Indian 
Department. While local officials, including the Governor General of British North American, 
Lord Dalhousie, continued to view Native Americans as useful allies against the republican 
threat to the south, as relations with the United States stabilized in the 1820s, they began to 
envision a move away from the present-giving obligations of the alliance, towards a program in 
which First Nations people would become “civilized” and thus absorbed into the rapidly growing 
settler population. The First Peoples of Upper Canada therefore seemingly declined in military 
importance to the British at the same time that their land increased in value due to a rapid 
upsurge in colonial settlement.162 Yet as the local British officials knew, the promises made 
when the military alliance was at a premium locked them into obligations that they could not 
rescind without both the danger of a First Nations backlash and a loss of honor. The practice of 
courting the First Nations through the rituals demanded by the fictional kin relationship of the 
father and his children had created, from the British perspective, a fiduciary obligation that 
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would be inequitable to breach. Only a higher moral duty could override this obligation. They 
found this in the idea that it was the true paternal duty of a benevolent father to “ameliorate the 
condition” of his children through civilization and Christianization.163  
Though this language of “protectionism” would come to dominate British policy towards 
the indigenous peoples of the empire, the same sense of paternal benevolence was also a major 
impulse of Indian policy in the United States. In particular, U.S. Superintendent of Indian Affairs 
Thomas McKenney, more sincerely committed to his role as protective father than the pragmatic 
Lewis Cass, proclaimed a particular commitment to seeing out his moral duty to protect his 
Indian children through civilization and Christianization. The strength of this commitment was 
clear in McKenney’s accounts of a particularly dramatic incident that occurred at the conclusion 
of the Butte des Morts treaty council in the summer of 1827, in which Cass orchestrated an 
improvised ceremony to emasculate an American Indian man in front of hundreds of 
Menominee, Ho-Chunk, and Ojibwe onlookers. For Cass, the ceremony represented a strategic 
maneuver to display the allegedly superior power and authority of the U.S. government to the 
peoples of the region. For McKenney, in contrast, the ceremonial emasculation of a Native 
American man (who attacked his mother-in-law) represented a “moral lesson,” which he saw as 
part of his true paternal moral duty: to oversee the transformation of all American Indians into 
“civilized” Christians.  
Although McKenney fashioned himself as a true friend of “the Indians,” he thus also felt 
a duty to act as their benevolent but stern father. In the moral order inspired by these benevolent 
                                                
163 As Sir George Murray, of the colonial office in London wrote to the Governor of British North America in 1830, 
“It appears to me that the course which has hitherto been taken in dealing with these people, had had reference to the 
advantages which might be derived from their friendship in times of war, rather than to any settled purpose of 
gradually reclaiming them from a state of barbarism, and of introducing amongst them the industrious and peaceful 
habits of civilized life.” Sir George Murray to Sir James Kempt, 25 Jan 1830, House of Commons Parliamentary 
Papers, Papers Relative to the Aboriginal Tribes in British Possessions  (London: House of Commons, 1834). 87-
89.; Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: 119-20. 
 86 
designs, the children were obliged to act according to paternal dictates. Like Arthur’s view of the 
Van Demonian indigenous people, McKenney saw Native Americans as a “moral problem” for 
the United States government. Not all moral issues raised in this relationship could be dealt with 
effectively by the U.S. legal system.  
Despite U.S. statutory claims to jurisdiction within “Indian boundaries” over crimes 
involving U.S. citizens, no enacted instruments attempted to impose U.S. notions of juridical 
justice over incidents between American Indians. While section 1 of the 1817 Act, which Cass 
and Clark would enumerate under section 45 of their 1829 Bill, purported to extend U.S. 
jurisdiction to crimes “within Indian boundaries,” this nevertheless specifically did not “extend 
to any offence committed by one Indian against another within any Indian boundary.”164 The 
British adopted a similar de facto policy in Upper Canada.165 Yet in both the United States, and 
in Upper Canada, the common law was only one avenue through which officials attempted to 
impose their understanding of the proper moral order of human society on Native Americans and 
First Peoples. In Upper Canada, the legacy of diplomatic alliances with the First Peoples 
continued to entail obligations for the British. While Native people residing in the United States 
and other parts of Upper Canada continued to migrate in mass to British stations in Upper 
Canada to receive presents and pay tribute to their British great father, on both sides of the 
border officials began to refashion the Indians as a “moral problem.”166 Despite the differences 
in circumstances between North America and the British penal colony of Van Diemen’s Land, 
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the moral vision of British and U.S. officials in North America distinctly resembled that which 
George Arthur had displayed during his early years in Van Diemen’s Land. 
 
Morality and Manhood at Butte des Morts 
 
During the summer of 1827, Lewis Cass and Thomas McKenney travelled to “La Petite 
Butte des Morts” (in present-day Wisconsin) to act as treaty commissioners in negotiations 
between the United States and groups of Ojibwe, Ho-Chunk, and Menominee people. At this 
council Cass intended to build on the diplomatic exertions he had made at Prairie du Chien two 
years previously when he sought to gain at least the nominal loyalty of the region’s American 
Indian peoples and their corollary renunciation of allegiance to the British. But the recent Ho-
Chunk attacks on residents of Prairie du Chien and on a U.S. keelboat crew on the Mississippi 
river threatened to unsettle the thin veneer of amicable relations between the U.S. agents and the 
congregated Indian peoples. No doubt Cass and McKenney also felt annoyed at the likelihood 
that the Ojibwe perpetrators of the Lake Pepin deaths would not surrender themselves, despite 
the agreement the two U.S. agents thought they had reached with the Ojibwes the previous 
summer at Fond du Lac. The treaty negotiations proceeded amidst all these tensions. Then, after 
the conclusion of the council, in response to an act of violence committed by a Native American 
man against his mother-in-law, McKenney, Cass, and the other U.S. agents improvised a 
punishment ceremony in which they symbolically castrated the man in front of a large crown of 
onlookers. In his written accounts of this incident, McKenney framed this punishment as a lesson 
in morality, given by the Americans to all the Indian men looking on, in an attempt to correct 
what McKenney saw as immoral gender relations among Indian people.  
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Though McKenney articulated his morality tale in terms of Indian gender relations, the 
U.S. agents’ improvised crime and punishment ceremony was ultimately more about gender 
relations between (male) U.S. agents and Native American men. On this day, Cass and 
McKenney seemingly managed to portray themselves as possessing a supreme paternal authority 
over the congregated Native American men. On most other recent occasions, this role had merely 
been aspirational; their abilities to play the authoritarian father had been limited by Native 
American expectations of paternal generosity and reciprocity and, above all, by the Indian 
leaders’ clear views that playing the diplomatic role of “children” to their American “fathers” did 
not, in any way, entail subordination to U.S. agents.  
McKenney published two accounts of the incident at Butte des Mortes. The first appeared 
in the New York magazine The Knickerbocker in 1835, and the second in his 1846 Memoirs.167 
The two versions differ slightly in their sequencing of events, and in the wording that McKenney 
used to recollect some of the rhetorical exclamations. But basically each tell the same morality 
tale in which McKenney, Cass, and the other U.S. agents inflicted a humiliating ceremonial 
punishment on a man who attacked his mother-in-law.  
According to McKenney, at the conclusion of the treaty council, as people packed up to 
leave, a whiskey trader arrived in the woods behind the treaty ground. A woman attempted to 
prevent her son-in-law from trading their recently received supplies for “fire-water.” In order to 
rid himself of this impediment, the son-in-law attacked the woman with his knife, making deep 
gashes in both shoulders before “Major F.” knocked him down and prevented him thrusting the 
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knife into the woman’s heart.168 When McKenney and the other U.S. agents asked Cass, “what 
shall we do with this man?,” Cass “answered promptly, ‘Make a woman of him.’”169 In front of 
all the Indians present, they improvised a ceremony in which they dressed the man in a woman’s 
petticoat and symbolically castrated him by breaking the blade off the handle of his knife. 
McKenney’s accounts ultimately constructed the ceremony as a lesson in morality, dispensed to 
the Indians by their American fathers in an attempt to rectify what McKenney saw as the 
unnatural and inhumane gender relations of a generalized “Indian” society.  
In addition to providing McKenney with raw materials for a morality tale, this incident 
appears to have been a small victory for Cass in his efforts to subjugate the Native American 
peoples of the Great Lakes. Yet the act of intervening in violence between Indians, and the 
nature the punishment took, appear to have been highly unusual. During the 1820s, Cass and 
other U.S. agents in the Great Lakes area generally did not attempt to bring violence between 
individual Indians within the jurisdiction of the U.S. law. In the 1850s, Judge Witherell, who had 
acted as counsel for Kataukah at his murder trial in 1821, recounted that he “had no recollection 
of one Indian being hung for killing another Indian. It was generally understood, in early times, 
that they might settle these matters in their own way.”170 Outside “Indian boundaries,” however, 
there appear to have been prosecutions for Indian on Indian violence. On 6 January 1826, Jaques 
Crow, an Ottawa man, was found guilty of manslaughter in the Monroe County circuit court in 
the Michigan territory for the death of a Pottawatomie woman named Ambequaw. Crow received 
one year of hard labor in the county prison and a fine of one hundred dollars.171  
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 Exceptions to the general rule of non-interference in Indian violence seem to have been 
made when U.S. agents judged that circumstances so demanded. In the case of the Saginaw 
Ojibwe leader Kishkauko, U.S. agents in Detroit used Indian on Indian violence outside Indian 
Country as an excuse for the incarceration of a man they considered a dangerous troublemaker. 
Before his arrest in 1826, Kishkauko was well known in the area for his violent acts, and was 
spoken of among the U.S. population as “murderous” and “notorious.”172 For instance, in 
December 1823, the Detroit press described Kishauko’s antics at an intra-tribal Saginaw Ojibwe 
ceremony to cover the dead (after a man had killed his neighbor). According to the report, 
interfering with the custom of the brethren deciding on the fate of the killer, “Kishkauko, the 
notorious Saginaw chief, stepped up to the slayer, and with a single blow with his tomahawk, 
laid him dead at his feet.” Apparently, “[t]he Indians present were very much astonished, and 
asked him the reason why he had interfered to prevent the operation of their old law? He replied, 
in his peculiar tone and manner, “The law is now ALTERED.”173 Kishauko made the news again in 
September 1825, when U.S. agents decided to hold him as security after the Saginaw Ojibwes 
refused to admit claims against their annual annuity payments. Then, the following January, 
when a Saginaw man was found nearly dead at sunset in the streets of Detroit with a tomahawk 
wound to the back of his head, “[s]uspicion immediately rested upon Kishkauko, the notorious 
war chief, long known for his many atrocious murders.”174  
The deputy sheriff and a posse immediately pursued Kishauko’s party, which included 
his son Chimick (or Big Beaver). The posse overtook Kishauko’s party at midnight and found 
Chimick with a bloody tomahawk. According to the newspaper report, on being told that it was 
Governor Cass’s “wish that they should immediately appear before him, [Kishauko and his 
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companions] quietly suffered themselves to be taken to prison.”175 At the coroner’s inquest the 
following day, the jury unanimously found Chimick responsible for the murder, and Kishauko as 
his accessory before the fact.176 Four months later, Kishkauko, with the help of a delivery of 
poison from his wife, killed himself in jail.177 In June, the leaders of the Saginaw Ojibwe 
petitioned Cass for the release of Chimick, who referred the petition to the President.178 
However, Chimick escaped from jail in October, only to drown sometime soon after.179 
  Cass was therefore not against subjecting Native Americans to the U.S. justice system 
for violence against other Indians if the situation permitted. In Kishkauko’s case, this may also 
have been taken as a chance to reinstitute a prosecution against him for a killing of a non-Indian 
several years before the war.180 In contrast, Chimick continued to be held only on the grounds of 
killing of the Saginaw Ojibwe man. As with the case of Jaques Crow, the violence occurred 
outside “Indian boundaries,” thus giving Cass and other U.S. agents firmer ground for imposing 
U.S. jurisdiction. In contrast, the punishment he designed at Butte des Morts was well inside 
“Indian boundaries,” and a long way away from recognized rituals of the U.S. justice system. 
Yet to Cass, the treaty grounds no doubt represented a landscape transformed (albeit temporarily) 
into a site to display the supreme power and authority of the United States government. 
For McKenney, the attack of the Indian man on his mother-in-law at Butte des Morts in 
1827 was symptomatic of the wider moral problem represented by “Indian” gender relations. The 
true immorality of the son-in-law’s violence at Butte des Morts lay not in the assault itself. 
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Rather, in McKenney’s narrations of the incident, it was the gendered nature of the attack that 
prompted American intervention. The man’s attack on his mother-in-law was a crime subject to 
the American’s summary and improvised ceremonial punishment because it was committed by 
an Indian man on an Indian woman. It therefore needed to be understood through the prism of a 
generalized “Indian” society, in which Indian men were the malign “Lords” of Indian women. 
He did not identify from which group the man came, though there were three peoples represented 
at the council – the Ojibwes, the Ho-Chunks, and the Menominees. Instead, McKenney wrote 
about the son-in-law’s actions as representing an immoral characteristic of a stereotyped 
“Indian” society.  
In his narratives of the incident, McKenney presented gender relations in this generalized 
“Indian” society as aberrant to his own version of ideal gender norms – the apparently essential 
and true universal standards to which all relations between the sexes should adhere. Thus, like 
many other nineteenth-century European and Euro-American commentators, McKenney judged 
gender relations among Native American peoples from the perspective of his own society’s 
prevailing gender norms. According to McKenney then, that day at Butte des Morts, during the 
summer of 1827, the Indians needed to be taught about the true moral order in which human 
society should be structured. 
McKenney therefore justified the actions of the U.S. agents in administering the 
punishment in terms of not only punishing the perpetrator of the attack, but in teaching a moral 
lesson, to all the Indian men present, about proper gender relations. In his 1835 narrative, he 
stated that “[i]t would never do to leave that region, and the Indians present, under the belief that 
such conduct would be permitted; and especially was it due to the Indian women to use the 
occasion in such a way as to raise them from that degraded subordination in which they were 
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held.”181 Similarly, he concluded his description of the incident in his Memoirs by stating that 
“this mode of punishment was intended to produce moral results, and to elevate the condition of 
women, among the Indians.”182 For McKenney, this quest to relieve Indian women of what he 
saw as “the drudgery to which she is subject” was a central element in his benevolent intentions 
towards the Indians. 
He therefore wrote about the punishment ceremony as if it were part of a righteous moral 
crusade. In his 1835 article, he stated that from the moment the U.S. agents interjected in the 
violence, they could hear the Indian men “whetting their knives, and denying [the American’s] 
right to interpose.” The Native men reportedly proclaimed that: “‘An Indian man has a right to 
kill a woman, and no white man shall interfere.’”183 When news spread that the man would be 
punished, an atmosphere of animosity apparently prevailed among the Native American men, for 
“They had all heard that the murderer, (in intent) was to be punished [even for] an attempt to kill 
a woman! – a right which the men considered to be as sacred as was their right to their hills and 
rivers.”184 McKenney therefore constructed the American intervention as a righteous and brave 
effort to counter what he saw as morally aberrant gender relations. 
Despite the discontent of the vast majority of the men present, the crowd nevertheless 
assembled, and the culprit was brought to the mound. In the 1835 account McKenney recalled 
that Cass then announced to the audience, “We have determined to punish this man: we will 
make a woman of him!” Two voyageurs then stripped the man of his leggings, “and all the 
exterior appendages of his sex” and “put on him an old worn-out petticoat.” McKenney then took 
the knife out of the offender’s hand, and in an act suggestive of castration, broke the blade from 
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the handle.185 In his later (and even more dramatic) Memoir account, McKenney recalled that 
before the voyageurs put the petticoat on the man, he (McKenney himself) took the knife out of 
the man’s waist-belt, drew if from its scabbard, then “thrust the blade into a crack in the flag-
staff, and broke it off at the handle; then putting the handle in the culprit’s hand, I raised it well 
and high up, and said – No man who employs his knife as this man employs his, has the right to 
carry one. Henceforth, this shall be the only knife he shall ever use.”186 McKenney then took the 
opportunity to pontificate his moral lesson to the crowd and proclaimed that “[w]oman, wherever 
she is, should be protected by man, not murdered. She is man’s best friend. The Great Spirit gave 
her to man to be one with him, and to bless him; and man, whether red or white, should love her, 
and make her happy.”187 
But for the man who received the humiliation of the summary public ceremonial 
emasculation there was, in McKenney’s accounts, to be no uplifting ending. After the ceremony, 
the man fled to a nearby lodge, followed by an interpreter. “On reaching the door of his lodge,” 
the man fell “face foremost,” and breathing “hard and heavily,” muttered that he wished the 
Americans had shot him, as he had thought they were going to. “I went out to be shot,” he said. 
“I am now a dog - - and worse than a dog, – I’m a woman!”188 In McKenney’s view, the man had 
received the punishment he deserved; he had come to be as degraded as the women who he, as 
an Indian man, had been guilty of degrading. 
 In both his accounts of the incident, McKenney maintained that the individual man’s 
punishment was of secondary importance to the message he hoped it sent to the Indian men in 
the crowd. And although this message was articulated through violent references to 
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emasculation, McKenney nevertheless argued that, overall, the Americans’ intentions had been 
benevolent because the fundamental aim of the ceremony was to relieve Indian women from 
what he saw as their subjection and drudgery. He thus wrote that, “this mode of punishment was 
intended to produce moral results, and to elevate the condition of women, among the Indians.”189 
For McKenney, above all else, the ceremony was benevolent in intent because it asserted 
universally proper and natural gender relations, for the benefit of Indian women. 
 By framing this incident as part of a morally righteous cause, McKenney also presented 
American intervention as natural and just. Yet intervening in this dispute, and administering a 
ceremonial punishment, was highly anomalous behavior on the part of the Americans, even 
when viewed in the context of American attempts to assert their controlling influence over the 
peoples of the Great Lakes region. During this time, Lewis Cass in particular was intent on 
bringing Native Americans within the ambit of the U.S. judicial system in cases where they 
caused the deaths of U.S. citizens. He attempted this even when these deaths occurred in Indian 
Country, where U.S. jurisdiction was more an aspiration than a contemporaneous reality. But as 
stated earlier, it was very unusual for U.S. officials to claim jurisdiction over Indian on Indian 
violence, especially in Indian Country. Yet in McKenney’s renderings, American intervention 
was unquestionably justified because the knife-wielding son-in-law’s act represented a grievous 
breech of the natural moral order.  
 But looking beyond the meanings that McKenney himself ascribed to this ceremony, this 
incident highlights other significant dynamics. Presuming that McKenney’s reminiscences give 
at least a general picture of what actually happened that day at Buttes des Morts in 1827, then 
this incident seems to have been a moment where Lewis Cass, Thomas McKenney, and their 
fellow U.S. officers, managed to gain (albeit temporarily) a much-sought-after ascendency over a 
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gathering of Native American men. Lewis Cass, in particular, was well known throughout the 
territory for his efforts to assert a controlling authority in U.S.-Indian relations. He was also 
known in non-Indian circles as an expert on “the Indian” and “the Indian character.” Yet, as 
discussed earlier, when read in light of his actual diplomatic activities in the Great Lakes, these 
often-degrading discursive stereotypes appear as disingenuous political maneuvers. By 1827, 
Cass had over ten years experience traveling through Indian Country and negotiating treaties 
with the various peoples of the Great Lakes region. He had spent time with various American 
Indians groups, not only during social and diplomatic gatherings, but also as part of his efforts to 
collect and record information about Native American histories and cultures. His understanding 
of the people with whom he dealt went beyond his own discursively constructed stereotypes. 
  In fact, it seems that when McKenney and the other U.S. officers came to ask Cass what 
they should do with the knife-wielding son-in-law, Cass used his interpretation of Native 
American histories to construct a punishment ceremony aimed at praying on deep-seated fears 
among the male onlookers. Cass most likely got the idea for dressing the man in a petticoat from 
his belief that the phrase “putting on the petticoat” denoted subjection and loss of manliness 
among at least some Native American peoples. In his 1826 article in the North American Review, 
Cass referred to the Delawares metaphorically “putting on the petticoat” by submitting to the 
Iroquois in the eighteenth century. In this article, he argued against an interpretation by a 
Moravian missionary that the Delaware were at the height of their power when they “put on the 
petticoat.” Cass wrote that to believe “an Indian tribe, while in the full career of victory, should 
be stopped, by a proposition from their rivals and enemies to become women, to put on a 
petticoat . . . the last degradation to which a warrior could submit, requires a degree of credulity 
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greater than has fallen our lot.”190 Cass’s choice to reference this idea at Butte des Mort suggests 
that he believed the petticoat would symbolize a loss of manhood among the peoples present at 
the council. He transformed this linguistic metaphor into a visual symbol to display one 
individual man’s punitive degradation. The Americans then combined the emasculation 
symbolized by the petticoat with the breaking of the man’s knife. This ceremonial allusion to 
castration and loss of masculine honor further represented this stripping of manhood.  
 So despite McKenney’s narrative attempts to make this ceremony about the morality of 
male-female societal relations, this ceremony was fundamentally about the U.S. agents asserting 
their control over the Native American men. The gendered interaction that seems most crucial 
here was thus between two groups of men – McKenney, Cass, and the other U.S. officers on the 
one hand, and the Ojibwe, Ho-Chunk, and Menominee men on the other. That Cass and 
McKenney chose publically and symbolically to castrate a Native American man, highlights 
most powerfully that understandings of manhood were central to their efforts to get their 
projected authority to gain some real traction. But in many other moments (as previously 
discussed), such as Cass’s failed attempts to bring the alleged Lake Pepin murderers within the 
ambit of U.S. justice, Cass and McKenney failed in their efforts to bring to fruition their 
discursive projections of control over American Indian peoples. And they failed in these cases 
because indigenous men did not subscribe to Cass and McKenney’s authoritarian pretensions. 
The protocols still current in the Great Lakes during this time required U.S. agents such 
as Cass and McKenney to take the role of “father” in diplomatic negotiations. Both men adhered 
to the linguistic conventions required by this role (for instance during the treaty negotiations at 
Fond du Lac in 1826 and then at Butte des Morts in 1827). As already discussed, their ideas on 
what it meant to play role of “father” involved differed from those of their Native American 
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“children.” While Cass and McKenney knew the required language, they subverted it in their 
attempts to assert a subordinating control over Native American people. At the same time Native 
American people attempted to reassert their ideal of a generous and forgiving father.  
At the same time, in the writings of men such as Cass and McKenney, Native American 
people had come to represent a “moral problem” of a different kind. Both men proclaimed that 
the United States government had a moral duty to the Indians. However, this was the kind of 
moral duty that McKenney represented in his narration of the crime and punishment incident at 
Butte des Morts. It was a unilaterally defined understanding of morality, which gave government 
agents the ostensible right and duty to assert control over Native American people when they 
transgressed this moral order. McKenney’s ideas in this area seem to have been genuinely 
idealistic, rather than disingenuous. He honestly believed he had a duty to bring Native American 
people in line with what he thought to be the true and proper moral order. In the case of Cass, a 
pragmatic and committed U.S. expansionist, references to the government’s moral duty appear 
more as rhetorical gestures than heart-felt commitments. But in neither man’s schema was there 
room for a moral code influenced by indigenous peoples’ understandings of right and wrong.  
For one day, in the summer of 1827, Cass and McKenney seemingly managed to make 
their vision of their own, unilateral, paternal authority a momentary reality. And yet, in the 
reality of negotiations and struggles with Native American people, their pretentions to being the 
supreme paternal authority in the land were rarely so successfully carried out.  
 
Honor, Obligation, and Equity 
 
 During the 1820s, the British authorities in the Canadas continued to be locked in the web 
of obligations created and perpetuated by the annual present-giving ceremonies. Attended by 
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thousands of Native Americans from across the Canadas, as well as by thousands residing in the 
territory claimed by the United States, the British authorities used these ceremonies as forums at 
which to exercise strategic diplomacy and gather intelligence. In November 1827 the Governor-
General of British North America, Earl Dalhousie, wrote from Quebec to the secretary of state 
for the colonies, Earl Bathurst, in London, strongly stressing the need to continue the tradition of 
giving presents to their Indian allies. In this dispatch, Dalhousie enclosed Captain Anderson’s 
August 1827 report from Drummond Island (now in Michigan) about news of a conflict between 
the Ho-Chunks and the Americans, which Dalhousie introduced as a description of “some late 
events and disputes with Governor Cass and the Americans in the Michigan Territory.” 
Dalhousie’s interpretation of the significance of Anderson’s letter was later removed from the 
version of the dispatch printed in the 1834 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers on 
“Aboriginal Tribes.” Referring to diplomatic dynamics between the British and their republican 
neighbors, which were perhaps deemed too sensitive for wider dissemination, Dalhousie stated 
that “[t]hese papers not only shew approaching dissentions in that matter between the Indians 
and Americans, but they shew urgent necessity for . . . attentive inquiries there, for a sort of 
Diplomatic management in that quarter, for active communication with the Officers of the 
Indians Department at these outposts – and above all for a pointed fidelity in the delivery of the 
presents that by long custom have been paid, and must continue to be paid to them.”191 For the 
executive government in British North America, the delivery of presents was part of a policy to 
protect British interests in the area.  
The British government in London did not necessarily share this understanding. Indeed, 
in stressing the vital role played by officers of the Indian Department, Dalhousie was directly 
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responding to an executive push from London to abolish the department. By the late 1820s, the 
expense of the annuities to the North American Indians had become a concern for the treasury in 
London, which was increasingly looking to systematize colonial administration in order to 
reduce expenditure. With pressure to administer the colonial office within the bounds of this 
tightening fiscal framework, the secretary of state for war and the colonies, Lord Goderich, wrote 
to Dalhousie in July 1827 stating “that measures should be taken for ascertaining the precise 
expense of the Indian department, both in the salaries of officers, and in the amount of the stores 
distributed to the Indians, with the view of effecting the reduction, and ultimately abolition of the 
establishment.”192  This policy therefore represented an economic rationalization, which would 
entail the ultimate abolition of a department whose entanglement in customary obligations 
seemingly did not fit neatly within the developing fiscal system. As part of the measures to 
implement this abolition, Goderich informed Dalhousie that the heads of the Indian Departments 
should meet with all the chiefs entitled to annual presents to negotiate the commutation of goods 
into fixed installments of British currency. Upon abolition of the department, these installments 
would be issued “at the nearest military post at which an officer of the commissariat may happen 
to be stationed.”193 The custom of present-giving, and the department that administered it, were 
therefore to be abolished to make way for a less expensive, purely financial arrangement through 
which the British government could discharge its obligations to the Indians.  
Dalhousie’s argument that the abolition of the Indian Department would harm Britain’s 
foreign relations interests was only one of many that he presented to refute, in its entirety, this 
policy directive from London. In his forcefully argued dispatch of November 1827, he gave an 
account of the local circumstances under which the Indian Department operated in order to 
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present the incompatibility of the proposed measures to local administrative demands. In 
wording which left no room for the adoption of the proposal, in either form or substance, 
Dalhousie stated that he thought “the proposed measure fully fraught with mischief to the 
Indians, no saving nor advantage possible to the Government, and the future consequences of it 
dangerous in the extreme.”194 He therefore firmly refused to end present-giving ceremonies or to 
commute annuities entirely to currency. Reminding the colonial office in London of the local 
customs to which officials in Canada were bound, he enclosed a letter he had sent to the former 
secretary of state for the colonial office, Earl Bathurst, in December 1822. In this letter he 
succinctly summarized these obligations and communicated the imperative need that they be 
met: “Old customs have established claims in the minds of the Indians upon the bounty of their 
Great Father, as his Majesty the King of Great Britain is spoken of by them, which, if curtailed 
or broken off, would be considered a breach of faith unjustifiable in their eyes, and would 
assuredly be followed by consequences seriously to be avoided.”195 As the overarching theme of 
his critique, Dalhousie argued that the policy directive had been conceived without any 
understanding of the demands of Indian policy administration in North America. British 
obligations to the First Nations could not be reduced to a purely fiscal relationship; they involved 
a web of diplomatic relations, and any such attempts to abrogate these heredity responsibilities 
would seriously impede British interests in North America.  
Dalhousie argued that the most serious consequences of such a breach of faith would be 
experienced in relation to the “Western tribes” in Upper Canada and the United States. He 
therefore stressed the dangers the local authorities in Upper Canada would face if presents were 
abolished, warning that “savage as those distant tribes are, they have their treaties, their peace 
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and war agreements, constantly in their minds; they would insist upon their presents established 
by long custom, and if not complied with on representation, they would do themselves justice to 
their own satisfaction, and we should soon find them most formidable enemies.” Moreover, 
Dalhousie argued that losing their Indian allies on both sides of the imperial frontier would affect 
their ability to secure their interests against the United States. He therefore stressed that their 
friendship with their Indian allies, on its present terms, worked as an effective buffer against the 
United States: “The friendship the Western tribes bear to the British is sincere, and in proportion 
as the American excite their [antipathy] by encroachments and by false promises; or by non 
performance of promises made, so does their regard for, and their admiration and confidence in 
the British rise with their Chiefs.”196 According to Dalhousie, the annual present-giving councils 
therefore served a necessary and effective role in protecting British interests in Upper Canada. 
 In rejecting the suggestion that Britain’s material obligations to the Native Americans be 
commuted to British currency, Dalhousie drew on language that stressed Britain’s paternal 
obligations to their Indian “subjects.” As part of his broader critique that the policy from London 
had been conceived without any knowledge of the local circumstances, Dalhousie stated that 
colonial officials in the Canadas would receive the news that they would be commuting the 
presents into money with “the utmost alarm” because “[e]very man here knows that money to 
Indians is instantly spent in spirituous liquors.” The system of giving practical presents as 
payment, he argued, had been “intended expressly to avoid temptation, and take away the means 
furnished to that dreadful state of brutal drunkedness, to which all Indians, men, women and 
children, give themselves.” In order to stress this issue as an imperative local concern, Dalhousie 
represented it as a matter of major importance to First Nations leaders, with whom he dealt 
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directly in the discharge of his administrative duties: “One of the most urgent and most constant 
prayers made to me by the chiefs is to remove the white men, tavern keepers, from their villages, 
and it has created great trouble, with much legal expense and difficulty, to do that in late 
years.”197 Dalhousie therefore represented the local government’s relationship with the Indians as 
entailing direct paternal obligations to the Indians, which – contrary to the assumptions being 
made in London – they carried out with a view to moral as well as fiscal responsibilities. 
 Dalhousie’s arguments suggested that he grasped the economic rationale behind the 
colonial office’s push to wind down and ultimately abolish the Indian Department. In advocating 
for the continuation of the department, he therefore used terms that might be more agreeable to 
the Treasury in London. In concluding his November 1827 dispatch, he expressed his “most 
humble but earnest advice, that this Department, so far from being abolished, should be 
remodeled, and made more efficient to the extensive and important duties which are required in 
it.”198 He thus expressed a politic willingness to adhere to the pressure on the colonial office to 
rationalize expenditure, though he redefined the bounds through which this was possible, firmly 
asserting that the duties of the Indian Department must nevertheless continue. 
 Although Dalhousie successfully persuaded the colonial office in London to retain the 
Indian Department in North America, over the ensuing years colonial office officials 
nevertheless continued to pass on, from the treasury in London to the executive in Upper 
Canada, the pressure to reduce the cost of the department. Five years later, in 1832, a private 
memo reached London which criticized the efficiency of the Indian Department and argued that 
the department be wound down.  In response to this, the lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, 
Sir John Colborne, stressed to Goderich – who had again assumed the role of secretary of state 
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for war and the colonies – the heavy weight of the obligation felt by the British officials in Upper 
Canada to continue the annual delivery of presents. “[T]he British Government cannot,” he 
stated, “I imagine, now, under any circumstances, get rid of an inconvenient debt, contracted at a 
period when an alliance with the Indians was highly appreciated.”199 Sensing the incongruity of 
the custom to administrators back in London, Colborne argued that national honor rested on the 
continuation of the tradition:  “However embarrassing, therefore, it may be found to incur an 
expense annually for presents, I am persuaded your Lordship will think that this periodical 
acknowledgement of their claims and exertions cannot be discontinued without a loss of 
character on the part of the British nation.”200 In order to bolster this argument, Colborne also 
enclosed a letter from the Chief Superintendent of the Indian Department in Upper Canada, 
James Givins, who gave further weight to these claims of honor, by stressing the nature in which 
the obligations arose. Givins couched the obligations in terms of those owed to former soldiers. 
He stated that the British commitments to the Indians had arisen “during the late contest with the 
United States,” in which the Indians had joined the British forces “with remarkable zeal.” He 
further stated that “[m]any individuals of the several tribes have received wounds in that war 
while fighting in our cause. Promises of support and assistance in presents were held out to them, 
under the authority and sanction of the Commander of the Forces for the time being, and that 
assistance was promised in perpetuity.”201 The British government could not, argued Colborne 
and Givins, abrogate these obligations without a breach of honor. 
 In his response to criticisms of his department, Givins used a language of equitable 
entitlement to articulate the relationship between his department and the Indians. For instance, 
writing about the British government’s practice of extinguishing Indian land title, Givins stated 
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that “it is a matter of public notoriety that the purchases from the Indians are made in a very 
formal manner, under written treaties and contracts, and the amount of the consideration 
specially stated.” Articulating how this practice created equitable obligations on the part of the 
British, he stated, that “the honor and good faith of the Government” were “as much pledged” to 
the fulfillment of these agreements “as in the case of any patent or deed from the Crown, and 
indeed more so, because the Indians have not the same legal remedy as other subjects.”202 In 
articulating the local diplomatic custom in terms of “honor” and “good faith,” Givins managed to 
frame an apparently anomalous colonial practice into a well established English customary 
language; the language of equitable obligations. Although there might have been grey areas 
regarding the exact legal status of Indian treaties, the practice nevertheless produced equitable 
claims on the British, which imposed upon them a duty to act in the interests of the Indians.203 
This type of language had already gained currency in London, as it allowed the colonial 
office to articulate requests for funds for an incongruous practice using an understandable 
administrative vocabulary. For instance, Dalhousie had suggested in 1827 that the custom of 
delivering presents had created an equitable obligation, the breach of which the Indians 
themselves would punish. As already noted, he believed that the “distant tribes,” in particular, 
“would insist upon their presents established by long custom, and if not complied with on 
representation, they would do themselves justice to their own satisfaction.”204 Similarly, when 
Viscount Howick, the under-secretary for the colonies, made the colonial office’s 1832 annual 
request for the treasury to defray money towards the expense of the Indian Department in British 
North America, he articulated the imperative to continue these obligations because of the 
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demands of both expedient and equitable government, stating that “[u]nder these circumstances 
it would be alike impolitic and unjust suddenly to discontinue the issue of the customary 
presents.”205 Justice, in this context, did not correlate to a legal obligation per se, but to a 
fiduciary obligation for the British to fulfill, in good faith, their promise to provide the First 
Nations with annual presents. Though First Nations people could not pursue a legal remedy in 
the British courts, they could nevertheless exact their own justice. Moreover – as the language of 
the British officials implies – to discontinue the presents would not only be unjust to the Indians, 
it would also bring shame and dishonor upon the British government.  
However, by the early 1830s, this framing of British diplomatic relations with North 
American Indians as a fiduciary relationship became increasingly paired with the language of 
broader benevolent intentions towards the “improvement” of “the Indians.” In 1830, for instance, 
Colborne wrote of his intention to implement, in a much more systematic way, a policy aimed at 
the ultimate “civilization” of all First Nations people in Upper Canada. He noted that although 
the Indians would unlikely be induced “to consent suddenly to exchange many of their usual 
presents for articles that we may consider more useful to them,” he trusted however, “that their 
interests which have been long shamefully neglected, will be found strictly consulted in 
following the system which has been commenced this season, and that in a few years they will 
become useful subjects, and prepared to provide for themselves.”206  These proposals gained 
strong support from the colonial office in London. For instance, in 1830, Goderich 
communicated his “approbation” for the measures Colborne had adopted “for civilizing and 
improving the condition of the Indians in Upper Canada.”207 Again in 1831, he approved of 
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Colborne’s plan to purchase tobacco in Canada, and to use the amount saved “to forward the 
measure in progress for civilizing and improving the habits of the Indian tribes.”208 
Given that these civilization plans aimed to make First Nations people self-sufficient, this 
policy would allow British officials to receive the necessary funds to fulfill their good faith 
obligations to the Indians, while also imagining a future where they would be released from such 
obligations. Therefore, in 1832, when Howick couched the colonial office’s request for the 
release of funds to buy the presents, he used the newly developed civilization program to assure 
the treasury that such grants would be finite; that colonial officials were committed to a policy 
which entailed the lessening of expenses. Howick therefore informed the secretary of the 
Treasury that though Lord Goderich regretted “the necessity of proposing that Parliament should 
be asked for so large a grant,” he trusted that the amount of future grants “may gradually be 
diminished in proportion as the Indians can be induced to settle and to adopt the habits of 
civilized life.”209 This also gave officers of the Indian Department a stronger moral position from 
which to request funds. In 1830, for instance, Colborne wrote of his intention to sanction, within 
the allotted budget for the Indian Department in Upper Cananda, “every reasonable expense 
required to civilize the Indians and ameliorate their condition.”210 Then, when arguments about 
the need to abolish the department again emerged in 1832, Colborne could refute them from the 
standpoint of moral obligations, stating that “the benevolent intentions of His Majesty’s 
Government will be frustrated should the expenditure of the Indian department be 
diminished.”211 
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 The custom of giving presents to the Indians, which appeared to the government in 
London as an incongruous practice, was translated into the language of governmental 
administration as an equitable obligation. Although it created responsibilities that would be 
unjust to abrogate, as the pressure from treasury increased in the late 1820s, British 
governmental officers in both England and North America increasingly viewed it as an 
inconvenient system that needed to be overcome. Yet it was only in the interests of a larger 
justice that it could be abandoned. Plans for the civilization in Upper Canada fit this criterion; in 
civilizing the Indians the officials could argue that they were, in fact, not abrogating their 
fiduciary duties, but instead were taking better care of the interests of those to whom they were 
under an obligation. Colborne, for instance, presented his civilization policy as a moment in 
which the true interests of the Indians had, at last, been recognized, stating that such interests 
“had been long shamefully neglected.”212 Moreover, once the civilization program had been 
articulated in this way, the custom of delivering presents itself became morally questionable. 
Now practices that did not contribute to the ultimate goal of “civilizing the Indians” could not be 
truly, morally just. Administrators therefore refashioned the custom of present-giving as a 
temporary problem that would be overcome once First Nations people embraced the benefits of 
“civilization” and Christianity. 
 In terms of the prevailing ideologies of moral duty and fiscal responsibility, a policy 
aimed at “civilizing the Indians” seemed the ultimate solution to the moral and fiscal problem 
that the Indians posed to the British administration in both Upper Canada and London. Though 
they could not immediately end delivering presents without compromising both their honor and 
the peaceful nature of their relationship with their “Indian children,” they could instead give 
presents that the First Peoples could employ towards the goal of becoming self-sufficient 
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subjects. The British would therefore discharge their moral duty by bringing First Nations people 





Ideas of morality therefore proved remarkably amenable on both sides of the border to 
providing both the imperative and the justification for rituals and policies that subjugated Native 
peoples. In the name of moral pedagogy, McKenney could justify a violent ritual of punishment 
to subject Native American manhood to the apparently unstoppable virility of U.S. power, thus 
imposing what he posited as the morally immutable and universally natural order of gender 
relations. Similarly, British plans to “civilize the Indians,” like earlier Jeffersonian ideology in 
the U.S., would discharge the British regime’s apparent “moral obligations” to the Indians by 
bringing them within the ambit of what British agents projected as proper human relations. They 
would become self-sufficient subjects rather than military allies to whom the British owed a 
fiscally inconvenient equitable obligation. Yet in both cases, the discord created by these 
dealings would have an ongoing impact. 
Cass and McKenney’s ceremony at Butte des Morts seems to have provoked, or at least 
contributed to, fears among Native American men in the Great Lakes of emasculation at the 
hands of the Americans. In April 1832, a group of mainly Sauk people, under the leadership of 
Black Hawk, returned to Illinois from across the Mississippi. Hostilities between the group and 
the U.S. ensued, continuing through the summer. In an attempt to understand Black Hawk’s 
grievances, William Clark gathered information from two neighboring Mesquakie (Fox) men. 
According to these men, a group of Sauk people from Black Hawk’s community had recently 
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returned terrified from a visit to the British fort at Amherstburg. The cause for alarm was the 
warning they had been given during the visit that “the Americans were determined shortly to lay 
hands on all [their] males, both old and young, and deprive them of those parts which are said to 
be essential to courage.”213 Such warnings apparently resonated in a region where a thousand 
people had five years earlier witnessed an American ceremony of symbolic castration. 
In the more immediate aftermath of the events of 1827, McKenney would continue to 
exhibit, in his administration of the Indian Office, a similar mix of obstinate authoritarianism and 
paternal benevolence. In their 1829 report on Indian Affairs, Cass and William Clark would, as 
already discussed, seek to formalize – and bring within the U.S. statute books – the procedures 
for negotiating the surrender of Native Americans accused of crimes against non-Indians. Had 
McKenney the final say on this authority, such surrenders may have been designated with more 
immediate and dire consequences. When Red Bird died in custody in January 1828, before being 
brought to trial – as Hootshoapkau related to the British at Drummond Island that summer – 
McKenney pronounced his regret, not only for Red Bird’s suffering, but also “from the loss of 
the example which hanging would have produced.”214 Writing to Clark in April 1828, 
McKenney argued that something needed to be done to reduce the long pre-trial incarceration 
periods of “Indians who commit violence, and who ought to die for their acts.” McKenney 
contended that the “forms of our Courts in their cases ought to be changed” so that “if an Indian 
surrenders himself, or is surrendered by his Tribe for murder,” the act of the surrender should 
itself be the only proof needed to carry out an execution. Until Clark and Cass wrote a report to 
consolidate such laws however, the Indian department would have to continue to “go on Slip-
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shod.”215 Such a merciless view was particularly curious from a man who, as will be discussed in 
the next chapter, had only the previous summer been tremendously enamored with Red Bird. 
In Upper Canada, the obligation of giving presents to their First Nations allies continued 
to create a headache for the British administration. In 1836, the British government in England 
again pushed for a commutation of presents to North American Indians. Well briefed on the 
government’s previous attempts to commute the presents to money payments, the new secretary 
of state for war and the colonies, Lord Glenelg, asked Francis Bond Head, the newly appointed 
lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, whether it would be possible to end delivering presents to 
“the Indians” without an “unjust and impolitic” breach of good faith.216 Though Head proposed 
plans to end delivering presents to the “visiting Indians” from the U.S., he nevertheless rejected 
proposals that the duties of the Indian Department be moved to the Commissariat, believing that 
this would end the special, fiduciary relationship between the British “father” and his “Indian 
children,” and entail a “Migration of these simple People from Equity to Law.” Head instead 
sought to hold onto the ceremonial role of “father” to the Indians, arguing that “The Lieutenant 
Governor of Upper Canada, styled by the Indians ‘their Father,’ has, under the Direction of the 
Colonial Minister, hitherto treated them as his Children, but if any new Regulations whatever 
were to be created to deprive him of parentally governing these People according to their simple 
Habits, and according to transient Circumstances, they would be Losers by the Arrangement.”217 
Like McKenney, Head would attempt to use his position of paternal governance to effect the 
“removal” of the Province’s First Peoples, with the stated aim of saving them from the 
apparently malevolent forces of “civilization.” Yet, as was also the case with McKenney, George 
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Arthur, and Charles La Trobe, these pronouncements about protecting indigenous people from 
“moral” dangers obscured – as will be discussed in the next chapter – more personal reasons for 
advocating for the complete separation of so-called “savage” and “civilized” societies.
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Chapter Three 




 When Englishman Charles Joseph La Trobe travelled through North America in 1832 and 
1833, his future as a British colonial official was as yet unforeseen. In the two-volume narrative 
of this trip, published in 1835 under the title The Rambler in North America, La Trobe 
proclaimed that one of the purposes of his travels was to meet American Indian people.218 During 
his travels La Trobe did, in fact, have several close interactions with Native American and First 
Nations people. In the United States, he also imbibed a large amount of Jacksonian rhetoric on 
U.S.-Indian relations. Although an outsider, and an avowed “cosmopolitan,” La Trobe’s 
descriptions of Native American people align remarkably closely with tropes commonly used in 
justifications for the Jacksonians’ Indian removal policy. On first reading, La Trobe appears to 
explain his support for the federal government’s policy as if he were a mouthpiece of the 
Democratic Party, heralding removal as the only way to solve the apparently inevitable and 
endemic problems created by the proximity of “civilization” and “savagery.” Like Lewis Cass, 
Thomas McKenney, and George Arthur, La Trobe framed these problems as issues of morality, 
which the non-indigenous, self-proclaimed “civilized” society had a moral duty to solve. 
Strikingly though, he defined the problems in abstract and generalized terms, rarely mentioning 
actual encounters or interactions with Native American people. Yet during his travels through 
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Indian Country in 1832, La Trobe confronted problems of a much more personal ilk; problems 
which he also framed – though only in private accounts – as “moral.” 
 Travelling as mentor to the twenty-year old Swiss Count, Albert de Pourtalès, La Trobe 
faced the ongoing challenge of preventing his young charge from the immorality of sowing his 
wild oats with as many Native American women as possible. In his published text La Trobe 
justified at length, in abstract, generalized terms, the Jacksonians’ starkly segregationist removal 
policy, but he never mentioned the day to day struggles he faced while attempting to thwart 
Pourtalès’s sinful intentions, and to reform his moral character. During his travels through Indian 
Country, La Trobe therefore experienced contacts between the so-called “civilized” and “savage” 
as rife with moral danger of a more intimate and therefore more unspeakable nature. Such 
perceptions of moral danger, experienced during close interactions with indigenous people, 
suggest that beneath the abstract, generalized justifications for removal, there lay other reasons 
why La Trobe believed that “[t]he white man and the Indian cannot be near neighbours.”219 
Like Thomas McKenney, George Arthur, and Francis Bond Head (who became 
lieutenant governor of Upper Canada in 1836), La Trobe used relational dichotomies such as 
“civilization” and “savagery” to explain what he saw as both the actual and proper order of 
human relations. He thus wrote of “civilization” and “savagery” as common-sense descriptors of 
readily perceptible societal characteristics; the U.S. polity took the mantle of “civilization” and 
Indian peoples, the other, less exalted label. Francis Bond Head also consistently referred to this 
relationship, though as a romanticist, he proclaimed the superior lifestyle of the so-called 
“primitive children of the forest,” over what he framed as the malevolence of “civilization.”  
While also presuming these categories, Thomas McKenney more often mobilized the paternalist 
relational metaphor of American “fathers” and Indian “children.” George Arthur too, though not 
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so committed to the overtly paternalist language, believed that ideal relations between the British 
colonists and the Van Demonian indigenous people would entail the indigenous people adhering 
to the benevolent, fatherly dictates of the colonists. Upon these abstracted, dichotomous 
relationships, these men founded their justifications for removal.  
These dichotomies represented particular visions of the true and necessary order of 
relations between different categories of people: in North America, “Indian” and non-Indian; in 
Van Diemen’s Land, “Aborigine” and non-Aborigine. For the men who employed them, they 
therefore also necessarily contained self-understandings of what it meant to be a non-indigenous 
man, and the self-proclaimed representatives of “civilized” society. Yet while these generalized 
understandings of the differences between themselves and indigenous people could be cleanly 
delineated in their written discourse, during interpersonal interactions with indigenous people, 
these men faced situations that challenged and subverted their discursively constructed 
boundaries. For instance, when confronted with fully mature Native American men, Thomas 
McKenney and Francis Bond Head had to face the physical presence of masculine subjectivities 
that destabilized their abilities to project themselves as the more-mature figures lording over 
their so-called Indian “children.” One does not need to read too deeply between the lines of these 
men’s writings about their interactions with indigenous people to uncover dynamics that suggest 
reasons why – beyond their overt justifications – they proclaimed support for starkly 
segregationist removal policies.  
While they advocated for removal as a way to discharge the so-called moral duty of a 
(self-styled) more advanced or mature society over supposedly childlike or “savage” people, 
their writings about interactions with indigenous people reveal many other issues, which they 
would also have identified as “moral,” but which they did not make explicit. In this chapter I 
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explore these hidden dynamics of encounters between U.S. and British government officials and 
indigenous people, in order to suggest how the white men’s experience of these encounters 
contributed to their support for removal. While McKenney, along with the Englishmen Charles 
La Trobe, George Arthur, and Francis Bond Head, ultimately promoted removal on the 
ostensible grounds that it saved indigenous people from inevitable harm and even extinction, 
their writings about their encounters with indigenous people reveal personal experiences that 
suggest alternative explanations for why they decided that proximity between indigenous people 
and “civilization” presented such “moral” dangers. In this way, I reveal some of the hidden 
cultural impulses behind the move in the United States and parts of the British Empire towards 
the stark extremism of removal policies, all of which entailed the attempted total expropriation of 
indigenous land and the almost absolute segregation of indigenous people from the invading 
society. 
When viewed from the perspective of interpersonal interactions, issues of masculinity lay 
at the heart of these cultural dynamics. During encounters between these American and English 
men and indigenous people, the non-indigenous men had to confront what it meant to be a 
“civilized” man, or the wise and benevolent “father” to their indigenous “children.” In the case 
of Thomas McKenney, who travelled to the western Great Lakes in the summers of 1826 and 
1827, the strict paternalist relational schema through which he viewed his all relations with his 
“Indian children” seemingly unraveled in the presence of large numbers of Native American 
men. In tantalizing homoerotic descriptions of these men’s beautiful physical forms and 
movements, McKenney implicitly revealed the unarticulated sense of danger he experienced 
from close personal proximity to Native Americans. In these situations the attraction McKenney 
felt towards the very unchildlike masculinities of Native American men represented an obscured 
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site of moral danger for his ostensibly heterosexually pure, “civilized” masculinity. Five years 
later, on the plains west of the Mississippi River, Charles La Trobe struggled to avert the moral 
danger represented by the potentially lecherous outcome of his young charge’s heterosexual 
desires. These perceptions of moral dangers, of a sexual nature, brought out by close contact with 
indigenous people, destabilized the starkly drawn categories on which these men defined their 
difference from indigenous people. 
Other attractions, not necessarily of a sexual nature, also contributed to these dynamics. 
In Van Diemen’s Land from 1828 to 1830, George Arthur implemented progressively more 
coercive measures against the island’s indigenous people as their conflict with the settlers further 
intensified. Under a declaration of martial law, he courted the favor of the captive leader 
Eumarrah in the hope that the indigenous man would help in his plans to achieve a conciliated 
resolution to the war. But when Eumarrah abandoned him during a military operation, Arthur’s 
sense of betrayal helped harden his resolve against the people he now painted as inherently 
“treacherous savages,” and thus paved the way for his adoption of a policy to expatriate the 
island’s indigenous people to Flinders Island in the Bass Strait. In Upper Canada in 1836, 
Francis Bond Head relished the opportunity to fulfill his romantic fantasy to play the role of the 
benevolent “father,” who would save his “Indian children” from the malevolent forces of 
“civilization.” His interactions with two indigenous men – Assiginack and Peter Jones – reveal 
that his plans to effect this salvation by removing Upper Canada’s First Peoples to Manitoulin 
Island in Lake Huron rested largely on his egocentric desire to play the all-powerful father to his 
Native American “children;” a role that his interactions with the apparently “authentic Indian” 
Assiginack allowed, but which his conversations with the Methodist minister Peter Jones, did 
not. Like McKenney, Arthur, and La Trobe, Head’s writings reveal that such interactions created 
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crucial sites for reifying, in complicated ways, an adherence to a policy that necessitated the total 
dispossession and expulsion of indigenous peoples from their land. 
 
Learning the “Indian Character”: Thomas McKenney and the Dangers of Masculine 
Allure 
 
 Unlike Lewis Cass, who did not support Indian removal until 1829, Thomas McKenney 
consistently advocated throughout the late 1820s for the federal government to adopt a removal 
policy. Though his views about a generalized “Indian character” owed much to Cass’s teachings, 
McKenney’s public pronouncements about the future of the eastern Indians were more saturated 
in paternalist language than those of the more pragmatic Cass. McKenney argued that the eastern 
Indians faced ongoing exposure to harm and even the danger of extinction unless they adhered to 
benevolent government dictates to emigrate to the safety of lands west of the Mississippi river. 
Yet for all his pronouncements about the U.S. government’s responsibility to save its Indian 
“children” by leading them to safety, McKenney’s writings about his 1826 and 1827 trips into 
Indian Country in the Great Lakes region suggest other causes for his feelings that proximity 
with Indians created sites rife with potential moral dangers. In his accounts of two encounters – 
one with the Ojibwes at Fond du Lac in 1826, and the other with the Ho-Chunk (Winnebago) at 
the portage of the Wisconsin River (present-day Portage) the next summer – McKenney barely 
concealed the unsettling sense of allure he felt towards the fully mature masculine physical forms 
of certain Native American men. Though McKenney always framed his written advocacy for 
removal in terms of paternal concern for the moral and physical well-being of his Native 
American “children,” his descriptions of these encounters suggest that McKenney feared moral 
hazards when among unmistakably adult Native American masculinities. Without ever explicitly 
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owning such feelings, McKenney’s rhetorical gestures towards them imply that behind his 
advocacy for removal lay feelings beyond a disinterested paternal concern for his Indian 
“children.” 
 At the treaty council with the Ojibwes at Fond du Lac in 1826, Thomas McKenney had 
expected to take an apprentice role to his more senior and experienced fellow commissioner 
Lewis Cass. During his fourteen years as head of the Indian Department, McKenney had 
acquired and maintained a great sense of esteem for Cass. By June 1826, when McKenney first 
visited Cass’s gubernatorial residence in Detroit, Cass was already an experienced Indian treaty 
negotiator, and had published an article on the “Indians of North America” in the North 
American Review. In the journal of his 1826 trip, published as Sketches of a Tour to the Lakes in 
1827, McKenney wrote that his experience in the Indian department had served to satisfy him 
“that it is not every body who knows enough of the Indian character to conduct councils with 
them to a successful and harmonious issue.”220 According to McKenney, Cass would therefore 
be “no ordinary instructor,” for “[f]ew men have so intimate a knowledge of the Indian character 
as Governor Cass.”221 Recording his first day in Detroit, McKenney wrote that “[a]t two o’clock 
I paid my respects, for the first time, in his own house, to a man, for whom, for fourteen years, I 
have cherished a feeling of the sincerest attachment, and whose talents will yet be availed of by 
the nation, and in some department of the general government. This is my prediction – mark 
it.”222 As hindsight shows, McKenney’s prediction was correct. Unlike McKenney, who would 
find himself on the wrong side of the Jacksonians and out of a job, Cass would ride the wave of 
Democratic politics into the inner sanctum of the Jackson administration. 
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In his 1826 article, Cass positioned himself in print, the way he presumably did in person: 
as the true arbiter of knowledge on the “Indian character,” and as a person continually occupied 
in the quest for further knowledge in this area. Coming out firmly against the removal policy that 
President Monroe had promoted in his address to Congress in January 1825, Cass argued that the 
Indians could not adapt to a “removal through eight degrees of latitude, and fifteen degrees of 
longitude,” that would bring them into “a country, of whose animal and vegetable production 
they are ignorant,” and which would “require them to make great changes in their habits.”223 
Cass saw only danger in the policy:  “The whole subject . . . is involved in great doubt and 
difficulty, and it is better to do nothing, than to hazard the risk of increasing their misery.”224 By 
the following year, although his public position on removal was more equivocal, he was no still 
not yet a fully fledged proponent of the policy. In his article on “Indian Treaties,” published in 
the North American Review in April 1827, Cass put removal forward as a well intentioned policy 
option in the moral crusade to ameliorate “the condition of the Indians,” but one which he still 
believed could have appalling consequences.225  
 Although McKenney exalted Cass as the expert arbiter of true knowledge on the “Indian 
character,” he did not share all his mentor’s opinions on the direction of Indian policy. In the 
summer of 1826, McKenney was already a keen supporter of, and advocate for, a policy to 
remove Native Americans west of the Mississippi River. In Tour to the Lakes, McKenney used 
his narrative as a forum for this advocacy. Narrating his journey to Detroit to meet Cass, 
McKenney described a conversation with fellow passengers on the mail stage between Utica and 
Auburn on the subject of the Indians. These passengers, all Quakers, consisted of “a Mr. M─s, 
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his sister and daughter, and two nieces.”226 Convinced that his fellow travelers held “the 
benevolent feelings of the entire community of Friends towards the Indians,” McKenney used 
the conversation as a opportunity to argue for the government’s benevolent aims to save “the 
remnant of the race” through removal. When Mr. M─s intimated that Secretary of War James 
Barbour’s “plan for colonizing these people” seemed contrary to the aims of teaching Indians the 
habits of a sober, settled, domestic life, McKenney responded by propounding the apparent 
benefits of removalist segregation. For instance, he concluded his monologue on the subject by 
stating, “[i]f I recollect the views of the secretary, they embrace all that can be desired by the 
warmest friends of the Indians. Lands, education, implements of husbandry, domestic animals; 
and added to all these, protection from surrounding enemies, whether white or red, and a 
permanent and ever-during home, where their faculties may continue to expand, and their hopes 
to brighten and flourish to the latest of their generations.”227 To McKenney, the plan to remove 
the eastern Indians west of the Mississippi was central to his benevolent intentions to save “the 
remnant of the race.” 
 While Cass would in 1829 make the pragmatic shift to support removal, justifying it on 
the basis that the policy of civilization had failed, throughout the late 1820s McKenney 
advocated for removal as the only way to achieve the civilization and Chritianization of the 
Indians. He proclaimed that only by segregating them from the apparently inevitable fatal 
dangers entailed by their contact with whites could the “remnant” of the eastern peoples be saved 
and civilized. As we have already seen (in previous chapters), McKenney imbued the language 
of metaphoric kinship with a meaning that reflected a newer, more unilateral understanding of 
paternal rights and obligations. Yet his writings about certain encounters he had in 1826 and 
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1827 with well-formed Native American men belied this newer paternalist metaphor, even as he 
continually reasserted it.  
 The first encounter occurred after the arrival of the parties to the treaty council at Fond du 
Lac, during an Ojibwe dance ceremony centered on the ritual of present exchange. Although in 
his discussion of the ceremony in Tour of the Lakes, McKenney stated that “[s]uch a sight 
presents a wide field for moral reflection,” his descriptions of this “sight” were infused with an 
unmistakable homoeroticism. He described the dancing of a group of men in which he could, for 
instance, “see from their breathing – for they were all naked (except the auzeum,) and painted, – 
that their dancing was a severe exercise.”228 The second scene involved the ceremony for Red 
Bird and Wakau’s surrender at the portage of the Wisconsin. McKenney’s first account of this 
event was published in October 1827. He subsequently included the incident in his 1846 
Memoirs, in which he quoted extensively from the letter he had addressed at the time to the 
Secretary of War James Barbour of “this most imposing, and . . . never-to-be-forgotten 
ceremony.”229 Nearly twenty years after witnessing the scene, McKenney’s descriptive focus 
suggests that what had most impressed him was Red Bird’s dignity in the face of defeat, the 
grace of his movements, and above all, the beauty of his masculine form.  
 In his writings, McKenney implies that the beautiful Native American masculine forms 
represented some kind of moral danger to the non-Indian onlooker. In his analysis in Tour of the 
Lakes of the dance ceremony at Fond du Lac, McKenney explains that his interest in the scene 
lay in the chance it gave for “moral reflection.” Central to this reflection was the beauty of these 
men’s naked physical forms:   
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No one can witness such a scene, and look upon bodies of the finest mould, for they are 
all such, and one especially the most perfect I ever beheld; and would in Italy be worth its 
thousands for a model, without feeling anxious for the arrival of the time (but how slow 
have been its advances!) when all these unmeaning and barbarous customs shall give 
place to the refinements of civilized life, and the sensual object which led to this, be 
changed to the nobler one of which their faculties are so manifestly capable.230 
 
In their nakedness, partaking in such “unmeaning and barbarous customs,” these men – including 
the “perfect” one who especially caught McKenney’s attention – represented an alluring 
sensuality. That this sensual allure represented danger was suggested by the urgency with which 
McKenney hoped it would be overcome. He therefore tempered his euphoric pronouncements 
about beholding such beauty by placing the scene within a teleological schema which dictated 
that such displays of magnificence could not, and would not, continue. According to McKenney, 
the time would come when such raw bodily sensuality would inevitably be overcome by “the 
refinements of civilized life,” which would allow Native Americans to realize the “nobler” fate 
to which their spirits were capable. The coming of civilization to the Ojibwes would therefore 
end such displays, and release McKenney from the unsettling feelings that gazing upon these 
“bodies of the finest mould” seemed to stir up. 
 Only by sharing the presumption that the dance ceremony was a malevolent custom could 
McKenney’s readers overcome the discord between his description of the scene and his 
subsequent analysis. McKenney portrayed the dance as an intense and pleasurable activity for 
both viewer and participant. Yet in his ensuing “moral reflection” on the scene, he nevertheless 
painted Native Americans as “sufferers.” Despite all the aesthetic and voyeuristic appeal to the 
viewer, and the apparent pleasures of participation in the dance, McKenney believed that such 
customs endangered Native American people because they could only be saved from the doom 
of their inevitable collective extinction, and the affliction of their unredeemed souls, through 
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civilization and Christianization. That they would, and must, become civilized and Christianized 
was therefore a non-negotiable imperative. In his “moral reflection” on the dance scene, he stated 
that “[i]t is too late now to tell us that Indians cannot be civilized, aye, and Christianized too.”231 
According to McKenney, this was the only way to save the Indians, so it was therefore the moral 
responsibility of the citizens of the United States to achieve these aims: “whilst we give up the 
old Indians to die as they live, and leave them and their destiny to their God, we are bound by 
every consideration of moral and religious obligation, to save their offspring.”232  
In this way, McKenney attempted to contain the pleasures of the ceremony, and the 
alluring masculine beauty that he had witnessed, within the realm of his controlling benevolence. 
Rather than giving in to the yearnings of the flesh, as the dancers themselves had done by 
pursuing the “sensual object” of their “barbarous custom,” McKenney instead stated his intention 
to remain steadfast to his conviction that he, and other U.S. citizens had the power and duty to 
save the Indians. He thus argued that “Indians are men – they are within our jurisdiction – they 
are sufferers – we have the power, and they the capacity; and we are bound to relieve them.”233 
Yet McKenney was not successful in fully resolving the unsettling discord between his 
descriptions of the dance scene and his benevolent designs for “the Indians.” Although in his 
subsequent advocacy for removal he would talk of the government’s benevolent desires to save 
its Native American “children,” this confrontation with the physical presence of beautiful 
strapping masculine forms at Fond du Lac could never really be made to fit his paternal 
metaphor.  
 The following summer, McKenney’s compulsion to hold forth on his glorious benevolent 
designs was again tempered when he became besotted with the perfect form of another fully 
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mature Native American man. During Red Bird and Wekau’s surrender to the United State 
military and Indian agents at the portage of the Wisconsin, McKenney seems to have kept his 
smitten gaze on Red Bird during almost the entire ceremony. His fellow on-lookers all 
apparently looked in the same direction because, as McKenney stated, “of all the Indians I ever 
saw, [Red Bird] is, without exception, the most perfect in form, in fact, and gesture. In height, he 
is about six feet; straight, but without restraint. His proportions are those of the most exact 
symmetry, and these embrace the entire man, from his head to his feet. His very fingers are 
models of beauty.”234 Gazing at Red Bird, McKenney noticed, and subsequently described in 
meticulous detail, how, for example, the piece of scarlet cloth around his neck rested “one-half 
on his breast . . . and the other on his back.”235 In his descriptions of the surrender ceremony, 
McKenney revealed his fancy for Red Bird as the apparent embodiment of grace and physical 
perfection.  
 Yet Red Bird also represented a danger, for behind his alluring physicality lay the mind 
of a murderer. The masculine beauty of Red Bird contrasted starkly with those he described as 
on display during the Ojibwe present giving ceremony at Fond du Lac the year before. Red 
Bird’s appearance and movements seemed beautiful to McKenney in that he interpreted them as 
containing markers of refined civilization. In listing off the splendor of Red Bird’s form, he 
noted for instance, “[h]is head, too – sure no head was ever so well formed. There was no 
ornamenting of the hair after the Indian fashion . . . but it was cut after the best fashion of the 
most civilized.”236 Unlike the almost naked Ojibwe dancers at Fond du Lac, Red Bird was dress 
in a “yankton dress” of “almost a pure white,” suggesting both modesty and sexual purity. 
McKenney was incredulous that behind this beautiful façade hid the mind of a killer, stating that, 
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“whilst his face is full of expression and of every sort, to interest the feelings, and without a 
single, even accidental glance, that would justify the suspicion that a purpose of murder could by 
any possible means conceal itself there . . . I could but ask myself, can this be the murderer – the 
chief who could shoot, scalp, and cut the throat of Gagnier?”237 What gave McKenney’s 
incredulity rhetorical force was that the aesthetically glorious Red Bird had, in fact, killed 
Gagnier. The danger of Red Bird laid not in any childlike attributes, but the compelling beauty of 
his graceful and regal form, which suggested the refinements of a civilized mind, rather than that 
of a barbarous killer. 
 At the same time, McKenney nevertheless used his knowledge of the “Indian character,” 
to redeem Red Bird – albeit only rhetorically – from his designation as a dangerous murderer to 
that of a chivalrous warrior. In his Memoirs, McKenney reminisced that “[t]here was, as I have 
said on a previous occasion, when referring to the subject of this voluntary surrender, something 
heroic in it.”238 To McKenney, this heroism laid in the fact that Red Bird and Wekau voluntarily 
surrendered to the U.S. agents, for the sake of their people. In McKenney’s words, they 
sacrificed themselves “rather than have ‘a road cut through their country with guns,’ which 
would subject the innocent to both affliction and death.”239 With the voice of authority on “the 
Indian,” McKenney stated that “the murders committed at Prairie du Chien were not wanton, but 
in retaliation for wrongs committed upon this people by the whites.” Although Red Bird was a 
“murderer” according to U.S. law, McKenney argued that he was not under “Indian law”: “The 
parties murdered at the Prairie, were doubtless innocent of the wrongs and outrages of which the 
Indians complained, but the law of Indian retaliation does not require that he alone, who commits 
a wrong, shall suffer. One scalp is held to be due for another, no matter from whose head it is 
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taken, provided it be torn from the crown of the family, or people, who have made a resort to this 
law necessary.”240 McKenney could therefore explain the murderous actions of the noble Red 
Bird, by subsuming them into an essentialized codification of “Indian” behavior. 
In this understanding, McKenney showed himself to be a true student of Cass. Though 
their views on removal differed, in many other respects McKenney assimilated Cass’s views on 
“the Indians.” Cass, the voice of authority, pronounced the sameness of the “Indian character” 
everywhere.241 When Cass did, in January 1830, publically, throw the weight of his authoritative 
pronouncements behind the cause of removal, he used his representations of a generalized 
“Indian character” to argue that removal was the only solution to the “moral problem” of the 
existence of the Indians east of the Mississippi. Cass thus argued that Indians made up “a distinct 
variety of the human race. Speaking languages, which, in the present state of our knowledge of 
them, appear to spring from four primitive stocks, and which are broken into many different 
dialects, in all the essential characteristics of mind, manners, and appearance, they are one 
people.”242 In making pronouncements about Red Bird’s “Indian” behavior, McKenney similarly 
subsumed all Native American peoples within the one racialized category. 
Despite these encounters, in his private advocacy for removal McKenney clung to the 
metaphor of Native Americans as children in need of paternal benevolence. Writing from 
Washington in 1829, he argued that the Whig opposition to removal, focusing on “the rights of 
the Indians” evaded the question at issue. The question, he argued, “is one of another sort; and 
embraces the simple proposition, what is to be done, all things considered, for saving, and 
bettering the condition of the Indians!” He compared “the Indians” to children who had inherited 
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a family mansion from which “deadly elements” originated, who should, despite holding binding 
title to the property, leave it to escape “their desolating effects.”  More overtly he stated, “I look 
upon the Indians (with some few exceptions of course) to be nothing but children, and am 
convinced that nothing would be so good for them as to treat them as such – provided the object 
of the treatment was to improve their condition.”243 Of the Cherokee, in particular, he stated that 
“[s]eeing as I do the condition of this people, and that they are bordering on destruction, I would, 
were I empowered, take them firmly but kindly by the hand, and tell them that they must go; and 
I would do this, on the same principle that I would take my own Children by the hand firmly, but 
kindly and lead them from a district of Country in which the plague was raging.”244 
Though he couched his arguments in terms of paternal benevolence, two recent 
encounters with Native American men had left him with those unsettling, alluring impressions. 
His ecstatic description of the Ojibwe dancers bore little direct relation to the need to relieve the 
Indians of their suffering. The physical presence of masculine bodies, and the sense of attraction 
that McKenney clearly felt towards them, suggested that the metaphor of leading children out of 
danger only fit the way that McKenney chose to articulate his feelings about “the Indians.” Fears 
of his own corruptibility in the face of the attractions of their masculine form informed 
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From Diplomatic Courtship to Treacherous Betrayal: George Arthur and Eumarrah in 
Wartime Van Diemen’s Land 
 
In November 1828, George Arthur, still lieutenant governor of the British colony of Van 
Diemen’s Land, declared martial law over all the indigenous people in the settled corridor of 
land between Hobart and Launceston. In the second half of 1829, he began courting the captured 
leader Eumarrah in an attempt to enlist the indigenous man’s help in implementing a conciliated 
end to the war. Yet when Eumarrah abandoned Arthur’s military operation against the district’s 
indigenous people in November 1830, Arthur felt betrayed. He had assumed that during their 
acquaintance he had won Eumarrah’s loyalty and trust. Rather than seeing Eumarrah’s actions as 
those of an independent political actor, Arthur ultimately explained them as the inevitable 
“treacherous” acts of an inveterate “savage.” Arthur explained that it was due to this treacherous 
character, apparently exhibited by all indigenous people on the island, that his conciliation 
efforts had failed. He thus justified his use of coercive force against the Van Demonian 
indigenous people, and their ultimate removal to Flinders Island. 
Arthur first became acquainted with Eumarrah, whom he referred to as the “chief of the 
Stoney Creek Tribe,” in 1829.245 Eumarrah had been captured in November 1828 by a party that 
included Gilbert Robertson, the Chief District Constable of the Sorrell district, and 
Kickerterpoller (“Black Tom”).246  Two years later, Eumarrah joined Arthur’s “Black Line” 
operation; a combined military and civilian operation that aimed to encircle, capture, and drive 
all the indigenous people in the settled corridor between Launceston and Hobart Town to the 
peninsula. When Eumarrah deserted the operation on 13 November, Arthur seems to have felt 
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personally betrayed. In his official dispatch to the colonial office of 20 November 1830 – dated 
four days before he ordered an end to the black line operations – Arthur referred to this recent 
abandonment. After informing George Murray (the secretary of state for war and the colonies) of 
the history of his acquaintance with Eumarrah, he stated that “[o]n this occasion therefore I 
brought him to me, and entrusted him to conduct a party to the Natives, assuring him that they 
should be clothed and fed and protected, but to my disappointment and sincere regret, he availed 
himself at the first moment to abscond and has I fear rejoined his Tribe with the most hostile 
intentions.”247 
 Arthur explained his “disappointment and sincere regret” by relating an account of his 
acquaintance with Eumarrah. Arthur wrote that after Eumarrah’s initial capture, “he was 
narrowly watched, but by his apparently artless manner, and strong protestations of attachment, 
he was gradually confided in more and more, until at length, I felt a confidence that he would be 
greatly instrumental in carrying into effect the measure so ardently desired for conciliation.”248 
Arthur had felt that a mutual understanding had grown between the two men as their 
acquaintance progressed: “I have continually had him brought to the Government House, and 
personally satisfied myself that he fully understood that the wishes of the Government were those 
of kindness and benevolence toward all his race.”249 But in light of Eumarrah’s recent 
abandonment, Arthur faced the fact that he had fundamentally misjudged the relationship. He 
trusted Eumarrah, and had thus pinned on him many of his hopes for conciliating the island’s 
indigenous people and ending their violent conflict with the settlers. Moreover, he had courted 
Eumarrah’s favor sincerely, with honorable intentions, only to experience the sting of rejection; 
                                                




despite Eumarrah’s “strong protestations of attachment,” the other man had not truly returned his 
feelings. Eumarrah had played him. 
 In trying to win over Eumarrah to his cause of conciliation, Arthur had shown a new 
openness to courting indigenous people diplomatically. Although his ultimate aim to civilize and 
Christianize the island’s indigenous people had not changed, by 1828 he had begun to see that 
benevolent intentions and the mobilization of the common law would not end the conflict. While 
the violence had continued to escalate after the executions of Dick and Jack in 1826 (discussed in 
chapter two), the colonial administration did not again attempt to bring any indigenous people to 
trial for the death of colonists. Instead, acknowledging that his policy, which aimed to achieve 
conciliation through benevolence, had not functioned as he had hoped, Arthur increasingly 
sanctioned the use of coercive measures to drive indigenous people from the “settled districts.” 
In November 1826, and then again in November 1827, he declared that “the black Natives may 
be driven from the settled Districts, which has now become a measure of indispensible necessity, 
as they cannot by conciliatory means be induced to retire from them.”250 In April 1828, he issued 
a proclamation that indigenous people were no longer permitted to enter the settled district. 
Then, in November 1828, he declared martial law over all indigenous people remaining within it. 
 Through these policies, Arthur incrementally sanctioned the colonists’ segregationist 
demands for what they referred to as “removal.” As early as 1825, petitions from free settlers had 
called for Arthur to direct military resources towards removing indigenous people from the areas 
subject to settlement.251 The press similarly advocated for Arthur’s administration to ameliorate 
the violence by ending the proximity of the colonists and indigenous people. Such plans entailed 
the colonists having sole possession of the disputed lands, while the government actively 
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removed the indigenous people to somewhere where they would no longer threaten settlers. In 
December 1826, the Colonial Times argued that intercourse between the colonists and 
indigenous people had “produced only hatred, and revenge” and that only “a removal” could 
protect the colonists from “incursions, similar to the Caffrees in Africa, or the back-woodmen, in 
North America.” They thus proclaimed that “[w]e make no pompous display of Philantrophy 
(sic) – we say unequivocally, SELF DEFENCE IS THE FIRST LAW OF NATURE. THE GOVERNMENT 
MUST REMOVE THE NATIVES – IF NOT, THEY WILL BE HUNTED DOWN LIKE WILD BEASTS, AND 
DESTROYED!” In this article, the Colonial Times suggested the offending groups could be taken 
to King’s Island “with a small guard of soldiers to protect them,” where they would “be 
compelled to grow potatoes, wheat, &c. catch seals and fish . . . and acquire some slight habits of 
industry, which is the first step of civilization.”252 In subsequent years, colonists would also 
suggest and experiment with Bruné and Gun Carriage Islands before Arthur’s administration 
finally decided on Flinders Island’s as the ultimate destination of this “removal.” 
 While many colonists in the late 1820s continued to call for removal, Arthur refused to 
condone such a solution. He instead still hoped to end the conflict through means that conformed 
more neatly with his humanitarian ideals. At a loss regarding how to resolve the situation, in 
January 1828 he wrote to the secretary of state for war and the colonies in London, Lord 
Goderich. “The necessity of taking some decisive step,” he wrote, “becomes every day more 
apparent, as the settlers advance on the favourite haunts of the Natives, but I confess I feel the 
subject exceedingly perplexing.” 253 He told Goderich that the only remedy he had heard 
proposed was “to collect the Natives, and remove them to some Island in the Straits, where there 
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is no want of their accustomed food, and where . . . a better chance would be afforded of success 
to any effort for their civilization.”254 Rejecting this as a course which would further aggravate 
rather than conciliate the indigenous people, he wrote that “nothing short of the last necessity 
could tolerate so great an aggravation to their injuries, as they would unquestionably consider 
removing them from their native tracts.”255 Showing some insight into the grievances that 
motivated indigenous attacks, Arthur argued that a removal policy would not help the benevolent 
mission to civilize the island’s indigenous people. He thus informed Goderich that the 
indigenous people “already complain that the white people have taken possession of their 
country, encroached upon their hunting grounds, and destroyed their natural food, the kangaroo; 
and they doubtless would be exasperated to the last degree to be banished altogether from their 
favourite haunts; and as they would be ill-disposed to receive instruction from their oppressors, 
any attempt to civilize them, under such circumstances, must consequently fail.”256 Removal, 
according to Arthur, was not a satisfactory solution to the problem. 
 Instead, Arthur articulated a policy to protect “the Aborigines” from the people he 
believed truly responsible for the conflict: the island’s lower-class convict and former-convict 
population. Although Arthur could understand that the conflict would further escalate as more 
settlers moved onto indigenous people’s hunting grounds, he did not directly link the violence 
itself with this systemic dispossession. Rather, in his Calvinistic calculations, the “formidable 
appearance” of “the Aborigines” who had “perpetrated . . . repeated outrages within the settled 
districts” could only be the direct result of sinful mistreatment on the part of the bad elements of 
the penal colony’s white society.257 Arthur therefore continued to blame the violence on the 
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treatment that indigenous people had received at the hands of convict and former convict “stock-
keepers,” and more especially, escaped convict “bushrangers.” In April 1829, for instance, he 
wrote to the Colonial Office in London stating that “I feel, and I feel it strongly too, that the 
animosity of those . . . people was first excited by the barbarous treatment which they 
experienced from the Convicts who absconded, and from the repeated cruelty of the distant 
Stock-Keepers.”258 To this belief Arthur had remained, and would continue to remain, faithful. 
Most importantly, this presumption about the true cause of the conflict informed the 
nature of solutions that Arthur would propose. Rather than adopting the suggested policy of 
removing the indigenous people off the main island, Arthur informed Goderich in January 1828 
that he would instead attempt to protect them from the threats posed by the stock-keepers. He 
explained that he would try “to settle the Aborigines in some remote quarter of the island, which 
should strictly be reserved for them, and to supply them with food and clothing, and afford them 
protection from injuries by the stock-keepers.” Like his earlier policies based on the proliferation 
of benevolence, such a measure required the cooperation of the indigenous people themselves, 
who were thus required to confine “themselves peacefully to certain limits, beyond which if they 
pass, they should be made to understand they will cease to be protected.”259 To Arthur, the free 
settlers were largely an unoffending party; the first aggressors had been the stock-keepers and 
runaway convicts. The perplexing question, which continued to haunt Arthur throughout the war, 
was how to make the indigenous people understand that there were two classes of men among 
the white colonists; that the unoffending class were generally men of good character who wanted 
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to protect the indigenous people from the harms inflected on them by the men of the lower-
class.260  
In place of such persuasion, Arthur implemented policies to compel indigenous people, 
by force if necessary, from the areas taken over by colonists. With the backing of his executive 
council, Arthur sanctioned the progressively more intensive use of coercive force to expel the 
indigenous people from the settled districts. On 15 April 1828, he released a proclamation which 
officially divided the island into “settled” and “unsettled” districts. Declaring that previous 
measures had proven ineffective in stemming the escalating violence, he stated it had “therefore 
become indispensably necessary to bring about a temporary separation of the coloured from the 
British population of this territory.” To achieve this, “the coloured inhabitants should be induced 
by peaceful means to depart, or should otherwise be expelled by force from all settled districts 
therein.” To police this arrangement, a line of military posts would be stationed “along the 
confines of the settled districts.”261 This, according to Arthur, was to be a lawful and respectable 
exercise of force, and not a license for colonist violence against Aboriginal people. He therefore 
proclaimed that “[n]othing herein contained shall authorize, or be taken to authorize, any settler 
or settlers, stock-keeper or stock-keepers, sealer or sealers, to make use of force, (except for 
necessary self-defence) against any Aboriginal, without the presence and direction of a 
magistrate, military officer, or other person of respectability.”262 However, six months later in 
November, Arthur declared that such measures had proven ineffective in “removing the 
Aboriginals from the settled districts,” and “putting a stop” to their “atrocities.” On 1 November 
he therefore “Proclaimed and directed” that until the cessation of hostilities, “MARTIAL LAW 
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is and shall continue to be in force against the several Black or Aboriginal Natives, within the 
several Districts of this Island.”263 Through these measures, Arthur admitted that the conflict 
could not be resolved through conciliating the aggrieved indigenous people, and instead 
attempted to force all those within the settled district to abandon their land. 
  In declaring martial law on 1 November 1828, Arthur also officially gave up any 
remaining pretenses that the violent conflict could be dealt with through recourse to the 
retributive functions of the English common law. In declaring martial law, Arthur stated that “it 
seems, at present, impossible to conciliate the several tribes . . .; and the ordinary Civil Power of 
the Magistrates, and the means afforded by the Common Law, are found by experience to be 
wholly insufficient for the general safety.”264 This declaration therefore heralded a significant 
reframing of the violence. While Arthur had previously approached the conflict as representing a 
collection of individual acts of violence, committed by British subjects on other British subjects, 
he now represented the violence as the open and declared hostilities of a group opposed to the 
British colonial establishment. In this new framing, indigenous people had officially become the 
colonists’ wartime enemies. Arthur therefore now interpreted indigenous attacks on settlements 
within the territory under martial law as acts of war, rather than transgressions of the common 
law. 
 Thus, when Gilbert Robertson’s roving party captured Eumarrah and four other Stoney 
Creek people a week after the declaration of martial law, the colonists treated the captives more 
as prisoners of war than alleged felons. As part of the declaration of martial law, Arthur 
established six roving parties to remove an estimated two-hundred indigenous people from the 
                                                




settled districts.265 On 7 November, the roving party of military and field police headed by 
Gilbert Robertson and guided by Kickerterpoller (Black Tom) tracked Eumarrah’s group from 
Oyster Bay to Maloney’s Sugar Loaf and surrounded them while they slept in bark huts. After 
the Stoney Creek people’s dogs alerted them to the approaching party, the colonists discharged 
their guns, shooting Eumarrah under the ear.266 Robertson later recalled that one of the soldiers 
then used Eumarrah “very ill.”267 The press reported that while five of the ten member group 
escaped into some nearby thick scrub, Robertson managed to capture the remaining five, among 
which was “their King, named Eumarrah, whose indignation at being deprived of his liberty is 
very great.” Eumarrah reportedly declared it was “his determined purpose, as well as that of the 
Oyster bay, the Blue hill, and the Big river tribes, to make repeated incursions, and to destroy all 
the whites he possibly can, which he considers a patriotic duty.”268  
When Robertson brought the five captives before Arthur and his executive council on 19 
November, Eumarrah and his comrades tactfully denied ever having speared white people. They 
instead stated that the Port Dalrymple people had killed white people because they had been 
driven off their kangaroo hunting grounds.269 After “considerable communication with the five 
Natives,” the executive council advised Arthur to remove the captives to the Coal River Gaol 
while measures could be adopted for their permanent security “so as entirely to prevent their 
return to the settled districts of the Island.”270 Unlike Jack and Dick, who had only two years 
previously been marched to the scaffold, Arthur’s administration treated Eumarrah and his 
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comrades as prisoners of war; held not predominantly for retributive purposes, but to stop them 
returning to the field of battle.  
 In defining the conflict as a state of war, Arthur also re-defined the bounds within which 
he would attempt his still existent, albeit diminishing, hopes to conciliate the island’s belligerent 
indigenous people. In this new context, even though Eumarrah was well known to have fought 
against and killed colonists, Arthur would acknowledge him as a leader of an opposing force, 
who commanded respect among his people. At a hearing of Arthur’s newly formed “Aborigines 
Committee” in March 1830, Eumarrah’s captor, Gilbert Robertson, expressed this new approach. 
Acknowledging his belief that Eumarrah “has committed several murders, although he denies it,” 
Robertson nevertheless argued that men like Eumarrah held the key to achieving peace, stating 
that the “only means of conciliating the Natives would be by keeping such a one as Umarow 
[Eumarrah], giving him a taste for our comforts.”271 While giving his evidence before the 
Aborigines Committee, Robertson also argued that the authorities needed to give Eumarrah some 
freedom of movement; if they treated him well, and permitted him to go to the bush, he would 
come back, but if they did not, he would try to escape.272 Robertson had formulated this plan the 
previous year in light of the apparent ease in which Eumarrah was able to escape his captivity. In 
a letter to Arthur’s colonial secretary dated 9 June 1829, he suggested that both in spite of, and 
because of, Eumarrah’s recent escape, the colonists should pursue a scheme of treating him with 
marked generosity and kindness, in order to “altogether fit him for the purpose of influencing his 
countrymen to put themselves under the protection of the Government.”273 Thus began Arthur’s 
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courtship of Eumarrah as a powerful war-time leader and man of dignity, rather than as a 
“murderer” and subordinate. 
 Arthur seems to have begun his acquaintance with Eumarrah sometime after Robertson’s 
June 1829 suggestion that the indigenous man could prove an effective peace emissary. 
Robertson, and most likely other colonists in the Richmond area where the Coal Goal was 
situated, had apparently been taken by Eumarrah, who appears to have been a man of 
considerable personal charm with an engaging and dignified demeanor. In his 9 June letter to 
Arthur’s office, Robertson informed the colonial secretary that although to them Eumarrah was a 
“savage and a captive,” they must “not forget that amongst his own people he is a Prince.” 
Relating information drawn from conversations with Eumarrah, Robertson also stated that 
although the colonists drew stark distinctions between themselves and the “savages,” Eumarrah 
himself viewed the colonists much as he would any other enemy tribe.274 Robertson therefore 
suggested that Eumarrah should be immediately taken out of jail and furnished with two well-
fitting and comfortable suits of clothes, a sufficient quantity of tea and sugar (“of the latter he is 
particularly fond”), well-fitting shoes, “a comfortable bed near a good fire,” and be presented 
with a “badge and chain” by the Governor. In order to show him the colonists’ might, he also 
suggested Eumarrah “be taken to see the first executions that take place . . . [and to] see the 
military under the arms, and the prisoners marched to church on Sunday.”275 In this plan, the 
colonists were to treat Eumarrah with the respect that his dignified countenance demanded, in the 
hope that they would win his allegiance. 
 When Arthur courted Eumarrah’s favor, the Englishman’s behavior therefore necessarily 
presumed that the other man was someone of power among his people, for it was this influence 
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that Arthur hoped to usurp for his conciliation efforts. On 10 June 1829, in immediate response 
to Robertson’s idea, Arthur noted that he “should much wish to join the whole of this on fair 
trial.” The first step, according to Arthur, was to find a steady, clever, intelligent and reliable 
man to be Eumarrah’s companion, and in the meantime ordered his secretary to send instructions 
to the Coal River jail to treat “this Chieftain” with kindness, “and let him have good Clothing &c 
&c.”276 In the next two weeks, Arthur’s administration had provided Eumarrah with a convict 
servant. According to Josiah Spode, the muster master in charge of convict records and assistant 
police magistrate for Hobart, this servant was a cut above “the ordinary run of Convicts.” For 
although a convict, Eumarrah’s servant William Pahle was “a German by birth [who] has 
formerly held a Commission in the Hanoverian Services, and his education & bringing up [was] 
altogether of a much superior cast.”277 Arthur ordered that Pahle be sent “to the Coal River in 
order that he may be with Eumarra a fortnight or three weeks – after that he will be able to judge 
whether sufficient confidence is to be placed in him, to carry into effect the plan enumerated by 
Mr. Gilbert Robertson.”278 Pahle must have reported favorably of Eumarrah’s potential because 
as Arthur’s letter of 20 March 1830 to Murray suggests, after this time Arthur had Eumarrah 
“continually . . . brought to the Government House” in order to fully convince him “that the 
wishes of the Govenrment were those of kindness and benevolence toward all his race.”279 
Arthur had thus stumbled on the apparent need to court the island’s aggrieved indigenous people 
diplomatically. During his personal interactions with Eumarrah, Arthur seems to have treated the 
indigenous man as an important war-time enemy leader, to be flattered and convinced that the 
good class of colonists had benevolent intentions towards the islands’ indigenous people.  
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 Arthur’s plans to use Eumarrah to effect his “so ardently desired for” hopes of 
conciliation fit with his continued attempts to resolve the conflict through peaceful means, while 
simultaneously sanctioning the use of coercive force by declaring martial law. Informing London 
of his 1 November 1828 declaration of martial law, he assured the secretary of state that “you 
may be assured that every means in my power, which are most consistent with humanity, will be 
used, even at the present extremity, for bringing about a good understanding with these wretched 
beings.”280 Earlier in 1828, in response to Aboriginal people’s complaints about the mistreatment 
of women by sealers on Bruny Island in the Bass Strait, Arthur had established a ration station on 
the island in the hope of attracting indigenous people from the settled district.281 In an effort to 
turn this ration station into a mission, in March 1829 Arthur advertised that in order to further his 
“anxious desire to ameliorate the condition of the Aboriginal inhabitants of this territory,” the 
government required “a steady person of good character . . . who will take an interest in effecting 
an intercourse with this unfortunate race, and reside upon Bruné Island.”282 From the applicants 
for the position, Arthur chose a man named George Augustus Robinson, a bricklayer and builder 
of strong evangelical Christian religious beliefs, who had moved to Hobart as a free settler in 
1824.283 In responding to the job offer, Robinson promised to devote himself “entirely to the 
object of the mission.”284 
 After six months of attentions from Arthur, and attachment to Gilbert Robertson’s roving 
parties, Eumarrah joined Robinson’s first conciliation mission. By December 1829 Robinson 
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had, with the aid of the influential Anglican clergyman Reverend Bedford, persuaded Arthur to 
allow him to lead the first of what would become known as his “friendly missions” to the 
island’s western peoples.285 Robinson had identified the first recipients of his efforts as the Port 
Davey people, who had become hostile due to the recent spread of colonists to their territory. On 
24 December, Eumarrah and Kickerpoller (Black Tom) arrived in Hobart from Richmond, after 
finishing their latest roving party activities, in preparation for joining Robinson’s mission.286 
Robinson had been anxious to have the two men assigned to him because of the Kickerpoller’s 
linguistic skills and Eumarrah’s prestige. He particularly requested that before the expedition, 
Eumarrah be allowed to accompany him to Bruny Island so he “could see the benevolent 
provision which His Excellency had made for the friendly natives.”287 Two days after arriving in 
Hobart, Eumarrah and Kickerpoller accompanied Robinson to Bruny Island where they were 
issued western clothing, before returning to town on 28 December. The party of Robinson, 
Eumarrah, Kickerpoller and eleven other indigenous people left in search of the Port Davey at 
the end of the following January.288 
 Eumarrah’s ensuing movements showed how little, during all these activities, he had 
subordinated himself to the colonists’ goals.289 In March, Eumarrah, Kickerpoller, and 
Robinson’s party made successful contact with the Port Davey people and set up camp in one of 
their villages. However, on hearing that Eumarrah and Kickerpoller had participated in roving 
parties, the Port Davey people stole away during the night. Robinson then ordered the rest of the 
mission party back to Hobart, but remained with Eumarrah and Dray, a Port Davey woman, to 
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make further contact with the group. In May, after making contact, Eumarrah and Dray both 
decamped, leaving Robinson alone in the bush.290 Eumarrah used his bush expertise to trek the 
approximately 160 miles eastwards back to his homeland.291   
This, however, was not the separation that so annoyed Arthur, for in October, during the 
commencement of the black line operation, news reached Arthur that Eumarrah had rejoined the 
colonists in Launceston. Arthur reportedly sent for Eumarrah to join him in the field.292 A memo 
dated 19 October 1830, sent to the Chief Police Magistrate at Launceston, instructed that “[y]ou 
will be pleased carefully to make known to UMARA that he will be employed in the bush with the 
Lieut. Govern. as it is supposed when he understands that he is not to be separated from His 
Excellency that he will go readily and cheerfully.”293 And employed in the bush he was. But 
whatever Eumarrah’s feelings for Arthur, his assistance on the line lasted less than a month; he 
“ran of into the bush” on 13 November.294 This very fresh sting of abandonment, rather than 
Eumarrah’s break from Robinson earlier in the year, prompted Arthur to write to Murray on 20 
November of his “disappointment and sincere regret” that Eumarrah had “availed himself at the 
first moment to abscond.”295 Although Eumarrah had received his attentions and proclaimed an 
attachment in return, Arthur now had to face the fact that the indigenous man had never really 
accepted the terms of the relationship Arthur had offered. 
 Arthur now correctly feared that Eumarrah had “rejoined his Tribe with the most hostile 
intentions.”296 After leaving the line, Eumarrah joined resistance efforts against the colonial 
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invaders in the Tamar and Esk valleys.297 Arthur seems to have experienced Eumarrah’s 
abandonment as the rupture of a developing, and promisingly close, personal connection. This 
connection had promised itself as a possible avenue through which to solve the “perplexing” 
problem of the conflict between the colonists and the island’s indigenous people. Earlier in the 
year, Arthur had written to London in an almost desperate plea for advice on the matter. He laid 
out the problem, defined within his terms: “We are bound to protect the Settlers from such acts 
of barbarity as they have been exposed to from these Blacks, and yet, I conceive, we are equally 
bound, notwithstanding all their treachery and inhumanity, to treat them with the utmost 
forbearance, for, although the free settlers are, in a great degree, an unoffending party, there can 
be no doubt that the runaway convicts were the first aggressors – and how are these ignorant 
savages to distinguish?”298 For a time, Eumarrah presented ray of hope.  Here was a leader of 
dignity, who was clearly not ignorant, and to whom Arthur might be able to impress upon the 
true nature of the conflict: that the aggressions had been committed by the lower class colonists, 
and that the rest of the colonial population had the interests of Eumarrah and his people at heart 
and sought merely to protect them.   
Eumarrah’s abandonment of him on the line convinced Arthur that he had been wrong to 
invest such hopes in an indigenous man. No doubt feelings of mutual respect and attachment had 
developed between the men, with Arthur previously courting Eumarrah as an important prisoner 
of war and potential ally, giving him gifts of tea and sugar, clothing, and a servant. Owing to 
Eumarrah’s “apparently artless manner, and strong protestations of attachment,” Arthur had 
“gradually confided in [him] more and more,” and had assumed that Eumarrah’s work on the line 
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represented a final enlistment in the colonial administration’s cause.299 Yet when Eumarrah left 
for a second time, Arthur faced his folly. In describing this in his 20 November dispatch to 
Murray, he concluded that this was merely one among many instances that “might be adduced of 
the treacherous character of these savages.”300  
Arthur’s account of his relationship breakdown with Eumarrah formed a crucial 
component of Arthur’s justification for the forced removal. The fact that Eumarrah’s 
abandonment came towards the end of the operation did not stop Arthur informing Murray in 
November 1830 that, in consequence of the inevitable and intractable “treacherous character” of 
“savages” such as Eumarrah, “conciliatory measures are not likely to succeed and cannot in 
prudence be any longer pursued.”301 He thus used Eumarrah’s “treachery” to justify why he had 
chosen, against Murray’s own directions for moderation, to mount such a costly logistical 
operation against the island’s indigenous people. Outlining the atmosphere that led to his 
decision to implement the black line operation, Arthur wrote that “[f]ailing in every endeavour to 
conciliate, and the outrages of the Savages being more daring in their murders and robberies 
more systematically conducted, the next measure which we are bound to attempt is, I conceive, 
that which is now in progress – the earnest and hearty cooperation of the whole of the European 
population to capture them with the least possible destruction of life, or to drive them into 
Tasmans Peninsula.”302 Arthur used his history with Eumarrah to illustrate – albeit 
anachronistically – the conclusions about the “treacherous character” of the island’s indigenous 
people. On this basis, he justified his decision to mount a six week long campaign, which drew 
£30,000 from the imperial coffers, and involved the mobilization of the colony’s entire military 
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and police force, supplemented by the “en mass” services of both free and convict inhabitants. In 
this way, he also rationalized his corollary 1 October declaration of martial law “against all the 
black or aboriginal Natives within every part of this island.”303  
In August 1831, George Augustus Robinson, in reliance on the indigenous leader 
Mannalargenna, finally remade contact with Eumarrah.304 The following month, in alliance with 
Eumarrah, Mannalargenna insisted that Robinson set up a meeting with Arthur. On 5 October 
1831, Arthur met with the group of indigenous people accompanying Robinson in Launceston.305 
Although no details of the meeting survive, the group seems to have insisted on the creation of a 
reservation near Campbell Town. They had realized that although Robinson had insisted that 
they would not be removed from the main island, he had nevertheless been trying to lead them to 
an island off the coast.306 When Arthur presented the proposal to the executive council on 10 
October, he did not mention that the plan had been achieved through diplomatic negotiations 
with Mannalargenna, Eumarrah, and the rest of the group. Instead he told the council that “Mr 
Robinson was . . . of opinion that some central situation should be established . . . so as to 
constitute a home for the Chiefs Manna Langana ‘Eumarrah,’ and the rest of the natives who 
form Mr Robinson’s party, and whom he considers perfectly conciliated.”307 
Eumarrah apparently understood the precarious nature of the agreement reached with 
Arthur. Aware that his room for maneuver had decreased, Eumarrah invoked his previous 
relationship with Arthur in an attempt to have his interests and concerns addressed. During the 
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ensuing month, while he continued as part of Robinson’s “friendly mission,” he pointed out to 
Robinson the route he had taken to leave the black line operation the year before. According to 
Robinson, while Eumarrah explained his movements, he “said I must tell the Governor 
UMARRAH was a good man and how he would find out the natives.”308 His appeals would not 
come to fruition. Eumarrah died of dysentery in Launceston hospital the following March.309 In 
death Eumarrah was spared the full realization that Arthur would ultimately not allow any 
indigenous people to remain on the Van Diemonian mainland. The agreement to have a reserve 
near Campbell Town had merely been a temporary means of appeasement. Over the next two 
years, Arthur’s administration removed the majority of the remaining indigenous people to the 
harsh environment of Flinders Island in the Bass Strait.  
 
An Englishman in the U.S.A.: Charles La Trobe and the Hidden Dangers of Indian 
Country 
 
Nowhere in the published narrative of his 1832-33 travels through North America did 
Charles Joseph La Trobe mention the personal struggles he had endured while acting as mentor 
and moral guardian to the twenty year-old Swiss Count Albert de Pourtalès. His trials had been 
particularly intense during their travels through Indian Country, when Pourtalès’ abstract 
romantic fascinations with American Indians translated into concerted efforts to initiate intimate 
relations with Native American women. For the deeply religious La Trobe, who like George 
Arthur and Thomas McKenney understood the world as a divinely controlled system of 
providential rewards and punishments, Pourtalès’s potentially lecherous behavior presented an 
acute moral danger, from which he (La Trobe) was honor bound to protect the younger man. Yet 
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in his accounts of their travels in The Rambler in North America, La Trobe omitted any illusions 
to these struggles. Instead, he infused his narrative with Jacksonian-like rhetorical 
pronouncements such as the “white man and the Indian cannot be near neighbours.”310 Yet like 
McKenney, La Trobe had experienced a sense of moral danger from encounters with Native 
American people in Indian Country. Though he did not publically admit to such feelings, they no 
doubt nevertheless formed part of the foundations for his support of the stark dispossessions and 
segregationist impulses necessitated by the implementation of the U.S. Indian Removal Act. 
When he arrived in the United States in May 1832, Charles Joseph La Trobe was a thirty-
one year old unpropertied English gentleman from a respectable family of Moravian clerics and 
missionaries. His father and grandfather, like George Arthur, had links to London’s influential 
Clapham Sect, which spearheaded the British anti-slavery movement. After his travels through 
North America, La Trobe received his first Colonial Office assignment to report on the education 
of former slaves in the West Indies, most likely due to family connections.311 Because of their 
Huguenot heritage, La Trobe’s family also had connections to Hugenot families on the European 
continent, such as that of the Swiss Count, Frédéric de Pourtalès of Neuchâtel. It was through 
this connection that La Trobe received his commission to undertake a tour of North America 
with the Count’s eldest son and heir, twenty year-old Count Albert de Pourtalès.  
In his published journal of the trip, The Rambler in North America, La Trobe wrote that 
one of his reasons for traveling to North America was to visit the homes of Native American 
people.312 Such a statement suggests that La Trobe’s own interests controlled the course of his 
tour. Yet La Trobe’s personal correspondence, written while he travelled, reveals a different 
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picture. It seems that much of the trip’s itinerary, including the men’s forays into Indian Country, 
was built around the whims and desires of the young Pourtalès. Pourtalès had a romantic 
fascination with American Indians. La Trobe, who had been engaged by the Count and Countess 
Pourtalès to travel with their wayward son, never mentioned the true nature of his relationship 
with the young Pourtalès in The Rambler. Nor did he mention how much Pourtalès’s whims 
informed their travels, and how much energy he spent trying to prevent Pourtalès from partaking 
in immoral activities. In The Rambler, La Trobe used Jacksonian inspired justifications for U.S. 
Indian removal policy as the backdrop for his narrative of the men’s travels in Indian Country. 
He pronounced that contact between the “white man and the Indian” had been an unmitigated 
disaster for the Indians, and to protect them from further danger and their apparently inevitable 
total extinction, the government had benevolently decided to remove the so-called “wrecks of 
these tribes” to lands west of the Mississippi.313 Yet La Trobe kept hidden from his public 
readership the more pressing personal dangers he experienced during his tours of Indian Country. 
In his daily struggles to mentor and protect the young Swiss Count, it was the Indians 
themselves, and Native American women in particular, who presented the moral dangers from 
which he needed to protect his young charge.    
La Trobe and Pourtalès traveled to North America at a time when “[h]undreds, nay, 
thousands of white sails” bespangled the Atlantic, and thus a voyage to America was “no longer 
a circumstance worth signalizing as a marvel.”314 La Trobe ended the first volume of The 
Rambler with an archetypal list of American travelers in Europe, and English travelers in 
America. After ridiculing various stereotypes of parochial and narrow-minded travelers, La 
Trobe put himself forward as somewhat of a “Cosmopolitan,” though he disliked the word. As a 
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cosmopolitan traveler, La Trobe was apparently open-minded about his new surroundings, 
adaptable “to change of place and scene,” and able “to form ties with the natives of every 
clime.”315 La Trobe did not explicitly categorize his “trusty comrade, Count Pourtales” in this 
discussion. However, given the few hints in the text of Pourtalès’s enthusiasm for the Indians, it 
is clear that had Pourtalès been English, La Trobe would have categorized him as the 
“sentimental traveller, who having read Rousseau and Chateaubriand, and become enamoured of 
the image of man in a state of nature, unsophisticated and unspoilt by civilization, or of some 
sweet picture of savage life, dives his way through the forests to the Indian settlements, to find 
an amiable ‘Chactas,’ or still more amiable ‘Atala.’”316 Reading between the lines, it seems that 
during their rambles through North America, Pourtalès hoped to translate his abstract romantic 
fascination with American Indians, into an experiential reality.  
 Above all else, Pourtalès wanted to live with the Indians – to hunt, live in their homes, 
and, most imperatively, to have many Indian wives. In particular, the young Count longed to live 
with the Osages on the plains, as he had met a group of Osages when they visited Switzerland in 
1827.317 When reading La Trobe’s Rambler in conjunction with other accounts of this trip, 
Pourtalès’s quest for the Indians provides a crucial subtext and hidden narrative thrust. Engaged 
by the Count and Countess Pourtalès to travel with their wayward elder son through North 
America, La Trobe was charged with the task of reforming the Swiss youth’s already dissolute 
character, and rescuing him from the immortal risks posed by a life lived without adherence to 
proper moral values. This struggle lay at the center of La Trobe’s travels in North America, yet 
they make no appearance in his published narrative. 
                                                
315 Ibid., 243. 
316 Ibid., 242. 
317 John Barnes, "Hunting the Buffalo with Washington Irving: La Trobe as Traveller and Writer," La Trobe 
Journal, no. 71 (2003): 57. 
 151 
During the entire trip through North America, La Trobe looked to divine providence to 
guide him as he in turn acted as moral guide to Pourtalès. Indeed, during the trip La Trobe and 
Pourtalès had many encounters that could be described as providential. On the ship from France 
they met the author Washington Irving, who was returning to his homeland after seventeen 
years’ residence in Europe. The three became firm friends. Then when Irving met Henry 
Ellsworth while holidaying at Saratoga Springs, La Trobe and Pourtalès received an extended 
invitation to accompany Ellsworth’s tour to Indian country west of the Mississippi. Irving would 
himself publish an account of the trip in 1835 under the title A Tour on the Prairie. 
Despite the 1830 Indian Removal Act’s designation of a territory west of the Mississippi 
for the resettlement of all eastern Native American peoples, no formal survey of the region had 
been undertaken. For many years much of this area had been predominantly controlled by the 
Osages, though it was also frequented by plains peoples such as the Pawnees, and more recently, 
an influx of emigrant Cherokee and Creek groups.318 It was linked to a network of competing 
political interests, centering on the plains, which also drew in many peoples east of the 
Mississippi.319 In 1832, Cass commissioned the first formal surveys of the area after land rights 
conflicts flared up between the western peoples and the emigrant groups.320 In La Trobe’s words, 
Ellsworth had therefore been commissioned by the Jackson administration to undertake an 
expedition to this “unexplored region to the West” in order “to arrange various matters connected 
with the Indian tribes newly congregated on the western frontiers.”321 La Trobe and Pourtales 
accepted the invitation. They saw it as a chance to further one of their own projects, which La 
Trobe writes was to attach themselves “to one of the two great bands of the Osage tribe, the Grey 
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Hairs or Clermont, and to accompany them on their autumnal hunt.”322 The chance to set out 
with a planned expedition, to further their quest to live and hunt with the Osages – Pourtalès’s 
image of the quintessential Indian – “offered too much temptation to be resisted or rejected.”323 
 La Trobe and Pourtalès had originally only intended to accompany the Ellsworth 
expedition until the first opportunity to break away toward an Osage hunting party. La Trobe 
wrote in The Rambler that “[t]his project was however eventually defeated, and you would 
hardly be interested by my going into the history of the disappointment, which, in truth, was a 
grievous one, especially to my companion.”324 By the time the expedition had set off from Fort 
Gibson, the Osage parties had advanced far into the prairies, making pursuit difficult, and 
exposing La Trobe and Pourtalès to the danger of Pawnee attack if they did manage to catch up 
with the Osages. Though everyone in the expedition had tried to convince Pourtalès of the 
“rashness” of attempts to join the Osages, he would not be dissuaded, and La Trobe had no 
choice but to follow him in what would become a precipitously abandoned venture.325 
 In omitting details of this “disappointment” in The Rambler, La Trobe applied a rule that 
he followed throughout the text; he avoided any discussion that might give his readers clues 
about the true nature of his relationship with Pourtalès. At the start of volume one, he had merely 
introduced him as the “young Count de Pourtales, a cheerful and accomplished travelling 
companion, who, I believe, was bent like myself on forming opinions from observation.”326 A 
different picture of Albert Pourtalès’s character and the nature of the travelling companions’ 
relationship emerge in La Trobe’s private letters to the Count and Countess Pourtalès.  In the 
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course of this correspondence, La Trobe refers to his “young & mercurial friend” Albert as a 
young man in need of “moral guidance,” who displayed a “fickleness and instability of purpose,” 
and was “deficient in endurances . . . in times of no excitement.”327 Writing to the Countess, La 
Trobe explained that it was often necessary for him to place checks upon Albert’s “proceedings 
& guard against excess.”328 However, he found that these checks had to be placed in a diplomatic 
and subtle manner because of “the peculiar character of the tie that binds my companion to me as 
fellow travellers – a tie that in fact binds him at the same time that it cannot be proclaimed.”329 
Throughout the tour, La Trobe’s letters to Pourtalès’s parents included long labored summations 
of whether their son was “retrograding or advancing,” and pondering on the likely longevity of 
any evidence of his improved conduct and adherence to proper moral principles.330 
 The main threat to Pourtalès’s moral feeling appear to have been his romantically 
inspired fascination with American Indians, initially the Osages in particular. On this topic La 
Trobe was less than candid in his letters to Pourtalès’s parents, though he did allude to incidents 
during the two month trip with Ellsworth and Irving that gave the young Count’s “unbridled & 
unreclaimed fancy . . . a force & vigor which made them particularly difficult to counteract.”331 
In contrast, Henry Ellsworth’s account of the trip presents a fuller picture of the extent of 
Pourtalès’s Romantic fancies and passions. In a long private letter to his wife, Ellsworth 
expressed his distaste for Pourtalès’s character and conduct. While Ellsworth disapproved of 
Pourtalès’s adoption of Indian style dress – amongst other things, it was the young Count’s 
                                                
327 La Trobe to Madame la Comtesse Frederic de Pourtalès, 24 March 1833; La Trobe to Madame Pourtalès, 26 
January 1833; La Trobe to Madame Pourtalès, 10 August 1832; La Trobe to Madame Pourtalès, 20 September 1833: 
La Trobe Neuchâtel Archive, La Trobe Manuscripts Collection (LTMC), State Library of Victoria, MS 13354, Box 
5, Folder 44. 
328 La Trobe to Madame Pourtalès, 26 January 1833, La Trobe Neuchâtel Archive, LTC, SLV, MS 13354. 
329 La Trobe to Madame Pourtalès, 3 December 1832, La Trobe Neuchâtel Archive, LTC, SLV, MS 13354. 
330 La Trobe to Madame Pourtalès, 20 September 1833, La Trobe Neuchâtel Archive, LTC, SLV, MS 13354. 
331 La Trobe to Madame Pourtalès, 3 December 1832, La Trobe Neuchâtel Archive, LTC, SLV, MS 13354. 
 154 
brazen pursuit of Indian women, which offended Ellsworth’s Yankee sensibilities most 
profoundly.332 
 According to Ellsworth, Pourtalès was driven in his commitment to break with the party 
in order to pursue the Osages by his quest for liaisons with Indian women. Referring to the 
incident, Ellsworth stated that “Mr Latrobe preferred to accompany us, but Mr Pourteles had 
become so completely beguiled by the stories of Osage customs and privileges . . . he determined 
to part with us – Mr Chouteau had assured him the facility of getting an Osage wife during his 
residence . . . this object blinded his eyes to all danger.”333 In the end, La Trobe and Pourtalès 
spent only a day in pursuit of the Osage, with Pourtalès apparently having been finally persuaded 
of the folly of the enterprise. They rejoined the Ellsworth party again at night fall.334 However, 
during their absence, Ellsworth took the chance to discuss his disapproval of Pourtalès’s conduct 
with Irving. Ellsworth related to his wife that Pourtalès’s “passions led him to great extremes.” 
He made particular reference to Pourtalè’s conduct at the Union mission station at Fort Gibson, 
where “he [had] attempted to seduce an amiable young Indian girl” by giving presents to her 
mother, and then prevailing on the superintendant’s wife about the matter. Of this conduct, 
Ellsworth proclaimed “what presumption! indignation and refusal, ought to have covered the 
Swiss gentleman [with?] shame.” Yet this was not the worst conduct. In the words of Ellsworth, 
“[t]here were other instances of misconduct more gross, but I will not pollute my pages with a 
recital of them.”335 
 Ellsworth’s pronouncements on Pourtalès’s conduct leaves open the question of whether 
the young Swiss Count did, in any way, fulfill his pretentions to the role of Don Juan of Osage 
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country. However, Ellsworth summarized Pourtalès as exhibiting “a curious compound of 
character, brilliancy & fun mixed with frivolity and base sensuality.” The young man’s age and 
“transatlantic indulgencies” could nevertheless not justify his conduct, and that “he will later in 
life, look back upon his western follies (to say the least) with shame – I have ventured through a 
friend, to mention the deep mortification which may be inflicted upon his future domestic felicity 
. . . by the appearance of red progeny, who will rise up to call him father!”336 
 Writing to Pourtalès’s mother after their tour with Ellsworth, La Trobe explained the 
anxiety and strain under which Pourtalès’s behavior had put him. Though he never explicitly 
referred to any immoral conduct, he explained to the Countess the difficulty he had restraining 
and guiding her son “without the display & production of some forceable means for restraint . . . 
on occasions where his fancies & plans were of a character that prescribed my giving 
concurrence either directly or indirectly.”337 He was, however, explicit about the strain he had 
been under during that time: “It has been a season of great mental anxiety to me, & now that I 
believe it has come to its termination I look back upon it with something like a shudder.”338 La 
Trobe subsequently wrote to the Countess of his misgivings about their plans to join an Osage 
buffalo hunt the following year, alluding to the fact that Indian country had dangerous effects on 
the young Pourtalès’s disposition: “Hitherto, a moment of passion has been a moment of 
absolute & almost literal intoxication with him – when one might say that, he had eyes, but saw 
not, & ears, but heard not.”339 In the end, the pair found their plans to return to Osage country 
thwarted by war between the Osages and Cherokees, but Pourtalès instead had his Romantic 
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fancies met by a tour of the Western Great Lakes and Upper Mississippi region.340 Returning 
from this trip at the end of November 1833, La Trobe wrote to the Countess: “I am thankful that 
our visit to the Indian country finished when it did, for I am now more and more convinced, that 
the species of feverish excitement under which he labours while in it, is far from being healthy - 
& not likely to add to the strength of his moral feeling.”341 
 These reflections on the struggles undertaken as Pourtalès’s mentor and moral guardian 
reveal much about La Trobe’s cosmology. The responsibility of being guardian to a wayward 
young man whose soul was in serious peril weighed heavily. To save Pourtalès from this danger, 
La Trobe had to continually reveal to the young man the true nature of God’s moral universe, 
and remind him of the necessity of heeding Providence in order to live by God’s law. In a letter 
to the Countess in March 1833, La Trobe wrote as evidence of her son’s improvement that “I 
have been gratified by hearing him . . . state clearly his conviction that the hand of Providence 
had been watchful over him & saved him in many instances from the madness of his own 
Schemes & the fruits of his follies by interposing checks or leading him another way.”342 In 
attempting to save Pourtalès, La Trobe needed to convince the young man of the danger into 
which his romantic fascination with the American Indians would lead, and that he must instead 
heed divine providence.  
 Although La Trobe made sweeping generalizations about “the Indians,” he was not a 
romantic of the same hue as Pourtalès. La Trobe nevertheless many times recounted in The 
Rambler the sweet sorrow he felt for what he saw as the inevitable decline of America’s Indians, 
who he stated “are known to diminish in number so rapidly, that common observation alone 
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enables any one to predict their utter extinction before the lapse of many years.”343 Though this 
was to be regretted, it was on this basis that La Trobe pronounced his intellectual solidarity with 
the Jackson administration’s removal policy. According to his public declarations, La Trobe 
believed that experience had shown “the insurmountable inconveniences and evils consequent 
upon the existence of bodies of men in their savage state in the centre of civilization.”344 In this 
equation, the evils presented danger to the Indians, and therefore, in the interests of benevolence, 
they needed to be removed to the west of the Mississippi. 
By the time he finalized The Rambler for publication, La Trobe therefore had much to 
say on the topic of the American Indian, and the U.S. Indian removal policy. He expounded, at 
length, the virtues of the removal policy, and gave other lengthy expositions on Native 
Americans. Presented as a lesson drawn from the experiences and knowledge gained from his 
travels in North America, he stated that “however unwillingly,” he had “been led at length to 
admit” that the “white man and the Indian cannot be near neighbours. They never will and never 
can amalgamate.”345 That the Indians needed to remove west of the Mississippi had been made 
necessary by the fault of two different parties. Firstly, it was the fault of sinful whites of bad 
character, who had thwarted the “benevolent designs” of the government, so that the Indians had 
been “surrounded by bad men, as the hungry wolves of the desert surround a troop of horses.”346 
Secondly, the Indians themselves were to blame, for they had turned their back on civilization – 
which was their only opportunity for both worldly and spiritual salvation: “If the Indian turns his 
back upon the alternative of civilization, he must recede; and were it not even advantageous to 
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the white, it would be a mercy to the latter to attempt by all lawful means to arrange matters in 
such a way as to avoid the possibility of collision.”347 
Though he had not, of course, been involved in the formulation of the removal policy, 
and was only marginally involved in its implementation, the idea of removal made sense to La 
Trobe. In his advocacy for Indian removal, La Trobe sounded like the most partisan of 
Jacksonian Democrats. At the start of The Rambler, La Trobe claimed the authority of one who 
had attempted to keep his imagination and his mind “unbiased and uninfluenced by preconceived 
notions, from whatever source they might be drawn.”348 Thus, La Trobe gave his 
pronouncements on Indian removal extra weight, for he presented them as the views of an 
objective, open-minded, cosmopolitan outsider. Yet he was only able to find solidarity with the 
U.S. government’s Indian removal policy because he could assimilate it to his epistemological 
and cosmological outlook; in other words, that there was one true and proper path that all human 
souls should and must follow and this was to live within a “civilized” society adhering to divine 
providence. 
Yet the struggles that La Trobe kept hidden from his public readership had no doubt also 
been influential in informing his views. As revealed by the level of anxiety experienced in his 
commitment to saving Pourtalès’s immortal soul, the “cosmopolitan” La Trobe’s acceptance of 
difference was limited only to that which fell within the proper bounds of Christianity and 
“civilization.” His constant efforts to prevent Pourtalès from engaging in immoral activity had 
shown that interactions between whites and Indians created sites of degradation and moral 
danger for both people, and needed to be stopped. La Trobe’s struggles to act as moral guide and 
mentor to Pourtalès, and to ameliorate the effects of his young friend’s romantic fancies, 
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therefore reveal more fully the constitution of La Trobe’s cultural world. Although in his 
published text he propounded a very detached Jacksonian style rhetorical justification for the 
United States government’s Indian removal policy, La Trobe had undergone severely taxing 
struggles which no doubt helped to entrench his belief in the extreme segregationist foundations 
of removal.  
 
The Romance of the Forest: Francis Bond Head, Assiginack, and Peter Jones 
 
In August 1836, Francis Bond Head, the new lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, 
travelled to Manitoulin Island in Lake Huron for the first annual delivery of presents to be held at 
that location. By his own accounts, upon arrival at Manitoulin, Head summarily decided the 
island would be the perfect site for the colony’s First Peoples to remove themselves to in order to 
escape the malevolent forces of “civilization,” which were spreading as the rapidly growing 
settler population engulfed the land.349 At this council, Head purported to effect the surrender of 
the extensive and fertile Saugeen Tract from the Saugeen Ojibwe, and to gain the consent of the 
region’s Anishinaabeg to remove to Manitoulin Island. However, in the subsequent controversy 
surrounding these proceedings, Head’s representations would come to be questioned. With a 
romantic sensibility reminiscent of Pourtalès’s, though seemingly without the blatant attempts at 
sexual conquest, Head represented himself as the heroic father chosen to save his innocent and 
primitively virtuous “red children” from the corrupting forces of civilization. Yet beneath all this 
heroic romantic bravado lay a fear: because it apparently decayed true “Indianness,” contact 
between Indians and whites would also undermine his ability to play his fantasy role of “father” 
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to his noble, Indian “children.” Consequently, Head held in high esteem the Odawa man, Jean-
Baptiste Assiginack who, despite not living a pristine “natural” life in the forest, had the 
diplomatic and interpersonal skills to allow Head to play his much-valued paternal role. Head did 
not hold Peter Jones – an Ojibwe man and Methodist minister – in similar esteem. Unlike 
Assiginack, Jones represented the moral danger of contact between so-called “civilized” and 
“savage” people; he represented the apparent decay of their pristine noble nature. But beneath 
such explicit deprecations lay perhaps Head’s true, more narcissistic reason for disliking Jones; 
with Jones, Head could not play his fantasy role of father to his noble, Indian “children.” 
 In the years preceding Head’s arrival in Upper Canada, the British obligation of giving 
presents to their War of 1812 Indian allies continued to meet with opposition from the 
government in England. In 1836, the government in London again pushed for a commutation of 
presents to the Indians in British North America. As part of his initial instructions on Indian 
policy in Upper Canada, Lord Glenelg (the secretary of state for war and the colonies) asked 
Head to investigate the possibility of abrogating the custom.350 Well briefed on the government’s 
previous attempt to commute presents to payments of money, Glenelg informed Head that “[i]n 
July 1827 a similar measure was proposed to Lord Dalhousie by the Earl of Ripon. Lord 
Dalhousie’s object to it was, however, very decided, and was expressed in terms which it would 
scarcely be possible to strengthen.”351 Glenelg grasped that the practice of giving presents to the 
Indians had created an equitable obligation for the British government, and that precipitously 
ending the practice, without warning would be an “unjust and impolitic” breach of good faith. He 
therefore asked Head to determine “how far it may be practicable consistently with good faith 
and sound policy gradually to diminish” the annual presents “with a view to the ultimate 
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abrogation of the existing custom.” In particular, Glenelg directed Head to consider how to wind 
down the practice in light of “the principle object” of current British “intercourse with the 
Tribes,” which he identified as “the moral & religious improvement of the Indians & their 
instruction in the arts of civilized life.”352 
 Head himself had a very strict understanding of the fiduciary nature of the relationship 
between the British government and the Indians. Forwarding a treaty that he had made with an 
Anishinaabe group at Manitoulin Island in the summer of 1836, he informed Glenelg that “Your 
Lordship will at once perceive that the Document is not in a legal Form, but our Dealings with 
the Indians have been only in Equity; and I was therefore anxious to show that the Transaction 
had been equitably explained to them.”353 Writing the next year of a plan to move the duties of 
the Indian Department to the Commissariat, he argued that “[t]he Migration of these simple 
People from Equity to Law would be productive of the most serious Evils to them as well as to 
the Government.”354 Head, in particular, sought to retain the kinship characteristics of the 
British-Indian alliance, with its concurrent requirement that the lieutenant governor play the 
ceremonial role of “father.” He thus argued to Glenelg that “[t]he Lieutenant Governor of Upper 
Canada, styled by the Indian ‘their Father,’ has, under the Direction of the Colonial Minister, 
hitherto treated them as his Children, but if any new Regulations whatever were to be created to 
deprive him of parentally governing these People according to their simple Habits, and according 
to the transient Circumstances, they would be Losers by the Arrangement.”355 Head believed it 
best to retain the gubernatorial discretion entailed in an equitable relationship between the British 
and the Indians. He thus though it “highly politic that we should retain the Advantage as well as 
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the Disadvantage of possessing no written Documents, or no fixed Rule of governing the Indians 
beyond the Will and Pleasure of the Great Father the King.”356 
 Yet Head’s vision of how he – as the local “father” representing the “Great Father the 
King” – would use this discretion diverged sharply from the policy that Glenelg advised him to 
pursue. Based on his staunch belief in the tenets of romantic primitivism, Head projected a vision 
of British-Indian relations that was, in many ways, antithetical to the prevailing civilization 
policy. Head believed, like other romantics such as William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge, that American Indians were exemplars of “natural man.” Living in this “natural” state, 
American Indians were uniquely positioned to reap the moral benefits of unadulterated 
communion with the benevolent spiritual forces of nature. Thus, unlike contemporaries who 
stereotyped American Indians as “degenerate savages,” Head valorized them as morally superior 
to populations subject to the artificial and corrupted “civilized” world.357 He filled his official 
dispatches on Indian policy with statements about Indian nobility, and the need to save them 
from the corruption of so-called “civilization.” In one letter to Glenelg, for instance, Head wrote 
of the unfailing nobility of “the Red Man,” stating that despite the “Cruelties and Injustice” they 
had endured, “in the Red Man’s Heart there exists no Sentiment of Animosity against us, no 
Feeling of Revenge,” and they always showed hospitality and kindness to a “White Man” if he 
“be lost in the Forest.”358 Unlike Glenelg, who wanted to save the Indians through 
Christianization and “civilization,” Head believed that Indians were fundamentally and 
incommensurably different (and superior) to “civilized man,” and that to remain true “noble 
savages,” they needed to be kept safe from the corrupting forces of “civilization.”  
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Yet despite this omnipresent romanticism, Head claimed to base his Indian policy 
decisions on knowledge drawn from direct acquaintance with the “Indian character.” In his 
official dispatch to Lord Glenelg of November 1836, he gave a lengthy account of his travels to 
“the annual Delivery of Presents to the visiting Indians at Amherstburg, and also that which took 
place for the first Time at the Great Manatoulin Island in Lake Huron.”359 Before launching into 
his pronouncements about “[t]he Fate of the Red Inhabitants of America,” Head also told 
Glenelg that “[d]uring my inspectional Tour of the Province I also visited (with One or Two 
trifling Exceptions) the whole of the Indian Settlements in Upper Canada, and in doing so made 
it my Duty to enter every Shanty or Cottage, being desirous to judge with my own Eyes of the 
actual Situation of that Portion of the Indian Population which is undergoing the Operation of 
being civilized.”360 Head used this statement as the foundation to bear the analytical weight of 
his ensuing policy justifications. He presented himself as a tabula rasa that had been filled during 
these visits, and also during the former “slight Opportunity” he had to make himself “acquainted 
with the Indian Character in South America.”361 In including South American peoples to his 
conceptions of American Indians, Head made his generalizations even more sweeping than 
Lewis Cass’s. Nevertheless, like Cass, Head claimed an authoritative foundation for his Indian 
policy based on his first-hand acquaintance with a supposed general Indian character. 
On this basis, Head justified the implementation of a policy to remove all the First 
Peoples of Upper Canada to Manitoulin Island. Although he viewed Indians as noble and 
morally superior to those who called themselves “civilized,” this superior nobility did not give 
the Indians the power to stop themselves “daily and yearly fading before the Progress of 
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Civilization.”362 For Head, the noble Indian existed in a state of virtuous simplicity akin to that of 
a child whose innocence was always in danger of being lost through contact with the complex 
and corrupt adult world. He therefore consistently referred to First Peoples as “the simple 
virtuous Race,” and the “Red Children of the Forest.”363 Similarly to McKenney, Head seized 
upon the linguistic metaphors of Great Lakes diplomatic culture, in which imperial officials took 
the title of “father” to their Indian “children,” and imbued them with a new significance based on 
his own epistemological sensibility. However, in contrast to McKenney, who saw removal as a 
means of ultimately achieving civilization, Head’s paternal benevolence consisted in removing 
the apparently simple and innocent Indians from all contact with what he saw as the inevitably 
malevolent forces of civilization. He argued to Glenelg that this noble simplicity and innocence 
put Indians at particular risk: “It is impossible to teach the Indian to beware of the White Man; 
for it seems to be the Instinct of his untutored Nature to look upon him as his Friend. In short, his 
Simplicity is his Ruin; and though he can entrap and conquer every wild Beast in his Forest, yet 
invariably he becomes himself the Prey of his White Brother!”364 He thus justified his removal 
policy to Glenelg by stating that “the greatest kindness we can perform towards these intelligent, 
simple-minded People, is to remove and fortify them as much as possible from all 
Communication with the Whites.”365 
On arriving on Manitoulin Island in August 1836, he apparently judged it a well-suited 
environment in which to “fortify” the Indians. He informed Glenelg that from his observations of 
the island, “he felt convinced that a vast Benefit would be conferred both upon the Indians and 
                                                
362 Head to Glenelg, 20 November 1836, in ibid., 129. 
363 Head, Emigrant: 97.; Head to Glenelg, 24 July 1837, House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence 
Regarding the Indians in British North America: 148.; PRO CO 42/438. 
364 Head to Glenelg, 20 November 1836, in House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence Regarding 
the Indians in British North America: 126. 
365 Head to Glenelg, 20 November 1836, in ibid., 125. 
 165 
the Province by prevailing upon them to migrate to this Place.”366 Head therefore transformed 
part of the present-giving ceremonies into treaty councils in which he purported to obtain the 
consent of the attendant Anishinaabe people to give up their land in exchange for reservations on 
Manitoulin Island.367 According to his official memorandum of the negotiations, he opened his 
address to the gathered Anishinaabeg by referring to the history of the Indian-British alliance in 
the Great Lakes: “Seventy Snow Seasons have now passed away since we met in Council to the 
crooked Place (Niagara), at which Time and Place your Great Father the King and the Indians of 
North America tied their Hands together by the Wampum of Friendship.”368 The time had 
however come when forces had changed the circumstances of that alliance. While the creation of 
the United States had separated from the “Great Father many of his Red Children,” the 
seemingly inevitable increase in the white population, and “the Progress of Cultivation” had, 
according to Head, impoverished native hunting grounds, thus making necessary new 
arrangements to protect “the Red Children of the Forest” from the “Encroachments of the 
Whites.”369 According to Head, during these negotiations one Annishinaabe group “consented to 
give up the Twenty-three thousand Islands,” while the Saugeen Ojibwe “consented to give up a 
Million and a Half of Acres.”370 Head had a “short plain Memorandum” drawn up to this effect, 
which he and the Indian leaders signed, witnessed by the clergy and government officers in 
attendance. 
Head relished this opportunity to play “father” to his “red children”; it was a romantic 
fantasy that had come true. In his explicit justifications for pursuing a removal policy he 
consistently referenced the supposed dangers that contact with “civilization” posed for the 
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Indians. Yet the corollary danger, implicit in his explanations of the Indians losing their 
childlike, innocent nobility, would be the much more personal loss of his own ability to play the 
role of “father” to his adored “red children.” Though in his official correspondence Head thinly 
concealed his personal attachment to this role, news circulating among his family more fully 
reveal his investment in this aspect of his gubernatorial duties. Writing to their son, his wife 
wrote of Head’s recent “delightful wild expedition to the Manitoulin Islands in Lake Huron to 
meet 1500 Indians,” where he had been “universally beloved & admired, and that the Indians 
were delighted with him.”371 As lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, Head was not only able to 
fulfill his fantasy of interacting with the noble “Red Man,” he became – at least in his own mind 
– the embodiment of an omniscient paternal authority over the apparently childlike Indians. This 
allowed him to play the role of hero “father,” who saves his Indian “children” from degradation 
by removing them from the malevolent forces of civilization.  
While Head apparently savored his “delightful wild expedition” to Manitoulin Island to 
counsel his Indian children, some Indians had not equally delighted in the prospect of making the 
journey. A group of Potawatomis living in the Indiana-Ohio region of the United States had 
received the news, sent the previous year, that all the summer presents for Upper Canadian and 
visiting Indians would be given at a Manitoulin Island. Though Head would, years later, continue 
to draw pleasure from the memory of his canoe trip to Manitoulin Island, for the Potawatomis 
whose trip would have been decidedly longer, such a journey was not something to be 
savored.372 They thus wrote to their “Father,” Sir Francis Bond Head, to inform him of the 
impracticality of the plan. “The hardships we would have to undergo by coasting the great 
Lake,” they stated, “to say nothing of the imminent danger, and loss of time, would be more than 
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our Great Father would be willing that his red children should suffer.” They therefore requested 
that the British continue the practice of distributing presents at Amherstburg, reminding their 
“father” of his duty not to abandon them after all the sacrifices they had made in taking up “the 
Tomahawk” when the Americans – “the Big Knife” – threatened.373 The Potawatomis’s petition 
also suggested that they were not exactly the kind of intrepid, canoe-bound, noble adventurers of 
the forest that Head had conjured in his visions. “We have long since abandoned the idea of ever 
ascending in our frail wooden Canoes beyond the rivers and bays immediately in our 
neighborhood,” they stated. Instead, they often employed ferrymen to transport themselves and 
their herds of ponies across the much-closer St. Clair River.374  
While not all invitees could make the council, the dignity and solemnity of the 
Anishinaabeg who attended seemed to confirm Head’s romantic-primitivist presumptions about 
the nobility of the Indians. In particular, Head was deeply impressed by the performance of the 
orator “Sigonak,” who the gathered Anishinaabeg selected to respond the Head’s proposals. 
Boasting to his publisher John Murray of his travels to Manitoulin to hold a “grand Council” 
with the Indians, he wrote about how enraptured he was with Sigonak’s reply, and his purported 
skills to speak “without once stopping, from sun rise to sunset.” He thus rhetorically asked 
Murray, “[i]s not this being what’s called ‘a powerful speaker’?”375 
 Sigonak, more commonly known to the British as Jean-Baptiste Assiginack, seems to 
have exemplified Head’s notion of the noble “Red Man.” Head was by no means the first British 
official to be deeply impressed by Assiginack. Apart from a small break in service in the late 
1820s, when he had returned to his Odawa community at Arbre Croche in the Michigan 
Territory, Assiginack had served as an “interpreter” for the British since the end of the War of 
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1812.376 He played a crucial, leading role in present-giving ceremonies and was well known 
among British officials, in the words of his friend Thomas Anderson, as “an Indian of 
extraordinary talents,” who possessed “an almost universal influence over the Western 
Tribes.”377 Head was so impressed with Assiginack during 1836 Manitoulin Island council that 
he added five pounds to his pay for the year.378 He also seemingly sought to establish ongoing 
contact with the Odawa man; Assiginack reportedly visited Toronto in November 1836 to lay 
before Head a wampum belt “delivered to the North American Indians by Sir William Johnson in 
1744.”379 Presumably for Head, Assiginack’s personal charm and diplomatic talents translated 
into a personification of true “Indianness.” 
 Indeed, this must have had more to do with Assiginack’s interpersonal skills, than the 
reality of his life, which in many respects did not fit Head’s vision of the pristine “red child of 
the forest.” Skilled in the diplomatic protocols that harked back to over two centuries of 
European-Indian relations in the Great Lakes, many aspects of Assiginack’s life also reflected 
the cosmopolitan cultural landscape of the region. Most likely educated in Lower Canada, where 
he converted to Catholicism, he seems have lived most of his early life at L’Arbre Croche, until 
he moved to Drummond Island to work for the British after the War of 1812, during which time 
he accumulated wealth by investing his money in Montreal and in local trading ventures.380 After 
a short stay back in L’Arbre Croche in the late 1820s, he moved back to the British side, joining 
Thomas Anderson’s settlement at Penitaguishene (Coldwater), which was planned as a 
“civilized” Indian settlement. Head must have been aware that Assiginack himself had chosen to 
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live a somewhat (so-called) “civilized” life. In 1837 Assiginack requested to commute his 
allowance of presents to purchase “a Yoke of Steers for his farming purposes.” Anderson 
recommended to his superiors in the Indian Department that such a request be granted “a man of 
[Assiginack’s] influence setting so good an example” might “be followed by many others.”381 
Head, presumably knowing the reason for Assiginack wanting money payment in lieu of 
presents, acceded to the request. Perhaps the so-called “civilized” aspects of Assiginack’s 
lifestyle did not decrease Head’s esteem; for all intents and purposes Assiginack could still pass 
as the noble “Red Man” of the forest. 
 Yet not all First Nations men with whom Head dealt could pass as “Indian” in the same 
way. Peter Jones (Kahkewaquonaby), a Methodist (Wesleyan) minister, and leader of the Credit 
River Mississaguas (Ojibwes), had the opposite experience. Unlike Assiginack, Jones spoke and 
wrote English fluently and, rather than relying on oral diplomatic protocols, he administered his 
people’s affairs by writing directly to the local administration. When Head arrived in Upper 
Canada, Ojibwe leaders such as Jones had already spent years struggling with the local and 
metropolitan British administrations to gain secure title deeds to their land. But their requests fell 
on even deafer ears under Head’s administration; in his schema real Indians would not request 
such documents. “[W]ho ever heard of an Indian . . . desiring to transmit Arable Land to his 
Children?,” he would write. People such as Jones, he believed might just as well declare that 
“when wild Beasts roar at each other it is to complain of the Want among them of Marriage 
Licences, for Animals understand these “Documents” just as well as Indians understand Title 
Deeds.”382  In November 1836, after declining the Credit River Ojibwe’s request for the title 
deeds, Head requested that Peter Jones wait upon his in Toronto. The outcome of the meeting – 
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unsurprisingly given Head’s views on the subject – appears to have been wholly unsatisfying to 
both parties. Jones subsequently traveled to London to directly petition the metropolitan 
government. 
For Head, Peter Jones represented a two-fold threat to his attempts to save the Indians. 
Not only was Jones a missionary, he was a missionary posing as an Indian, who was thus 
corrupting “real” Indian culture from within. As soon as Head heard that the Credit River 
Ojibwes had sent Jones to petition Queen Victoria directly, he sent a letter to Lord Glenelg 
warning him of the danger posed by Jones. He wrote that, “Mr Peter Jones who in the Power of 
Attorney of which he is the bearer has the double title of Chief and Missionary of the 
Mississagua tribe of the Chippewa nation of Indians is the son of an American surveyor who 
having in open adultery had children by several Indian Squaws deemed it admirable to bring up 
one of them as a Missionary!” To Head, Jones’s parentage and vocation meant that he could not 
be a real Indian. However, he noted that when Jones had visited England in the same capacity 
earlier in the decade, “he was believed to be an Indian” by those he met with. Head represented 
this belief as false, for Jones’s “sallow complexion, his aquiline nose, the position of his eyes and 
the phrenological formation of his head would to any one acquainted with the red aborigines of 
America have at once betrayed his origin.”383 Unlike Assiginack, Jones was not, in Head’s mind, 
a true “Indian.” 
Although Head presented his removal policy as if it were based on empirical observation, 
the generalized “Indian” of his gaze consistently adhered to the tropes of romantic primitivism. 
Jones did not fit that vision. When he met Queen Victoria in September 1838, Jones – in a 
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calculated act of strategic essentialism – wore his fringed and beaded buckskin attire and 
moccasins ornamented with porcupine quills.384 Presumably though, he more often did not dress 
in this kind of attire for local meetings in Upper Canada. Head had no room in his schema for 
Indian men who did not play the part of noble “red children of the forest.” His policy to remove 
all the province’s First Peoples to Manitoulin Island rested on a narrative of himself – as heroic 
father – saving his “Indian children” from the malevolent forces of civilization. Men like Jones, 
who were literate Christian ministers seeking legal documents for their land, did not fit Head’s 
narrative. 
 Jones was not the only local Wesleyan to challenge Head’s removal policy. Other 
Methodists similarly opposed not just Head’s vision, but also the reality of the methods he had 
used in his attempts to implement this vision. Over the two turbulent years of his tenure in Upper 
Canada, Head faced concerted challenges to his Indian policy. In particular, firsthand accounts of 
the 1836 proceedings at Manitoulin Island emerged to challenge Head’s own representations. 
Most notably, members of the Wesleyan missionary society, whose minister, Joseph Strinson, 
had purportedly signed the written agreement, contested the alleged surrender of the Saugeen 
tract. In 1836, Head boasted to Glenelg of this purchase of a “Million and a Half Acres of the 
very richest Land in Upper Canada” as the most notable coup of the Manitoulin council.385 
Although in these reports, he emphasized his benevolent aims to save the Indians, he 
nevertheless bragged of his consequential success in effecting the surrender of a territory that had 
“long been a Desirandum in the Province.”386 However, by 1838, the Wesleyan leadership in 
both Upper Canada and London were pursuing a concerted campaign to persuade the colonial 
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office to repudiate Head’s removal policy. They argued that not only was removal anathema to 
their attempts to “civilize” the Indians, but that in his colonial office dispatches Head had 
misrepresented the methods by which he had implemented the policy. For instance, Egerton 
Ryerson, a minister in Upper Canada, wrote to Glenelg in April 1838 informing him of several 
misrepresentations he had noted in Head’s “dispatch on the Affairs of the Indians.” Among these 
was “Sir Francis’ statement that the Indians readily consented to cede to him the Sankin 
Territory & remove to Manitoulin & other Islands.”387 
 Relating Strinson’s first-hand account of the council, Ryerson argued that the Saugeen 
Ojibwes did not, as Head represented, agree to sell their land and move to Manitoulin. In 
Ryerson’s words, upon the Ojibwes’s refusal to surrender the whole of the Saugeen territory, 
Head “persuaded and even threatened them (by saying he could not keep the white people from 
coming to settle on their land, that it only belonged to the Indians as a hunting ground &c, & c) 
they were inflexible – they told him they could not live on Manitoulin and the other Islands – 
they would not go there.” According to this account, the Ojibwes told Head “that they wanted 
lands they could call their own and live in houses, and have their children learn to read like the 
white man.”388 Despite Head’s continued efforts to persuade and threaten the Ojibwes, they did 
not accede to his demands until he scaled down the proposal. They thus ultimately agreed to cede 
only the part of the territory adjoining the Canada Company’s Huron tract in return for secure 
title to the territory north of Owen’s Sound. According to Ryerson, “[t]his is what they wanted – 
land secured to them from which they could not be removed – on which they would have help to 
build houses, and settle their families and rest their bones.”389 Though in disputing Head’s 
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removal transactions, the Wesleyans sought to defend their own missionary interests, such 
accounts nevertheless worked to question the credibility of Head’s own representations.  
 While Head consistently refuted such accusations, alternative accounts of the proceedings 
throw into relief the stylized nature of Head’s own representations. In 1837, he had assured 
Glenelg that equitable procedures had been followed regarding the Saugeen surrender. He wrote 
that “[t]he proposed Surrender having been previously explained by me to the Chiefs of the 
Saugeen Territory, as well as to their Methodist Ministers, it was again formally proposed to 
them by me in Presence of the assembled Chiefs.”390 He sought to reinforce the legitimacy of the 
surrender document further by stating that he “explained to the Council that we White People 
have the Power of placing our Words on Paper; that to prevent any Mistakes hereafter I would 
make their Interpreters translate aloud what I had that Morning written, in order that the Chiefs 
might judge for themselves whether or not it accorded with what I had just said.”391 Yet despite 
these rebuttals to the Wesleyan offensive, Head’s representations seem to contain the tint of 
charlatanism.  
Perhaps for Head though, his versions of events represented the whole truth, for they 
were founded on his apparent conviction regarding his moral duty to his “red children.” But in 
his encounters with First Peoples in Upper Canada, Head was clearly not a tabula rasa. All his 
observations fit remarkably neatly into the edicts of his romantic sensibility. It therefore seems 
likely that he interpreted the events and proceedings of the treaty councils to fit a predetermined 
narrative, in which he heroically saved his Indian children from the dangers of “civilization.” He 
consistently referred to the danger of this contact lying solely with the Indians; it would lead to 
the decay of their pristine nobility and their eventual doom. Yet implicitly, the prospective 
                                                
390 Head to Glenelg, 15 Aug 1837, in House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, Correspondence Regarding the 
Indians in British North America: 150. 
391 Head to Glenelg, 15 Aug 1837, in ibid.  
 174 
blurring of lines between Indian and white – inherent in the civilizing mission – posed a danger 
to Head’s ability to fulfill his dream to play the role of benevolent father, who wisely guides his 
“Indian children” away from danger. While even a shallow look past superficialities would have 
shown Head that the on-the-ground realities of First Peoples’ lives in Upper Canada did not fit 
his romantic pastiche, details seemed not to have bothered him when he could play the role of 
“father.” Though Assiginack’s life contained many realities that did not conform to Head’s 
vision of a true “Indian” lifestyle, Head seems to have esteemed him because he, at least 
formally, fitted the requisite complementary role of noble child of the forest. Peter Jones, on the 
other hand, did not. Men such as Jones threatened Head’s ability to fulfill his fantasy to embody 
a romantically attune, dominant masculinity over his “red children of the forest.” Contact 
between Indians and whites therefore seemingly represented a much more personal, 




As with McKenney, Arthur, and La Trobe, Head’s interactions with particular indigenous 
people or peoples highlight how important his ability to perform a particular masculine role was 
to his projections of indigenous peoples’ future. Always couched in the fixed terms of his 
romantic-primitivist philosophy, Head could not allow for a relational future between himself 
and Upper Canada’s First Peoples in which he was not the “father” to a romanticized group of 
“authentic Indians.” Head’s interactions with Assiginack and Peter Jones thus reveal how crucial 
fulfilling a particular masculine role was in encounters with indigenous people. While for Head 
this entailed the performance of the heroic father, for Arthur it was that of the sincere 
humanitarian conciliator; for La Trobe it was as the morally virtuous “civilized” mentor; and for 
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McKenney it was as the representative of a sexually pure father figure. Like the other three men, 
Head viewed contact between “civilized” and indigenous people as a site of danger. However, 
encounters with indigenous people seem not to have changed his predetermined romantic ideals, 
which shaped all his descriptions of his interactions with First Peoples. In contrast, the writings 
of the other three men reveal how moments of insecurity and emotional struggle worked to reify 
their belief that indigenous people should, and must, be exiled from the lands earmarked for 
settlement. 
 Rather than explicitly highlighting such impulses in their writings, these men claimed an 
intellectual authority, based on their first-hand interactions with indigenous people, from which 
they propounded representations of the general “character” of these people. In turn, they used 
these representations to justify the total dispossession and exile of entire groups of indigenous 
peoples. The stories of these encounters reveal the way in which these men had to alter the 
performance of their authority in light of their dealings with autonomous political indigenous 
actors. Nevertheless, the fact that the men chose – at least in part based on these encounters – to 
support removal policies had very real and violent effects on the indigenous peoples who 
struggled to retain their political autonomy and land in the face of such forces of subjugation. In 
the United States, this came in the form of a military backed operation to exile them to lands 
west of the Mississippi. 
 While removal never gained the same official legitimacy in the British empire, it 
nevertheless formed an important dynamic in the policy of “protection,” adopted by the colonial 
office after the release of the Aborigines Select Committee’s report in 1837. Although Glenelg 
ultimately repudiated Head’s removal policy in his instructions to Head’s successor George 
Arthur, for a short period, Head’s policy gained considerable traction within the colonial office 
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in London. Ultimately though, the voices of dissent, such as the Wesleyans, reminded Glenelg 
and his staff of their commitment to the civilization and Christianization of the empire’s 
“Aborigines.” Among the voices of dissent was Charles La Trobe’s brother Peter, who 
challenged Head’s removal treaty with the Delware of Fairfield in Upper Canada on behalf of the 
Moravians. La Trobe, an advocate of removal in the United States, no doubt followed the family 
line in this instance. La Trobe, whose prose in The Rambler was eerily reminiscent of Cass’s 
Jacksonian rhetoric, nevertheless held a Christian sensibility closer to McKenney’s, and hoped 
for the ultimate civilization and Christianization of the North American Indians. Although in its 
Jacksonian guise, removal appeared to be in direct opposition to apparently more humanitarian 
civilization policies, removal was not a quintessentially Jacksonian phenomenon; it was, in fact, 
malleable to a variety of ostensibly contradictory ideologies. In his published writing La Trobe 
chose to make similar moral reconciliations to those which his fellow-Englishman George Arthur 
had been forced to make in the aftermath of the so-called black wars in Van Diemen’s Land: 
removal was ultimately an unavoidable component of benevolent policies.
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Chapter Four 




 Preparing to leave Van Diemen’s Land for London in 1836, George Arthur struggled 
with an issue that burdened his conscience. During his tenure in Van Diemen’s Land, he had 
presided over a war between colonists and indigenous people that had led to the resettlement and 
near extermination of the island’s Aboriginal peoples. Unsurprisingly, such a possible “stain” on 
his administrative record required some kind of moral reconciliation.392 With his pen in hand, 
writing to his successor Sir John Franklin, Arthur narrated the “black wars” in vague, generalized 
terms, which nevertheless barely concealed the struggles of his conscience. There was, he wrote 
to Franklin, no blessing of divine providence for which he was more grateful than that which 
enabled him “to press to a decisive result a policy in which the mutual interests, and safety of the 
natives, were, even at the time of their most fatal and incessant aggressions, a subject of the 
deepest and most anxious concern.”393  
Although Arthur clearly felt burdened by some sense of responsibility to the “Native 
Aborigines,” he could turn to “providence” in order to explain how the human actions of good 
Christian men could fail to prevent violence and tragedy. Any human fault for what occurred 
could be fixed upon the apparently savage character of the indigenous people themselves, and to 
                                                
392 Arthur had worried about this potential “stain” at the height of the conflict in 1830: Arthur to Twiss, 28 May 
1830, HRA 3, vol. 9, 343-344. 
393 Arthur to Franklin, 29 October 1835, ML, Aurthur Papers, A2165, vol. 5,  
 178 
the perhaps more savage character of the lower-class convicts and former-convict “stock 
keepers”: “[m]uch as the numbers of the Aborigines were diminished, by their own mutual wars 
– by the custom, of destroying their children, when pressed by enemies, and by the too often 
more wanton attacks of distant Stock Keepers, it is gratifying to me that in its’ [sic] collective 
capacity this Community is guiltless of their blood.”  According to Arthur, providence had 
worked to punish the sinful behavior of others; he and the other respectable colonists were not to 
blame. Regarding the “Native Aborigines,” he informed Franklin “that peace, conciliation, and 
kindness towards them have marked the course of Government, and that there is still a remnant 
living to enjoy the fruits of that compassion, which I would have gladly extended to the whole 
race.”394 
Arthur’s reflections on the events that led to the expatriation and slaughter of Van 
Diemen’s Land’s indigenous people appear exceptional in the sense that they were the 
retrospective, private struggles of someone who had instigated a removal policy amidst a violent 
conflict over the control of land. While for Arthur, justifications for removal took the form of a 
retrospective personal moral reconciliation with himself and his God, other British and American 
men made public arguments in favor of adopting systematic, preplanned policies to expatriate 
indigenous people from lands earmarked for British or American settlement. Yet similarly to 
Arthur, such justifications predominantly involved “moral” considerations: Thomas McKenney, 
Lewis Cass, Charles La Trobe, and Francis Bond Head all advocated publically for removal as a 
morally righteous and necessary prospective policy.  In this chapter I will focus on these four 
men’s explicit, public arguments in favor of policies “to remove” indigenous peoples from their 
homelands. 
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All these men justified removal as the humanitarian response to an otherwise unsolvable 
problem. Although not necessary so deeply influenced by Calvinist understandings of providence 
as Arthur, they nevertheless portrayed the situation of indigenous peoples’ contact with “whites” 
as one steeped in some kind of inevitable misfortune. They presented removal as a necessary, 
responsible step to alleviate the inevitable suffering and loss apparently inescapably produced by 
such contact. They framed this suffering and loss as a “moral problem,” to which removal 
represented the morally righteous response. Despite the clear differences in the ideological or 
philosophical frameworks within which each man articulated their justifications for removal, 
ultimately McKenney’s paternalism, Cass’s Jacksonianism, La Trobe’s Toryism, and Head’s 
romanticism led each man to the same conclusion; that removal represented both a necessary and 
morally upright solution to a moral problem. 
 
Thomas McKenney and the Strictures of Paternalism 
 
 The rise of Andrew Jackson and the nascent Democratic Party did not substantively 
change McKenney’s pro-removal rhetoric. He gave his whole-hearted approval to the 
Jacksonians’ plans to transform the executive’s removal policy into a congressional enactment. 
In August 1829 Thomas McKenney addressed the first (and last) public meeting of the recently 
formed New York Board for the Emigration, Preservation, and Improvement of the Aborigines 
of America (“New York Board”). Speaking amidst the mounting controversy over the proposed 
congressional removal bill, McKenney sought to find common ground with the ever-growing 
opposition to removal, instigated by vocal, reform-minded Christian men and women, 
predominantly from the Union’s northeastern states. But McKenney’s efforts to promote removal 
as a cause of Christian benevolence ultimately proved illusory; the vast majority of reform-
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minded Christians continued to support the southern nations, particularly the Cherokees, in their 
opposition to removal. Though ultimately unsuccessful, McKenney’s struggles to carve out a 
discursive space for removal as a benevolent, Christian policy reveal how tightly he was caught 
within the scope of his own paternalist fantasy about U.S.-Indian relations. He could not 
assimilate any logic except that which would fit within his view of the proper “moral” relations 
between a benign U.S. “father” and his American Indian “children.” 
 In seeking support for Indian removal, McKenney initially turned to those who had been 
his allies in the government’s civilization program during the 1820s. From 1819 McKenney had 
overseen the annual distribution of $10,000 in congressional appropriations to societies 
committed to educating and Christianizing American Indians. The American Board of 
Commissioners for Foreign Missions (“ABCFM”) received the largest proportion of this “Indian 
Civilization” fund. Consisting of a relatively affluent, largely Congregational and Presbyterian 
membership, by 1829 the ABCFM had twenty-one schools located within the Southern 
nations.395  
Yet McKenney’s commitment to the Christianization and so-called “civilization” of 
American Indians ultimately sat uneasily with his paternalist characterization of U.S.-Indian 
relations. Although throughout the 1820s he had promoted civilization programs, he never 
seemed able to view Indian leaders – even those who adopted the trappings of “civilization” – as 
fully autonomous political actors. Like the so-called “uncivilized” leaders he encountered at 
Fond du Lac in 1826 and Buttes des Mortes in 1827, McKenney could not consider Indian men 
as fully mature political actors. No matter how “civilized” they became, they could never fully 
escape their designation as “children” who needed to obey the omniscient, benevolent dictates of 
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their American “father.” All McKenney’s justifications for removal presupposed this entrenched 
vision of how relations between the U.S. people and American Indians should and must be 
ordered. 
 As an early advocate of removal under the James Monroe and John Quincy Adams 
administrations, McKenney expressed the belief that once the eastern Indian peoples heard their 
“father’s” recommendation to emigrate west of the Mississippi, they would obey. Reporting to 
Congress in December 1826 on “the disposition of the several Tribes of Indians within the 
United State to emigrate West of the Mississippi,” McKenney conceded that Indian peoples 
generally opposed removal. However, referring “to the four Southern Tribes,” to whom, he 
believed “the greater portion of the remaining Tribes in our States and Territories look” for 
policy, McKenney argued that once they – and in particular the so-called “influential half breeds 
of these Tribes” – had the “real views of the Government” explained to them, they would realize 
that “the interests of the great body of their people would be promoted by emigration.”396 So at 
the end of the summer of 1827, after the treaty at Butte des Morts and the surrender of Red Bird, 
McKenney traveled south to talk to the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Cherokees.  
But on this tour of the South, McKenney discovered that despite his confident 
predictions, the “Southern Tribes” would not be so easily persuaded. McKenney first met with 
Chickasaw and Choctaw delegations and managed to coerce a tentative agreement that they send 
delegates to join a party to explore lands west of the Mississippi. Then in October, with winter 
looming, McKenney felt he would not have sufficient time to hold a council with the Cherokees. 
The Cherokees, he believed, would pose a greater diplomatic challenge than the Choctaws or 
Chickasaws; their leaders’ responses to his proposals would be “too-long winded” and would 
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need “to be met at a thousand points.” Moreover, their apparently “delusional . . . scheme of 
Soverignty, & Independence, & c would have first to be demolished” before any progress could 
be made in convincing them of the wisdom of their “Great Father’s” advice.397 McKenney 
instead decided to call a council of Creek leaders, subsequently held in the Creek capital of 
Tuckabatchee. 
 Still fresh from his diplomatic dealings in the Great Lakes region, McKenney used the 
same rhetorical style in his attempts to persuade the assembled Creek leaders to accede to their 
“father’s” wishes. Rather than pushing for removal as he had with the Chickasaws and 
Choctaws, McKenney attempted instead to have the Creeks “comply with their father’s wishes” 
and sell their remaining lands within the borders claimed by Georgia.398 Giving a long-winded 
description of his summer travels in the Northwest and then among the Chickasaws and 
Choctaws, he stated that he had cleared the “briers” from the path of his Indian children, healed 
their bleeding feet, and spoke “the voice of wisdom from Washington,” which he intended now 
to do for the Creeks. He then asked the Creeks to obey their “father” in Washington, and give up 
the land that “the Georgians wanted.”399 
But McKenney’s attempt to play the role of the wise and benevolent father fell flat when 
the assembled leaders refused to play the parts of his grateful and obedient “Indian children.” 
Although he had hoped to avoid discussions with the Cherokees, Cherokee leaders David Vann 
and John Ridge attended the council in Tuckabatchee. In the Cherokee Phoenix the following 
summer, Ridge gave a scathing account of McKenney’s performance. He described McKenney 
as having spoken in a “style and manner” that was “no doubt . . . practiced among the 
Chippeways, Kickapoos, Menominees, Sioux, & c,” but to Ridge, McKenney’s oratory consisted 
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“in gross Indian and disgusting flattery.”400 When this long-winded speech failed to impress the 
Creek and Cherokee leaders, McKenney attempted to nullify what he saw as the obstructing 
influence of Vann and Ridge. The following day he asserted that Opothleyaholo, one of the 
attendant Creek leaders, had, in conspiracy with Vann and Ridge, made a verbal promise behind 
the backs of the other Creek leaders to annul a previous treaty made with the United States in 
Washington.401 According to Ridge, when these accusations failed to break the leaders’ 
solidarity, McKenny “made a disconnected speech, destitute of any reason, apparently the effect 
of anger and disappointment.” When Opothleyaholo told him “he talked too much, and if he 
talked this way for ten days it would not alter the determination of the council,” McKenney 
rebuked that “he would be the judge of the length of his own speeches and would talk as much as 
he pleased.”402 
With his projections of paternal authority failing to gain traction, McKenney faced the 
indignity of fighting for his masculine honor against men who had transgressed their proper roles 
as his obedient children. When he told the council that he could prove that Vann and Ridge had 
been involved in a conspiracy, Ridge responded that he would swear on the Bible that he had not 
been. McKenney, incensed at being thus challenged, asserted that he had documents in 
Washington which proved his charges against Vann and Ridge, and then allegedly declared that 
“[t]he President had not sent a boy to be contradicted in council, but had sent a man.”403 By 
apparently treating him like a “boy,” the Creek and Cherokee leaders had inverted what 
McKenney believed should and must be the proper relational position between them and himself. 
In McKenney’s view, only he and other U.S. officials could embody a mature masculinity, and 
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thus exercise (what he presumed to be) the rightful and necessary authority of the U.S. 
government over American Indians within the nation’s (proclaimed) state and territorial 
boundaries.  
 Instead of admitting to his own impolitic behavior and undiplomatic missteps, McKenney 
blamed the council’s failure on the Creek and Cherokee leaders. From this time he would 
continue to blame the refusal of American Indians to emigrate west of the Mississippi on men 
such as Opothleyaholo, Ridge, and Vann; “the enlightened and influential half breeds” whose 
influence he had originally hoped to co-opt.404 According to McKenney, these men were the root 
cause of Indian disobedience of their “Great Father’s” benevolent dictates. 
 As the controversy over removal intensified after the electoral success of the Jacksonians 
in 1828, McKenney continued to proclaim support for the implementation of a purely voluntary 
Indian emigration program. But his November 1827 council with the Creeks had provided a 
crucial insight into what “voluntary” removal, on McKenney’s terms, would actually entail. 
McKenney conceptualized this voluntariness within the scope of the strict paternal relationship 
supposedly existing between the U.S. government and American Indians. It implied Indian 
choice only in so much as American Indian were obliged to obey the dictates of U.S. paternal 
authority. It did not imply, despite McKenney’s own involvement in Indian treaty negotiations, 
the need for the U.S. government to gain the consent of sovereign peoples. Moreover, as the 
council at Tuckabatchee had shown, it would involve bypassing influential, antiremoval, Indian 
leaders.  
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In his report of the Tuckabatchee council, McKenney thus told the Secretary of War that 
the Creeks were “a wretched people,” who in the name of “humanity and justice,” needed to 
remove west of the Mississippi. This “voluntary” process would involve taking the Indians 
“kindly, but firmly, but the hand, – and telling them they must go and enjoy it.” Moreover, as the 
Government had the object of “being kind to the Indians” and bettering “their conditions,” 
McKenney declared that the government’s “determination” would be final, and that “no persons 
will be permitted, with impunity, to interfere in it.” To prohibit such interference, he believed 
that “the presence of a few troops only would be required.”405 In McKenney’s designation 
“voluntary” removal therefore equated to a scenario in which the eastern peoples obeyed the 
dictates of their benign father, with only the presence of a few troops to remind the U.S.’s 
“Indian children” of their “Great Father’s” strength. Such a scenario would seemingly assert 
McKenney’s view of the proper relation order between U.S. government agents and the 
American Indian; an order that had been transgressed at Tuckabatchee. 
 
 Prior to Jackson’s 1828 election victory, McKenney had hoped to conscript the support of 
like-minded Christians to petition for Congress to take a more active role in Indian Affairs. In 
March 1827 he wrote privately to known promoters of Indian welfare, including the ABCFM 
secretary Jeremiah Evarts, to begin an interdenominational campaign to petition Congress to 
support Executive policies aimed at saving the Indians from “termination.”406 Writing in the 
context of Georgia’s well-publicized designs on Creek and Cherokee land, McKenney stated that 
to be successful, the proposed campaign must especially involve the support of committed 
Christians “in the states and Territories where the opposition to Indians protection and 
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preservation . . . is most violent.” He thus wanted “the good” to “rally round the Executive . . . by 
speaking in respectful but strong language to the Legislative,” to promote the Executive’s Indian 
policy, which he believed could not “succeed without Congress.” As part of this appeal to fellow 
evangelical Christians, he also referred to the “odium” that would attach to the nation, if they did 
not avert the “termination” of the Indians.407 But the election of 1828 cemented a divide between 
McKenney and the majority of northeastern Christian reformers: with his vision firmly fixed on 
both keeping his job and the potential fruition of his removal plans, McKenney allied himself 
with the Jacksonian Democrats, while reformers such as Evarts, with whom he had hoped to 
form a Christian coalition, opposed the policies of the nascent Democratic Party, and over the 
next few years would organize into the Whig party.408  
McKenney, who initially managed to hold onto his position within the new 
administration, threw his energetic support behind Jackson’s plans to implement a statutory 
removal program. In contrast, groups who actively sponsored missionary work among American 
Indians, such as the ABCFM and the Missionary Society of the Methodist Episcopal Church, 
came out in strong opposition to the proposed bill. Jeremiah Evarts and other influential (and 
predominantly evangelical) Christians began to organize a massive and vocal opposition to the 
Jacksonian’s Indian removal policy, perceiving it as a direct threat to their Native American 
missions. As part of the highly public and vocal opposition, evangelical editors of widely 
circulated denominational periodicals, for instance, developed a decisive stance against the 
government’s policy. Focusing mainly on the peoples of the South (and the Cherokees in 
particular), these antiremovalists refuted Jacksonian claims that the civilization policy had failed, 
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circulating stories of American Indians who embraced Christianity and so-called 
“civilization.”409   
By supporting the Jacksonians’ Indian removal policy, McKenney therefore found 
himself in direct opposition to the people who shared his vision for the physical and spiritual 
salvation of the Indians. While he continued to proclaim solidarity with these antiremovalists’ 
commitment to civilizing and Christianizing the Indians, he believed that all efforts to achieve 
this salvation had thus far failed. In May 1829, for instance, he wrote again to Jeremiah Evarts, 
arguing that it was in fact possible “to remodel the Indian character, and fashion it after the 
civilized form, situated as are those tribes who are within our States.” According to McKenney, 
the existing “intellectual, moral, political, and social relation” between the United States and the 
Indians were leading to the destruction of the eastern peoples. Any effort to save the eastern 
Indians must, McKenney asserted, begin with them removing themselves to lands west of the 
Mississippi, away from these apparently malign relations.410 In this reckoning, all missionary 
efforts that took place among the Indians in their current lands were necessarily doomed to 
failure, and would aid in the destruction, rather than the salvation, of the eastern Indians. 
As the controversy over the proposed Indian removal bill escalated in the spring and 
summer of 1829, McKenney attempted to claim a shared moral high ground with the 
antiremovalists. Conscious that the vast majority of influential religious voices opposed removal, 
McKenney attempted to organize a board of interdenominational churchmen and humanitarians 
to publically support Indian removal as a benevolent Christian cause. After eventually 
conscripting the Revered Eli Baldwin of the New York Dutch Reform Church as the board’s 
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secretary, McKenney emphasized to Baldwin what he saw as the common ground between their 
pro-removal board and the ABCFM’s antiremovalist stance. The “feelings and views” of the 
ABCFM, McKenney informed Baldwin “are as ours, but the policy embracing the emigration of 
the Indians is not seen correctly by them, and of course is not for that reason appreciated.” One 
of the aims of their pro-removal board would be “to produce a cooperation of views” with such 
reformers, who McKenney referred to as “our friends of Boston and elsewhere.”411 On 22 July 
1829, mostly due to McKenney’s tireless efforts, a handful of other clerical and lay members of 
New York’s Dutch Reform Church formally organized the New York Board and adopted a 
constitution proclaiming as their goal “the preservation of the American Indians” through their 
“final and speedy removal . . . from within the jurisdictional limits of the sovereign States.”412  
At the Board’s public meeting on 12 August, McKenney, according to Baldwin “in his 
usual style of elegance and perspicuity,” addressed a smaller-than-hoped-for gathering by again 
framing removal as a benevolent program, and proclaiming solidarity with the antiremovalists’ 
goodwill towards the Indians.413 He argued that while the Indians could only be saved from an 
otherwise inevitable doom by their so-called “elevation into the civilized and Christian state,” 
such “elevation” could only be achieved in a territory away from “the perishing consequences to 
the Indian of a near connexion with a white population.”414 He claimed that all Christian 
Americans had a moral duty to heed the apparent “admonition of experience” and “employ all 
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honourable means to persuade these hapless people” to acquiesce “to remove” west of the 
Mississippi River.415  
McKenney’s framing of removal as a purely benevolent policy betrayed no signs of 
disingenuousness. In contrast to the hollow pro-removal rhetoric of Andrew Jackson – the 
champion of white frontiersmen, who nevertheless touted removal as a policy of benevolence 
towards the Indians – McKenney seems genuinely to have believed that the Jacksonian 
Democrats’ proposed bill represented the only way to save the eastern peoples from their 
apparently inevitable decline and extinction. Perhaps willfully unaware that he had aligned 
himself with a pro-removal moment motivated more overtly by a push for Indian land than by 
any genuine commitment to Christian benevolence, McKenney consistently touted the 
government’s policy as truly righteous. In his speech at the New York Board’s public meeting, 
he rejected the antiremovalists’ framing of the controversy as a contest between righteous 
humanitarians and sinister, land-hungry, and avaricious sinners. He proclaimed that “[t]here is 
nothing of cruelty cherished either by our government or people towards the Indians.” Surely, 
McKenney argued, a difference among good, Christian Americans, over the question of 
emigration could be permitted “without involving those of us who think the salvation of the 
Indians depends on a change of their relations to us . . . in the charge of mediating evil, or 
cherishing a spirit of vindictiveness against these hapless people!”416 He thus sought to defend 
himself and other removal supporters against the implication that advocates of removal had cruel 
and self-interested motivations, and that good Christian men of honor would never support such 
a policy. 
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But McKenney’s attempts to organize a religiously inspired pro-removal campaign paled 
into insignificance in the face of the vocal evangelical opposition to the government’s Indian 
policy. For instance, between 5 August and 19 December 1829, Jeremiah Evarts published, 
under the pseudonym William Penn, a series of eloquent and detailed treatises in the national 
press, in which he presented the removal bill as posing a grave moral and legal breach.417 In the 
late summer of 1829, these became the most widely read political essays since Thomas Paine’s 
Common Sense.418 The same summer, after a conversation with Evarts, the female-education 
reformer Catharine Beecher began to organize a women’s opposition movement. In December 
1829, she initiated the United States’ first ever women’s petition campaign against the removal 
bill.419 Many evangelical women had personal ties to the teachers, missionaries, and Indian 
students at mission schools in the southern Indian nations. For these antiremovalists, removal 
represented not just an abstract legal and moral breach, but also an attack on the civilization 
programs that they believed were necessary for the United States to fulfill its moral obligation to 
save and protect its American Indians.420 
It was therefore a high stakes moral playing field on which McKenney met and attempted 
to counter the non-Indian opposition to removal. Although he took an opposing view, McKenney 
also appealed to an absolutist sense of morality. For instance, in the increasingly partisan debates 
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leading up to the congressional vote on the Jackson administration’s removal bill, McKenney 
denied all political motivation, and instead proclaimed himself driven by a called of absolute 
moral righteousness that transcended political and sectarian divides. In September 1829, for 
instance, he urged a like-minded Baptist to support removal by putting aside “everything 
irrelevant,” and letting “not an atom of politicks, or sectarian be permitted to float even in its 
neighborhood.”421 His approach paralleled that of female antiremovalists such as Beecher, who 
sought to advocate on purely moral grounds. For the purpose of their petition campaign, these 
women – as Alison Portnoy has shown – claimed an obligation to enter the male-only bastion of 
Congressional politics by mobilizing an image of women as uniquely moral and benevolent 
beings.422 According to Beecher, women were particularly suited to the role of moral arbiter 
because, in their province away from government, they were “protected from the blinding 
influence of party spirit, and the asperities of political violence.”423 And while male reformers 
such as Evarts and statesman Theodore Frelinghuysen – who led the congressional opposition to 
the removal bill – could participate in debates that specifically discussed issues of legality and 
governmental policy, like their female allies they nevertheless framed the ultimate stakes of the 
debate in terms of moral obligations. 
McKenney’s defense of removal as a morally righteous plan to fulfill these obligations 
ultimately rested largely on his reassurance that emigration would be purely voluntary. At the 
end of that August, McKenney supervised – at the executive’s expense – the publication of a 
pamphlet containing the “Documents and Proceedings” of the New York Board.424 As the first 
comprehensive statement of the government’s avowed Indian policy, it framed removal, on 
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McKenney’s terms, as the most benevolent of causes for the Indians.425 He was particularly 
anxious to defend it against what he saw as the antiremovalists’ inaccurate insinuations that the 
government intended to expel American Indians from their homes. Just before the pamphlet went 
to press, McKenney sought to include a statement from the President or Secretary of War to meet 
such “misrepresentations.”426 The published pamphlet therefore included the Secretary of War’s 
assurances in a letter to Baldwin “that nothing of a compulsory course, to effect the removal of 
this unfortunate race of people, has ever been thought of by the President, although it has been so 
asserted.”427 Similarly, in October 1829 when the ABCFM adopted a resolution asserting that no 
Indians should be compelled to leave ancestral lands guaranteed to them by treaty, McKenney 
argued that the resolution was “an empty form.” According to McKenney, the antiremovalists’ 
were “wholly mistaken”; there was no contemplation or intention on the part of either Congress 
or the Executive to compel the Indians to move.428 
McKenney also continued to perpetuate his vision that most Indians in fact wanted to 
emigrate. In his speech at the August 1829 New York Board public meeting, he had challenged 
the antiremovalists’ assertions that the Indians were “opposed to removal,” and that force would 
therefore “be employed to compel them to go.”429 In fact, he argued, “the great body of the 
Indians . . . are anxious to remove.”430 McKenney believed the government would not need to 
use force; the “present excitement” among the “southern tribes” on the issue of removal was 
“occasioned in great part by the opposition of those persons whose interest is to keep the Indians 
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where they are.”431 Although he did not specifically identify “those persons,” he alluded to them 
as a group who delivered “threats” against “those who wish to better their destiny,” and who 
forbade “an enrolment for emigration . . . on pain of death!”432 In private McKenney made it 
explicitly clear that “those persons” consisted mainly of Creek and Cherokee “Chiefs,” who 
interfered, apparently on behalf of their own self-interest, with the benevolent plans of the 
government.433 They were the same so-called “enlightened and influential half breeds” who had 
frustrated his plans at Tuckabatchee in 1827. Though McKenney defended the government’s 
removal policy on the basis of its supposed voluntariness, he believed that once the government 
somehow negated the interference of the antiremovalist Indian leaders, force would not, in any 
case, be needed.  
McKenney’s apparently opaque public allusions to Southern Indian leaders were 
transparent to the leaders themselves. The Cherokee Phoenix – edited by ABCFM educated Elias 
Boudinot – took particular exception to McKenney’s claim during the New York Board’s public 
meeting that “the great body of the Indians” were “anxious to remove,” but had been dissuaded 
by the death threats of “others.” The Phoenix noted McKenney’s comment only to dismiss it as 
an unfounded misrepresentation.434 
As McKenney’s response to this critique revealed, he had an incommensurably different 
view of the removal debate than the Phoenix editor. Rather than providing empirical evidence to 
back-up his claims, McKenney merely attempted to reassert his position as the true, wise, and 
benevolent “friend” of the Cherokees. Clearly strung by the newspaper’s dismissal of his speech, 
he wrote to the editor proclaiming it unjust to have pronounced him their “enemy” just because 
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he “should indulge [an] opposite view of this question.”435 Rather than justifying the public 
statements he had made in New York, McKenney chastised the Phoenix for apparently failing to 
give him the respect he, as their “friend,” deserved: “Think of it as you may,” he wrote, “you 
never have had, nor have you now, a warmer or more devoted friend.” Taking on an air of 
omnipotence, he sanctimoniously warned them to “spurn my counsels as you may – rely on your 
own superior wisdom as you seem resolved on doing – but mark my words – the day will arrive 
when you will see for yourselves, who are you real and who are you pretended friends; who your 
wise, and who your unwise counselors.”436  
With the subordinating implications of these words no doubt clear, Boudinot responded 
by reasserting the Cherokees’ right to determine their own destiny. The editor thus replied that 
McKenney “may be a ‘real friend’ – he may be a ‘wise counselor,’ but after all we must beg 
leave to judge for ourselves and choose our own friends.”437 Yet this was in fact not something 
that McKenney – stuck within the scope of his paternalistic schema – could admit.  
McKenney’s use of “friendship” in this context actually implied a paternal authority in 
which his American Indian “children” would necessarily obey his self-touted “benevolent” 
dictates. Rather than viewing the decision of the Southern peoples to remain in their homelands 
as a legitimate, active choice, McKenney saw it as illegitimate disobedience. In McKenney’s 
view, the necessary and proper ordering of U.S.-Indian relations had apparently gone awry 
because of the (illegitimate) influence of the Native American leaders. McKenney saw himself as 
embodying the designated authority of the “American Great Father,” and he therefore expected 
to be treated by Indian leaders as the personification of a supreme paternal authority. In contrast, 
men such as Boudinot could never actually escape their designation as “children.” Within this 
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schema, no matter how thorough their non-native education, or how many trappings of so-called 
“civilization” they had adopted, American Indian leaders’ views could only be legitimate if they 
obeyed the U.S. government’s dictates. No room existed in this schema for independent Native 
American sovereignty, even when Indian leaders nominally adopted “civilization.” 
 On this fundamental point, McKenney also differed from the non-native antiremovalists 
with whom he sought a common political ground. While his religious sensibility seemingly 
placed him more in sympathy with these reformers than with his Jacksonian allies, McKenney’s 
justification for removal highlighted some fundamental differences between his own paternalism 
and that of the evangelical antiremovalists. In particular, while McKenney viewed Cherokee 
claims to sovereignty as “delusional,” men such as Evarts supported such claims and strongly 
advocated for the U.S. nation to honor its treaty obligations to American Indian peoples. Evarts, 
for instance, saw the U.S.’s Indian treaty obligations as inextricably mixed with the nation’s 
moral duties to American Indians such as the Cherokees.  
 But McKenney apparently had no time for arguments that did not correlate with his 
vision of a benevolent U.S. father saving his Indian “children” from the apparently inevitable 
forces of doom. While in Washington for the Congressional debates over the bill in April 1830, 
Jeremiah Evarts called on McKenney at the War Department. According to Evarts, McKenney 
began their awkward private conversation by saying to Evarts, “Well, you have been laboring 
hard.” When Evarts asked him to what he referred, McKenney replied, “in writing the numbers 
of William Penn – but it won’t do. I understand the whole subject. I see through it all. These 
questions of abstract rights are of no use. The Cherokees are like children in a house on fire. We 
must pull them out.”438 Whereas abstract metaphors about paternal relations and threatening fires 
could somehow represent grounded reality, no arguments that represented American Indians as 
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anything but the dependent recipients of his (and the rest of the U.S. government’s) benign 
attention could, for McKenney, be relevant. McKenney saw law and politics as man-made, 
whereas the so-called “moral” order that governed U.S.-Indian relations was immutable. He 
failed, for example, to grasp the political functionality and flexibility of Great Lakes diplomatic 
metaphors, understanding them instead as a fixed relational system in which the U.S. 
government agents had the immutable right to dictate how American Indians lived their lives. 
When McKenney had written to Evarts in 1827, he had sought to form a coalition of like-
minded Christians, who shared a commitment to saving the Indians. He wrote that “[e]very good 
man should interfere, . . . and voices should be raised from every corner of the land where Justice 
and Humanity can be found to exist, that such a termination of this race may be averted and the 
charter of the nation saved from such odium.”439 While for both men the issue of how the nation 
treated “the Indians” was an issue of major significance, McKenney described the extinction of 
the Indians as a potential “odium” for the U.S. nation. For the more Calvinist-minded Evarts, the 
vision of doom was even more marked; if the people of the United States did not save the 
Indians, God’s wrath would be wrought upon the entire nation.440 But the two men’s 
conversation in McKenney’s office in April 1830 also evinced a more fundamental divergence of 
opinion on Indian policy. After proclaiming to Evarts that the “Cherokees are like children,” 
McKenney nevertheless (and perhaps mistakenly) admitted that “[t]he Indians have a right to 
their country, a perfect right, as much so as any man has to his domicile; but . . .” When Evarts at 
that point interrupted him to ask “why he did not, in all his writing, begin by saying, that the 
Indians had a perfect right?,” McKenney (according to Evarts) looked embarrassed and stated, 
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“it would do no good – it is not in the power of man to defend them.”441 According to 
McKenney, the Cherokees, like all the Native Americans, were at the mercy of forces beyond 
human control. 
But for Evarts, such appeals to powerlessness were sinful; it was unequivocally immoral 
to stand by and witness breaches of solemn promises and inflictions of harm. He therefore 
rebuked McKenney, stating, “Sir, it is in the power of man to defend them . . . Is the world to be 
told that we cannot fulfill our most solemn engagements?”442 Although McKenney had 
proclaimed that the only thing separating him and men such as Evarts was how to save the 
Indians, their divergence of opinion over removal actually represented fundamentally different 
moral stances. McKenney justified removal by appealing to the existence of malevolent forces 
outside human control. For Evarts such justifications were an immoral shirking of the nation’s 
God-given obligation to honor its treaty commitments to the Indians. But by the time of Evarts 
and McKenney’s conversation in Washington in April 1830, another prominent pro-removal 
voice had broken out in the debate on Indian removal. Lewis Cass’s article on Indian removal, 
published in the North American Review in January 1830, provoked a chorus of antiremovalist 
opposition much more vehement and heated than anything that McKenney’s pro-removal 
advocacy had inspired. 
 
Lewis Cass and The Misfortunes of Providence 
 
Riding the wave of populist support for removal, Lewis Cass’s essay on “Indian 
Removal” in the January 1830 issue of the North American Review presented an extended 
justification for the Jacksonians’ removal plans. Ostensibly written to review Thomas 
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McKenney’s “Documents and Proceedings” of the New York Board, Cass claimed a rhetorical 
position congruent with the views of the “executive branch,” as represented in McKenney’s 
pamphlet.443 He justified removal with appeals to morality, creating a discursive moral universe 
in which the removal all the eastern peoples to the west of the Mississippi exemplified the 
morally upright, and indeed necessary, course of action. Like McKenney, Cass invoked the 
image of a world in which malevolent forces – existing outside human control – wrought 
inevitable harm upon American Indians in contact with so-called “civilization.” But Cass’s 
mobilization of McKenney’s views belied some fundamental ideological differences between the 
two men’s moral stances: Cass painted a moral order that blamed all the present and past “moral” 
failings of Indian-white relations on what he describes as the inherently inferior “moral 
character” of the Indians themselves. Unlike McKenney, he abandoned his previous commitment 
to “civilize” and Christianize American Indian people. According to Cass, the administration’s 
removal bill represented a just policy, made necessary by the apparent inability of American 
Indians to adopt “civilization.” 
Cass provoked the vehement ire of the antiremovalists because he presented a moral 
universe in which the U.S. people held no moral responsibility for the failings of Indian-white 
relations. But the antiremovalists also used empirical reasoning in their strong objections to 
Cass’s representations that the Cherokees, for instance, had resisted “civilization.” Yet the words 
Cass used to frame his argument – and more specifically, the theological concepts that these 
words referenced – provoked deeper outrage. Cass, a committed expansionist without strong 
religious convictions, built his pro-removal argument on references to divine providence; an idea 
that held deep theological significance for the antiremovalists. He argued that divine providence 
had ordered Indian-white relations to benefit the U.S. nation and its antecedents, and that the 
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correlating misfortunes experienced by the Indians were in no way the fault of the U.S. people. 
For the northern evangelical antiremovalists, such an arguments was both fallacious and 
blasphemous.  
In contrast to McKenney and the antiremovalists, whose views represented projections of 
an immutable, conscience-based morality, Cass’s stance appears more overtly politically 
calculated. He wrote of Indian-white relations, and therefore removal, as a “moral” issue, though 
he did not link this morality to any doctrinal system. Moreover, unlike McKenney who would, 
within the course of the year 1830, find himself cast-off by the Jackson administration, Cass 
would in 1831 become admitted to the inner sanctum of Jackson’s cabinet as Secretary of War. 
Cass was an ardent, ideologically committed Jacksonian. 
For Cass, the leap onto Andrew Jackson’s bandwagon involved a minor reframing of his 
public stance on U.S.-Indian relations. While he still spoke of American Indians as a “moral 
problem” for the United States, he moved away from his previous equivocal opposition to 
removal. His 1830 article provided an expansive, sixty-page argument proclaiming removal as 
the only possible solution to the apparently inevitable and otherwise intractable “moral problem” 
posed by the existence of American Indians on territory earmarked for the U.S. nation’s geo-
political future.444 Entitled as a review of the “Documents and Proceedings” of the New York 
Board “for the Emigration, Preservation, and Improvement of the Aborigines of America,” Cass 
mobilized the substance of McKenney’s pamphlet to bolster his arguments about the necessity of 
Indian removal. After constructing his own framing of the issues in the first twenty-two pages of 
his article, Cass turned his attention to the text of the pamphlet, using it to build on his argument 
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that the states and the federal government had the apparently irrefutable right to exercise 
jurisdiction over American Indian peoples.445  
In contrast to McKenney’s advocacy, Cass’s public support of removal entailed 
eschewing the possibility that American Indian people could become “civilized.” Through the 
1820s Cass had, like McKenney, supported programs aimed “to civilize” the Indians within the 
Michigan Superintendency. Yet coinciding with his support for removal, Cass claimed the 
definitive failure of these programs. In early 1830, in response to a Senate resolution requesting 
that the War Department report on “the progress made in civilizing the Indians for the last eight 
years, and their present condition,” McKenney requested that all Indian Superintendencies report 
on the question. Cass wrote accordingly in February that “[s]o far as respects the three great 
tribes of the Northwest, the Chippewas, the Ottawas, and Pottawatomies, I am not aware that any 
improvement has taken place in their condition within the last eight years.” Rather, Cass claimed 
that “the progress of our settlements, and the greater facilities afforded for the introduction of 
whiskey, I believe every year adds to the moral and physical evils which surround them.”446 
Cass’s public support for removal coincided with his declaration that civilization policies had 
failed. 
In contrast to McKenney’s arguments, Cass posited removal as a just and necessary 
policy on the basis that American Indians could not, in fact, become “civilized.” Although his 
pro-removal article drew on McKenney’s arguments, Cass justified removal on suppositions 
from which McKenney had been at pains to distinguish himself. Cass thus represented the 
apparent failure of American Indians to become civilized as some kind of inherent and 
inescapable failing of the so-called “Indian character.” “Existing for two centuries in contact 
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with a civilized people,” he stated, “they [the American Indians] have resisted, and successfully 
too, every effort to meliorate their situation, or to introduce among them the most common arts 
of life.” The fact that the Indians “moral and intellectual condition” had apparently “been equally 
stationary,” was “not to be attributed to the indifference or neglect of the whites.” Instead, Cass 
concluded early in his article that “[t]here must then be an inherent difficulty, arising from the 
institutions, character, and condition of the Indians themselves.”447 In this schema, the “moral 
problem” lay with an inherent “moral” defect in the Indian character. All future plans “to 
civilize” American Indians were therefore necessarily doomed to the same failure as those of the 
past. 
 Also unlike McKenney, Cass therefore did not need overtly to challenge the 
antiremovalists’ framing of the debate over Indian policy as a battle between those wanting to 
civilize the Indians and those wanting to remove them. While he implicitly contested the 
antiremovalists’ judgment regarding who fell on the side of good and evil, Cass nevertheless 
acceded to the idea that the controversy over removal was a dichotomous battle between policies 
of civilization and removal. But Cass evoked a very different moral playing field by attributing 
the “moral problem” apparently resulting from contact between “the two races of men” to an 
inherent failing of the so-called “Indian character.”448 In this discursive arena, the only way 
eastern American Indian peoples could have had any ongoing claim to their land was if they had 
been able to incorporate themselves into so-called “civilized” society. 
For in this reckoning, the spread of “civilized” society was a providentially determined, 
inevitable occurrence, the collateral consequences for which no humans could be held 
accountable. “Providence,” Cass stated “has placed them in contact with us, and with habits and 
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feelings, which render their incorporation into our society impracticable.”449 The history of 
contact between the Indians and the “civilization now represented by the U.S.A. had been 
determined by “Providence,” and could therefore be written in decidedly deterministic terms:  
 
The decree had gone forth, that the race of pale men should increase and multiply, and 
they did increase and multiply. Who, that looks upon human life as it is, could expect, 
that superiority in arts, in arms, in intelligence, in all the elements of physical and moral 
power, would not elevate the one party and depress the other; and that this elevation and 
depression, rendered still more obvious by characteristic differences, could not produce 
the results which history recorded?450 
 
Given the predetermination of events, the fact that such forces would “elevate the one party and 
depress the other” could not be the fault of “the race of pale men.” Who, asked Cass, “under such 
circumstances, would impeach the motives or conduct of the adventurers or their descendants, 
because the people, who preceded them, disappeared or receded before the circle of 
civilization?”451 It was therefore not the fault of “civilized” U.S. society that an inherently 
inferior group of people was unable to adapt to the inevitable, providentially created world order.  
Cass fortified these appeals to providence with Lockean-inspired proclamations about 
land entitlement. He thus argued that American Indians had no ongoing right to own or use the 
land that providence had destined for full “industrious” use by this “civilized” society. In Cass’s 
words, the Indians’ “misfortunes have been the consequence of a state of things which could not 
be controlled by them or us. Planted, as our ancestors were, in the course of Providence, upon the 
skirts of a boundless forest, they gradually subdued it by toil and industry.”452 The Indians’ rights 
to the land that would inevitably be “subdued” therefore extended only as far as they remained in 
harmony with the providentially determined spread of so-called “civilized” industry. 
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On these presumptions, Cass made his case for the underlying moral righteousness of the 
U.S. government’s plans to remove the eastern peoples from their land. There could, stated Cass, 
be no doubt that “the Creator intended the earth should be reclaimed from a state of nature and 
cultivated; that the human race should spread over it, procuring from it the means of comfortable 
subsistence, and of increase, and improvement.” On this basis he argued that “[a] tribe of 
wandering hunters, depending upon the chase for support, and deriving it from the forests, and 
rivers, and lakes, of an immense continent, have a very imperfect possession of the country over 
which they roam.” 453 Although Cass allowed that perhaps providence had brought misfortunes 
to the Indians, the fact that such misfortunes were providential meant that no fault or liability lay 
with the “civilized” society who necessarily benefited. Moreover, because providence had 
dictated that the forest would not be “doomed to perpetual unproductiveness,” no Indian land 
rights took precedence over the claims of those wanting to make the land productive. 
Consequently, no charges of immorality could lie against those claiming Indian land for these 
purposes. 
 Nor, in Cass’s reckoning, should the Indians’ misfortunes at the hands of providence be 
too much lamented. Cass presented his article in opposition not only to the evangelical 
antiremovalists who wanted a policy of civilization rather than removal; he also rebuked 
romantics who, like Albert Pourtalès and Francis Bond Head, proclaimed “the inferiority of 
civilized to savage life.”454 According to Cass, the world had “had enough of romantic 
description,” and the “distempered imaginations and unscuttled reason” of Rousseau and his 
disciples. Instead, it was “time for the soberness of truth and reality.”455 Although it had 
apparently caused the decline of the Indians, overall providencial power was something to be 
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celebrated, rather than lamented. “It would be a miserable affectation,” he wrote near the start of 
the article, “to regret the progress of civilization and improvement, the triumph of industry and 
art, by which these regions have been reclaimed, and over which freedom, religion, and science 
are extending their sway.”456 According to Cass, to wish that such achievements had come at no 
cost to “the aboriginal population” was a vain one. Were “the Indians” the idealized people 
depicted by the romantics, their sacrifice to the inevitable, providential, “progress of civilization 
and improvement” might have been cause for lament. But by defining the Indians as in every 
way inferior to “civilized” people, Cass also dismissed romantic laments for their misfortunes. 
 Cass infused his article with an implicit vision of “civilized” U.S. society that correlated 
closely with the partisan ideology of the Jacksonian Democrats.457 Although he never explicitly 
lists those included in “civilized” U.S. society, he nevertheless created the boundaries of 
inclusion by making it clear that Indians were not, and indeed could not, be part of this implied 
polity. He also indicated that this society, which had been providentially chosen to inherit 
American Indian land, was a made up of the “race of pale men.”458 Moreover, only people of this 
apparently superior kind had the requisite abilities to claim the status of a politically sovereign 
people. On this basis Cass therefore dismissed, for instance, Cherokee claims to sovereignty. As 
people who, due to their inherent “moral” failings, could not be part of this superior group, the 
Cherokees therefore had no right to make claims to political sovereignty. “Let them know,” Cass 
wrote of the Cherokees, “that the establishment of an independent government is a hopeless 
project; which cannot be permitted, and which, if it could be permitted, would lead to their 
inevitable ruin.”459 In denigrating these claims to sovereignty, Cass made the same rhetorical 
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move as when he evoked his generalized, and inherently inferior “Indian character”; he set 
American Indians outside the realm of political personhood, and he placed non-Indians, and 
more specifically the “race of pale men,” within it. Such a construction of racial difference 
resonated with Jacksonian ideology, which posited egalitarian political inclusion for “white” men 
while simultaneously excluding other groups such as “Indians.”460 
 But for northern evangelical Americans committed to a different vision of U.S. society, 
Cass’s “moral” justifications for removal were immoral and deeply sinister. Indeed, 
antiremovalist responses to the article – published under anonymous authorship – were swift, 
vehement, and deprecating. The fieriest rebuke came from the pen of a young theology student 
named George Cheever in the January edition of the short-lived, Boston-based literary journal 
the American Monthly Magazine.461 Extended and published in pamphlet form the following 
month, Cheever’s article condemned the arguments of the North American Review essay – which 
he correctly attributed to Cass – in strong, vitriolic language. Among other offences, Cheever 
accused Cass “of justifying our Government in an act of the most unparalleled perfidy and bare 
injustice.” Cheever also clearly found the system of morality Cass constructed in his article 
abhorrent. He thus condemned Cass as “arguing down the lofty obligations of national morality 
to a place below the never-to-be-satisfied demands of national selfishness.”462 Dismissing the 
entirety of the article’s claims, Cheever referred to “the insinuating sophistry” of Cass’s 
paragraphs.463 
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 For Cass’s critics, this sophistry existed on an empirical, as well as moral level. This 
opposition took particular exception to Cass’s statements about the Cherokees and “other 
southern tribes.” Of the Cherokees, Cass had written, for instance, that “[w]e doubt whether there 
is, upon the face of the globe, a more wretched race than the Cherokees, as well as the other 
southern tribes, present. Many of them exhibit spectacles as disgusting as they are degrading.”464 
A common argumentative thread of the antiremovalist rebuttal highlighted Cass’s lack of 
knowledge about the “Southern tribes,” and the Cherokees in particular. James Blunt, the author 
of a February 1830 pamphlet directly responding to Cass’s article, dismissed the entire essay as a 
“most unfair argument”; a dismissal Blunt based principally on Cass’s deficiency of first-hand 
experience regarding the actual conditions of Cherokee life.465 Similarly, Samuel Worcester – a 
professor at Amherst College and a friend of Evarts cited Cass’s own admissions that his 
“general facts and deductions” concerning the Cherokees and the other Southern peoples were 
not “founded upon what he has seen and heard among” those tribes, but were “principally found 
upon what he has seen and heard among the tribes in the Northwestern regions of the United 
States.”466 Writing in the March edition of the Spirit of the Pilgrims magazine, Worcester went 
on to assert that “the article in the last N. A. Review, upon the ‘Removal of the Indians,’ so far as 
it relates to the Cherokees particularly, is nothing less than a series of unblushing and 
unpardonable misrepresentations.”467 These antiremovalists believed that, contrary to Cass’s 
statements, Cherokee society was, in fact, moving towards “civilization.” 
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 Such arguments formed part of the antiremovalists’ staunch refutation of Cass’s broader 
claim that the so-called “Indian character” was inherently resistant to “civilization.” Identifying 
that the authority of Cass’s assertions rested on his proclaimed knowledge of this generalized 
“Indian character,” the antiremovalists aimed to challenge the presumptions underpinning this 
apparent authority. Worcester, for instance, questioned Cass’s claim that an apparent “failure of 
effort to civilize the Indians” could be attributed “to something peculiar to their nature,” and 
refuted his claim that all American Indians could be lumped together. He thus disapprovingly 
noted that “[t]he reviewer [Cass] takes all the Indians of the north and the south, gives them all 
the same general character, and would sweep them all away with the same besom of removal.”468 
But while the antiremovalists questioned Cass’s authority on a representational level, the most 
strongly worded arguments were reserved to contradict his moral logic. 
The moral universe that Cass projected in his article, including his claims that the Indians 
could not be “civilized” and Christianized, deeply offended the antiremovalists’ beliefs about the 
true and proper moral world order. For men such as Cheever, Cass’s arguments presented a 
twofold affront to morality. First, “the false faith that the Indians never can be civilized” was 
deeply blasphemous because, according to Cheever, there were “none, however singularly 
ferocious, whom He cannot reclaim from their savage barbarity.”469 Cheever argued that 
“Almighty Providence” had in fact caused the so-called “improvement” of the Cherokees “in 
scorn of daring blasphemers, who assert that any of the human being he has made are 
irretrievably beyond the regenerating energy of the Gospel of his Son, and forever out of the pale 
of civil and social improvement.”470 Moreover, for evangelicals such as Cheever, the seriousness 
of Cass’s blasphemy lay in his denial of the U.S. people’s absolute moral obligation to spread the 
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light of the Gospel. “Providence” had placed the Indians in a singular relation to the people of 
the United States; a nation particularly blessed with great civil and religious privileges, living 
under a light poured “abundantly” upon them by “the universal spread of the Gospel.”471 Being 
thus blessed, the U.S. people had an absolute moral duty both to extend the civil privileges of 
their “civilization,” and spread the light of the Gospel to the Indians. In denying this apparently 
fundamental and irrefutable truth, the antiremovalists believed the moral universe Cass created in 
his article was dangerously aberrant to God’s true moral order on earth. 
 For men such as Cheever, Cass’s article also represented even more blatant rhetorical 
distortions of this true moral order. In appealing to “Providence” to justify the Jacksonians’ 
Indian removal policy, Cass had evoked the supposedly immutable dictates of a divinely inspired 
world order. Yet in Cass’s rendering, providence was cleanly shaven of its Calvinistic retributive 
elements. In Cass’s providentially defined moral order, events had been predetermined in such a 
way that the U.S. nation could not be held morally accountable for the condition of the Indians. 
To antiremovalists such as Cheever and Evarts, whose understanding of providence retained 
some decidedly Calvinistic attributes, the suggestion that moral responsibility could be thus 
avoided was an abomination.  
Under the “supreme authority of the Law of God,” the U.S. nation could not escape 
accountability for its treatment of the Indians. In the words of Cheever, if the nation followed 
Cass’s “depraved moral vision,” and thus “set aside the law of nations and of God,” dire 
consequences would follow. Although fearing damage to the United States’ international 
reputation, the main terror lay in the “vial of God’s wrath”: “the sentence of the Almighty – the 
judgment of the Ruler of the universe – will go out against us, and a curse must follow its 
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train.”472 Just as individuals needed to heed the dictates of providence in order to live in 
accordance with God’s moral order, the U.S. nation, as a collective, needed to do the same or 
God would visit “His” wrath upon the entire nation. “We know,” stated Cheever, “there is an 
eternal, indissoluble connection between national virtue and national prosperity, as there is a 
connection, equally indissoluble, and terribly certain, between national crime and national 
misery.”473 If the U.S. people proceeded with removal plans, in defiance of the nation’s 
obligations to the Indians,God would – according to Cheever – inflict “vengeance upon a guilty 
people.”474  
 Cass’s views crystallized a decidedly Jacksonian view of Indian relations. Jeremiah 
Evarts’ assessment of the true inspiration behind Cass’s article seemingly contained considerable 
insight. Writing to Eleazar Lord after the publication of the article, Evarts wrote that “[t]his man 
[Cass] wishes to trim his sails, in such a manner as to catch the breeze of government favor and 
patronage.”475 Yet Cass’s article did not merely represent a cynical attempt to gain favor among 
the Jacksonian Democrats. As already discussed, during his early career as a lawyer and 
politician Cass had moved away from his father’s Federalist beliefs and become a Jeffersonian. 
Such a move evinced not only astute political judgment, but was also Cass’s seemingly sincere 
choice to align himself with those whose interests he had represented in his daily life as an 
attorney in Ohio: the frontier farmer-citizens of Jefferson’s ideal.476 With Jackson winning the 
1828 election as advocate of the western agrarian, Cass’s support of the new Democratic Party 
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represented an ideological consistency, and a continuance of his ongoing political allegiance 
with the western homesteaders of the states and territories of Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, 
and Pennsylvania. The anti-Indian rhetoric that Cass used in his article would have been familiar 
among the farmers whose interests the Jacksonians represented.477 Indeed, when Jackson purged 
Eaton from his cabinet in 1831, he sought to replace him with a staunch supporter. After his first 
two choices rejected the nomination, he offered the position to Cass, who formally became U.S. 
Secretary of War on 1 August 1831.478 Reporting the appointment that September, the Cherokee 
Phoenix noted that McKenney’s prophesy in his 1826 Tour to the Lakes – that Cass’s “talents 
will yet be availed of by the nation, and in some department in the General Government” – had 
been fulfilled.479 
 Yet McKenney’s apparent talents as a political fortuneteller did not extend to other 
endeavors. By 1831 the politically guileless McKenney had been dismissed by President 
Jackson. Though Cass had presented their views as in agreement, McKenney – with his staunch 
commitment to removal as a benevolent cause – found himself on the wrong side of the Jackson 
administration. By the time the removal bill had passed, the lack of provisions made for Indians’ 
wellbeing and salvation across the Mississippi made McKenney begin to question the true nature 
of the administration’s plans for the Indians.480 His doubts apparently manifest further when the 
administration cancelled the money set aside for the ABCFM’s missionary and schooling 
programs among the southern peoples, and dictated that Cherokee treaty annuities be distributed 
among tribal members, bypassing the tribal treasurer. McKenney, who already did not agree with 
suspension of missionary activities, also began to see his department’s attempt to circumvent 
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Cherokee tribal authorities as an unjust effort to undermine their ability to fight removal through 
means such as the Cherokee Phoenix.481 As the net of coercion tightened around the Cherokees, 
McKenney came to see that removal was likely not to be effected along the “voluntary” dictates 
of benevolent paternal authority. Only then did he begin to view challenges to Cherokee 
sovereignty as insidious.   
 While Cass was able to “catch the breeze” of the emerging U.S. political climate, 
McKenney found himself out of place in the nascent partisanship of the second party system. In 
his ideological sensibilities he was more neatly aligned with the reform-minded antiremovalists 
who, in opposition to the Jacksonian Democrats, over the next two years formed the Whig party. 
McKenney received a note dismissing him from office while in Philadelphia in August 1830. 
According to the account he gives in his Memoirs, when he returned to Washington and asked 
the acting secretary of war the grounds for his dismissal, he was told, “Why, sir . . . everybody 
knows your qualifications for the place, but General Jackson has been long satisfied that you are 
not in harmony with him in his view in regard to the Indians.”482 Writing to his friend John 
McLean, McKenney claimed that the breach between him and the Jackson administration had 
been mutual: “It was my misfortune, perhaps, to demur to some of the strange orders that were 
sent out – the sole tendency of which was to harass, & oppress the Indians. I was frank enough to 
give my opinion. I was sincere. I felt deeply for the Indians, & the honor of the country. I knew, 
if this policy & those proceedings, were right, all the past, under the enlightened Administrations 
which have preceded this, were wrong. I could not believe this. My own judgment, however, was 
enough. Whatever it may be worth. I felt a reliance on it, in this matter. I knew all was wrong – 
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deeply so.”483 Indian removal, in its Jacksonian guise, did not fulfill McKenney’s vision of 
proper, paternal relations between the federal government and Indian peoples. 
 Cass, on the other hand, apparently had no such scruples. In his 1830 North American 
Review article Cass – an unapologetic expansionist – painted “the Indians” as a “moral problem” 
only in that they were, in his renderings, an inherently morally inferior group unable to adapt to 
the inevitable spread of “civilized” society. Given that providence had dictated the geo-political 
expansions of a “civilized” U.S. nation, such misfortunes could not be blamed on members of the 
U.S. nation. The vehement response of the antiremovalists to Cass’s arguments, highlights, in 
particular, the important shift that Cass had made with his anti-Indian logic. Unlike in his 
previous essays, in which he expressed hope for the “civilization” of the Indians, in his Indian 
removal article, Cass closed the door on such a possibility. No longer were Indians capable of 
becoming equal members of the U.S. nation through civilization; rather, through their own 
supposed inferiority, they retained neither any real claims to their land, nor any rights beyond the 
dictates of the U.S. nation. 
 Yet as someone well able “to catch the breeze” of prevailing political winds, such words 
represented a pragmatic political stance rather than a deep-seated belief in a programmatic and 
unchangeable moral world order. In January 1834 – a little over two years after he become 
secretary of war, and with the conflict between Georgia and the Cherokee Nation and its 
ABCFM missionary allies continuing – Cass welcomed the ABCFM’s then secretary David 
Green into his office in Washington, stating that “the government was ready to do everything in 
their power to aid [the] Board in benefitting the Indians.”484 Making a division between the 
southern peoples and the peoples of the northwest, Cass stated (in Green’s words) that he had no 
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objection to the ABCFM “nominating all the labors provisions” in upcoming treaties “with the 
Menomonies, Pottawatomies, Sac & Foxes, & c.,” and that “he would give letter of introduction 
to agents, chiefs &c.” In the course of the conversation, Cass mentioned the “Southwestern 
Indians” partly, it seemed to Green, “for the purpose of saying the government had no grudge 
against us on that score.”485 Programs to civilize and Christianize American Indians had, it would 
seem, again become worthwhile. Unlike McKenney, who framed removal in fixed moral terms, 
Cass founded his Indian policy on no such doctrinally absolutist foundations. Although in his 
1830 article he constructed a moral universe in which removal represented the just and necessary 
solution to the existence of inherently and irredeemably “barbarous” people on lands 
providentially-destined to belong solely to the United States, by 1834 he sought to appease the 
ABCFM and coopt them into programs to civilize and Christianize the peoples of the northwest. 
If required as part of his aspirations for U.S. sovereignty over the Great Lakes region, efforts to 
“civilize” American Indians were no longer necessarily antithetical to his departments 
overarching policy to remove all eastern peoples – including those of the northwest – west of the 
Mississippi River. 
 
Charles La Trobe and the Tory Elements of U.S. Indian Removal  
 
From the perspective of U.S. federal politics, the demise of Thomas McKenney’s 
Washington career seems to suggest the entrenchment of removal as an issue defined by a two-
sided, partisan battle. In this sense, as others drew the partisan lines of the second party system in 
the late 1820s, McKenney got caught in a political no-man’s land because he failed to align 
himself fully with either the Whigs or the Democrats. Yet in another sense, McKenney’s 
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advocacy for removal as a benevolent, Christian policy highlights that at least in terms of 
political discourse, removal was actually a malleable political concept. Indeed, as Charles La 
Trobe’s travel narrative, The Rambler in North America for instance shows, the discursive 
dimensions of removal were not confined to the landscape of U.S. partisan politics. As the 
narrative of an outsider to U.S. political culture, La Trobe’s text offers alternative ways of 
framing the political undercurrents of Indian removal. Rather than being merely a Jacksonian 
phenomenon, it could be molded to fit different political ideologies. Even a self-proclaimed 
English Tory like La Trobe, who understood the world as divinely ordered under God’s 
providence, and who projected that the only possible future for any society lay in 
Christianization and so-called “civilization,” could assimilate to his own beliefs the 
segregationist and supremacist underpinnings of the U.S. government’s Indian Removal Act. 
Although his political beliefs fundamentally contradicted Jacksonian-Democratic ideology, La 
Trobe nevertheless managed to fit the dictates of the U.S. Removal Act with his own views about 
a properly ordered society. 
 In two major trips to Indian Country – the first in 1832 and the next in 1833 – La Trobe 
witnessed, and subsequently reflected on, the political landscape of U.S. Indian removal. As 
already discussed, on these tours La Trobe acted as moral guardian to the young Swiss aristocrat 
Albert de Pourtalès, whose romantic fancies and sexual interests made Indian Country a 
particular destination of choice. Their first trip to Indian Country – when La Trobe struggled to 
reign in Pourtalès – brought them into direct contact with the effects of the U.S. government’s 
Indian removal policy. Narrating their journey toward the western territory on this occasion, La 
Trobe observed in The Rambler that the “general government’s” Indian removal policy had 
begun to take effect and “many tribes found themselves dispersed upon the frontier, from about 
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the 91st to the 95th degree of longitude, in the Missouri and Arkansas Territory.”486 They then 
joined a Jackson government-commissioned survey party to tour the trans-Mississippian Indian 
Territory designated for the emigrant eastern peoples.  
Despite the Jacksonians’ confident projections of American Indian prosperity across the 
Mississippi, when the Removal Act came into force in May 1830, U.S. officials possessed 
remarkably limited knowledge of the designated trans-Mississippi Indian Territory. In his 1830 
North American Review article, Cass glossed over this lack of collective knowledge by drawing 
on the observations of the Baptist missionary Isaac McCoy. Following McKenney’s 1827 
negotiations in the South, McCoy had led an expedition to explore the western territory with 
Chickasaw and Choctaw delegations, hoping they would decide to emigrate.487 McCoy, who like 
McKenney was an early advocate of removal, reported on the territory in highly favorable terms. 
Cass therefore cited McCoy’s “personal observations” in his 1830 article to confirm “the country 
west of Missouri and Arkansas, as suitable for the colonization and permanent residence of the 
Indians.”488 Yet, as already noted, a more extensive formal survey of the area was not completed 
until Cass, as Secretary of War in 1832, appointed three commissioners to survey the land and 
resolve the territorial disputes that had flared up among, and between, the western peoples and 
the immigrant groups.489 Among the three appointed commissioners was Henry Ellsworth, 
whose survey expedition La Trobe, Pourtalès, and Washington Irving joined in 1832. 
 Ellsworth had not been among the administration’s first choices as commissioner. In an 
attempt to deflect continued criticism of their Indian removal policy, Cass – most likely in 
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consultation with Jackson – offered one of the positions to Roberts Vaux, a Quaker attorney and 
philanthropist from Philadelphia, known for his humanitarian views. When Vaux turned down 
the commission, Ellsworth was appointed in his stead. Cass’s subsequent efforts to appoint a 
well-known humanitarian also failed, including his offer to William Jay, a lawyer from upstate 
New York who was reportedly also renowned for his “high character for philanthropy and 
benevolence.”490 The Jacksonian party organ, The Globe, nevertheless declared the 
administration’s attempts to appoint such men as evidence enough of their humanitarian 
intentions towards the Indians: “the President could give no stronger proof of his determination 
to act in a spirit of justice and humanity towards this unfortunate race, than by committing the 
performance of the requisite trusts, to such men as William Jay and Robert Vaux.” Jay’s gracious 
refusal letter was read not as a condemnation of the administration’s removal policy, but as “his 
testimonial to the liberal nature of the instructions, issued to the Commissioners.”491 In the end, 
the commission consisted of its chairman, Montford Stokes, the former Democratic governor of 
North Carolina; John Schermerhorn, a Dutch Reform minister and an ardent Jacksonian; and 
Ellsworth, a well-known Connecticut lawyer and businessman.492 
Though not a humanitarian or anti-Jacksonian in the vein of Vaux or Jay, as a New 
Englander, Ellsworth was the compromise candidate who came closest to the original criteria. 
Moreover, Cass may have believed that having a majority of commissioners from the northeast 
would provide the next-best chance of neutralizing antiremovalist criticism. 493 While 
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Ellsworth’s stance on removal seems originally to have been ambivalent, he had connections 
with people among the antiremovalist ranks.  
But whatever his previous ambivalence, during his tour with Irving and La Trobe in 
1832, Ellsworth embraced the Jackson government’s policy. Despite his antiremovalist 
connections, he proclaimed a commitment to the implementation of the Removal Act, writing to 
his wife that his initial journey into Indian Country had convinced him of the “mistaken policy” 
of their “eastern friends.” He thus concluded that, based on his preliminary observations, the 
western territory through which he and his party toured contained “good land enough, for the 
present Indians in the United States.” Seemingly referring to people who had already emigrated 
as proof that removal was truly (as Jacksonian rhetoric so often asserted) in the interests of 
Indians peoples, he stated that “none can behold the improvements and comforts of the Creeks 
Cheerokees & Choctaws, without lamenting the mistaken policy of many of our eastern friends 
who oppose the emigration of the aboriginees to this country.”494  Now that he was out west, 
away from the debates over Indian removal, Ellsworth believed that he could view the situation 
without the distorting representations made for “party effect.” Being “very far, removed from all 
scenes of political strife,” his “feelings” had “become every day more & more interest[e]d in 
behalf of the Indians.”495 With epistemological presumptions similar to Thomas McKenney’s, 
Ellsworth presented his support for removal as an objective, apolitical judgment, drawn from 
observable empirical proofs. 
La Trobe articulated his support for removal in similar terms. Indeed, in spite of 
Pourtalès’s erratic behavior, there appears to have been considerable mutual respect and 
harmony of opinion between La Trobe and Ellsworth. In La Trobe’s published narrative of the 
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tour, he included an extended treatise on Indian removal, concluding, similarly to Ellsworth, that 
the “general government” had adopted a necessary and humane policy. Although La Trobe never 
mentions his struggles to keep Pourtalès in check, he presented his agreement with the 
government’s removal policy as something that had taken place only after some struggles. 
Although convinced that the government and people of the United States were “very sincere in 
their desire to see justice done to the Indians,” he had not been sure of the justice of “expatriating 
the wrecks of these tribes from their small heritage of the land of their forefathers.” Despite the 
treaties, and some remuneration for the lost lands, it was, according to La Trobe, “still 
expatriation.”  La Trobe does not specifically mention the evidence and arguments that had 
convinced him of the justice of the policy, but instead falls back on the abstract generalizations 
that characterize all his discussions of Native Americans in The Rambler: “This plea I have, 
however unwillingly, been led at length to admit. The white man and the Indian cannot be near 
neighbours. They never will and never can amalgamate.”496 La Trobe thus proclaimed his 
adherence to removal with a strong, segregationist statement, which he offered as a conclusion 
drawn from observable facts, but which actually seemed to parrot the abstracted and contextually 
unmoored rhetoric of Jacksonians such as Lewis Cass.  
 On the one hand it seems unsurprising that La Trobe articulated views in harmony with a 
well-respected travel companion, using similar tropes to the Jacksonian rhetoric that surrounded 
him on his travels.497 Yet on the other, the fact that La Trobe aligned his views with a political 
movement that he seems otherwise to have abhorred appears somewhat remarkable. Unlike the 
Jacksonian Democrats, La Trobe was not a proponent of egalitarian democracy in any guise. 
Writing to Pourtalès’s mother in November 1833, he proclaimed that he had been “born a Tory 
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with a most religious horror of radicals & democrats, & every years [sic] observations [make] me 
more firm of my dislike of them.”498 Part of his mission as Albert de Pourtalès’s mentor involved 
ending the young aristocrat’s flirtation with democratic philosophies. In this task, La Trobe 
found early assistance in the “fancy” Pourtalès took “against the character of the ordinary 
American.”499 By the following year La Trobe could triumphantly report to Pourtalès’s mother 
that her son was “quite cured of his democratic fancies, & promises to become a legitimiste & 
aristocrat of the first water.”500 La Trobe’s commitment to this cure went further than any 
mandate that the Count and Countess Pourtalès may have given him. Teaching the young Count 
to face his aristocratic obligations conformed to La Trobe’s belief that a properly ordered 
society, under God, was structured around distinctions of rank mediated by personal loyalties 
and duties. This political ideology put La Trobe decidedly out of step not only with the beliefs of 
Jacksonian Democrats, but with the political culture of the United States more broadly. 
 While La Trobe expressed solidarity with the U.S. government’s Indian removal policy, 
he seems to have disapproved of every other product of U.S. political culture. As narrated in The 
Rambler, in 1832 and 1833 La Trobe confronted a politically active society “whereby the whole 
mass are more or less agitated from year’s end to year’s end.”501 In La Trobe’s rendering, such a 
culture offended against the immutably proper way “civilized” societies should (and indeed 
must) be ordered. He particularly disapproved of U.S. partisan politics’ “degrading style of 
warfare,” and the accompanying character attacks and “alternate bespattering and bepraising” 
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touted in the “polemical newspapers.”502 But not only did he disapprove of the “American 
political atmosphere,” he also condemned the ideological claims on which the U.S. political 
culture were founded;  he disapproved of the Americans’ claims to be “politically equal” and 
“emancipated from the thraldom of mind and body which they consider consequent on upholding 
the divine right of kings,” and their disowning of “[a]ll claim to place, patronage, or respect for 
the bearer of a great name.”503 Rather than being an achievement to celebrate, this republican and 
democratic political culture represented decay and decline. “There must,” concluded La Trobe, 
“be something in the political atmosphere of America, which is more than ordinarily congenial to 
that decline of just and necessary subordination which God has both permitted by the natural 
impulses of the human mind, and ordered in His word.” He thus lamented the “decay of loyal 
feelings in all relation of life . . . observable in many parts of the United States” and manifest in 
the “looseness of the tie . . . between the master and servant,– the child and the parent,– the 
scholar and the master,– the governor and the governed.”504 The republican and democratic 
political culture he found in America was therefore not something to be celebrated. 
 Unlike the Jacksonian Democrats, La Trobe did not even nominally believe in 
egalitarianism. When Cass, in his Indian removal article, for instance, wrote about “civilization” 
or “civilized” society, he generally implicitly referred to a “white” American society, which he 
defined against a derogatorily depicted, generalized, “Indian” society. At times in The Rambler, 
La Trobe used the term “civilization” in a similar sense, to signify a modern U.S. society, 
contrasted against American Indians in a so-called “savage state.”505 In other reflections on 
American society though, La Trobe mobilized the adjective “civilized” to denote differences of 
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rank within white society. He wrote, for instance, that people in the United States did not 
understand him when he spoke “of the possibility of the existence of civilization without 
cultivation.”506 While “civilization” referred here to U.S. society in the broad sense, he 
subsequently referred to the cultivated sections of the U.S. population as belonging to “civilized 
society” in a more exclusive sense. This use of the phrase “civilized society” signified what La 
Trobe viewed as the most respectable and highest-ranking social circles in the United States. 
Though these circles – with the requisite mix of education, manners and behavior that apparently 
distinguished “good society in Europe” – were few in number, in the “principle cities” of the 
U.S. the traveler could “find circles more or less exclusive, with the majority of individuals 
composing which he may be proud to acknowledge community of sentiment or feeling.”507 
Outside these circles, U.S. society was, according to La Trobe, a “singular melange” where “you 
find the rude and the polished in contact,” and “the rough simplicity of semi-barbarism” 
juxtaposed with “the inroad of luxury. . . existing without refinement.”508 Unlike Cass, La Trobe 
did not necessarily conflate “civilized society” with a non-Indian whiteness. 
 Despite the Jacksonian-style rhetoric through which he pronounced his approval of the 
U.S. Indian Removal Act, La Trobe nevertheless founded his support on the very un-Jacksonian 
presumption that there were distinctions of rank within white society, and that whiteness did not 
necessarily signify “civilization.” After declaring that the “white man and the Indian” could 
never be neighbors or “amalgamate,” La Trobe suggested that the “mutual aggression among the 
dissolute and ignorant of both class” was to blame for this incompatability.509 In contrast to Cass 
who blamed “the Indians,” La Trobe also blamed the “dissolute and ignorant” members of white 
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society. In particular he blamed the men employed as agents to execute the “benevolent designs” 
of the government’s Indian policy. According to La Trobe, these were not, in the majority, “just, 
honest, and good men – men of character and probity;” the Indians were thus surrounded “by bad 
men, as the hungry wolves of the desert surround a troop of horses.”510 The responsibility for the 
incompatability of Indian and white society – and the subsequent need for the Indians to remove 
westward – therefore lay partly with the white men of bad character, who shirked their 
responsibility to act benevolently towards the Indians. 
 The Indians were themselves also to blame for not embracing so-called civilization. In 
contrast to Cass, who in his 1830 article argued for removal on the grounds that American 
Indians were inherently unable to become “civilized,” La Trobe instead blamed “the Indian” for 
“his” apparent unwillingness to adopt “civilization.” “If,” he wrote, “the Indian turns his back 
upon the alternative of civilization, he must recede.”511 In La Trobe’s view, the apparent failure 
of the Indians to adopt “civilization” was a choice, rather than an inherent failing. Indeed, La 
Trobe believed that while differences of merit between and amongst men were to some extent 
natural born, they were not necessarily born along the lines of Indian and “white.” Although 
American Indians could probably not, in La Trobe’s schema, join the ranks of those 
distinguished with truly “honourable ancestry,” unlike Cass he did not believe in the inherent 
inferiority of all Indians to all white men.512 In apparently rejecting civilization, they had 
therefore partly caused their own demise and the subsequent need to emigrate west of the 
Mississippi River.  
 La Trobe’s justifications slip between presenting removal as the necessary response to 
inevitable and unavoidable forces, and suggesting that human exertions could have counteracted 
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these forces. He thus explained the apparently “common observation” that predicted American 
Indians’ “utter extinction before the lapse of many years,” by stating that there were “causes 
operating . . . which are not fully understood,” though he believed it was a process which had 
begun before the coming of the “white man,” who nevertheless intensified the process.513 Yet he 
also suggests that the seemingly “inevitable” and “unavoidable” evils born of the collision 
between Indians and whites – which he uses to justify Indian “expatriation” – might have been 
staved off had the Indians not turned their backs “upon the alternative of civilization,” and had 
the government not employed benevolent Indian agents, rather than men of bad character. 
Although somewhat obscured by echoes of Jacksonian rhetoric, in these statements La Trobe 
suggests that had circumstances and human characters been better, the civilizing mission to the 
American Indians could have been achieved.  
 When La Trobe travelled to Upper Canada in 1833, away from the omnipresent 
democratic rhetoric of U.S. partisan politics and its “polemical newspapers,” his narrative 
evinces a more pronounced commitment to the civilizing mission among American Indians. In 
September 1833, before crossing the border at Detroit and venturing west to Chicago for the 
Potawatomi treaty, La Trobe and Albert Pourtalès visited the Moravian Mission to the Delaware 
village of Fairfield on the River Thames. Unlike most of the American Indian (or First Nations) 
communities that La Trobe and Pourtalès visited during their North American tour, this stopover 
appears primarily to have fulfilled the desires of La Trobe rather than those of the Swiss Count. 
As La Trobe made clear in The Rambler, this visit was of particular personal interest to him. 
“From my childhood,” he stated, “I had been accustomed to hear of missionary labour, 
missionary trials, and missionary joy and sorrow, and to see and know those who had spent their 
lives freely in the service of God among the heathen.” Stopping at Fairfield gave him the much-
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anticipated chance to witness the “labour” and “trials” with his “own eyes” and his “own 
ears.”514 His ensuing descriptions of the visit reveal his staunch faith in the absolute 
righteousness and imperative necessity of missionary endeavors to civilize and Christianize 
American Indians.  
 In La Trobe’s account, the Moravian mission to the Delaware represented an 
unequivocally virtuous endeavor. He described the visit as having had a revelatory effect on him. 
Although he had, from youth, “been taught to value the devotion . . . which lead the Missionary 
to forsake his home and country,” visiting Fairfield had caused him to see this calling in an even 
more positive light. “I own,” he claimed, “that till the opportunity was afforded me to see for 
myself what the heathen soil was wherein they had to labour, – I never formed a conception of 
what missionary devotion, perseverance, toil, and suffering really were.”515 What he saw had 
strengthened his belief in the missionary project. 
In La Trobe’s eyes, the continuance of this missionary activity, in the face of the extreme 
hardships of “the heathen soil,” was itself proof of the righteousness of the missionaries’ work. 
To explain these hardships he included a historical narrative of “the labours of the Brethren’s 
Church” among the Delaware in North America. Writing of Moravian missionary efforts to the 
end of the eighteenth century, he noted the baptism records of “between thirteen and fourteen 
hundred Indians.” Although “a small number truly after the labours of three quarters of a 
century,” they were nevertheless “sufficient to show that God was with them; that the labour, 
devotion, and constancy of the Missionaries, and the faith of the Church from which they were 
sent forth, were not in vain.”516 Quantifiable results were not the true measure of missionary 
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success. However small the returns might seem, missionary labor – according to La Trobe – was 
never in vain. 
 His observations and conclusions about the mission at Fairfield presumed the absolute 
righteousness of this labor. He designated the Moravian missionaries as the heroes of the 
narrative; they had responded to God’s call to perform the imperative duty of Christianizing and 
“civilizing” the “heathens.” In this rendering, the “heathen” Indian flock acted functioned mostly 
as narrative foils against which he highlighted the valiant labors of the Moravian missionaries. 
Among the trials the missionaries faced were the Indians’ “strange hankering after certain of 
their Indian superstitions, which seemed to have taken almost irradicable possession of their 
strong minds,” or their continued “desire to follow some ancient Indian custom.” Yet La Trobe 
even “with all these drawbacks,” La Trobe believed the brethren found “encouragement 
sufficient to persevere in their labours,” and could trust that they had truly converted “many a 
poor Delaware” to depart “out of this world at peace with God, and in certain hope of a blissful 
immortality.”517 Although he presented what he saw at Fairfield as a revelation about the true 
value of the missionary endeavor, it was a revelation that merely confirmed his existence beliefs 
about the glorious commitment of the missionaries who battled on despite the Indians’ obstinate 
resistance to the missionaries’ valiant efforts to put them on the path to physical and spiritual 
salvation. It was as if what La Trobe saw confirmed all his existent views even more powerfully 
than he had expected.518 
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 He characterized the threats that continued to frustrate greater returns for the 
missionaries’ valiant efforts in terms very similar to those he used to justify Indian removal in 
the U.S. Not only did the resistant aspects of the “Indian character” work to thwart the 
Moravians’ endeavors, bad elements among the whites had also seriously hampered these labors. 
He declared that “[o]f the two great hindrances to missionary labours which exist even at this 
day, – the natural repugnance of the savage to a change of life, and the evil influence and 
opposition to be experience from the whites, – the latter has been at all times the most to be 
feared and to be lamented.” La Trobe therefore added to the other trials endured by the 
missionaries, the persecution they and their “flock” faced at the hands of other whites: “The 
suffering endured by the Missionaries and the Indians under their care, from this source, from the 
very commencement, are hardly to be pictured.”519 The righteous missionaries had therefore 
been hindered in their efforts “to give the Indian true light and knowledge” by a bad element 
among “white” society, just as “bad men” had thwarted the benevolent designs of the U.S. 
government, necessitating Indian expatriation.  
 In narrating his subsequent trip to U.S. Indian Country, La Trobe gives a more cynical 
take on the U.S. government’s Indian policy than in his discussions of the previous year’s tour 
with Ellsworth’s party. After visiting Fairfield, La Trobe and Pourtalès traveled through Detroit 
to Chicago in time for the U.S.-Potawatomi treaty council of September 1833. In contrast to his 
descriptions of the government’s removal policy during his tour of the western prairies with 
Ellsworth and Irving, his framing of removal in the context of the Chicago treaty negotiations 
give a more negative depiction of the Jackson government’s plans. Having gained access to the 
negotiations, La Trobe astutely observed that the U.S. government-appointed commissioners 
attempted not only to have the Potawatomies cede their lands in Michigan and Illinois, but also 
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to have them emigrate west of the Mississippi. He presents government actions in this context as 
those of a bully rather than a benevolent protector. For instance, describing one stage of the 
proceedings he states, “the Commissioner made them [the attending Potawatomies] a forcible 
Jacksonian discourse, wherein a good deal which was a-kin to threat, was mingled with 
exhortations not to play with their Great Father, but to come to an early determination.”520 While 
such a scene did not unsettle La Trobe’s conviction “of the necessity of [Indian] removal,” he 
nevertheless seems to have more consciously distanced himself from the motivations of the 
“forcible” Jacksonians. He suggested himself as having a contrasting sensibility, because 
apparently unlike the Jacksonian commissioner, his “heart bled for them [the Potawatomies] in 
their desolation and decline.”521 And yet, with all the bleeding of his heart, La Trobe continued 
to support the Indian policy of a government with whom he shared very little ideological 
compatibility. 
 Although La Trobe’s initial statements of support for Indian removal in The Rambler 
echoed Jacksonian discursive tropes, such as those propounded by Cass in his 1830 North 
American Review article, he founded his support on a decidedly different set of political beliefs. 
Despite refuting democratic and republican ideologies, La Trobe found solidarity with the U.S. 
government’s Indian removal policy because he could still assimilate his epistemological and 
cosmological outlook with the apparently undeniable need for the eastern American Indian 
peoples “to remove” west of the Misssissippi. As a committed Christian, and self-proclaimed 
Tory, La Trobe believed that there was only one true and proper path that all human should and 
must follow: to live in a hierarchically ordered “civilized” society, adhering to (a Christian) 
God’s law. Like antiremovalists such as Jeremiah Evarts, he fervently believed that so-called 
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civilized Christian people had an imperative duty to bring American Indians within this proper 
societal order. Also in contrast to the views Cass expounded in his 1830 article, La Trobe was – 
as shown by his discussion of the Moravian mission at Fairfield – absolutely committed to the 
civilizing mission. Though he admitted that perhaps American Indians had, in general, a “natural 
repugnance” to change, they were not beyond redemption; such a belief would have invalidated 
the missionaries’ glorious vocational calling. It was the Indians themselves, who had apparently 
chosen to turn their backs on “the alternative of civilization,” that had partly precipitated the U.S. 
government’s removal policy. Moreover, bad elements among both the whites and the Indians – 
including the very un-Jacksonian implication that whiteness was not necessarily interchangeable 
with “civilization” – were apparently also to blame for the need to separate American Indians 
from white society. 
La Trobe’s The Rambler highlights that even when discussed in the context of U.S.-
Indian relations, the political dimensions of Indian removal were not solely prescribed by the 
concerns of U.S. partisan politics. Removal was not a quintessentially Jacksonian phenomenon; 
it was, in fact, malleable to a variety of ostensibly contradictory ideologies. Indeed, only a few 
years after La Trobe visited Upper Canada, Francis Bond Head would attempt to implement his 
program – based on romantic ideals seemingly incompatible with Jacksonian ideology – to 
remove the colony’s First Peoples to Manitoulin Island.  
 
Francis Bond Head and the Romanticism of Indian Removal 
 
 Francis Bond Head first called at the Delaware village at New Fairfield in September 
1836, three years after Charles La Trobe’s visit. Where La Trobe had seen missionary heroism, 
Head saw only decay and doom. Writing to Lord Glenelg (the secretary of state for war and the 
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colonies) in November 1836, Head painted an extremely negative picture of life in the village; an 
image he used to justify his arguments for the necessity of removing all Upper Canada’s First 
People to Manitoulin Island. According to Head, the Delawares at New Fairfield represented a 
“very common” picture of the destitution caused by missionary efforts to civilize and 
Christianize “the Indians.”522 Head used such a description to justify to the colonial office in 
London, his efforts to enter into removal treaties with Upper Canada’s First Peoples. He thus 
used the proclaimed negative effects of the civilizing mission as a foil against which he justified 
his Indian policy. The apparent failure of practical efforts to “civilize” people proved the tenets 
of his romantic-primitivist beliefs: “civilization” was a malevolent force, which would 
necessarily destroy the Indians. To avoid this fate, they needed to emigrate to the safety of 
Manitoulin Island. Head’s justifications for his removal policy remained remarkably similar. In 
his initials explanations for the policy, and in response to questions from the colonial office 
amidst he controversy generated by the missionary opposition, he consistently fell back on the 
same romantic tropes. After his tenure as lieutenant governor, he used the same tropes to justify 
his removal policy, though his distance from the political reality of government in Upper Canada 
allowed him to present an even more generalized vision – shorn of any polluting specifics – of 
the necessary and proper relationship between the pristinely natural “red men of the forest” and 
their “white brethren.” 
While La Trobe presented himself as an open-minded cosmopolitan observer of North 
American societies, Head maintained an open disdain for the republican society to the south.523 
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He arrived in Upper Canada to a fermenting political dispute between local Tories and “radicals” 
seeking broader democratic rights. More openly hostile to U.S. “egalitarianism” than La Trobe, 
Head viewed the demands and aspirations of these “radicals” as part of a continental democratic 
scourge that had already infected the United States. Writing to his publisher John Murray amid 
the economic crisis of 1837, he proclaimed that “[f]rom the bottom of my soul I detest 
democracy.” Head believed that his fiscal policies would “shew the civilized world that [the] 
‘all-men-are-born-equal’ system cannot in the moment of adversity sustain itself with the old 
English aristocratic principle of conduct which has honor for its guide, and hereditary distinction 
as its reward.”524  
Head resigned his post the next year because he felt his conscience could not bear 
complicity in any attempts to conciliate the “low-bred antagonists” of the 1837 rebellion. Back in 
London, Head met with the Whig Prime Minister Lord Melbourne in the hope of finding another 
government appointment. At the end of the meeting Melbourne declared to Head, “[y]ou are 
such a damned odd fellow,” and did not recommend Head for another position.525 In his response 
to the political strife, as with the policy he formulated in 1836 to remove all of Upper Canada’s 
First People to Manitoulin Island, Francis Bond Head had been conspicuously out of step with 
the Whig administration in London.  
 Head’s Indian removal policy gained notoriety because it contrasted sharply with the 
prevailing colonial office stance towards the empire’s “Aborigines.” His short tenure in Upper 
Canada coincided with the 1836 sittings of the Aborigines Select Committee in London.  The 
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formation of the Committee resulted largely from the efforts of House of Commons member 
Thomas Fowell Buxton, who had succeeded Wilberforce in the leadership of the abolition 
campaign. After the passing of the Slavery Abolition Act in 1833, these reform-minded 
evangelicals turned their benevolent agenda to the plight of the empire’s “Aborigines.”526 In its 
1837 report, the Committee recommended a policy to protect indigenous people against settler 
violence, and to implement programs to civilize and Christianize them; an ethos which already 
largely permeated a colonial office peopled with Clapham Sect evangelicals. Yet for a time, 
Head managed to obtain tentative approval for a program that seemed fundamentally to 
contradict these policy aims. In advocating for the removal of all the First Peoples in Upper 
Canada to Manitoulin Island, Head subverted the prevailing notion that civilizing “the 
Aborigines” would ameliorate their condition. Through the fixed lens of his romantic-primitivist 
sensibility, Head viewed “civilization” as a malevolent force that would inevitably wash away 
the noble, primitive Indians unless they were removed from its path. 
 This romantic impulse infused both the official explanations of his Indian policy, and his 
subsequent literary accounts of his gubernatorial acquaintance with his “red children.” Both 
before and after his post in Upper Canada, Francis Bond Head had a prolific publishing career 
with John Murray publishing house in London, which also published most of Washington 
Irving’s works, including his Tour on the Prairies in 1835, as well as those of other authors such 
as Jane Austen, Sir Walter Scott, and Lord Byron.527 Head also regularly contributed to the 
firm’s political and literary journal, the Quarterly Review; the journal that Cass had taken 
occasion to vehemently denounce in his North American Review articles in the late 1820s. 
Although Head’s first substantial work about Upper Canada focused on the political strife 
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leading to the 1837 rebellion, he subsequently published his observations and judgments about 
American Indians in his 1840 Quarterly Review essay “The Red Men,” and in an extensive 
account of his 1836 trip to Manitoulin island in The Emigrant (1847).528 Stylistically, these 
retrospective accounts did not differ greatly from his original official correspondence, which he 
inflected with a similar literary flair. Responding to Glenelg’s first directive on Indian policy in 
November 1836, Head commenced a memorandum in his official “dispatch” by proclaiming that 
“[t]he Fate of the Red Inhabitants of America, the real Proprietors of its Soil, is, without any 
Exception, the most sinful Story recorded in the History of the Human Race.”529 This sensibility 
consistently infused in all his writings about First Peoples. 
 By the time Head responded to Lord Glenelg’s Indian policy directive in November 
1836, he had already begun to implement his removal plans. Though the policy “to remove” the 
colony’s First Peoples had been conceived by officials under the previous administration, in 
Head’s hands it took on a decidedly new romantic-primitivist flavor. When in 1835 Thomas 
Anderson – by then superintendent of Indian Affairs at Coldwater – wrote to Head’s predecessor 
Sir John Colborne, he proposed Manitoulin Island as a separate Indian settlement, necessary “for 
the Civilization of the Indians.”530 Head subsequently advocated for an isolated Indian settlement 
for very different reasons: it would enable “the Red Man” to escape the apparently malevolent 
forces of civilization. In Head’s rendering, removal became an oppositional reaction to the 
“civilization” policy advocated by both the colonial office in London and the previous local 
administration in Upper Canada.  
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In his contemporary reports to Glenelg, Head justified his renunciation of the civilization 
policy by referring to his empirical observations of “the actual Situation of that Portion of the 
Indian Population which is undergoing the Operation of being civilized.”531 Missionary activity 
among the colony’s indigenous peoples featured prominently in these initial justifications. While 
Glenelg, in his Indian policy directive of June 1836, had confirmed to Head the British 
government’s prerogative of supporting missionary endeavors among Upper Canada’s 
indigenous people, Head in his response justified his break with this policy by claiming that 
missionary attempts to “civilize” and Christianize “the Indians” had failed. According to Head, 
the missionary programs had resulted in deaths by consumption that had decimated “its 
Followers.” He then swiftly concluded that “an Attempt to make Farmers of the Red Men has 
been, generally speaking, a complete Failure,” and that “congregating them for the Purpose of 
Civilization has implanted many more vices than it has eradicated.”532 According to Head, 
policies aimed at “civilizing” the Indians had been fundamentally misconceived.  
 Head implied that this misconception lay with previous policy makers’ failure to 
recognize the (apparently) clearly evident truth that “Indian” and “civilized” society could not 
mix. As with his descriptions of Peter Jones, Head described the product of contact between 
“civilized” and “Indian” society as necessarily resulting in the decay of Indianness; the loss of 
“the Indian’s” characteristic pristine nobility. The apparently inherent and immutable 
characteristics of Indian nature explained the present state of “much of the Indian Property in 
Upper Canada”; “however useful rich Land may be to us,” wrote Head, “its only Value to an 
Indian consists in the Game it contains: he is in fact Lord of the Manor, but it is against his 
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Nature to cultivate the Soil.”533 Head thus presented missionary attempts to transform Indians 
into Christian farmers, as futile and destructive efforts to alienate Indians from their true nature 
as hunters and “Lords of the forest.” There was no point, according to Head, for Indians to 
continue living surrounded by white settlers in areas from which the game had been frightened 
away. Unable by circumstance to hunt for Game, and unsuited by nature “to cultivate the Soil,” 
the Indians had apparently become destitute on lands which white settlers could otherwise put to 
good use. 
 To illustrate this alleged phenomenon, Head drew on observations from his recent visit to 
the Moravian mission at Fairfield. There he found, he wrote to Glenelg, “Sixteen or Eighteen 
Families of Moravian Indian living on a vast Tract of rich Land, yet from Absence of Game 
almost destitute of every Thing.” This “Picture,” he stated, “is a very common one,” which he 
believed would “sufficiently show that however desirous one may be to protect the Indians . . . 
the greatest Kindness we can do them is to induce them . . . to retreat before what they may justly 
term the accursed Progress of Civilization.”534 Using the Moravian mission at Fairfield as the 
example of a broader, apparently inevitable phenomenon, Head presented missionary efforts to 
Christianize and “civilize” the colony’s “Indians” as both futile and destructive. For these 
reasons, he wrote, he was “decidedly of the opinion that His Majesty’s Government should 
continue to advise the few remaining Indians who are lingering in Upper Canada to retire upon 
the Manitoulin and other Islands in Lake Huron.”535 The apparently disastrous results of 
missionary endeavors, such as those of the Moravians at Fairfield, therefore formed a crucial 
discursive foil against which Head justified his break with the prevailing direction of British 
“Aboriginal” policy. 
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 At first, colonial office officials in London seem not to have fully grasped the 
fundamental incompatibility of their policy prerogatives and Head’s removal plans. Glenelg 
wrote to Head stating that while he felt it “impossible to question the Accuracy” of his view “of 
the Consequences resulting to the Indians from their Intercourse with White Men,” he would 
“reluctantly yield” to the conviction that promoting the Indians’ welfare meant abandoning “the 
Hope of imparting to the Indians the Blessings of Christianity.”536 Tactfully avoiding the 
stigmatized word “civilization,” Glenelg nevertheless gently reminded Head that Christianization 
must remain an imperative goal of British Indian policy. He gave tentative assent to Head’s 
removal policy, but only on the basis that he believed it might, in fact, enhance the chance of 
missionary success. Glenelg thus anticipated that “[o]ne Great Advantage . . . of interposing a 
considerable Space between the Country occupied by the White Men and the Indian Settlements, 
is the Facility which such an Arrangement might offer to the Inculcation . . . of the Doctrines and 
Precepts of Christianity.”537 But despite such (albeit gentle) edicts, Head continued to promote a 
policy founded on his belief that all facets of the civilizing mission, including endeavors aimed at 
converting Indians to Christianity, represented a malevolent threat to the wellbeing of the 
Indians. Even when Glenelg’s office began to receive pressure from the treasury department in 
London to elicit from Head an explanation regarding why he had reneged on the previous local 
administration’s civilization program, Head remained unapologetic.538 He had broken with 
previous policy based on “the real State of the Indians in this Province,” whose “Situation” he 
had judge with his “own Eyes.”539 
                                                
536 Glenelg to Head, 20 January 1837, ibid., 73. 
537 Glenelg to Head, 20 January 1837, ibid. 
538 Alexander Spearman to James Stephen, 9 February 1837, ibid., 76. 
539 Head to Glenelg, 18 July 1837, ibid., 139. 
 236 
 As already discussed, what Head saw with his “own Eyes,” differed consistently from the 
“Situation” as depicted by missionaries working among First Peoples in Upper Canada. These 
missionaries responded to Head’s policy with an outcry of opposition. Yet despite the consistent 
rate of missionary petitions received against Head’s Indian policy initiatives, the colonial office 
initially remained supportive of Head’s efforts.540 In subsequent months, however, Head’s claims 
about “the real State of the Indians” met with increasing skepticism within the colonial office. 
Towards the end of the summer of 1837, Glenelg and the influential under-secretary of the 
colonial office, James Stephen, took steps to direct a third party to visit the “Indian tribes” in 
Upper Canada in order either to confirm or correct Head’s opinion.541 They also began to pay 
more heed to Head’s opponents, such as Robert Adler, the secretary of the Wesleyan Missionary 
Society in London, who had consistently petitioned the colonial office against the threat Head’s 
policy posed to Wesleyan missions in Upper Canada. In August 1837, Stephens wrote to Adler 
on behalf of Glenelg requesting that he write a concise summary of his views on the “Indian 
Settlements in U. Canada,” and informing him that an officer had been employed to investigate 
“the real state of the Indians & their Settlements.”542 
 Although the Wesleyans initiated the campaign, the ensuing controversy focused on the 
Moravian mission to the Delawares, as well as the Wesleyan missions to the Ojibwes. In June 
1837, the president and ministers of the Wesleyan (Methodist) church in Canada addressed a 
memorial to Head complaining about his dealings with the Indians of Upper Canada. Enclosing 
the memorial in his dispatch to Glenelg, Head refuted the charges, proclaiming that all the 
previous years’ surrenders of land – by the Saugeen Ojibwes at Manitoulin Island, the 
Wynandots (Hurons) at Amherstburg, and the Delawares at Fairfield – had been voluntarily 
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entered into, and properly executed.543 In response to the memorialists’ complaint that lands 
previously granted to Christian Indians had been give to settlers without compensating the 
Indians for their improvements, Head specifically referred to his dealings with the Delawares, 
asserting that “of their [the Delawares] own Suggestion, and at their own Request, I ordered their 
Improvements to be regularly valued, and that although in my Opinion they were over valued, I 
immediately, without the slightest Deduction whatever, paid the whole Amount.”544 Indeed, 
Head could confidently reference his dealings with the Delawares to counter the specific claims 
that his administration had not paid compensation for surrendered improvements.545 But what 
would really be at stake for the Moravians, like the Wesleyans, was not so much the substance of 
the transactions that Head’s administration had entered into with the respective First Peoples, it 
was the effect that these dealings had on their actual ability to continue to exist, and thus 
undertake their civilizing missions. 
 In the summer of 1837, the Moravians joined the chorus of people petitioning the 
colonial office against Head’s Indian policy in Upper Canada. Their petitions revealed, more 
explicitly than the Wesleyans’, the nature of the threat that Head’s policy posed to their 
missionary activities. In their submissions to the colonial office, the Moravians were more open 
about the fact that by being sidelined in the negotiations between the government and their 
“flocks,” their perceived authority over the Delawares, on which they based their ability to 
pursue their civilizing mission, had been seriously compromised. In September 1837, Charles La 
Trobe’s older brother Peter, who had succeeded their father as Secretary to the Society for the 
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Furtherance of the Gospel in Britain, wrote to Glenelg to notify him of the destructive impact of 
Head’s actions to his Brethren’s mission at Fairfield. Peter Latrobe had been informed of Head’s 
dealings by Andrew Benade of the Brethren’s missionary society in Pennsylvania – the Trustees 
of the mission property in Canada – who requested him to seek relief for Head’s settlement with 
“their Indian converts.”546 Though like the Wesleyans, the Moravians complained of the 
“irregular and arbitrary” nature Head’s transactions, they used these details of the negotiations to 
illustrate how Head had gained the Delawares’ majority consent only by illegally circumvented 
missionary approval.  
The Moravians thus had a legal argument on which to base their outrage that the 
government had dealt with “their converts” without their permission. The land on which the 
mission at Fairfield stood, the Moravians informed Glenelg, had been granted to the Moravians 
in 1793 to hold in trust “for the sole use of their Indian Converts.”547 They claimed that during 
the negotiations for the surrender, Head and the local Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Joseph 
Clench, sidelined the missionaries despite their protestations that “the Indian Converts” had “no 
right to dispose of the Mission Land without the Consent of the Trustees.”548 Yet instead of 
reversing the land surrender, the Pennsylvanian Moravians asked Peter Latrobe “to instruct the 
Provincial Government to avoid in future treating with our Indians about the Lands they occupy, 
without having made a previous Communication to the Missionaries, and obtained their 
Concurrence, as well as that of the Trustees.”549 The Moravians sought not the restitution of the 
Trust’s property, to which they would presumably have been legally entitled, but rather the local 
administration’s acknowledgement of their claims to authority over the Delawares. They 
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therefore used the legal wrong as a hook on which to hang their argument against Head having 
circumvented their authority over “their Indian Converts.” 
  But in Head’s view, the missionaries had no legitimate claim to authority over the 
Indians; only his government, as representative of the “Great Father in England” held the 
requisite authority for a relationship with Upper Canadas’ Native peoples. He was, moreover, 
deeply suspicious of the missionaries, suggesting that they had avaricious rather than spiritual 
motives, and that they were actually surreptitiously attempting to dupe the Indians of their land. 
As part of his response to the Wesleyan’s memorial, he thus wrote to Gleneg that though he 
disliked the attempts of “Squatters . . . to obtain furtive Possession of the Indian Lands,” he 
thought it nevertheless “natural . . . for White men openly to commit the Sin of cultivating rich 
Land wherever it is found sleeping by itself in a State of Nature.” However, he suggested that the 
missionaries actually committed the same “Sin,” but in their case it was not excusable: “when the 
same Offence is attempted under the Cloak of Religion, when with uplifted Eyes it is urged that 
‘it would be of great Advantage to the moral and religious Improvement of the Indians, and at 
the same Time be peculiarly acceptable to the real Friends of that interesting People, both in this 
Province and in England,’ I entertain Feelings which I will not allow myself to express.”550 In 
Head’s view then, missionary activity represented not only a misconception of the problem of 
Indian-settler relations, missionaries also used their relgious activities as a screen for the 
hypocritical pursuit of their own self interest. 
 In Head’s schema of the proper order of Indian-white relations, there existed no room for 
interactions between missionaries and American Indians. Yet as lieutenant governor of Upper 
Canada, he had to deal with the reality of missions to the Indians, and with missionaries 
upsetting what he believed to be the true and necessary image of what Indians, and their 
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lifestyles, should look like. In justifying his removal policy, he thus needed to deal with the 
opposition of those who challenged his depiction of the proper order of Indian-settler relations. 
But when Head resigned as lieutenant governor, and moved back to England, he no longer had to 
deal with the messy details of the reality of American Indian lives in Upper Canada. Instead, he 
would fall back on his romatic imagery, without the pollution of a reality that included men such 
as Peter Jones, and white missionaries apparently contributing to the doom and decay of Native 
peoples. He could proclaim the existence of an unbreachable divide between “civilized” and 
“savage” man, without having to deal with the specifics of anyone or anything, that seemed to 
fall somewhere between these two categories. 
 In his first literary treatment of the topic, Head presented a generalized, retrospective 
justification for his removal policy. In his 1840 analysis of “The Red Man” for the Quarterly 
Review, Head proclaimed policies aimed at “civilizing” American Indians as highly dangerous to 
the Indian wellbeing, for they intensified exposure to the very thing that unavoidably caused 
their decline: civilization. For Head, Indian society was inherently unchangeable, so any contact 
with “civilized” mankind inevitably led to the corruption, degradation, and inevitable extinction 
of the Indians. He used the geological metaphor of the relationship between metal and “mundic” 
– the word that Cornish miners used to describe iron or arsenical pyrites – to posit what he 
regarded as the general rule governing the interaction between the so-called uncivilized and 
civilized worlds. He stated that while the “glittering substance” mundic, which covered the 
surface of the “richest lodes,” resembled metal, “on being smelted [it] flies away in poisonous 
fumes of arsenic, so is the portion of the uncivilized world which border upon civilization always 
found to be contaminated, or, in other words, to have lost its own good qualities, without having 
 241 
received in return anything but the vices of the neighbouring race.”551 For Head, his observations 
of the conditions of the Indians in contact with “civilization” evinced the inevitable result of 
contact between the Indians with civilization. Yet unlike in his policy justifications to the 
colonial office, Head did not feel the need to ostensibly base this theory on specific empirical 
observations of Indian communities.  
In his 1847 book The Emigrant, Head presented in even starker terms the tenets of his 
romantic philosophy. In this work, he briefly expounded his justifications for adopting a removal 
policy as part of a context-setting precursor to a chapter-long romantic narrative of his 1836 trip 
to Manitoulin Island. Despite “the friendly feeling [that] exists between the red men of the forest 
and their white [British] brethren,” and the fact that British “governors have never found any 
difficulty in maintaining the title of ‘Father,’” Head wrote that he learnt, on arriving in Upper 
Canada, of a plan to induce a portion of “the Indians . . . to dispose of their lands to the crown, 
and to remove to the British Manitoulin Islands in Lake Huron.” Though he had apparently 
initially felt “much averse” to the project, after taking “a great deal of pains to ascertain what 
was the real condition of the Indians in Canada, and whether their proposed removal would be 
advantageous to them, as well as to the province,” he ultimately judged that he should 
recommend the plan to the Indians.552 As with his initial justifications to Glenelg, Head stated 
that he based his decision on personal observations. Yet unmoored even of any of the nominal 
specifics of his earlier explanations, his discussion in The Emigrant appears even more as pure 
romantic pastiche. In broad brush strokes, devoid of any historical specificity, he thus described 
how “man who subsists solely on game” had succumbed to the evils brought by “the white 
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settler,” which “combined” to produce, “as may be imagined, the most unfortunate results.”553 
On this basis, Head justified his plan to “prevail on” the Indians “to remove to the British islands 
in Lake Huron,” where they could hunt and fish away from the malevolent forces of 
civilization.554 
Head did provide a few more specifics about his repudiation of the previous 
administration’s civilization policy. Relying on the same generalized presumptions about the 
inescapable incompatibility of “savage” and “civilized” society, he explained that in spite of the 
well intended “parental attention” of men such as Sir Peregrine Maitland and Sir John Colborne, 
any attempt to tether the Indians “to the laborious occupations of their white brethren” were 
inescapably doomed to failure.555 With characteristic flourish he explained that 
 
one might as well attempt to decoy a flight of wild fowl to the ponds of Hampstead Heath 
– one might as well endeavor to persuade the eagle to descend from the lofty region in 
which he has existed to live with the fowls in our court-yards, as to prevail upon the red 
men of North America to become what we called civilized; in short, it is against their 
nature, and they can not do it.556  
 
Using these flowery metaphoric abstractions as his baseline, Head then described how he had 
found “in one or two parts of Upper Canada . . . a few Indians,” apparently living in a “civilized” 
state, but “in a condition highly demoralized, and almost starving on a large block of rich, 
valuable land.”557 With these vague specifics, Head thus justified his repudiation of the previous 
administration’s civilization policy on the same basis that he had used in his initial justification 
to Glenelg: not only was it against “the Indian’s” nature to become “civilized,” a policy that 
prescribed such a future was also highly dangerous to the Indians’ wellbeing. He did, however, 
                                                
553 Ibid., 78. 
554 Ibid., 79. 
555Ibid., 78-79. 
556 Ibid., 79. 
557 Ibid. 
 243 
include one caveat; the civilization project had apparently, “to a certain degree succeeded” in 
cases “where the Indians, circumscribed by temptations . . . had become a race of half-castes.”558 
Yet in Head’s mind, these people, who presumably included men such as Peter Jones, did not 
actually count as “Indians.” Civilization necessarily eroded true “Indianness.” 
In The Emigrant, Head therefore reaffirmed the ideas on which he had founded his 
removal policy. He presented in even starker terms, the tenets of his romantic philosophy about 
the unbreachable divide between the apparently noble natural existence of the American Indians, 
and the corrupted societies of the “civilized” world. “[T]he truth is,” he argued, “that between 
what we term the civilized portion of mankind, and what we call ‘the savage,’ there is a moral 
gulf which neither party can cross, or, in other words, on the subject of happiness they have no 
ideas with us in common.”559 Rather than referring to specific First Nations people or 
communities, Head presented a panoramic vision of “Indian” society, incommensurably distinct 
in its morally superior primitive nobility from the artificially corrupted “civilized.” Even 
Assiginack, whose “Indianness” had so impressed Head at the 1836 Manitoulin Island council, 
did not rate a specific mention.560 Instead, Head wrote more generally of the “calm, high-bred 
dignity” of “the manner in which the red aborigines of America . . . conduct their councils.”561  
  Ten years after his summer of 1836 trip, Head thus continued to write unapologetically 
of his policy to segregate, and therefore apparently save from degradation and ultimate 
extinction, the “red children of the forest.” Just as Head discursively fixed true “Indianness” as 
inflexible to temporal or environmental alternation, the presumptions that underscored his 
discourse remained unchanged. In his 1847 work The Emigrant, he remembered with wistful 
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fondness his journey in a “bark canoe” to Manitoulin Island in 1836. Adhering to his immutable 
romantic schema, he narrated this trip as a commune with nature, which had allowed him to 
interact with the Indians in their natural state. He concluded his chapter-length account by stating 
that he too had drawn moral strength from the natural environment, and had thus returned to his 
daily work in Toronto “considerably stronger” than when he had left it to make his visit “to that 
simple, high-bred, and virtuous race of men, the red aborigines of the forest.”562  
In his initial reports to the colonial office, Head had relied heavily on his romantic 
philosophy to justify what he saw as the inescapable need to save and preserve “the Indians” 
from the corroding influence of “civilization.” Yet at the same time, he had needed to deal with 
the practical reality of Christian missionaries challenging his Indian policy. In response, Head 
strove to reassert his vision of true and proper order that he believed should exist between 
“Indians” and their “white brethren.” Ten years removed from these pressures, he was able to 
reassert this romantic vision in a purer literary form, without needing to react to the voices of 
dissent, or the reality of First Peoples such as the Delawares who perhaps did not necessarily fit 




 In his controversial 1830 North American Review article, Lewis Cass railed – amongst 
other targets – against “Rousseau and the disciples of his school” for their “romantic description” 
of the superiority of “savage” to “civilized” life. Cass based his unequivocal support for the 
Jackson administration’s removal policy on the inverse dichotomy: the absolute superiority of 
“civilized” society to the inherently degraded “condition of the Indians.” In Cass’s hands, Indian 
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removal appears as a quintessentially Jacksonian phenomenon; the necessary result of the 
inevitable spread of an expansionist “civilized” society of “pale men.” With no class or status 
distinctions within this “civilized” society, his discourse projected an “egalitarianism” based on 
the apparently natural and superior claims of “the pale race of men” to Indian lands. Little 
wonder that he managed, as Jeremiah Evarts predicted, “to catch the breeze” of Democratic 
politics, and land a position in Washington. 
Evarts himself died in May 1831 of an illness likely caused by his exhausting efforts to 
oppose Indian removal. In his 1846 Memoirs, McKenney remembered Evarts as “[o]ne of the 
best men I ever knew – a man of education, of intelligence, and humanity, and a zealous friend 
of the Indian race.”563 Perhaps recollecting the awkwardness of their final meeting before the 
passing of the Removal Act in 1830, McKenney expressed regret that Evarts and other “friends 
of the Indians” had not joined him on (what he framed as) the moderate ground of supporting 
removal as the only way to save the Indians from their otherwise-inevitable doom.564 Yet Evarts 
and his fellow antiremovalists had been more politically savvy in their prediction that the 
Jacksonians would sanction violent coercion to implement their Indian removal plan. 
McKenney, however, never saw himself as complicit in these events; instead, he blamed 
the Jacksonians’ for distorting an otherwise benevolent policy, and the northern evangelicals for 
not supporting his attempts to implement “voluntary” removal. Finding himself out of step with 
the newly formed partisan divides of U.S. politics on the issue of removal, McKenney would not 
make the same mistake again. In the ensuing years he threw his whole-hearted support behind 
the Whigs, hoping that a Whig administration would return him to the (newly named) Bureau of 
Indian Affairs. When the Whigs gained the White House in 1840, McKenney campaigned hard 
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to be reinstated. The ABCFM, however, politely refused to endorse his candidacy, as did both 
William Henry Harrison and John Tyler.565 
 Though in the arena of U.S. partisan politics, Indian removal represented both a defining 
policy of the Jacksonian Democrats and an issue around which their opponents organized into 
the Whig party, understood more broadly, removal was not a quintessentially Jacksonian 
phenomenon. As Charles La Trobe and Francis Bond Head’s justifications for removal show, as 
both a discursive idea and coercive practice, “removal” was malleable to a variety of ostensibly 
contradictory ideologies. Though La Trobe’s advocacy for the U.S. government’s removal policy 
in the pages of The Rambler in North America sounded like echoes of Cass and Jackson’s 
rhetoric, on closer reading, he based his support on a fundamentally different set of political and 
religious beliefs. And six years after Cass railed against the followers of Rousseau, Head based 
his removal policy in Upper Canada on his romantic vision of saving the “noble red men.” 
Moreover, though Cass – ever the pragmatist – spent five years as secretary of war overseeing 
and reporting on the implementation of the government’s removal policy, he nevertheless also 
welcomed David Green, Evart’s successor as ABCFM secretary, into his office in Washington in 
1834, to discuss the Board’s involvement in “civilization” efforts in the Great Lakes region. 
When the winds of political expedience seemed to require missionary labors “in benefitting the 
Indians,” Cass himself held no ongoing commitment to the idea that “the Indians” were 
inherently immune to becoming “civilized.” 
In contrast to Cass, La Trobe believed sincerely in the civilizing mission as an imperative 
duty, rather than a pragmatic tactic. When the colonial office, adhering to the advice of both the 
Aborigines Select Committee and George Arthur, decided to instigate an Aboriginal Protectorate 
in the recently colonized Port Phillip district of New South Wales, they chose La Trobe to act as 
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Superintendent of the district and to oversee the protectorate’s implementation. Constantly at 
odds with the department’s “chief protector,” George Augustus Robinson – who had received the 
job due to Arthur’s glowing recommendations – throughout the 1840s La Trobe continually 
lamented the chief protector’s failure to implement what he saw as the protectorate’s raison 
d’être: to save the local indigenous people through civilization, Christianization, and their 







 In the 1830s, many British subjects, including those who worked in the colonial office, 
believed that Britain had a duty to help “the natives” who came within their nation’s admittedly 
dangerous imperial reach. As Zoë Laidlaw states, Thomas Fowell Buxton and other members of 
the Clapham Sect, for instance, “expressed a religious conviction . . . that the British owed 
reparation to dispossessed indigenous peoples throughout the empire,” and that “such reparation 
should take the form of ‘civilisation’ and conversion to Christianity, and could thus be combined 
with missionary endeavor and very restricted colonial settlement.”566 Although George Arthur 
did not adhere so strongly to the idea of restricting colonial settlement, his views on the need “to 
conciliate” the indigenous people in areas colonized by Britain otherwise aligned closely with 
Fowell Buxton’s. This set of beliefs informed Fowell Buxton’s initiation of the Aborigines Select 
Committee and also the views represented in the committee’s final report.567 Clearly influenced 
by Arthur’s correspondence, the Committee’s 1837 final report characterized the late conflict in 
Van Diemen’s Land as having resulted from “deadly antipathy . . . excited between the 
Aborigines and the Bushrangers,” which “provoked a series of outrages which would have 
terminated in the utter extermination of the whole race, if the local Government had not 
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interposed to remove the last remnant of them from the island; an act of real mercy, though of 
apparent severity.”568 Evangelical Christians such as Arthur therefore sought, in the words of 
historian Bain Attwood, to preempt a recurrence of “these problems, and so justify British 
colonisation, by promoting an agenda that would transform sinful settlers and non-Christian 
indigenes into moral beings, assimilate both into a civilised community, and make the British 
nation live up to its civilising and Christianising responsibilities.”569  
The views of these people, who would in the 1840s acquire the label “humanitarians,” 
gained such traction that when a group of Van Demonian colonists crossed the Bass Strait in 
1835 to claim sheep runs on the Australian mainland, they framed their petitions for government 
sanction of their land title claims in “the language of humanitarianism.”570 In other words, they 
sought to gain official approval of their venture by maintaining that, in addition to seeking sheep 
pastures, they sought to do justice by “the Aborigines,” and bring them “civilization” and 
Christianity. While Arthur dismissed these men’s claims as insincere, he never doubted his own 
commitment to such a policy. Arthur “spoke the language of humanitarianism,” and he remained, 
in the aftermath of the Black War, committed to the so-called “reclamation” of Australia’s 
indigenous people. Charles La Trobe – who was appointed to oversee the new district across the 
Bass Strait – spoke a similar language. Like Arthur and the guiding members of the Aborigines 
Select Committee who ultimately recommended an Aboriginal Protectorate in this new “Port 
Phillip” district of New South Wales, La Trobe believed in the apparent need to protect “the 
Aborigines” from the aggressions of the “lower class of settlers,” save their souls through 
conversion to Christianity, and educate them to lead settled and industrious lives as (so-called) 
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civilized British subjects. Seemingly selected for colonial office duties due to his Moravian 
family’s “humanitarian” connections, La Trobe had, since returning from North America, visited 
the West Indies and written reports on the educations of former slaves which met the satisfactory 
benchmarks of prevailing humanitarian views.571 
 During their respective tenures in Van Diemen’s Land and Port Phillip, both Arthur and 
La Trobe viewed themselves as above the fray of indigenous-colonist violence, which they 
generally blamed on “lower-class” stockmen and convicts. Many scholars have since judged 
them in a similar light. For instance, in a recent biographical description of La Trobe, the author 
sets the Superintendent apart from the indigenous-colonist violence in the Port Phillip district: 
“Unable either to restrain settlers or the overseers of their property from the acts of ‘savage 
retaliation or cruelty’ or to protect them against what they called the ‘outrages’ (mostly thefts of 
stock or other acts of plunder) of the native population, La Trobe was precipitated into a situation 
outside his control.”572 Yet La Trobe’s policies in Port Phillip, like Arthur’s in Van Diemen’s 
Land, were a fundamental part of the multifarious forms of violence experienced by Australian 
indigenous peoples as the British colonists dispossessed them of their homelands. Like Arthur’s 
program for “conciliation,” which he formulated to preempt a future “Black War” on the 
Australian mainland, La Trobe implemented a programmatic indigenous policy in which 
indigenous people’s only possible legitimate future lay in “civilization” and Christianization. 
Moreover, in contrast to Arthur who only implemented a removal policy after a violent conflict, 
La Trobe attempted – from his first months in Port Phillip – to remove and restrict Kulin people 
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from parts of their homeland. He viewed such a policy as necessary both for the creation of a 
“well ordered” colonial society and for the wellbeing of the indigenous people themselves. But 
such spatial restrictions cut at the heart of Kulin people’s ability to maintain some of their vital 
political, legal, and social institutions. 
Indeed, when considered as an integral component of colonial governance, Arthur and La 
Trobe’s humanitarian beliefs can be seen as a fundamental element of a coercive (albeit chaotic) 
system that worked to abrogate indigenous peoples’ personhood, their cultural institutions, and 
their abilities to determine their own futures. I will tell this story through the activities and 
writings of Arthur, in Van Diemen’s Land and London in the 1830s, and then those of La Trobe, 
from his arrival in Port Phillip in 1839. Connected through official British policies and an array 
of people – most notably those involved in the Port Phillip Aboriginal Protectorate – I will show 
how the “language of humanitarianism” spoken by Arthur and La Trobe cloaked what were, 
ultimately, profoundly dehumanizing and subordinating policies. 
 
The Language of Humanitarianism 
 
During his final years in Van Diemen’s Land, George Arthur remained well informed 
about the speculative claims of Van Diemen’s Land colonists to the lands across the Bass Strait. 
In 1835 a group of colonists formed the “Port Phillip Association” and, after purporting to enter 
into a land purchase agreement with the area’s indigenous landowners, claimed title to an 
extensive tract of territory. During the next year, Arthur wrote several letters to Richard Bourke 
(the governor of New South Wales) passing on accounts of “the rage for Port Phillip” among 
Van Demonian colonists.573 Though Arthur had close personal and professional connections to 
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the members of the Port Phillip Association, he nevertheless referred with skepticism to their 
proclaimed benevolent intentions towards “the natives”; he characterized their treaty as the 
“golden bait” thrown out in order to receive government sanction of their acquisitive claim to 
“many Millions of Acres of the finest Land.”574 Others seeking “equal claims to consideration 
upon Government for their enterprise” in Port Phillip, Arthur noted, claimed that “their object 
has also been the civilisation of the Native!!” He similarly dismissed these pretentions: “This, of 
course, is all stuff, and it is better for all parties to be sincere, and plainly state that the 
occupation of a good run for sheep has been the primary consideration – if not the only one.”575 
As Arthur seems well aware, the colonists understood the humanitarian discourse circulating 
between and amongst the British colonies and metropole, and they knew that their land claims 
would, in the prevalent political climate, have more chance of succeeding if they emphasized 
their concern for indigenous people.576 Arthur condemned the pecuniary motivations as too 
apparent, dismissing the colonists’ claims to benevolence as disingenuous. Yet while he judged 
these pastoralists as insincere in their stated humanitarian intentions, he never judged himself as 
wanting in this regard. He did not recognize the inescapable connection between his sincerely 
held humanitarian beliefs and indigenous dispossession. 
 In making a treaty with the Kulin nation, the Port Phillip Association were perhaps 
influenced by Arthur’s opinions on indigenous-colonist relations, formed in the aftermath of the 
Black Wars.577 In these retrospective moral reconciliations, Arthur particularly identified the 
initial failure of the British colonists to treat with the Van Demonian indigenous peoples as a 
major reason for the ensuing bloodshed. In 1832 he wrote to the colonial office in London to 
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offer advise how new colonies on the Australian mainland could weather what he characterized 
as the unavoidable exposure “to all the evils which have befallen Van Diemen’s Land from the 
opposition of the Aborigines.” He recommended that “the utmost care should be taken” to 
provide “the Aborigines” with presents “for whatever land is taken possession of by the British 
settlers.” Having come at least nominally to recognize indigenous land ownership and 
indigenous people’s understanding of diplomatic negotiations, he argued that because “each tribe 
claims some portion of territory, which they consider peculiarly their own, they should be in 
some formal manner satisfied for bartering it away; a negotiation which they perfectly 
comprehend.”578 In trying to come to terms with the tragic disaster over which he presided in 
Van Diemen’s Land, Arthur proclaimed an important lesson: that the indigenous people felt a 
strong sense of claim over their land and could “perfectly comprehend” a land-transfer 
negotiation. 
 Arthur advised that the foundations for ongoing peaceful relations could be laid with little 
expense by negotiations involving the British exchanging “mere trifles” for indigenous land. He 
believed that warfare could have been avoided in Van Diemen’s Land, if the colonists had 
initially– “in some formal manner” – made such offering to the island’s indigenous people. Only 
“the most trifling” presents would therefore be needed to “satisfy” the Australian “Aborigines” 
and thus facilitate the peaceful British possession of territories on the mainland.579 As more 
colonists sought land on the Australian continental mainland, Arthur continued to press the 
colonial office to avoid repeating the mistakes made in Van Diemen’s Land. It had been a “great 
oversight,” he stated, not to make an initial treaty with “the natives, and such compensation 
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given to the chiefs as they would have deemed a fair equivalent for what they surrendered; a 
mere trifle would have satisfied them, and that feeling of injustice which I am persuaded they 
have entertained, would have had no existence.”580 For Arthur, this exchange of goods – merely 
nominal from the point of view of the British – would be the initial act of appeasement on which 
to found a broader program of “conciliation.”  
After this initial act of appeasement, Arthur’s plans for how to “conciliate” indigenous 
people remained much the same as those he advanced during his first years in Van Diemen’s 
Land. He believed that the British government had a duty to use the law to protect indigenous 
people from “bushrangers, and convict shepherds” so the British could fulfill their broader 
humanitarian obligation to “civilize” and convert them to Christianity.581 He recalled the war in 
Van Diemen’s Land to highlight the consequences of not following the initial steps of his 
program: “had [the Natives] received some compensation for the territory they surrendered, no 
matter how trifling, and had adequate laws been, for the very first, introduced and enforced, for 
their protection, His Majesty’s Government would have acquired a valuable possession, without 
the injurious consequences which have followed our occupation, and which must ever remain a 
stain upon the Colonisation of Van Diemen’s Land.”582 This formulation on how to avoid 
bloodshed would lay the groundwork for the ultimate goal of civilizing and Christianizing the 
indigenous people. As he informed Thomas Fowell Buxton in 1834, he was “anxious to apply” 
the experience he had gained in Van Diemen’s Land “to the civilization of the aborigines in the 
country on the opposite coast of New Holland.”583 The initial “trifles” and the protection of the 
law would prevent a repeat of the bloodshed in Van Diemen’s Land and facilitate a more 
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successful realization of Britain’s duty also to save “the Aborigines” by imparting to them the 
blessings of civilization and Christianity. 
 While Arthur generally framed his recommendations for staving off the (supposedly) 
otherwise inevitable violence between colonists and indigenous people in terms of protecting 
“the Aborigines,” he also still clung to the idea that hidden dangers would continue to lurk in the 
“savage” character, even when indigenous people appeared conciliated. Writing to Bourke in 
1832, he deployed the trope of the “treacherous Savage,” similar to that which he drew on when 
Eumarrah left the black line operation. Informing Bourke of the island’s relative state of 
“Tranquility” and his imminent expectation of achieving “lasting reconciliation” with the 
indigenous people, Arthur nevertheless insisted that “of course, it is quite impossible to place any 
dependence upon consistency in the conduct of Savages!”584 Though his government seemed 
finally to have appeased the remaining Van Diemen’s Land indigenous people, and were sharing 
with them the blessings of “civilization” and Christianity, one could never fully be sure whether 
the “savage” character had been fully conciliated, or that the recipients of such benevolent 
British attentions would not turn of their benefactors. Four years later, fearing the potential 
breakdown of peaceful relations between the Port Phillip Association squatters and the 
indigenous people in the Port Phillip district, he anticipated “the ordinary course of proceedings 
with Savages.” “Sooner or later,” he told Bourke, “there is too much reason to apprehend the 
opposite interests of these Parties will lead to misunderstanding – so long as the Company will 
given them food & clothing, just so long will they allow them peaceful.” But when the “Savages 
. . . are not satisfied with what is given they will take and petty thefts will be first remonstrated 
against – then will follow resistance then retaliation – and lastly, blood-shed!”585 While in his 
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explicit blueprint for conciliation Arthur did not stress these observations about “the conduct of 
Savages,” they nevertheless informed his presumptions about the obstacles the British faced in 
achieving true conciliation.  
 Although he suspected that something lurked in the “savage” character that 
predetermined their relapse into “savage” conduct, Arthur at the same time remained committed 
to the ideal that “the Aborigines” were not inherently inferior. But his plan for “conciliation,” 
framed in the language of humanitarianism, nevertheless represented a prescribed system of 
coercive control. No doubt he genuinely believed that through learning so-called “civilized” 
ways, and converting to Christianity, “the natives” could escape what he saw as their “poor” and 
“wretched” state. As he wrote to Fowell Buxton, notwithstanding circulating representations of 
“the aboriginal inhabitants of Van Diemen’s Land . . . as necessarily occupying the lowest place 
in the human family,” Arthur believed that they shared a common humanity with the British: 
“the more we inquire,” he stated, “the less difficulty have we in reconciling the present condition 
of these poor creatures with the fact, that all the nations who dwell upon the face of the whole 
earth are sprung from the same source, and are capable of the same attainments.”586 Yet despite 
this invocation of a universal humanity, such appeals represented a specific definition on the way 
people should and must live to be truly considered human. Moreover, these beliefs both 
presumed and justified the righteousness of unilateral and dictatorial British power over 
indigenous peoples. His terms for “conciliation” did not involve recognition of indigenous 
people as political actors beyond the initial exchange of “trifles” for land title. In Arthur’s 
schema, indigenous people had only two choices: either to accept the “trifles” and then adopt 
“civilization” and Christianity, or refuse them. He believed that they would accept the trifles as a 
matter of course, and, if they received true kindness at the hands of the British, they would also 
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accept the other terms this conciliation program. If they did not accept these imposed terms, they 
must have regressed to their “savage” ways. 
 But the indigenous peoples who initially adopted conciliatory policies towards 
trespassing foreigners had, of course, their own understandings of how relations between 
themselves and the intruders should and must proceed. For the Kulin people who entered into the 
“Batman treaty” with the Port Phillip Association in 1835, the decision to meet and offer terms 
to the foreigners appears to have been made over a period of a week, in which they kept watch 
over Batman’s party.587 When the two groups met, Batman enacted an agreement in the form of 
the English feudal ritual of feoffment, while the Kulin enacted their ritual of tanderrum. As 
historian Bain Attwood writes, “[a]ccording to Batman, he had purchased the permanent right to 
the land; according to the Kulin ngurungaeta, they had granted the Association’s agent an 
impermanent right to use the land.”588 The Kulin expected that the foreigners would maintain 
friendly relations by continuing to give them presents in order to main the right to live on Kulin 
land.589 Such reciprocity played no part in Arthur’s benevolence. He imagined the indigenous 
peoples’ futures along lines in which “the aboriginal natives” would be subject to British 
authority and prevailing British ideas about how people should and must live. 
 While Arthur saw the Port Phillip Association’s motives as inescapably mercenary, 
doubting that the colonists’ appeals reflected sincere intentions about “the civilisation of the 
Native,” he never problematized the link between his own humanitarian pronouncements and his 
career ambitions. For his own livelihood, Arthur traded as a man of good character who could 
administer a colony competently and efficiently. Moreover, by proclaiming his benevolent views 
towards the “native” people within British imperial reach, Arthur also portrayed himself as 
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conforming to influential humanitarian ideals of justice and humanity. Though his program for 
conciliating “the Aborigines” on mainland Australia was seemingly based on sincere good 
intentions, by writing treatises on the subject to his superiors, he nevertheless also put himself 
forward as an exemplar of the colonial service.590 Arthur’s career with the British colonial office 
highlights the pattern: while humanitarian ideals could be easily proclaimed, in the messy 
realities of colonial governance they existed within a web of other considerations and priorities. 
And yet, for the devoutly religious Arthur, a colonial governor’s conscience always had to 
answer for how he responded to the worldly matters over which he presided, even if – as he 
believed with respect to the Black Wars – events had been outside his control. 
Maintaining the colonial population’s confidence in his authority constituted one of 
Arthur’s most pressing ongoing concerns in Van Diemen’s Land. Ostensibly at least, his 
delegated Crown authority gave him almost autocratic local power; but to establish the rule of 
law, and govern effectively, he needed the colonial population’s general assent.591 During his 
time in Van Diemen’s Land, however, Arthur found his authority challenged not only by 
indigenous people, but also by many who self-identified as subjects of the British Crown. 
Though his perceived success in ending the indigenous-settler conflict – especially his tireless 
efforts in the field during the “black line” operation – temporarily bolstered his popularity, loud 
voices of dissatisfaction and personality conflicts peppered his reign.592 In the early 1830s, local 
discontent grew around the “constitution” set out for Van Diemen’s Land in the New South 
Wales Act of 1828. On May 23, 1831, colonists met in Hobart and petitioned the King for trial 
                                                
590 Ibid., 30. 
591 C. A. Bayly, Imperial Meridian: the British Empire and the World, 1780-1830  (London ; New York: Longman, 
1989). 
592 See Shaw, Sir George Arthur: 135-76. 
 259 
by jury and a representative assembly.593 But criticism over the allocation of land – so recently 
wrestled from the island’s indigenous peoples – caused the greatest challenge to Arthur’s rule. 
Arthur bore the brunt of colonists’ discontent over the British government’s new land 
regulations, which replaced Crown grants with sales at a minimum price of 5 shillings per 
acre.594 As he wrote to Goderich in September 1832, this new policy “excited a good deal of 
unpleasant feeling.”595 In the confusion of the system’s implementation, Arthur received an 
onslaught of public criticism, including accusations of impropriety. Arthur’s style of colonial 
governance was not generally conducive to avoiding criticism or appeasing those who felt that he 
did not properly support their interests.  
Arthur’s humanitarianism existed alongside such often-competing interests and priorities, 
all of which he had to deal with in the unremitting day-to-day business of administering a 
colony. Even before he arrived in Van Diemen’s Land, Arthur had honed his personal approach 
to colonial administration. As historian Alan Shaw notes, when Arthur left his previous post in 
Honduras, “[a]lready manifest were many characteristics that were to appear constantly 
throughout his career – an almost incredible industry, strong imperial sentiments, a passion for 
‘approbation’ of his work from his superiors, a desire for the financial reward which he was 
convinced he needed for the sake of his family, a strong dislike of opposition, particularly if it 
seemed tinged with any radical political ideas . . . and an undoubted humanitarianism based on a 
deeply felt devotion to his Calvinist brand of Christianity.”596 This combination of characteristics 
meant that for Arthur, colonial governance was a heavy load to bear. In Van Diemen’s Land he 
spent long hours fulfilling his gubernatorial duties against loud opposition – including “radical” 
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voices – that threatened to stain his reputation and diminish his future employment prospects and 
thus his ability to provide for his large family. Moreover his religiously inspired humanitarian 
beliefs heightened the stakes of every issue with which he dealt. Not only did his livelihood, and 
thus his ability to provide for his family, rest on pleasing his superiors in the colonial service, he 
believed that he would not receive future providential rewards unless he fulfilled his 
humanitarian duties. His humanitarianism thus worked to amplify his inextricably linked 
metaphysical and worldly stakes as he navigated the political mires of colonial governance.  
Such anxieties contributed to the pressure-cooker environment in which Arthur undertook 
his job. A particular pressure point for Arthur concerned others’ perceptions of his character. For 
instance, in May 1835, just when he thought he had successfully weathered the storm of public 
criticism worked up by his detractors in Van Diemen’s Land, he received his notice from the 
colonial office recalling him from his post. 597 Though the new secretary of state, Lord Glenelg, 
assured Arthur that his “measures had been projected with wisdom, executed with firmness and 
vindicated in your despatches with unusual ability,” Arthur believed that the recall was a “slur on 
his reputation” and “an injury to the feelings of the respectable,” particularly given that one of 
his fiercest detractors, William Bryan, had vowed to effect his removal from office.598 With his 
reputation thus apparently sullied, his future in the colonial service became uncertain. On the 
voyage back to England, he wrote to his nephew, John Montagu (the colonial secretary of Van 
Diemen’s Land) that with his family’s future plans so uncertain, he “cast Himself unreservedly 
upon the providence of God.” With nothing else to moor himself to, he held steadfast to his faith 
that if he completely “resigned” himself to God, he would receive the rewards that he could not 
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yet himself foresee.599 At the same time, he also necessarily faced the possibility that the 
besmirching of his character might be a sign that God had judge him wanting, and that his 
family’s future was therefore in serious jeopardy.  
These struggles to reconcile his anxieties about the future, along with the demands of 
colonial governance, seem to have taken a toll on Arthur’s physical and mental health. In 
particular, his sense of self worth – based largely on his perceptions of how others viewed his 
character – eventually broke under the strain of his detractors’ attacks. After landing in Plymouth 
in March 1837– as when he returned from Honduras thirteen years earlier – Arthur became 
severely ill, the result, he stated at the time, “of anxiety of mind.”600 Later that year, he reflected 
that, “when I landed it pleased God, for the wisest purpose no doubt, to bring sickness upon me 
to a very severe degree, so that I very nearly lost my life and my Memory was shaken to a most 
distressing degree and for several months it was most painful to me to be called upon to speak 
upon any past events.”601 The past events that particularly weighed on his mind related to his 
alleged misconduct during his time in Honduras; allegations that had been resurrected in the 
House of Commons while he was still in Van Diemen’s Land. Little wonder that once recovered, 
Arthur made concerted efforts to vindicate his conduct in Belize and thus remove any public 
stain upon his character.602  
Through such vindication he aimed to achieve not only personal and public satisfaction, 
but also to ensure he would receive another colonial posting. The allegations that he had cruelly 
                                                
599 Arthur to John Montagu, 27 Jan 1837, Mitchell Library (ML), Arthur Papers, A2165, vol. 5. 
600 Arthur to Gardiner, 19 March 1837, ML, Arthur Papers, A2165, vol. 5. Shaw, Sir George Arthur: 177. 
601 Arthur to Gregory, 9 November 1837, ML, Arthur Papers, A2165, vol. 5.  
602 Arthur wrote many letters in his attempts to vindicate himself from the revived allegations of a Lieutenant 
Colonel Bradley, who alleged that Arthur had cruelly punished a soldier named Ingram during his Superintendency 
in Belize. For example, Arthur to Gregory, 9 November 1837, ML, Arthur Papers, A2165, Vol. 5; Arthur to Major 
General Lord Fitzroy, 29 September 1836, Durham University Library Special Collections (DUL SC), 3rd Earl Grey 
Papers GRE/B76/3/4-7; Arthur to Major Noel, 28 March 1837, DUL SC, Earl Grey Papers, GRE/B76/3/8-12; 
Arthur to Major General Lord Fitzroy Somerset, 22 April 1837, DUL SC, Earl Grey Papers, GRE/B76/3/13-16; 
Arthur to Viscount Howick, 25 April 1837, DUL SC, Earl Grey Papers, GRE/B76/3/18.  
 262 
treated a soldier by supervising 200 lashings while directing the beat of a drum to the time of his 
watch, would potentially dry-up all his sources of patronage. Moreover, the particular need for 
Arthur to successfully present himself, in 1837 London, as both a conscientious and morally 
upright colonial officer with humanitarian sensibilities was made all the more pressing by the 
Whig ascendency in Parliament and the colonial office, and the hearings of Thomas Fowell 
Buxton’s House of Commons Aborigines Select Committee.603 Seemingly though, his superiors 
never lost confidence in him, and Arthur was himself ultimately satisfied with Viscount 
Howick’s vindication of his “Military conduct & character” before Parliament in June 1837.604 
Lord Melbourne (the prime minister) considered sending Arthur to the Cape to ameliorate the 
settler-indigenous conflict overseen by Benjamin D’Urban; the bloodshed that had originally 
precipitated Fowell Buxton’s Select Committee.605 Though they instead decided to give that post 
to Sir George Napier, Arthur probably regained self-confidence, and a sense of the confidence of 
his superiors – Glenelg and James Stephens – when they offered him the lieutenant governorship 
of Upper Canada.606 
 Despite his worries, Arthur’s reputation within the colonial office seems to have 
remained high. His views on how to “conciliate” indigenous people on the mainland of Australia 
gained particular traction. For instance, James Stephens recommended that Arthur’s views on 
“conciliatory measures” to avoid another Van Diemen’s Land-type conflict “be sent to each of 
the Australian colonies as far as it relates to the general principles on which we should act 
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towards the Aborigines.”607 While the British government refused to recognize the unauthorized 
treaty between the Port Phillip Association and the Kulin nation, the colonial office endorsed the 
idea – put forward both by the Aborigines Select Committee and Arthur – that an Aboriginal 
protectorate be established in New South Wales.608 In stressing to treasury the need to fund such 
an undertaking, Stephens used Arthur’s encapsulation of the relevant issues: “It is the acts of 
aggression committed on the natives by the stock keepers and inferior agents of the colonists . . . 
that misunderstandings and conflicts with the natives are attributable. It, therefore, becomes a 
paramount duty to spare no precaution which may avert such disastrous consequences.” Stephens 
explained that, “[a]dopting to a great degree the plan suggested by Sir George Arthur, Lord 
Glenelg would propose the appointment of a Protector of Aborigines whose principal post should 
be at Port Phillip, and who would be invested with the power of a magistrate. His Lordship 
would also contemplate the appointment of two Assistant Protectors to be stationed in the 
territory to the eastward and north of Port Phillip.”609 In another vindication, Arthur had 
considerable influence over the people appointed to these positions. 
 His recommendation, for example, of George Augustus Robinson as chief protector, was 
decisive in Robinson’s appointment.610 Arthur had previously offered to send Robinson and his 
“Friendly Mission Aborigines” to assist with indigenous-colonist relations in the new colonies of 
Western Australia and South Australia.611 Arthur championed Robinson as a man possessing 
talents particularly suited to the task of indigenous-colonist conciliation.  In England in June 
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1837, having received the reports in the Sydney papers of a clash between indigenous people and 
an exploring party “in the vicinity of Port Phillip,” Arthur felt “induced” to write to Sir George 
Grey to remind him of Robinson’s talents. “He has,” wrote Arthur, “apparently, a natural instinct 
. . . for drawing savages towards him and conciliating them; and I feel convinced if Lord Glenelg 
would approve of giving him a liberal allowance, and sending him armed with the Magisterial 
authority which he now bears . . . to the country which Major Mitchell has lately explored, that 
the most satisfactory consequences would result.”612 In Arthur’s view, so-called “savages” in 
Port Phillip would have the same characteristics as those in Van Diemen’s Land. And, given that 
the danger of clashes between the indigenous people and lower-class stockmen and bushrangers 
would also apparently be the same, Arthur believed that Robinson could apply the same talents 
to preventing conflict that he had seemingly used to end it in Van Diemen’s Land. 
 The colonial office also sought Arthur’s help in recommending four assistant protectors 
to work under Robinson in Port Phillip. In response to Glenelg’s request whether he knew of 
“any persons . . . well qualified to fill those appointments,” Arthur requested “ten day or a 
fortnight more to prosecute” his inquiries.613 During this time he diligently sought out eleven 
possible candidates, and interviewed each man. He provided each candidate with an enumerated 
list of the duties of the position, which included attaching himself “as closely and constantly as 
possible to the aboriginal tribes,” “endeavouring to conciliate their respect and confidence,” 
watching over their “rights and interests,” attempting to induce them “to locate themselves in a 
particular place,” and tending to their “religious improvement.” In making his final 
recommendations of four “highly eligible” candidates, Arthur seemingly used criteria similar to 
that used by missionary societies in selecting overseas missionaries. He selected four “married 
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men” whose wives might “prove highly useful” in assisting their husband with their duties, 
particularly education and religious instruction. Indeed three of the candidates Arthur 
recommended – William Thomas, Edward Parker, and James Dredge – were Wesleyans and 
schoolmasters. The other, Charles Sievwrieight, was a military officer who had decided “he 
should take an interest in the civilization of the Aborigines and in their religious instruction.”614 
Glenelg accepted these recommendations, and these four men and their families subsequently 
sailed to Port Phillip in 1838.615 
 Ultimately, neither the Port Phillip Association nor the Kulin people’s vision for 
indigenous-colonist relations in the Kulin Nation prevailed. Instead, it was the humanitarian 
agenda in the form of a protectorate that came to the fore. The British were to compensate the 
Kulin people for taking over their land by “civilizing” them and converting them to Christianity; 
thus saving their souls from eternal damnation while at the same time protecting their bodies 
from the cruelty of “lower-class” colonists. To speak the language of humanitarianism, as Arthur 
did, was to envisage this program as both righteous and necessary; it was a therefore a program 
to which indigenous people should and must submit. Such thinking acknowledged indigenous 
peoples’ humanity only to the extent that indigenous people strived to meet the colonizer’s 
cultural criteria for what it meant to be fully human. In this schema, the only ostensible choice 
open to indigenous people was to accept this foreign vision for their future. Arthur, along with 
other British people who adhered to this humanitarian program, seemingly held these principles 
sincerely and earnestly. But for Arthur, such beliefs were also an inextricably part of what he 
traded for his material livelihood and his family’s position in society, both of which depended on 
his ability to project himself as a man of good character. 
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 The Woiwurrung and Bunerong land that the Van Demonian colonists chose for the town 
of Melbourne was already an important center for the Kulin people; at the end of every summer, 
their confederacy would hold social events and important legal and political proceedings there.616 
In April 1839, George Augustus Robinson had been in Melbourne a little over a month when he 
intervened – according to his private journal – in proceedings between two different groups 
within the Kulin nation.617 A party of Wathaurongs had come to town “with the intention of 
redressing [the] wrongs done . . . by some of the Waverongs [Woiwurrungs],” who had 
unlawfully killed one of their people. Despite Robinson’s disapproval of the ensuing punitive 
ceremony, his journal entry nevertheless reveals details about the solemn form of the ritual. He 
described, for instance, how the Wathaurongs “marched to the camping ground in military way 
in a compact body and seated themselves on the western extremity on the bare ground.” 
Apparently feeling it his duty, as chief protector, “to prevent the poor creatures from doing 
mischief,” Robinson tried to stop the ensuing “fight” by going “among the combatants [and] 
calling upon them to desist and threatening them with gaol.” When this failed and he attempted 
to intervene in the ceremonial combat, “the natives” demanded that Robinson “get out of the way 
and let them fight.” When he said he would not, “Big Jaggy Jaggy” (Billibellary), the leader of 
the Woiwurrungs’ Wurundjeri-willam clan, cursed Robinson, telling him to “buggah” his 
eyes.618 Billibellary no doubt very much meant that Robinson should remove himself 
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immediately from the ceremonial grounds. Robinson’s utter dismissal of both Billibellary’s 
instructions and the legitimacy of the Kulin juridical proceedings foreshadowed the patterns of 
coercion Billibellary and his people would face during La Trobe’s superintendency.  
 La Trobe, who arrived in the Port Phillip district in September 1839, thought the Kulin 
people’s presence in Melbourne a source of unacceptable “disorder.” As part of his vision for he 
future of the district, and his oversight of the Aboriginal Protectorate’s civilizing mission, he 
repeatedly ordered Robinson and the assistant protectors to “remove” and exclude all 
“Aboriginal Natives” from Melbourne. Believing the same policy needed to be followed in all 
towns in the district, La Trobe thought that the mixing of indigenous people and colonists 
produced effects inimical both to the establishment of a “well ordered” colonial society, and to 
the “civilization” and Christianization of the indigenous people. Unlike George Arthur, La Trobe 
did not think highly of George Robinson. Though he held similar “benevolent” views to Arthur 
on indigenous policy, he had not presided over a war of near-extermination in which Robinson’s 
“friendly missions” delivered the only skerrick of redemption. The Protectorate’s failure to 
remove the Kulin people from Melbourne became a major issue of contention in the turbulent 
relationship between La Trobe and Robinson. Yet in blaming the protectors for this failure, La 
Trobe revealed, more fully, the dimensions of his views on indigenous people. He never 
managed to grasp Kulin personhood beyond viewing them as the objects for the British 
authorities to protect (from lower-class colonists), “civilize” and convert to Christianity. Though 
La Trobe saw himself as above the general fray of the district’s settler-colonial society, his 
dictates nevertheless formed as integral a part of Kulin dispossession as the pastorialists’ 
appropriation of large tracts of Kulin homelands. In attempting to expel and prohibit Kulin 
people from their important ceremonial grounds, La Trobe denied their legitimacy as a people, 
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with their own political and legal institutions, and their own understandings of that forms that 
relations between themselves and the colonists needed to take. In La Trobe’s eyes, Kulin people 
could only have true personhood if they adhered to his “benevolent” dictates, stayed away from 
Melbourne, and became “civilized” Christians.  
 
By 1839, the colonists had seriously reneged on the obligations that the Kulin people had 
expected since 1835. Billibellary, who had taken part in the 1835 “Batman’s treaty” negotiations, 
was initially optimistic that La Trobe’s arrival would reinvigorate a spirit of reciprocity. 
According to Robinson’s account of a conversation he had with the Wurundjeri leader at the 
beginning of October 1839, Billibellary related that the “white fellow” had told him that “the 
new governor” would give his people “plenty.” Arriving on the mutually comprehensible title of 
“picanniny governor” to describe La Trobe, Billibellary understood the Superintendent’s 
respective rank among the colonists, and appears to have held out some hope that because of his 
official standing, La Trobe would compel the colonists to meet the obligations they had agreed to 
four years previously as consideration for their admission to, and use of, Kulin territory. La 
Trobe, however, would not meet such hopes. 
La Trobe in fact showed no inclination to recognize any of the terms that the Kulin 
people set for relations between themselves and the colonists. In the months following his arrival 
in Melbourne, La Trobe seemingly developed few perceptive understandings of either Kulin 
politics or the diplomatic dimensions of local indigenous-colonist relations. Early on he perhaps 
projected onto Kulin people the ideas he developed in North America about doomed “native” 
people, making an apparently telling slip in a diary entry, recording a recent controversy 
involving one of the assistant protectors by stating, “Mr. Sievwright’s charge against Mr. 
 269 
Walker’s men for violently ejecting certain Indian blacks, seemingly extremely ex-parte and ill-
founded.”619 By the end of the following year however, he privately described the Kulin people 
in terms more derogatory than any he ever used to portray American Indians. “The natives for 
their part,” he wrote in December 1840, “look like a race of beings that was never intended to be 
swaddled at all – you are almost surprised at discovering that he or she is not marsupial like the 
majority of the other wild animals upon the same uncouth continent.”620 Unsurprisingly, such 
private views manifested in a public failure to recognize indigenous people’s views in his 
government’s plans for their future. 
  In terms of diplomacy, La Trobe did not take any cues from the U.S.-Indian negotiations 
he had witness in North America. Despite at least Billibellary’s expectations, La Trobe did not 
grasp the need to play the part of the generous and respectful senior British official in his 
dealings with the Kulin people. His failure to assume this role perhaps contributed to the 
palpable discontent among indigenous people staying in Melbourne following his arrival. Having 
told La Trobe that “the Aborigines . . . were anxiously looking to the presence of His Honor,” 
Robinson organized to mark La Trobe’s arrival with a feast for the indigenous people in 
Melbourne.621  In the meantime, however, the people in “the native camp” had begun to grow 
noticeably impatient with the colonists, with Robinson describing them as “very much excited,” 
and saying that “white man Port Phillip plenty sulky.”622 Though the feast went ahead on the 15 
October, La Trobe came without his wife and, being pressed with other business, did not stay for 
the evening corroboree.623  
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Performed at the end of these mixed indigenous-colonist gatherings, these corroborees 
communicated the indigenous peoples’ gratitude for the feast provided by the colonists and their 
commitment to ongoing reciprocal relations. Whether or not the indigenous people felt offended 
by La Trobe’s early departure, they no doubt noted his breach of protocol. When Governor 
Bourke had visited Melbourne in March 1837, he gave blankets and other gifts to the Kulin 
people, who in exchange had given the British official kangaroo meat and a corroboree.624 Most 
likely, the congregated indigenous people expected the new, permanent “picanniny governor” to 
step into this role. But in leaving early, La Trobe seems not to have grasped to need play the part.  
 Kulin dissatisfaction evidently abounded because of the colonists’ invasion of their 
homeland. As pastoralists expanded further into Kulin territories, incidents of indigenous-
colonist conflict escalated, particularly those relating to (what the colonists labeled) sheep 
“theft,” but what indigenous people most likely generally viewed as the rightful appropriation of 
resources owed to them.625 Travelling to the northwest of Melbourne with assistant protector 
Edward Parker in January 1840, George Robinson had to defuse a situation in which a group of 
indigenous people wanted him “to try a shepherd and send him to jail for not letting them have 
jumbuck or sheep.”626 With other means of subsistence damaged or increasingly unreachable, 
these people expected Robinson to enforce their right to receive much needed payment for the 
use of their land and resources. Similarly, in September 1840, Benbow (a Bunurong leader) and 
Betbengai (a Woiwurrung leader) related to assistant protector William Thomas the sense of 
injustice they felt about the current situation. Thomas’s diary record of their words reads, “Now 
many white people come, & turn Black fellows away. Why white man Pilmularly [steal] ground, 
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& no let good White fellows give poor Black fellows bread.”627 Benbow and Betbengai’s 
complaints suggest increasing frustration with the colonists’ failure to discharge the material 
obligations entailed by their use of indigenous land and resources, as well as their anger at the 
practice of “white men” – presumably men such as La Trobe – who attempted to stop the “good 
White fellows” giving indigenous people the bread they both needed and were, in fact, owed. 
Moreover, these grievances evinced particular dissatisfaction not only with the colonists’ failure 
to pay for their use of indigenous land, but also highlight these leaders’ perception that the 
colonists had in fact stolen the land for their exclusive use; presumably implying that the 
colonists turned “Black fellows away” not only when they sought payment in resources, but 
when they attempted to enter the stolen ground. According to historian Marie Fels’s 
interpretation of this conversation, the indigenous leaders felt particularly wronged by the local 
government’s attempts to exclude them from Melbourne.628 
Even if La Trobe dimly recognized indigenous people’s attempts to enforce their own 
moral understandings on indigenous-colonist relations, he had no room for these in his vision for 
the district’s future. He found much of the local indigenous and settler-colonial cultures inimical 
to his goal of establishing a well-ordered, “civilized” society. Despite his initial corroboree 
blunder, La Trobe and his wife attended a corroboree in November 1839 and, according to 
Robinson, were “much pleased with the entertainment.”629 Nevertheless, neither “the 
entertainment,” nor the majority of the large crowd of colonists in attendance, met La Trobe’s 
benchmarks for “civilized” society.  
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In the same letter in which he likened Kulin people to marsupials, he informed the 
publisher John Murray that he felt little cultural solidarity with many of the settler-colonists, 
whom he characterized as unpalatably avaricious: “Some people certainly emigrate to these 
outlandish countries with all their wits about them; a great many leave theres [sic] at home & 
perhaps are just as well off here without them, for any use that they can make of the finer 
portion, in that scramble . . . for fortune which is going on here.”630 As he wrote in The Rambler 
in North America, La Trobe believed that truly “civilized” society needed refined manners and 
high culture.631 Thanking Murray for the reading materials he had sent to his family, he 
described his situation in Port Phillip as an “exile” from the truly civilized culture of Europe. 
“You, my dear Sir,” he thus wrote, “have I believe never been transported 16000 miles from 
civilization & cannot imagine what it is to be cast so far from the reach of the thousand daily 
means of improvement & enjoyment which they possess who breath the Air of Europe.”632 La 
Trobe’s plans to oversee the development of a well-ordered, truly “civilized” society, excluded 
all the aspects of indigenous and settler-colonial culture that he found unpalatable. 
Although La Trobe might have enjoyed the entertainment offered by the Woiwurrung and 
Daungwurrung people’s corroboree for one evening in November 1839, he foresaw no future for 
either indigenous people or their rituals in the township of Melbourne. He viewed the Kulin 
people as a source of “disorder” and “disgrace,” and thus wanted them excluded from town. At 
the end of October 1839, La Trobe began complaining to Robinson of the “discharge of firearms, 
day and night, in the black encampment,” – the toleration of which he described as “against all 
prudent and well ordered principles” – and asking the chief protector to use all his “authority to 
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keep the blacks as much as possible from the neighbourhood of the [immigrant colonists’] 
tents.”633 With the approval of Gipps in Sydney, La Trobe attempted to institute a policy to 
compel “the natives to remove from the immediate neighbourhood of Melbourne,” and to stay 
away.634 When in December 1839, a large number of Kulin people, including those from 
Melbourne, Western Port, the Goulburn and Geelong area, camped in Melbourne to transact 
important confederacy business, La Trobe wrote to Robinson that “[t]he continued location of 
such a numerous body of natives in the immediate vicinity of the town cannot be endured much 
longer.”635 In September the following year, he ordered that “no Aboriginal blacks of the District 
are to visit the township of Melbourne under any pretext whatever.”636 Though such edicts 
generally proved impossible to implement over the ensuing years, La Trobe continued to view 
indigenous people’s presence as “the source of great disorder.”637  
La Trobe considered indigenous and colonist social interactions as an especially 
objectionable ingredient in this “disorder,” which – according to the reports he received – 
sometimes culminated in disgraceful “scenes of debauchery.”638 He felt particularly affronted by 
colonists who attended corroborees on the Christian Sabbath. In April 1840, for instance, he 
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wrote to assistant protector William Thomas requesting that he “seek to give the Blacks on the 
left side of the Yarra Yarra [River] an intimation of my desire that there should be no more 
corrobbories on Sunday evenings.” In order temporarily to prevent “the disorders and scandal” 
caused by “large bodies of the townspeople on that evening at the Camp,” La Trobe ordered that 
the river punt “cease to ply at 6 o’clock in the evenings on Sundays.” His main imperative, 
however, was for Thomas to use his “influence with these poor people” to “effect their removal 
from the neighbourhood of the township.”639 To reduce the “disorder and scandal” that 
apparently arose from indigenous-colonist social mingling, La Trobe asked the “protector” to 
removal and exclude indigenous people from Melbourne. 
 La Trobe framed colonist-indigenous interactions in Melbourne not only as a threat to the 
formation of “civilized” society in the town, but also as a danger to indigenous people 
themselves. He envisioned colonist-indigenous segregation as a necessary precondition for 
instituting what he saw as the British colonists’ moral duty to save indigenous people through 
imparting “civilization” and Christianity. In July 1840, for instance, he requested that assistant 
protector Charles Sievwright follow this policy in the town of Corio (40 miles southwest of 
Melbourne). In response to Sievwright’s view that preventing “the natives from frequenting the 
town” precluded them from receiving the benefits of charity and hiring out their labor, La Trobe 
argued that the “little of the temporary benefit” this offered was “perfectly outweighed by the 
evils resulting from the intercourse.” Extrapolating on this negative balance of outcomes, he 
stated that “[t]he native obtains little food and a little clothing either through pity or as a servant, 
and he carries away with him vice, disease, and the means of both injury to himself and his 
neighbours.” Interactions in the towns apparently produced “evils” and were therefore 
antithetical to the colonists’ moral duty to protect and save the indigenous people. “I am 
                                                
639 La Trobe to Thomas, 7 April 1840, PROV, VPRS 16, Unit 1, File 40/152. 
 275 
convinced,” he thus concluded, “that it is our duty to keep them [the indigenous people] away 
from the towns.”640 La Trobe therefore justified his policy of creating segregated, colonist-only 
spaces by prescribing it as part of the government’s moral obligations towards the district’s 
indigenous people. 
 But in the same way that La Trobe defined these moral obligations without any apparent 
recourse to Kulin people’s own moral understandings of indigenous-colonist relations, he also 
failed to comprehend the political imperatives that informed the Kulin people’s movements in 
and out of Melbourne. Confined predominantly to conceptualizing indigenous people as 
degraded, and their entire culture as illegitimate, La Trobe generally blamed Robinson and the 
assistant protectors for the failure of his policy to remove and exclude indigenous people from 
Melbourne. To some extent, the protectors – particularly Robinson and Williams – more 
accurately grasped the political landscape on which they sought to impose their civilizing 
mission.  
La Trobe had arrived in Melbourne in October 1839 in the midst of a dispute between the 
Woiwurrung and Wathaurong (in which the Woiwurrung enlisted the help of some Bunurong 
clans), which at least partly explained the large influx and extended stay of so many people in 
Melbourne in the subsequent months.641 As Williams would reflect to Robinson, the 
Woiwurrung and Bunurong people “anticipated a fight with the Barrabools [Wathaurong]. 
Messengers were sent to and fro, [and] they became an annoyance to the settlement.”642 The 
various members of the confederacy came and stayed in Melbourne to continue the juridical 
proceedings that many colonists’ had witnessed earlier in the year, and which, in April, Robinson 
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had interfered with and received Billbellary’s verbal lashes.643 Robinson recognized, and 
informed La Trobe in December, that the large group of “Goulburn blacks” (Daungwurrungs) 
had come to Melbourne because of their alliance with the Wathaurongs, who “according to their 
ancient customs,” were “to go through the forms of a fight.”644  Although Robinson, like La 
Trobe, viewed such “fights” as savage and illegitimate, he nevertheless realized their importance 
as dispute resolution events, and knew they in some way explained the increased presence and 
activity of Kulin people in Melbourne.645 La Trobe, in contrast, seems merely to have viewed the 
situation in terms of the protectors’ failure to discharge his official directive to persuade the 
Kulin people to leave town and stay away.646 
Robinson’s inability to effectively oversee his assistant protectors and achieve the 
permanent removal of indigenous people from Melbourne became a major issue of friction in his 
stormy relationship with La Trobe. La Trobe had arrived in Melbourne with low expectations of 
Robinson’s capacities, having spent time in July and August 1839 with Governor George Gipps 
in Sydney. By this time Gipps had realized that Robinson – who in Van Diemen’s Land had been 
accustomed to following Arthur’s specific orders – had no specific plans for setting up the Port 
Phillip Protectorate, and he had grown weary of the chief protector’s inefficient administration 
and lengthy reports.647 Over the ensuing months and years, La Trobe and Robinson built a 
dysfunctional working relationship upon awkward meetings and terse correspondence. Robinson 
never fulfilled the role of chief protector as La Trobe envisioned it. In a characteristically tense 
meeting in December 1839, La Trobe reportedly stated that “the natives must be got from 
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Melbourne,” and regaled Robinson for having “no influence” among the indigenous people and 
for being unable to “get them to mind” him and leave town. He expected Robinson to exert over 
the indigenous people the authority ostensibly invested in his by his government appointment; he 
expected him to be their “master.”648 For La Trobe, the fact that Robinson did not seem able to 
control the indigenous people’s movements, nor coordinate his assistant protectors to do the 
same, highlighted the chief protector’s unsuitability for his role. In the eyes of La Trobe, 
Robinson failed to impose the proper order of relations between the protectors and their 
indigenous charges, in which the indigenous people were to be made to heed the protectors’ 
dictates. 
 These disagreements took place within more general differences of opinion about the 
running of the protectorate, which began almost immediately after La Trobe’s arrival in 
Melbourne. According to Robinson’s account of their first official meeting, La Trobe 
immediately reprimanded him “[w]ith a variety of severe remarks the like I had not received 
from the Govt of [Van Diemen’s Land] during my long connection with them.” The dispute 
centered on Robinson’s attempts to claim the site of the first (by then defunct) Christian mission 
for indigenous people in Melbourne. La Trobe disapproved of Robinson’s apparently unseemly 
acquisitive interest in the property, and reprimanded him by saying that he “must have only one 
subject in view – the blacks and the blacks alone or [he] should never succeed,” to which 
Robinson replied that if he “was actuated by any other object [he] should not have come here or 
accepted the appointment.”649  
Subsequently, Robinson continually complained to La Trobe about a variety of 
employment-related fiscal inconveniences, such as having to pay for travel expenses and an 
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office clerk out of his own salary. La Trobe generally replied that if Robinson found the terms of 
employment unsatisfactory, he should have refused the position, to which Robinson responded 
that he would have refused it, had he known the conditions.650 Recording these conversations in 
his journal, Robinson described La Trobe as “haughty,” and his letters as, for instance, “damning 
and dictatorial.”651 La Trobe privately summarized a discussion with Robinson about the 
protectorate as “all very unsatisfactory.”652 Like Gipps, La Trobe also very quickly tired of 
Robinson’s wordy reports. La Trobe thus qualified one of his early letters to Gipps – in what 
became a steady and amicable personal correspondence – by stating that he did “not wish to 
inflict a correspondence à la Robinson upon” him. In the three weeks since his arrival in Port 
Phillip, Robinson had, La Trobe complained, already also “opened a terrible file fire upon” 
him.653  
Class differences no doubt played a significant role in this personality conflict, as well as 
in how La Trobe appraised Robinson’s (un)suitability for the role of chief protector. Each man 
seemingly based their dislike for the other on their own class-based sensibilities. For instance, La 
Trobe partly judged Robinson – a tradesman by background – as unfit for the role of chief 
protector because he believed him motivated as much by his wish to provide materially for his 
family as out of concern for indigenous people.  Robinson seemingly viewed La Trobe as a 
dictatorial snob, who was out of touch with the challenges he faced in trying to run the 
protectorate. When Robinson heard of his reputation among Gipps and La Trobe for his long-
winded letters, he wrote in his journal that “Sir George Gipps may thank himself for all the 
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trouble given, for it is a trouble to me as well as himself . . . However though intended as a 
complaint I take it as a compliment. It is not every person that can write.”654 Robinson, originally 
a bricklayer, felt unfairly treated by his ruling-class superiors, yet nevertheless proud of himself 
for having achieved the requisite level of literacy for a government role. La Trobe did not judge 
Robinson’s talents as substantial enough to overcome his lowly birth status. 
La Trobe also perceived Robinson as dishonest, shifty, and inefficient – an opinion 
subsequently shared by Robinson’s biographer Vivienne Rae-Ellis – and held him personally 
accountable for the failure to remove and exclude Kulin people from Melbourne.655 Implicit in 
this was the presumption that Kulin people’s reasons for being in Melbourne could not, 
conceivably, be relevant. For La Trobe, indigenous people’s actions could only be legitimate if 
they followed his dictates. In the day-to-day administration of the protectorate, rife with power 
struggles and personality conflicts, indigenous people’s subjectivities counted for nothing. And 
yet, beneath all these personality conflicts there lay a fundamental solidarity between the La 
Trobe and Robinson. As highlighted by Robinson’s intervention into the Kulin juridical 
proceedings in April 1839, Robinson no more believed in the legitimacy of Kulin politico-legal 
rituals than did La Trobe. 
 Moreover, with a belief that the only legitimate legal rituals originated from European 
traditions, such as those of the English common law, it was seemingly too much of a conceptual 
leap for La Trobe to understand the importance of Melbourne’s environs for indigenous juridical 
proceedings. When, in December 1839, he was unable to abide the presence of so many Kulin 
people in Melbourne, La Trobe reportedly told Robinson that “the natives must be got from 
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Melbourne,” and that “force must be made use of.”656 Although Robinson refused to use force, 
government agents nevertheless apparently threated violence in order to persuade people to leave 
Melbourne. Robinson informed La Trobe that the “Goulburn blacks” were so displeased at being 
thus forced to leave town “that they would kill sheep,” to which the Superintendent reportedly 
replied, “if they do they must take the consequences.”657 La Trobe could not, it seems, grasp the 
reasons for Kulin displeasure or the moral logic behind their threats to retaliate for the wrong of 
being forced away from their important ceremonial grounds. His solution to dealing with the 
repercussions of pressuring Kulin people to leave Melbourne would be to subject indigenous 
people to the “consequences” of the British legal system.658 Indeed, his aspirations for dealing 
with the increasing number of conflicts between indigenous people and colonists on “the 
frontiers” mirrored those Arthur had attempted during his initial years in Van Diemen’s Land: to 
mobilize the British legal system and thus resolve the conflict through the impartial application 
of English-style “justice.” Little did he seem to realize that his own exclusionary edicts 
potentially helped fuel indigenous-colonist conflicts on Kulin lands outside Melbourne, now 
increasingly overrun with sheep and claimed by colonists for their exclusive use.659 
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No Sheep, No Land, No Justice 
 
Writing to the Governor’s office in Sydney in 1846, La Trobe described all the cases that 
had come before the Supreme Court in Melbourne where attempts had “been made to bring 
Aboriginal Natives to justice for alleged acts of violence.”660 Among these cases, he listed that of 
“Bob and Jack,” whose skin color and background marked them for inclusion in this list, though 
they, like the colonists of European origins, were foreign to the district. “Bob and Jack” – 
(Robert Timmy Jemmy Smallboy) Maulboyheener and (Jack Napoleon Peevay) 
Tunnerminnerwait, two survivors of the Black Wars and members of Robinson’s “friendly 
mission” – came to Port Phillip from Flinders Island with the Robinson family in 1839. Along 
with three Van Diemen’s Land women, they took to the bush around Westernport in September 
1841 and, after killing two whalers, became the first two people executed by the British in the 
Port Phillip district.661 In his notes on the case, La Trobe wrote that “[n]o reason could be 
adduced why they left Mr. Robinson’s service and much less for their suddenly betaking 
themselves to the Bush.”662 Yet even at the time of their execution, many stories circulated 
around Melbourne regarding Maulboyheener and Tunnerminnerwait’s grievances. Indeed, their 
story can be understood as one of the tragic aftershocks of the war in Van Diemen’s Land. For 
La Trobe however, their story exemplified his efforts to effect what he had described to 
Robinson as “even handed justice”: “If a black was guilty he would be punished as well as a 
white.”663 As Arthur had done early in his tenure in Van Diemen’s Land, La Trobe clung to the 
idea that the common law could provide equitable arbitration for the escalating conflict between 
                                                
660 La Trobe to Deas Thomason, 4 July 1846, enclosed in Fitz Roy to Gladstone, 25 October 1846, CO 201/369 
(AJCP reel PRO 374) 
661 For an fuller account of these events and these people’s biographies, see Leonie Stevens, "The Phenomenal 
Coolness of Tunnerminnerwait," Victorian Historical Journal 8, no. 1 (2010). 
662 La Trobe to Deas Thomason, 4 July 1846, enclosed in Fitz Roy to Gladston, 25 October 1846, CO 201/369 
(AJCP reel PRO 374) 
663 George Robinson, Journal, 10 October 1839: Clark, George Robinson Port Phillip Journals, 91. 
 282 
colonists and indigenous people. He attempted to mobilize the British law to punish both colonist 
and indigenous violence, believing that this “justice” would, along with efforts to “civilize” and 
Christianize, provide protection to indigenous people. 
Robinson had originally wanted to take all the indigenous people from Flinders Island 
with him to Port Phillip. Through Arthur’s influence, the colonial office in London heeded his 
advice that “no ill consequences would arise from their removal . . . but on the contrary they [the 
Van Diemen’s Land indigenous people] would be highly useful in conciliating the Aborigines of 
Port Phillip.”664 However, opposition in Sydney ultimately prevented this plan. Franklin 
subsequently authorized him to take one “family.”665 He chose the people he was closest to, most 
of whom had accompanied him on his “friendly missions.” Leaving Flinders Island in February 
1839 amidst an influenza outbreak, only six members of the group were well enough to 
accompany him, among who were Trucanini and Tunnerminnerwait. The remaining group of ten 
people, which included Maulboyheene, accompanied Robinson’s wife the following month.666 
They became known among the Port Phillip colonists as “the Van Diemen’s Land blacks.” 
 Issues surrounding “the Van Diemen’s Land blacks” very quickly became a source of 
tension between Robinson and La Trobe. Robinson believed, for instance, that the government 
would provide for their material support, while La Trobe had been under the impression that this 
would be provided by the Van Diemen’s Land government.667  By the time of La Trobe’s arrival, 
Robinson appears to have wanted to sever his connection with them. In November 1839 he 
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reportedly requested to La Trobe that he “be relieved” of the “VDL blacks.”668 Although fiscal 
considerations no doubt contributed to this desire, Robinson seems also to have lost the respect 
of the people on whom his conciliation efforts in Van Diemen’s Land had relied. Truganini – his 
former lover and the women who had once saved his life – continually left his household with 
her friends Charlotte, Matilda or Rebecca to live in Kulin camps, or with white shepherds. 
Robinson continually sent out search parties to find her, but on being brought back, she would 
merely “abscond” again.669  
His relationship with Maulboyheener (Bob) and Tunnerminnerwait (Jack) also became 
highly fraught. This appears to have begun back at the exiles’ settlement of Wybalenna on 
Flinders Island. With disease rife, most people chose to leave the settlement and spend their final 
days in the bush. In October 1837, with an impending visit from Governor Franklin, 
Maulboyheener and Tunnerminnerwait returned to Wybalenna and asked Robinson for supplies 
to take back to the rest their party, who were too sick to return to the settlement. Robinson 
apparently reprimanded the men for staying away from the settlement at such an important time, 
and refused their request.670 Little wonder that when two months later Maulboyheener and 
Tunnerminnerwait (amongst others, including Truganini) accompanied Robinson on an 
exploration of Flinders Islands, for the first time ever they did not share with him any of their 
game or help him erect his shelter.671 In Port Phillip, seemingly without any other means of 
support, the men attempted to earn their own living as laborers. In his diary in November 1839, 
La Trobe mentioned learning “from two of the so called V.D. Blacks – women that their 
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husbands had gone to S Australia as bullock-drivers.”672 Tunnerminnerwait seemingly had a 
short reaffirmation of more cordial relations, travelling together through the district from March 
to August 1841.673 
 The previous year, however, Robinson had campaigned to relinquish his responsibility to 
the “Van Diemen’s Land blacks.” When in August 1840 La Trobe demanded a full report on 
“the VDL blacks,” Robinson told him that “they were of no use to me and I wished to get rid of 
them,” and requested that they be sent back to Flinders Island.674 Robinson seems well aware 
that these people held considerable feelings of hostility regarding their treatment and situation. 
Although he could not belabor the point without uncovering his false claims about their 
“civilized” docility, Robinson mentioned to La Trobe “the fear” that “those natives” might 
render “hostile the Aborigines” of Port Phillip. La Trobe dismissed this possibility, relying on 
their good reputations, informing Robinson that he did “not see why such of their number as you 
had permission to introduce should be sent back merely because a false impression, easily 
removed, may have existed as to their character and influence.”675 Yet in December 1840, when 
La Trobe asked Robinson deliver the people to him, and he would find them employment, 
Robinson sidestepped the request, lest he have to admit that the “VDL blacks” were not the 
docile “civilized” subordinates that he had represented them to be, and that he did not actually 
know many of their whereabouts.676 
 In September 1841, five of the “Van Diemen’s Land blacks” headed to the bush around 
Westernport (approximately 90 miles southeast of Melbourne). Over a period of six weeks, the 
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group of five – Truganini, Maytepueminner (Matilda), Maulboyheener, Tunnerminnerwait, and 
Planobeena (Tunnerminnerwait’s wife, otherwise known as “Fanny”) – moved through the 
Westernport and Dandenong districts, committing nine robberies, wounding four white men, and 
killing two.677 Once word reached Melbourne of these activities, they created a sensation in the 
press, which reported on the “horrid outrages” and “unmentionable atrocities” committed by the 
“the black marauders whose numerous depredation have rendered them the terror of the 
settlers.”678 A large party led by Frederick Powlett, Commissioner for Crown Lands in 
Westernport, and including the assistant protector William Thomas, searched at length for the 
group, finally apprehending them on 20 November.679 La Trobe had ordered Robinson to join the 
search party, though he ultimately did not make it beyond Narre Narre Warren before turning 
back to Melbourne, without having offered any assistance.680   
The five captured people subsequently faced trial back in Melbourne for the murder of 
the two whalers, a William Cook and his companion, known only as “Yankee.” On the evidence 
presented in court, it appeared that the group had been involved in a dispute with a coal miner, 
William Watson, operating near Cape Paterson, and that they had mistaken the whalers for 
miners.681 Persuaded by the women’s denial of involvement, and Robinson’s evidence that “the 
women . . . are in entire subject to the men – in absolute thraldom,” the jury acquitted Truganini, 
                                                
677 Ian MacFarlane, 1842: The Public Executions at Melbourne  (Melbourne: State of Victoria, 1984). 6-8; Rae-Ellis, 
Black Robinson: 34; Stevens, "Phenomenal Coolness of Tunnerminnerwait," 1-2,8-11. 
678 Port Phillip Patriot, 28 October 1841; Port Phillip Herald, 29 October 1841; Port Phillip Patriot, 25 November 
1841. See also, for example, Port Phillip Gazette, 30 October 1841, 10 November 1841; Port Phillip Herald, 9 
November 1841, 26 November 1841. 
679 Powlett to La Trobe, 1 November 1841, PROV, VPRS 19, Box 21, File 41/1687; William Thomas to La Trobe, 3 
November 1841, PROV, VPRS 11, Box 8, Item 411; Thomas to Robinson, 11 November 1841, PROV, VPRS 11, 
Box 8, Item 412; Powlett to La Trobe, 16 November 1841, PROV, VPRS 19, Box 22, File 41/1835; Deposition of 
Powlett, 27 November 1841, PROV, VPRS 24, Box, Whaler’s Case; Powlett to La Trobe, 4 December 1841, 
PROV, VPRS 19, Box 22, File 41/1835: MacFarlane, 1842 Public Executions: 79-81. See also Susanne Davies, 
"Aborigines, Murder and the Criminal Law in Early Port Phillip, 1841-1851," Historical Studies 22, no. 88 (1987): 
315; MacFarlane, 1842 Public Executions: 9. 
680 La Trobe to Robinson, 31 October 1841, PROV, VPRS 16, Unit 2, File 41/1198; Rae-Ellis, Black Robinson: 214. 
681 Evidence of William Johnson, Supreme Court Report, Port Phillip, 20 December 1841. Enclosed in Gipps to 
Stanley, 11 March 1842, CO 201/318 (AJCP reel PRO 339). 
 286 
Maytepueminner, and Planobeena. They found Maulboyheener and Tunnerminnerwate guilty, 
but accompanied their verdict with a recommendation for mercy, “on account of their general 
good character, and the peculiar circumstances under which they were placed.”682 The Executive 
Council in Sydney, however, rejected the recommendation for mercy, declaring “That the 
Sentence of the Law be allowed to take its course.”683  
 The residues of the sensation that these events created in the district provide rare 
glimpses into the motivations and experiences of these exiles. In the lead-up to their executions, 
Maulboyheener and Tunnerminnerwate became even greater objects of fascination to the 
colonists. Although the Port Phillip Gazette, for instance, unsympathetically described 
Tunnerminnerwate using the trope of “the irreclaimable character of the Australian savage,” their 
report, along with those in the two other Melbourne newspapers, also offered substantive insights 
into the two men’s most burning grievances. Ongoing anguish and anger about the deaths of their 
loved ones in Van Diemen’s Land provided significant fuel for their acts. During the killing of 
Cook and Yankee, Maulboyheener reportedly refused to inflict the deadly blows until 
Tunnerminnerwate and Truganini urged him “to remember the massacre of their relatives at Port 
Arthur by the Van Diemen’s Land whites.”684 The Gazette also noted that though the men had 
followed Robinson to Port Phillip, they had not done so “without dissatisfaction; they had or 
believed they had in conjunction with the rest of the natives at Flinder’s Island, some interest in a 
flock of sheep which had been bred for the sole use of the establishment, and expressed their 
disappointment in not having been allowed to take their share either in sheep or value.”685 
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Historian Vivienne Rae-Ellis suggests that Robinson in fact appropriated many of these sheep for 
himself. In March 1839 he wrote to his son George Robinson junior to send over the sheep 
belong to “the Aborigines” as they would soon be joining him; eighteen months later he listed 
638 sheep, valued at £713 pounds among his personal assets.686 Though Judge Willis wrote to La 
Trobe at the conclusion of the case that Tunnerminnerwate and Maulboyheener possessed sheep 
on Flinders Island, perhaps their grievances related not only to being denied the ability to bring 
their property to Port Phillip, but to its appropriation by Robinson.687 Without this means of 
income, and facing discrimination when they tried to gain proper compensation for their labors, 
“Bob and Jack” experienced, to a sever degree, the multifarious and multi-layered dislocations of 
removal both from their homelands and from their ability to determine their own futures. 
 Though La Trobe referred to his family’s distance from Europe as an “exile,” 
Maulboyheener and Tunnerminnerwate’s executions reveal the characteristics of a true exile; one 
that had involved forced removal from their homelands. At their public hangings in Melbourne 
on 20 January 1842, Maulboyheener died a broken man, while his long-time friend 
Tunnerminnerwate died with hopes for the afterlife. Tunnerminnerwate reportedly remained 
relatively composed throughout the execution ritual, having expressed during his incarceration 
the belief that upon his death he would return to Van Diemen’s Land, where he would join his 
father and hunt kangaroo.688 But Maulboyheener endured his violent death in the midst of a 
complete breakdown. Already unable to come to terms with his situation in the days leading up 
to his execution, when he emerged from the covered horse-drawn van that had transported him 
and Tunnerminnerwate to the site of their execution, he recoiled in further shock and anguish as 
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he suddenly found himself the object of the gaze of over 3,000 colonists who had come to 
witness his death. They also witnessed his breakdown: he reportedly “trembled violently,” and 
let out “the most heartrending groans” while “sweat burst from his face.” Physically unable to 
climb the ladder onto the gallows platform, he fell several times during his attempts.689 The 
scaffold itself had been hastily and shoddily constructed so that when the hangman activated the 
drop, it only descended only half way, and Maulboyheener and Tunnerminnerwate “jambed, and 
twisted and writhed convulsively.”690 When a bystander knocked away the obstruction, 
Tunnerminnerwate died instantly, while Maulboyheener, whose noose had been partially 
displaced, died in agony minutes later.691 
 Maulboyheener and Tunnerminnerwate were not the last indigenous people sentenced to 
a violent death in Port Phillip. While La Trobe organized to send the remaining “Van Diemen’s 
Land blacks,” including Truganini, Maytepueminner, and Planobeena, back to Flinders Island 
during July and August 1842, tensions between Kulin people and colonists continued to 
escalate.692 In September 1842, the government hanged a man known as Roger (and alternatively 
as Figara or Alkeperte) for the murder of colonist Patrick Codd at Mount Rouse in the Western 
districts.693 Though the death had occurred in May 1840, La Trobe revived the investigation in 
1842 when he read a letter from Clement Codd identifying Roger as the perpetrator.694 He 
privately expressed his reservations about the case to Gipps, stating that he had information that 
“Mr. Codd’s conduct towards the natives had been criminal in the highest degree; and the quiet 
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murder of many of that race was avenged by his death.”695 Nevertheless La Trobe remained 
committed to bringing violent instances between colonists and indigenous people within the 
purview of the legal system.  
The revival of the investigation into Codd’s death coincided with La Trobe’s efforts to 
bring to justice the perpetrators of more recent fatalities in the Mount Rouse area, those of three 
indigenous women and a child. After receiving reports of the killings, La Trobe offered a £50 
reward, or a condition pardon in the case of a convict, for anyone who informed on the 
perpetrators. Gipps subsequently recommended that La Trobe increase the reward to £100 and a 
free pardon for convicts. But faced with a wall of colonist silence over the matter, and judging 
that “neither the Protectors, nor the Police Magistrates” were acting as he though “they ought to 
do,” he sent a special commission, consisting of three men, “to sift the affair as thoroughly as 
possible.”696 The trial for what became known as the “Muston’s creek massacre” or the “Osbrey 
and Smith station murders” was held in Melbourne the following year. 
 La Trobe believed that the British law could, and would, dispense equal justice in 
arbitrating the violence between colonists and indigenous people. In pursuing the perpetrators of 
the Osbrey and Smith station murders, he attempted to redress the balance of prosecutions, which 
had thus far predominantly targeted indigenous people. He seemingly saw himself as a neutral 
conduit of the legal process, and used the case to make it clear to the colonists that he would not 
automatically take their side. When a group of western districts colonists wrote to him in March 
1842 requesting greater government protection against indigenous people’s attacks and raids, La 
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Trobe wrote a scathing response. He stated that “[e]ven under circumstances far more favourable 
both to the settler who seeks protection, and the Government desiring to afford it – for instance, 
where a well-defined frontier or neutral ground could be interposed between the civilized and 
uncivilized – I need scarcely remind you, how little real security has been enjoyed.” Instead of 
offering the memorialists sympathy or further government protection, La Trobe admonished 
them; he had just received news of the Osbrey and Smith station murders, and noting that Osbrey 
and Smith were among the signatories, he reproached the letter writers for “the acts . . . 
perpetrate among” them, urging them “to come forward in the aid of the authorities,” and 
attempting to reach their consciences by proclaiming, “Will not the commission of such crimes 
call down the wrath of God, and do more to check the prosperity of your district, and ruin your 
prospects, than all the difficulties and losses under which you labour?”697 La Trobe’s attempts to 
bring those responsible for the murders to justice, however, ultimately proved fruitless. The jury 
acquitted the three men brought to trial, based on the “discredit” brought upon the Crown case by 
their principal witnesses.698 
 Despite his considerable disappointment at the outcome of the case, La Trobe remained 
committed to the law as an instrument that could dispense equal justice.  In a rare example of 
concurrence with Robinson, he agreed with the chief protector’s summation that “the destruction 
of the aboriginal natives has been accelerated from the known fact of their being incapacitated to 
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give evidence in our courts of law.”699 La Trobe believed that, if Aboriginal testimony were 
admitted, the law would more effectively arbitrate and ameliorate the colonist-indigenous 
violence. Reporting to Sydney in 1846, he noted the “difficulty of bringing Europeans to justice 
for crimes committed against the Aborigines,” stating that “until the British Legislature is 
pleased to pass a Law admitting Aboriginal evidence . . . in the majority of instances, the 
criminal may elude the consequences of crime.”700 Yet both La Trobe and Robert FitzRoy – 
George Gipps’ successor as Governor of New South Wales – seemed unaware, or had forgotten, 
that Gipps had successfully petitioned the government in London to pass an Act allowing 
Aboriginal evidence in court. The New South Wales Legislative Council had, however, refused 
to adopt the Act, and continued to refuse even in the face of pressure from Britain.701 In 
continuing to emphasize the need to admit Aboriginal evidence, La Trobe highlighted his belief 
that, if reformed, the British legal system could dispense universal justice. 
 He did not combine this commitment to the legal process with support for the Port Phillip 
Aboriginal Protectorate. La Trobe remained pessimistic about the protectorate’s capacity to 
ameliorate the indigenous-colonist conflict and to achieve (what he believed to be) the 
unquestionably righteous goals of “civilizing” and Christianizing indigenous people. He 
consistently blamed its apparent failures on Robinson and the assistant protectors. Indeed, the 
disharmony among Robinson and the assistant protectors – seemingly at least partly based on the 
fact that most of the assistant protectors considered themselves of higher-class status to Robinson 
– hampered the men’s relationships, and hence their ability to form a cohesive government 
                                                
699 Robinson to La Trobe, 30 December 1843, in House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1844 Papers on 
Aborigines (Australian Colonies): 280. 
700 La Trobe to Deas Thomson, 4 July 1846, enclosed in FitzRoy to Gladstone, 25 October 1846, CO 201/369 (AJCP 
reel PRO 374). 
701 Rae-Ellis, Black Robinson: 208-09. 
 292 
department.702 In 1843, La Trobe had become convinced of the protectorate’s complete failure. 
However, feeling hopeful after a visit to assistant protector Edward Parker’s Loddon station, he 
recommended the maintenance of a reduced department.703 By this time, in any case, both 
Sievwright and his replacement, William Le Souef had been fired, and James Dredge had 
resigned.704 Gipps and the Legislative Council in Sydney, influenced by La Trobe’s support of 
Parker’s apparent success, decided to continue the protectorate, though significantly reducing its 
funds from £8000 in 1843 to £2239 in 1844, and setting a subsequent annual limit of around 
£2000.705 La Trobe latched onto the success he thought he had witnessed at the Loddon station 
because he supported the protectorate’s general aims of reducing the rate of indigenous deaths 
through disease, poverty, and colonist violence, and of ending indigenous people’s “wandering 
habits,” and inducing them to settle and become “civilized” Christians. 
 Though he agreed with these aims, La Trobe remained critical of the both the methods 
and the people chosen to carry them out. Continuing with his penchant for missionary activity 
initiated by religious societies, La Trobe favored the idea of “Christian Ministers” acting in a 
purely missionary capacity over men employed as part of a government department. Indeed, his 
consistent pessimism about the prospects of the protectorate, for a time, contrasted strongly with 
his hopefulness about the Wesleyan’s mission in the district. In 1844, for instance, he wrote to 
Sydney requesting further funds for the Wesleyan mission at “Buntingdale” on the Barwon River 
(southwest of Melbourne), which he thought it just for the government to provide, especially 
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given the considerable expense still incurred by the protectorate, “the real utility of which,” he 
wrote, “may still be considered very questionable.” In making clear his preference for 
missionaries over the protectorate department, La Trobe wrote that “expertise has shown that 
almost, it may be said, in every instance in which it has pleased God to operate so great a change 
as that aimed at, among any considerable body of a savage people, it has clearly appeared to be 
consequent upon the steady teaching and judicious example of Christian Ministers resident 
among them.”706 Yet in 1846, after visiting the mission, La Trobe regretfully conclude – as he 
had done regarding Parker’s establishment on the Loddon – that the mission at Buntingdale was 
“a total failure.”707 
 When finally confronted with both the protectorate and the Wesleyan mission’s failure to 
“civilize” and Christianize “a single Aboriginal Native,” La Trobe began to question the 
presumptions behind the civilizing mission itself.708 In 1848, responding to an inquiry regarding 
whether to abolish the office of chief protector, La Trobe reiterated the unsuitability of Robinson 
and the assistant protectors to their assigned task, and the fact that they never “drew together” or 
developed “mutual confidence.” In recommending that Robinson’s position be abolished, La 
Trobe argued it had been a mistake to withdraw Robinson from the “peculiar circumstances” in 
Van Diemen’s Land, in which his apparent talents as a conciliator of “the Aborigines” had been 
developed, and to impose “upon him the task of bringing his past experiences to bear upon a 
field of a very different character.” The management of a government department, stated La 
Trobe, “was quite beyond his powers.” And yet, perhaps because he also had to face the failure 
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of the Wesleyan missionaries, La Trobe no longer saw the protectorate’s organizational structure, 
and the personalities involved in it, as the fundamental cause of its failure. In an apparently 
astute observation, which seemed to challenge the presumptions underpinning the entire British 
policy of protection, La Trobe stated: “It appears to me, however, one main error, if I may be 
allowed to use the term, in all schemes devised at a distance for the protection and reclamation of 
the Aborigines, is to be remarked – namely, that taking for granted, what a real acquaintance 
with the Colony, and the form assumed by its Aboriginal races, shews to be unfounded, and this 
is, that the Aboriginal Natives will submit, in a greater or less degree to your guidance.”709 La 
Trobe therefore recognized that there was more to the “failure” of the protectorate than 
incompetence and misguided government planning of a government department; problems with 
the scheme ran deeper and had something to do with the will of “the Aborigines” themselves. 
 Despite La Trobe’s admission that British protectionism had been based on faulty 
assumptions, he nevertheless remained committed to the ideals behind the policy; he continued 
to believe that the British had an imperative duty to civilize and Christianize indigenous people. 
La Trobe’s admission that the “Aboriginal Natives” had not, and were unlikely in the future, to 
submit “to a new system,” was not an acknowledgement that indigenous people had asserted 
their own moral and political system. Instead, he blamed the “natural appetites and propensities” 
of “the savage,” of which not even the “experience of the real kind intentions of the Government 
and better class of Europeans towards them” could “strip.” Perhaps revealing the true extent of 
his subjugating tendencies towards indigenous people, La Trobe argued that although “cajolery” 
and “example” had not worked, “actual coercive measures” had “never been tried,” and he was 
“sure that if anything would retard the decline of the Aboriginal race . . . and give promise of 
moral and physical improvement, and development, it would be the employment of such 
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coercion.” Recognizing, however, that such measures were “not consistent with the spirit of the 
age,” La Trobe recommended that a system of reserves be set up and controlled through his own 
office.710 Though, according to La Trobe, British protectionism had been conceived without true 
knowledge of so-called “savage” tendencies, he nevertheless remained committed to the policy’s 
aims. 
 After thirteen years presiding over what he judged as the “failure” of the Protectorate, as 
well as the failure of the Wesleyans at Buntingdale, La Trobe nevertheless did not abandon his 
belief in the imperative need to continue efforts to missionize the local peoples. Apparently there 
remained one further hope: his own brethren, the Moravians, whose raison d’être was to 
missionize the heathen, had not yet made any attempts to redeem the “natives” of his district. In 
1851, through his brother Peter (who was still secretary of the Moravian Mission Board) he 
encouraged the Moravians to establish a mission at Lake Boga, 200 miles north of Melbourne.711  
 La Trobe also seems to have endeavored, when possible in his day-to-day life, to 
implement this civilizing mission. In his daughter Agnes’ scrapbook is a sketch of a grave 
entitled “Tuggundun’s Tomb, Banks of the Yarra,” in which La Trobe commented on his 
relationship with the deceased. “This was a Youth,” he wrote, “I was very much attached to. I 
scarcely ever went from Narre Warren but he accompanied me, often of a moonlight night had 
he charmed me with singing the old Hundred to an Aborigl Hymn.” La Trobe attempted to 
impart to his young friend what he saw as the blessings of Christianity and so-called 
“civilization”: “I had hopes that he would have been some evidence of my endeavors – he could 
read & write, knew the 10 Commandments Lords Prayer & creed & apparently understood their 
import, after being for at least 3 Yrs partially civilized, he must leave for 6 months return’d in a 
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consumptive state & died by my tent between Mr. Kerrs & Lyon Campbells by Banks of the 
Yarra.”712 For La Trobe, the tragedy of Tuggundun’s premature passing lay not just with the 
death itself, but also with the destruction of the potential for the personal reward he had hoped to 
gain from his friend: evidence that his own “endeavors” to achieve Tuggundun’s “civilization” 




Charles La Trobe spoke a policy language remarkably similar to that of George Arthur. 
Despite the authoritarian style of his policies towards the Kulin people, La Trobe was – like 
Arthur – (what would come to be known as) a humanitarian: he had a commitment to extending 
a particular vision of human dignity to indigenous people. In attempting to exclude Kulin people 
from Melbourne, he sought not only to make the town a more “civilized” space, but also to 
transform into reality his genuine belief that the only way for indigenous people to escape what 
he saw as their degraded state was to remove them from the corrupting influence of lower-class 
whites and instruct them in how to live a settled, industrious, and Christian life. Utterly confined 
within the scope of his equation of what a dignified human life should and must look like, La 
Trobe seemingly remained completely blind to indigenous people’s actual humanity, and their 
attempts to impose their own moral understandings on relations with their invaders. La Trobe 
saw himself as aloof from the violent conflicts taking place outside Melbourne, in which 
indigenous people and colonists vied to impose their own – often violent – sense of justice, while 
the colonists invaded and sought to impose exclusive ownership over lands that the Kulin people 
had never actually alienated. Though clearly not the root cause of the conflict, La Trobe’s efforts 
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to remove and exclude the Kulin people from their important ceremonial grounds highlight that 
he was nevertheless complicit in the processes through which the British colonists, collectively, 
dispossessed the Kulin people of their land. A fundamental part of the dispossession lay in 
denying the legitimacy of Kulin institutions and self-defined personhood. In this denial, La 
Trobe was seemingly consistent and unstinting. 
Like the prescription that Arthur gave for the “conciliation” of “the Aborigines” on the 
Australian mainland, La Trobe attempted to impose English “justice” to ameliorate indigenous-
colonist violence, and thus to protect indigenous people from those colonists who did not share 
his views of extending “benevolence.” But with the death by hanging of “Bob and Jack,” the 
violence that had threatened to leave a “stain” upon Arthur’s administration in Van Diemen’s 
Land reverberated more directly through Port Phillip. Maulboyheener and Tunnerminnerwate 
died – as Musquito had done nearly twenty years earlier in Hobart – in exile and at the hands of 
the same foreign regime that had dispossessed them of their homelands. Under the banners of 
extending to indigenous people the “protection” of the common law, and programs to “civilize” 
and convert them to Christianity, humanitarians such as La Trobe and Arthur were as much part 
of the story of indigenous dispossession – be it their complete removal from their homelands in 
Van Diemen’s Land, or through attempts to removal and exclude them from important 
ceremonial grounds in Port Phillip – as the so-called “lower-class” people they blamed for the 
inhumane bloodshed on the “frontiers.”
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Chapter Six 




Although ostensibly a policy of the United States, Indian removal had broader regional 
and international reverberations. George Arthur’s stay in England in 1837 (before he left for 
Upper Canada) overlapped with the presence in London of two Ojibwe leaders: Peter Jones 
(Kahkewāquonāby) and his fellow Methodist cleric Shawundais (John Sunday), leader of the 
Bay of Quinte Ojibwes (Mississauguas). Both men travelled to London to petition the 
government for title deeds to their people’s lands, framing their claims in ways that located the 
British regime in Upper Canada in both its regional and imperial context. Following an interview 
with Glenelg, Jones (yet again) sent the colonial office a written enumeration of his people’s 
appeal. He conveyed the urgency of the matter by referring to his people’s fears that “the White 
Man” would take over their land and expatriate them, as citizens had done in the United States; 
“this Apprehension,” he stated “is constantly cherished by observing the Policy pursued by the 
United States Government towards the Indians in that Country, in forcing them to leave their 
Territories and the Bones of their Fathers.”713  
Shawundais wrote of similar fears, attributing them to his people seeing their “Red 
Brothers so often removed.” In his written petition to Glenelg in August 1837, Shawundais also 
showed his full awareness of the intra-imperial politics that had informed Thomas Fowell 
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Buxton’s initial push for the Aborigines Select Committee hearings, before which Shawundais 
himself gave evidence in March 1837.714 Asking Glenelg to grant title deeds to their land, he 
analogized his people’s situation with that of the Xhosa in the South African Cape: “The 
uncivilized Caffer was despoiled of his native Land by men of Your own Nation: it was told to 
you & you held the balance between the Dusky man and his white oppressor; You restored the 
Caffer to his own.”715 Viewed from the vantage point of these British imperial networks, U.S. 
Indian removal can be seen as part of a broader regional and trans-imperial story. 
 Jones’ and Shawundais’ appeals also resonated directly with British political imperatives. 
Both men framed their petitions around the prevailing British policy to both “civilize” and 
Christianize of “native” peoples. They claimed that until they received secure title deeds, their 
people would not be able to continue their path to “civilization.” Shawundais, for instance, asked 
specifically for a title deed to secure to his people the lands where they had settled, cleared, and 
“built Log Houses.” Using this language of industry and “improvement,” he thus requested “a 
Title deed to secure to us & our Children the quiet possession of that Land which has been 
cleared by their Father’s labor.” He argued that the climate of fear caused by anxieties regarding 
U.S. removal made granting these deeds even more imperative, as such apprehensions hindered 
his people’s commitment to “improvement”: “We have seen our Red Brothers so often removed, 
that, until we get A Title deed we shall not walk with Confidence along the Path of 
improvement.”716 Jones similarly claimed that that people’s fears of facing a similar fate to 
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American Indians in the United States acted “as a powerful Drawback upon the Industry and 
Improvement of our Indian Tribes in Upper Canada.”717 
George Arthur would be much more open to hearing these arguments than his 
predecessor Francis Bond Head. In particular, Arthur had much more sympathy with the 
missionary drive of the Wesleyans, who had come into strong conflict with Head over his Indian 
policy. On December 13, Richard Adler and Jabez Bunting – two of Jones’ London-based 
Wesleyan associates – called at Arthur’s lodgings in Kensington.718 Writing later that day to 
convey his disappointment that he “had not the pleasure of finding” Arthur at home, Bunting 
stated that though he had wanted briefly to discuss the merits of the prospective appointments “in 
the Office of Assistant Protector for South Australia,” his main object was to schedule a time 
when “the Rev. Peter Jones (alias Kakkequonaby) the converted Chippeway Chief, might have 
the honour of waiting upon” him.719 Though it is unclear whether Arthur found time to meet with 
Jones in London, the close association of these men highlights the harmony of many of their 
fundamental beliefs about the righteousness of missionary activities among both the First 
Nations and the empire’s “Aborigines” more broadly. 
Yet despite this congruence of belief, some of Arthur’s views also seemingly conflicted 
on a fundamental level with the Wesleyans’, particularly with those of Ojibwe leaders Jones and 
Shahwaundais. Arthur saw the British civilization policy as a way to impart to the First Nations 
people – in the same way as he had hoped to do for “the Aborigines” in Van Diemen’s Land – 
what he saw as the blessings of life as “civilized,” Christian British subjects. For Jones and 
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Shawundais, the choice to adopt Christianity and a so-called “civilized” settled agricultural 
lifestyle represented – among other factors – a means through which their people could secure 
their own future amidst the growing governmental and demographic pressures that threatened 
their ability to exist as self-determining political entities. Their own understanding of their 
relationship with the British crown differed from that which Arthur assumed. Arthur 
predominantly thought of the First Peoples as British subjects and as recipients of British 
governmental benevolence, both of which entailed an element of subjection to the will of the 
crown. In contrast, First Nations people generally saw themselves as in alliance with, rather than 
in subjection to, the British Crown. So while Arthur, Jones, and Shawundais all spoke the 
language of humanitarianism, their political imperatives for mobilizing this language were at 
cross-purposes. Arthur’s tenure in Upper Canada (from 1838 to 1841), coincided with a time of 
increasing tension between these two categories – subjection and alliance – which meant that the 
First Nations people had increasingly found themselves in a liminal political and social position.  
The ambivalence surrounding the First Nations’ exact political relationship with the 
crown came to the fore during their defense of the established government in the 1837 rebellion 
and subsequent “Patriot War” in 1838. In the crisis following the initial rebellion of 1837, with 
the ongoing threat posed to the British administration by Canadian rebels and Hunters’ Lodge 
members from the northern United States, the First Peoples overwhelmingly chose to continue 
supporting their “Great Mother.” While this support was pivotal to the strategy and execution of 
the government’s military defense of the province, as Rhonda Telford has noted “[m]ost 
secondary sources on the Upper Canadian rebellion consistently fail to give much weight to the 
role of the Native peoples.”720 Moreover, Telford challenges Colin Read and Jack Stagg who, 
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though acknowledging First Nations involvement, suggest “there never was any doubt that 
Native people would ‘defend a government which they felt had always looked after them,’ or 
that they would unthinkingly stand ‘by their traditional alliance with the crown.’”721 First 
Nations people had various reasons for deciding to support the crown during the unrest, none of 
which assumed either contentment with their relations with the government or blind obedience or 
subjection to a benevolence sovereign. The complexity of this story also gets obscured in broader 
accounts of British Indian policy in the Canadas. J.R. Miller, for instance, writes that “[o]nce a 
lasting peace was established in North America [after the War of 1812], it was merely a matter of 
time until Britain recognized that its erstwhile Indian allies were now an expensive encumbrance 
and an obstacle to agricultural expansion. Not only were they irrelevant militarily but they were a 
social responsibility.”722 First Nations involvement in the defense of the government in 1837 and 
1838 disrupts the idea that they had become militarily irrelevant. The dynamics of Native 
participation in the loyalist forces also highlights the ambiguous and complicated situation in 
which the First Peoples found themselves in relation to the British crown; suddenly they were 
called forth as military allies amidst government efforts to end the expense of the alliance by 
discontinuing presents and attempting to make First Nations people into self-sufficient farmers. 
 In the late 1830s, American Indians living on the U.S. side of the Great Lakes border 
region had to consider both British and U.S. Indian policies when making decisions about their 
immediate survival and future security. From the U.S. government they received pressure – 
forceful in some cases – to remove west of the Mississippi. From the British they received a 
rescission of their previous alliance by a policy to discontinue presents to “visiting Indians” from 
the United States. When Arthur reported to London in 1840 on the influx of Native immigrants 
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from the U.S. to Upper Canada, he initially emphasized the British government’s policy to end 
giving presents to “visiting Indians” as the major impetus for the emigrations. By moving to 
British-claimed territory, American Indians would continue to be eligible for presents.723 Writing 
later in 1840, however, Arthur seemed more aware of the role that the U.S. removal policy had in 
prompting these waves of immigration.724 Correspondence crossed his desk suggesting the 
negative effects these migrations were having on British-U.S. relations at the border. A terse 
letter from the U.S. commanding officer at Fort Gratiot (Port Huron) to the British Indian 
superintendent at Port Sarnia, for instance, requested that the British turn back Pottawatomies 
who attempted to cross into Upper Canada.  According to this U.S. officer, “the Pottowatomie 
Tribe [were] under Treaty obligations with the United States to take up their residence in our far 
Western Country.”725 
Yet as treaties on both sides of the U.S.-British delineated border attest, with respect to 
issues of political sovereignty Native people viewed the border – in the words of Phil Bellfy – 
“as an issue between the Americans and the British.” Many prominent Anishinaabeg leaders 
signed treaties with both nations.726 During the 1830s and 1840s, however, this U.S.-British 
defined border became a very real, practical consideration for many Anishinaabeg people in the 
Great Lakes region. The pressures faced by Anishinaabeg on the U.S. side of the border, in 
particular the Pottawatomies, induced several thousand to take up residence on the British side. 
Had Lewis Cass remained in the United States, he would most likely have had much to 
say about how these movements represented the malevolent influence of the British over “the 
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Indians,” and the threat they posed to the security of the United States. A pamphlet he wrote in 
Paris in 1842 suggests his feelings towards the British had not grown any fonder.727 Although 
posted to Paris in 1836 as minister to France, the effects of the policy Cass had implemented 
during his time as Secretary of War continued to be felt during the late 1830s and early 1840s. In 
his report for 1834, for instance, he wrote that the Pottawatomies “in the vicinity of Chicago, 
have conditionally acceded to the alteration proposed in the boundaries of the tract assigned for 
them west of the Mississippi by the treaty concluded in 1833.” They would thus, he wrote, “be 
removed to a district whose climate is suitable to their habits, and whose other advantages cannot 
fail to offer them strong inducements for moral and physical improvements.”728 After Cass’s 
departure, U.S. agents continued to pressure the Pottawatomies to remove west of the 
Mississippi. Yet despite some horrendous occurrences of forced removals from the Great Lakes 
region – such as that of Menominee’s Pottawatomie village – most groups north of Ohio, Indiana 
and Illinois managed to avoid direct coercive force.729 Unlike the peoples of the lower Midwest 
and southeast, the many Indian peoples further north and west of Potawatomi country – which 
lay on and around the Detroit-Chicago road project – long denied the United States effective 
control over their lands.730 The efforts of conscientious U.S. agents were also thwarted by the 
fact that the peoples of the Great Lakes could also cross into Upper Canada to escape pressure to 
remove west. 
 While Cass lived in France, his former protégé and colleague Henry Schoolcraft ran the 
Michigan Superintendency. Committed to the removal of American Indian peoples from 
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Michigan, after the Treaty of Washington in 1836, Schoolcraft sought, for instance, to persuade 
the Ottawas in Michigan to remove to Kansas. Facing Ottawa resistance, Schoolcraft realized 
that if such removal appeared imminent, most Ottawas would leave U.S.-claimed territory and 
move to Manitoulin Island in Upper Canada.731 Schoolcraft therefore threatened that if they 
moved permanently to the British side, they would forfeit their share of treaty annuities and 
goods.732 With such threats coinciding with the British policy to discontinue delivering presents 
to “visiting Indians,” American Indians faced pressures from both sides of the border. When 
George Arthur questioned British Indian Department agents what “visiting Indians” thought of 
the new British policy, Thomas Anderson – now superintendent of the settlements on Manitoulin 
Island – replied “They think it a very great hardship! They have payments due them by the 
American Government which they are threatened to be deprived of if they come to reside in 
Canada, and if they do not come they lose their Presents from the British Government.”733 
 Although ostensibly an escape from the coercive atmosphere created by the removal 
policy in the United States, Anishinaabeg who chose to move permanently to Upper Canada also 
faced pressures on their arrival in Upper Canada. Though some managed to take up residence on 
established reserves in the south of the province, for others the only available choice of abode 
was that of Manitoulin Island. As a reserve set up (in contrast to Francis Bond Head’s vision) as 
a place for Native people who wanted to adopt a “civilized” and Christian lifestyle, the 
immigrants had no choice but to ostensibly adhere to British Indian policy imperatives. So 
although some people chose to move to British territory in order to secure their future in the 
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Great Lakes region, like the First Nations people already resident in Upper Canada, they would 
have to negotiate the complicated politics of their increasingly ambiguous relationship with the 
British government. As with the First Nations’ defense of the government in 1837-38, Native 
people had their own reasons for seeking to continue their alliance with the British; reasons that 
generally had little to do with the way British leaders such as Arthur portrayed the government’s 
relationship with the First Peoples. While British Indian policy increasingly presumed First 
Nations people as subjects rather than allies of the crown, such presumptions failed to correlate 
with the way First Nations leaders, such as Jones and Shawundais, attempted to use their 
relationship with the British to implement their own vision for their peoples’ future. 
 
Supporting the Great Mother 
 
Reflecting in 1839 on the fraught political situation that greeted his January 1838 arrival 
in Upper Canada, George Arthur wrote in a private letter to Glenelg that “[t]he excitemt. which 
my immediate Predecessor created rendered it quite frightful to enter upon the administration of 
this Province; & often have I wished myself back to V. D. Land, where, comparatively I had no 
difficulties.”734 Although loyalist forces quickly quelled the initial rebellion in December 1837, 
from the moment of his arrival Arthur had to deal with the ongoing threat posed by the rebels 
and the members of the Hunters’ Lodges across the border in the northern United States. By the 
end of 1838, the loyalist forces had thwarted rebel attacks, and Arthur had dealt with the 
“traitors” through a combination of amnesty, execution, and transportation to Van Diemen’s 
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Land.735 Unlike the rebels, who sought a redress of their political grievances through an attempt 
to overthrow the British government, the First Peoples of Upper Canada chose to pursue their 
political imperatives through a continuing alliance with the British. Their participation in the 
loyalist forces proved crucial to the defense of the government. It also highlighted the liminal 
position that they had come to occupy in the province. As a group of First Nations leaders would 
ask Arthur in 1840, did they stand in relation to the British government “as subjects or 
Allies?”736 
 First Nations people overwhelmingly supported the British government during the Upper 
Canada rebellion of 1837 and the ensuing “Patriot War” of 1838. After receiving news on 
December 7 in Coldwater of the outbreak of the rebellion in Toronto, the Ojibwe leader John 
Aisance led 21 warriors to Holland Landing (40 miles north of Toronto). Runners were also sent 
out to hunting grounds, and over the following week, 70 more Anishinaabe warriors came down 
from the Coldwater and the Narrows (Orillia) area, including at least 40 Pottawatomies and 
another group of Ojibwes under the Narrows Chief Nainikishkung.737 Although the initial 
rebellion was quickly crushed by Colonel Fizgibbon’s loyalist forces at the Battle at 
Montgomery’s Tavern in Toronto on December 7, the threat of further unrest continued with the 
retreat and dispersal of the rebels. In the ensuing tensions, the border towns on both sides of the 
U.S-Upper Canada frontier became particular focal points, with Upper Canadian rebels joining 
forces with Hunters’ Lodges in northern U.S. towns, such as Detroit, Cleveland, Rochester, and 
Buffalo. When news reached Port Sarnia of the rebellion and the “assemblage of Rebels” across 
the border at Mount Clemens, for instance, William Jones, Indian superintendent, asked the men 
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to defer their hunting expedition and stay in residence to fight in case of a rebel attack.738 As 
with the Anishinaabe groups further north, these First Nations men complied with the request to 
take up arms to defend the crown against the republicans’ attack on the established political 
order. 
 Amidst the political ferment in the months following the initial rebellion, Indian 
Department agents worked to shore up First Nations support in the event of further attacks. 
Samuel Jarvis, the chief superintendent of the department, sent out instructions to local 
superintendents to keep First Nations people in a state of readiness to take up arms. Thomas 
Anderson at Coldwater, for instance, sent Jean-Baptiste Assiginack to Manitoulin Island with 
wampum to convey “Paroles to the Western Indians,” informing them to “[b]e ready to smoke 
the pipe of war, if our Great English Mother calls you, and, should the bad voices of the Big 
Knives, make your English Mother angry, We, (the English and the Indians) will strike them to 
the ground.”739 In labeling the republican rebels as “Big Knives,” Anderson characterized them 
as a force representing the United States. Continuing along this vein, he instructed that should 
their “Great Mother raise the War Cry” the First Nations should “unbury the Hatchet,” thus 
alluding to the official peace that had existed between all sides since the War of 1812. He also 
warned – likely referencing both the rebels and their circulating “seditious” republican political 
ideas – that First Nations people not heed the rebel cause: “[t]ho’ bad birds may whisper in your 
ears,” he stated, “mind them not, but look to the rising sun and you will be happy.”740 
 Little wonder that, with such instructions, rumors circulated that war with the Americans 
loomed, and that the British intended to pressure First Nations warriors into service. The 
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uncertainty of the political situation seemingly induced some people who would otherwise have 
travelled to Manitoulin Island for presents in the summer of 1838 to remain on their lands. 
Overlaying this were their concerns and that during the delivery of presents, the British officers 
would pressure warriors into fighting against the Americans. In his main speech at the present-
giving ceremony at Manitowaning (on Manitoulin Island) that August, Jarvis informed the 
congregated First Nations people that he had been told that some people had stayed away 
because “wicked men” had induced “some of the Indians to believe that it was the intention of 
their Great Mother to impress into Her Service all Indians Warrior, who should visit 
Maniouwanning this year – place Muskets in their hands and compel them to fight against the 
Long Knives.”741 In response to these rumors, and most likely also in response to First Nations 
leaders’ inquiries regarding the government’s exact position in relation to the rebels, Jarvis 
sought to clarify the government’s policy. He confirmed that the “Great Mother” had not 
“unburied the Hatchet against the Long Knives,” but that instead, “during the last winter . . . 
experienced much Trouble with some of Her white Children who influenced by the evil passions 
not only rebelled against Her Authority, but actually united themselves with many of the worst 
and most depraved of the Long Knives, and wage War against Her.”742 
 In a diplomatic practice that would be repeated during the ensuing months of unrest, 
Jarvis praised the First Nations’ continued loyalty to the Crown. Referring to the response of 
First Nations people to the initial rebellion in December (1837), he told the congregated crowd 
that “Your Great Mother . . . will never forget the Brave and Spirited conduct of the Indian 
Warriors, residing within the Settlements of Her White Children.” According to Jarvis, while the 
Queen’s “rebellious White Children” had endeavored “to persuade, Her Red Children to 
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renounce their Allegiance to Her . . . every Tribe from the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte to the 
Chippewas of the River St Clair . . . rejected the invitation with contempt and disdain and 
instantly gave information of the Proposals, which had been made to them, to their Great Father 
the Lieutenant Governor at Toronto.”743  
Indeed, in incidents subsequent to the initial rebellion, First Nations support had already 
been vital. For instance, in June 1838, William Jones sent a party of men to Sombra and Moore 
to aid the militia, whose commanders found the presence of First Nations people to be the best 
deterrent against attack.744 The largest mobilization of First Nations people then came in 
November 1838, after Arthur received information that the Hunters’ Lodges across the border in 
the U.S. had 160,000 members, with 40,000 pledged to invade.745 He commanded that all First 
Nations people in the Province be concentrated in seven locations. The declared purpose, 
according to the official memorandum, was to defeat the “treasonable schemes” of “disaffected 
persons” who had allegedly “tampered with the Indian inhabitants of this Province under 
expectation that they would succeed in alienating the affections of those brave people from their 
Sovereign.”746 But as suggested by the strategic locations of these concentrations, as well as the 
fact that Arthur placed them under military command, the First Nations soldiers – particularly 
those stationed near the U.S. border – actually played a vital role on the province’s defensive 
frontlines. In the Battle of Windsor on 4 December, for instance, First Nations warriors joined 
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the local militia to repel attackers from across the border.747 In the aftermath, Arthur sent out a 
“Militia General Order” praising the actions of the Windsor militia for defeating “the attacking 
Banditti,” and mentioning “the display of their usual sagacity and gallantry on the part of the 
Indian Warriors.”748 
 Yet such effusive statements of praise obscured the less than valorous actions of the 
loyalist forces. In the case of the Battle of Windsor, for instance, Arthur’s uncritical praise of the 
militia glossed over the already-circulating reports of illegal summary executions of prisoners, 
ordered by the commander, Colonel John Prince (but which the First Nations soldiers had 
refused to sanction).749 On hearing the news of the executions Arthur had been appalled, 
describing Prince’s actions as illegal and unjustifiable, and lamenting that he “had again and 
again urged upon every one to forbear & to leave the punishment of delinquents to the Laws.”750 
Although he did not include such sentiments in his militia order, he nevertheless alluded to the 
situation when he asked that the “Officers of the Indian Department . . . communicate to the 
Indian Warriors, His Excellency’s gracious thanks” not only for their “sagacity and gallantry,” 
but also “especially for the humanity to the captured enemy.”751 Such specific praise for the 
treatment of prisoners suggests Arthur’s awareness that the First Nations soldiers had not taken 
part in the executions, and his wish to convey to them that knowledge.  
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 This acknowledgement also suggests the liminal position in which the “Indian Warriors” 
found themselves after responding to the government’s call up. Arthur’s praise for their gallantry 
and humanity implicitly referenced and refuted circulating stereotypes about “savage” Indian 
warfare. Yet such stereotypes were nevertheless part of the social dynamics among the loyalist 
forces. As they had done in the past – most recently in the War of 1812 – British commanders 
found First Nations soldiers to be useful allies not only for their military skills, but also for the 
effect they were seen to have in intimidating the U.S. enemy and deterring their attacks. 
Moreover, the Prince executions during the Battle of Windsor reveal something of the 
ambivalent position that the First Nations soldiers occupied in the eyes of other loyalists. A 
report of the incident told how a group of First Nations soldiers pursued and captured seven of 
the enemy soldiers in the woods. When they first brought the prisoners “out of the woods, the cry 
was ‘Bayonet them’ but Martin one of the Indian braves replied ‘no we are Christians – we will 
not murder them – we will deliver them to our Officers to be treated as they think proper.’” 
Unlike five other prisoners, whose execution Colonel Prince had already ordered, Prince yielded 
to the entreaties of some local non-Natives not “to let a white man murder what an Indian has 
spared.”752 Such references to derogatory stereotypes of Indian “savagery” – inverted here to 
suggest that “a white man” should not stoop to a level of savagery that even “an Indian” would 
not in these circumstances – brings to light the ambivalent image that other loyalists had of the 
First Nations soldiers.  
 In choosing a more positive (albeit still seemingly stereotyped) image of “Indian 
Warriors” as loyal, valorous, and noble, Arthur followed the wartime strategy, implemented also 
by the Indian Department, to shore-up support for the crown by lavishing gratitude upon First 
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Nations people. Statements such as those of Jarvis at the August 1838 present giving on 
Manitoulin Island, and Arthur in his militia order after the Battle of Windsor, drew on existing 
diplomatic conventions; yet they also represented strategic wartime diplomatic practices, aimed 
to aid in the overriding concern of maintaining the established government, and mobilizing as 
much of the population as possible to defend it. Demonstrations of gratitude to First Nations 
people – especially those expressed in terms of obedient loyalty of the “Great Mother’s” “Red 
Children” – also worked to obscure the array of complicated political circumstances that explain 
First-Nations involvement in defending the crown during the 1837 and 1838 uprisings.   
 Each group that supported the crown had its own complicated reasons for fighting, none 
of which included either blind obedience to the British, or thorough satisfaction with their 
current relations with the government. In the wake of Francis Bond Head’s 1836 Indian-treaty 
splurge, many groups were, like the Saugeen Ojibwes, deeply unsatisfied with the treaties that 
the administration purported they had entered into. For instance, John Aisance and his fellow 
Ojibwes from Coldwater were seriously at odds with the local British administration after Head’s 
version of their November 1836 treaty negotiations claimed that they had surrendered all their 
lands (from Coldwater on Lake Huron to the Narrows on Lake Simcoe). Moreover, though 
Aisance and a group of warriors from Coldwater turned out during the initial rebellion on 7 
December 1837 – they did so amidst an intense and ongoing dispute between themselves and the 
government over ownership and control of their mills at Coldwater.753 They also mobilized to 
Holland Landing the next year until Arthur’s November 1838 orders, despite the ongoing nature 
of the mill dispute. Noting that their “dissatisfaction” over the issue threatened to jeopardize 
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Anishinaabeg military support, Gerard Alley, the commander of the forces at Holland Landing, 
strongly recommended to Jarvis not to pursue the matter of the mill ownership.754  
 Moreover, the political relations between the government and First Nations also existed 
amidst the wider political crises threatening to engulf the Canadas. Commenting on the 
atmosphere of York in the early 1830s, for example, one of the future rebels stated that the 
inhabitants were “all politicians” who spent their time “talking politics and walking the 
streets.”755 Though First Nations people had their own concerns, separate from the issues central 
to the Tory-Reform conflict among the non-Native population, they nevertheless also lived 
amidst this political ferment. And though, unlike many who supported the reform agenda, First 
Nations people chose overwhelmingly to back the established government in order to have their 
political grievances addressed, they nevertheless framed their conditions for this support in terms 
akin to reform notions of equality. For instance, when Nainikishkung and other Narrows Ojibwes 
– who had responded to the call up during the initial rebellion – learnt that the non-Native militia 
had received pay for the same duties, they requested that their officer, Gerard Alley, petition the 
Governor on their behalf to receive payment for the time they remained mobilized.756 The local 
superintendent, Thomas Anderson, passed on the request to Jarvis despite his incredulity that the 
idea for pay had First Nations origins; but noting the volunteers’ entitlement to such pay, he 
nevertheless subsequently made out the pay-lists.757 Though Anderson blamed the First Nations’ 
new expectation for remuneration on non-Natives who sought to have more money circulating in 
their local economies at a time of economic recession, the more widespread nature of the 
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petitioning during the mobilizations of 1837 and 1838 suggests a broader political trend, in 
which First Nations people recognized the strength of their bargaining position, and requested 
equal treatment as a condition of providing military support to the crown. In another instance, 
Peter Jones wrote to Jarvis from Credit River in December 1838 stating that he was “requested 
by the Warriors of this village to inform you that it is their wish to be paid in the same way as the 
Militia are when called to take up arms for the defence of the Province.”758 
 In addition to framing their requests in terms of equality with the white militia, many 
First Nations petitioned for compensation in the language of practicality. Being mobilized to 
defend the Province meant foregoing hunting expeditions, and also, in some cases, vacating their 
houses for the militia. For example, in January 1838, the people living on the St. Clair reserve 
petitioned for compensation because, by staying to defend the frontier, they had “not been able to 
hunt enough” to support their women and children, who were camped in the woods because they 
had “had to give up” their “comfortable houses for the use of the Militia.”759 Other groups more 
specifically petitioned for remuneration in the form of currency, rather than payment in supplies, 
to reflect the economic realities of their lives. As Peter Jones related on behalf of the soldiers 
congregated at Credit River, “[t]he Warriors state that many of them have small debts to pay, 
which they will not be able to discharge unless they receive money for the time they may be 
required to hold themselves in readiness at this Village, as their principal resources are 
dependent on their hunting excursions.”760 When Arthur finally disbanded the First Nations 
forces in January 1839, many Anishinaabe warriors were annoyed at being released during the 
middle of winter, without further rations, and without time to undertake a proper hunting 
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season.761 Their requests for compensation for time away from their hunting-centered livelihoods 
therefore rested on considerations of practicality as well as of principle, and suggest that the First 
Nations soldiers did not intend to shoulder any more of the burden for defending the crown than 
other members of the loyalist forces.  
 The emphasis on the continuing importance of the hunting-based economy in the 
soldiers’ petitions also reveals a reason why, despite dissatisfaction with the government, First 
Nations warriors chose to join loyalist forces in the first place: mobilizing to defend the crown 
held the promise of receiving guns and ammunition. As part of implementing their “civilization” 
policy, the British had been substituting presents of agricultural tools in the place of hunting 
equipment. As a result, at the outbreak of the rebellion, the First Nations in Upper Canada had 
very few guns in their possession.762 So not only did the conflict give the young Aninshinaabe 
men the chance to properly reach “warrior” status, they also most likely anticipated being able to 
retain the distributed guns and some ammunition for hunting purposes.763 Although Indian 
Department officers initially attempted to recover the distributed guns, by the fall of 1840 Jarvis 
had accepted that hand-backs were unlikely and thus recommended that warriors be allowed to 
keep the weapons.764 
 But perhaps even more importantly, First Nations’ loyalty to the crown in Upper Canada 
represented part of their strategy to defend their own sovereignty amidst the ever-growing 
pressures of an expanding non-Native population and a government not overly sympathetic to 
their land and resource rights. Unlike the rebels who sought to assert their rights by attempting to 
overthrow the established government, the First Nations chose to reaffirm their alliance with the 
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crown in order to strengthen the bargaining position from which they could press the government 
to adhere to its fictive kinship obligations. Like other strategies, such as the adoption of 
Christianity and “civilization,” this “loyalty” never fit the literal definition conveyed in the 
diplomatic language of British agents. Rather than representing submissive obedience to their 
protective “Great Mother,” First Nations fought for their own political reasons. 
 They also fought to defend themselves against a shared republican enemy. Although as 
evident at the Manitoulin present-giving meeting in August 1838, some First Nations people 
were reticent to unbury the hatchet for a full-blown war against the United States, the American 
taint of the republican Patriots was nevertheless ultimately no doubt a motivating factor for why 
people chose to join the loyalist forces. In fighting for the established British government, they 
chose to defend their alliance with the crown against the alternative of having to deal with a 
land-hungry republican entity potentially part of, or aligned with, the United States.765 Such 
concerns were even more pressing for those people who had recently emigrated to Upper Canada 
from the United States to escape the pressures of the Jacksonians’ removal policy. For instance, 
the Pottawatomies who quickly mobilized during the initial rebellion had migrated to Upper 
Canada in the wake of the Chicago treaty of 1833, rather than face expatriation west of the 
Mississippi river.766 First Nations people therefore chose to affirm their alliance with the British, 
against the Patriots, who they saw as a greater threat.  
 But this militarily backed loyalty also shed light on the ambiguities that had come to 
characterize relations between First Nations and the British crown. In the lead up to the rebellion, 
British Indian policy had aimed to “civilize” and Christianize First Nations people towards self-
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sufficiency, thus enabling the British government to dispense with the expense of the Indian 
Department. As already discussed, such a move also represented a shift from treating First 
Nations people as valued military allies, to treating them as subjects of the crown.767 Yet in being 
called upon again to defend the crown, the British government had to acknowledge the ongoing 
value of First Nations people as military allies. Native people themselves recognized and pointed 
out this ambiguity. In a council held at Credit River in January 1840, the Anishinaabe leaders 
from a collective of mostly Christian “Indian settlements” petitioned Arthur for the clarification 
and resolution of a number of pressing (and outstanding) issues. Opening the petition by 
impressing upon Arthur the exertions they were making in their “agricultural improvements,” 
they immediately followed with a humbly worded request for title deeds to their lands; a request 
that Peter Jones and Shawundais’s advocacy in London had not achieved. But in their next 
statement they sought clarification on an even more fundamental issue, which went to the heart 
of the ambiguity of their legal and political relationship with the British government: “Father, It 
is our wish to be informed with regard to the relations in which your Red Children stand to the 
British Government whether as subjects of Allies?”768 The apparent contradictions between the 
government’s recent need for their military support and its attempts to make them into self-
sufficient civil subjects had not gone unnoticed. 
 Even amidst the threat of rebellion, British Indian department agents had continued the 
policy of promoting “civilization” and Christianity. In his speech at Manitoulin in August 1838, 
after he flattered “the Brave and Spirited conduct of the Indian Warriors, residing within the 
Settlements of Her White Children,” Jarvis proceeded to extol the virtues of “embracing the 
Christian faith” and “a civilized mode of life.” As part of his attempts to induce the attendant 
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Native people to follow this path, he encouraged them to consider moving to Manitoulin Island, 
stating that their “Great Mother the Queen . . . has chosen this beautiful Bay for the Site of an 
Establishment which is henceforth to be honoured by Her Patronage. And she invites Her Red 
Children to resort hither and participate in the benefits which it is Her intention to bestow upon 
them.”769 On the face of it, there was no inevitable contradiction between the British policies of, 
on the one hand, considering First Nations people as recipients of the civilizing mission and, on 
the other, treating them as military allies. For leaders such as Jones and Shawundais, who met at 
Credit River in January 1840, adopting marking of this so-called “civilized mode of life” 
definitely did not mean renouncing their claims to holding a different political status from the 
Queen’s non-Native subjects. But in terms of British aims, the civilization policy was part of 
attempts to escape the material obligations posed by the alliance. The British policy makers 
instead eventually wanted to make the First Nations into self-sufficient civil subjects, without 
their separate political status or claims to annual presents. For many of the American Indians 
who moved to Upper Canada from the U.S. during the late 1830s and 1840s, their only option 
would be to reside on Manitoulin Island under the auspices of this policy. 
 
Removals and Emigrations 
 
 Writing to London in May 1840 about “the consequences” of discontinuing “the issue of 
Presents to the Visiting Indians,” George Arthur included a report from a Detroit paper that had 
“been copied into one of the Upper Canadian papers.” The report consisted of a “letter professing 
to have been written by Mr. Schoolcraft, the American Agent for Indian Affairs at 
Michilimackinac,” alleging, in Arthur’s words, that “a correspondence has been carried on 
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between authorities of the British Indian Department, and the Indian Tribes in the interior of the 
Western States, for the purpose of encouraging them to come within the British Dominions with 
a view to a future state of hostility.” Bringing this report to the attention of the colonial office in 
case “the subject may be noticed by the American Government,” Arthur assured Lord Russell 
(the secretary of state for war and the colonies) that “no such correspondence had been carried on 
by the Department.” In the interests of regional peace and security, Arthur sought to stress that 
the British offered no such active encouragement for the immigrations, and that people’s 
decision to settle permanently in Upper Canada “must be considered altogether a voluntary one.” 
He also informed Russell that the immigrants had been “strongly recommended to consent to be 
located on the Manitoulin Island.”770  
 The portrayal that Arthur (and other U.S. and British agents) gave of U.S., British, and 
Native relations in the Great Lakes region rarely reflected the political reality experienced by 
Native peoples themselves. For the Anishinaabeg people of the Upper Great Lakes, decisions 
regarding movement around the region were not truly “voluntary.” Anishinaabeg peoples’ 
political reality included negotiating the intersecting pressures of both British and American 
“removal” policies. These stories of “removal” included a nexus of competing factors. In their 
attempts to retain the ability to determine their own destinies, people had to negotiate pressures 
associated with U.S. agents’ attempts to implement their government’s statutory removal policy 
as well as the British policy to discontinue delivering presents to “visiting Indians,” and their 
civilization policy with its associated British recommendations to remove to Manitoulin Island. 
 In the late 1830s and early 1840s, thousands of American Indians – predominantly 
Anishinaabeg – crossed the U.S.-British defined border to settle in Upper Canada. Unlike in the 
southern states, the U.S. government never managed to implement a comprehensive and 
                                                
770 Arthur to Russell, 4 May 1840, NAC, RG7 G7, vol. 2. 
 321 
concerted plan to coerce the people of the Upper Great Lakes to the west of the Mississippi. For 
many Ottawas and Ojibwes, the demographic pressures of a westward migrating population did 
not directly affect their lands or resources. For the Potawatomis, however, whose prime 
agricultural lands were predominantly further south, the pressures were much greater. In the 
aftermath of the treaty of Chicago (1833), government agents put pressure on the Pottwatomies 
to accede to the stipulations of the treaty and remove westward. While some moved west under 
their own accord, and others in deadly marches under armed guard, a great number moved to 
other Anishinaabeg communities, including those on the British-claimed side of the region. 
Anthropologist James Clifton estimates that “by the late summer of 1837 some 1,465 
Potawatomi are known to have been on their way toward or already settling at various locations 
in Upper Canada.”771 Though effective U.S. administrative, military or demographic pressures 
did not, in reality, extend further north into the state of Michigan or Wisconsin territory, the 
tactics of U.S. agents nevertheless threaten the exertion of such pressure, and seemingly 
contributed to some other Anishinaabeg groups choosing to leave U.S.-claimed territory.772 In 
1838, for instance, Jean-Baptiste Assiginack informed Samuel Jarvis (chief superintendent of the 
Indian department in Upper Canada) that a large number of people living in Michigan had 
decided to move to Upper Canada as soon as some of their pecuniary claims against the 
American Government had been settled.773 The following May (1839), Thomas Anderson (now 
superintendent of the Indian settlements on Manitoulin Island) reported that “a large number of 
Ottawa” had arrived on the island from Lake Michigan to settle at the predominantly Roman 
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Catholic village of “Wequamecong” [Wikwemikong].774 That same spring, 157 “Saginong 
Indians” arrived at Port Sarnia, and were followed by others over the ensuing few years.775 
 Governmental policy on the British-claimed side of the border also contributed to the 
environment of political instability with which the American Indian peoples in region had to 
contend. The pressures of the U.S. Indian removal policy coincided with the British decision to 
end delivering present to “visiting Indians” from the U.S. side of the border. Arthur inherited this 
policy from Francis Bond Head, who had instituted it as a money saving measure, which he 
believed, if applied with fair warning to the affected American Indians, would not breach 
Britain’s equitable obligations. He hoped the policy would placate the Treasury in London by 
saving £4,000 a year, and that it would also appease the U.S. officials’ well-known displeasure at 
the ongoing travels of U.S.-based American Indians to receive British presents.776 In 1836, he 
thus informed Glenelg that he would formally announce “at the next Delivery of Presents” that 
“their Great Father was still willing to continue Presents to such of his Red Children as lived in 
his own Land, but that, in Justice to the Americans, who are now our Allies, he could not arm 
against them those Indians who should continue to reside in the Territory of the United States.” 
After three years “Presents would only be given to those of our Red Children who actually shall 
inhabit the Canadas.”777 Though the death of the King the next year (1837) prevented Head from 
repeating the performance of his much-loved role of father during the present delivery at 
Manitoulin Island, Samuel Jarvis made the announcement on his behalf.778 In his speech, Jarvis 
included the promise that the government would “be most happy” to continue giving “presents to 
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the Indians of the United States,” provided that they move somewhere within the “British 
Empire.” Jarvis did not single out Upper Canada as the destination of choice, but instead listed it 
among the other possibilities of “Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, or any other 
British Colony,” even including the option of emigration “across the Great Salt Lake to the 
Country of their Great Father the King.”779 The British therefore gave their U.S.-resident 
American Indian allies an ultimatum; to continue their alliance with the British government they 
must move within British-claimed territory. 
Arthur initially emphasized this forthcoming discontinuance of presents to “visiting 
Indians” in his rationalizations for the large number of emigrants arriving from the United States 
side of the border. When he wrote to Lord Russell in May 1840, he noted that “considerable 
bodies of Indians” had “come into the Western part of the Province from the United States.”780 
Subsuming this information under the stated topic of his dispatch – “the subject of the 
consequences which may be expected to arise from the discontinuance of the issue of Presents to 
the Visiting Indians” – Arthur represented the central reason for the emigrations as American 
Indian desires to remain eligible for British presents. “It appears,” he continued, “that different 
views as to the propriety of coming to reside within the Province, are entertained amongst the 
Indians themselves; many, however, display an anxiety to adopt the course of putting themselves 
into a situation to receive Presents by coming to reside within the Province.”781 While he thus 
suggested that other (unnamed) factors may have played a part in the movements, he 
nevertheless signified British presents as the dominant reason. 
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In partly framing the discussion in terms of the views “entertained amongst the Indians 
themselves,” Arthur therefore also chose to emphasize that American Indian determinations 
(albeit made in response to British policy) lay behind the migrations. Arthur appears to have 
been well briefed on some of the complexities of the situation, and to have been interested in 
U.S.-based American Indians’ reactions to the prospective discontinuance of presents. As part of 
queries he made in July 1839 “with respect to the condition of the Indians,” Arthur requested an 
inquiry into “the feeling of the Visiting Indians as to the Stoppage of the usual distribution of 
Annual Presents to them, unless they become residents in the British Dominions.”782 Thomas 
Anderson, by then the superintendent of the Manitoulin Island settlements, responded by stating 
that “[t]hey think it a very great hardship! They have payments due them by the American 
Government which they are threatened to be deprived of if they come to reside in Canada, and if 
they do not come they lose their Presents from the British Government under those 
circumstances many prefer losing their Land payments for the Known certainty of receiving 
Presents.”783 Arthur thus apparently grasped, at least to some extent, that American Indian 
peoples’ decision to move to Upper Canada represented choices made within a political context 
of decreasing options for them on both sides of the frontier. 
But Arthur’s representations of the situation never fully evoked the coercive political 
atmosphere within with American Indian groups made these choices. He emphasized American 
Indians as independent actors in order to rebuff American criticism of British actions rather than 
to present the situation from Native standpoints. In his May 1840 dispatch to Russell, he thus 
characterized American Indian migration as a voluntary “Act” – “the result of their own anxiety 
to become entitled to the Presents from the British Government, and wholly uninfluenced by any 
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persuasion of the Executive Government.” He acknowledged that persuasion to move had “no 
doubt” come from “persons amongst [the Indians] themselves,” and that “the Superintendents 
have very probably, in some instances, held out the prospects of advantage to such Indians as 
may adopt the plan of permanent settlement.” Yet he discursively placed the only important 
decisions to be made in this situation squarely on the shoulders of the American Indians 
themselves. They could choose between two apparently fixed options; between the “prospects of 
advantage” offered by the British and the “counter-inducements on the part of the United States 
Agents for Indian Affairs, [which] have been strongly urged upon the Indians rather to go to the 
West.”784 Such representations whitewashed the atmosphere of coercion created by both British 
and American agents, and instead posited American Indians as political actors making free 
choices. In this way, he framed the situation so as to refute American rumors – such as that 
allegedly perpetuated by Henry Schoolcraft – that British Indian policy held malevolent, anti-
American designs. 
  Arthur nevertheless began to recognize, at least to some extent, the important role that 
the U.S. government’s Indian removal policy had in precipitating the large numbers of American 
Indian emigrations to Upper Canada. After a number of incidents in the summer and autumn of 
1840 relating to emigrating Anishinaabeg, it became harder to ignore that the emigrants’ most 
pressing concerns lay not in receiving British presents, but in escaping U.S. agents’ coercive 
attempts to enforce the Indian Removal Act. Writing to Lord Sydenham (the new Governor 
General of Canada) in October 1840, for example, Arthur discussed the “considerable 
Emigration of Indians . . . from the United States” with greater emphasis on the impact of U.S. 
government policy. He thus referred to an enclosed report of Jarvis that the emigration amounted 
“to about two thousand . . . principally of Chippewas and Pottawattamies, and that other Bands 
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are on their way to join these Indians, but that they are prevented by the United States 
Authorities, who are endeavoring to make them remove West of the Mississippi.”785 Incidents 
involving Pottawatomies crossing at Fort Gratiot (Port Huron) to the British side at Sarnia had, 
for instance, produced a string of terse correspondence between American and British officials. 
In letters that Arthur forwarded to his superiors, the U.S. commander at Fort Gratiot informed the 
British that the “fugitive” Pottawatomies “were under Treaty obligations to go to the Westward 
of their former (recent) locality, and that in proceeding in the opposite direction they have not 
only violated their engagements with, but disappointed the just expectations of the United States 
Government.”786  
 In response to this situation, Arthur tried to mark out a middle path that would conciliate 
the U.S. government agents and also keep “the faith of the [British] Government” with “the 
Indians.”787 Writing to Lord Sydenham (the new Governor of Canada) in October 1840, he 
expressed his ongoing concern that “the American Authorities had been led to believe that these 
Indians had received encouragement to settle in the Province from Authorities in Canada.”788 In 
order to make it clear that such beliefs did not reflect the actual policy of the Upper Canadian 
Executive, Arthur informed Sydenham that he had “caused a Minute of Instructions” to be 
circulated in the Indian Department, announcing the government’s policy that no encouragement 
be given to induce emigration from the U.S.A.789 The minute stated that Arthur had, “after 
serious consideration, come to the conclusion, that it is by no means consistent with the good of 
the country that a large Body of Indian population should take up residence in it, and that no 
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encouragement, therefore, should be held out to them to do so.”790 Although this wording seems 
to frame Arthur’s anti-encouragement directive as a discriminatory and segregationist 
immigration policy, the more pressing political imperatives of the minute become clearer in the 
concluding paragraph. Reading like a caveat aimed both at appeasing American Indians and at 
rebutting American criticism by articulating British Indian policy as benevolently motivated, the 
minute qualified the previous statements by announcing that “[t]he British Government, 
however, being pledged to the Indian Race to afford protection to all Indians within the British 
Dominions, when any such are found, it will be the duty of the Indian Department to take care to 
give full effect to that pledge.” The “object” of the minute was thus “merely to prevent any 
means whatever being used to induce or encourage Indians to come into the Country.”791 
 And yet the segregationist dynamics evident in this minute nevertheless reflected the 
reality of British Indian immigration policy. The “protection” that the British government 
foresaw providing for the immigrating American Indians was their settlement on the already-
instituted Indian reserve of Manitoulin Island. As Arthur informed Lord Russell in 1840, the 
American Indians who had come to “make a permanent settlement” in Upper Canada “were 
strongly recommended to consent to be located on the Manitoulin Island.”792 British Indian 
department agents, for instance, strongly suggested to the 157 Saginaw Ojibwes who crossed to 
Port Sarnia in May 1839, that they “extend their journey to the Great Manitowawning 
[Manitoulin] Island and make that place their future residence.”793 The information that 840 
more Ojiwbes from the U.S. side were likely to follow their brethren induced Jarvis to express to 
Arthur’s secretary that the time had arrived when it was necessary for the government to adopt 
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an established policy of assisting immigrating “Indian families on their first arrival in the 
Province.” He proposed immediate “assistance in the shape of provision or otherwise” to relieve 
their “destitute circumstances” and “to enable them to reach the Manatowawing [Manitoulin] 
Island with the least possible delay.”794 
 But this declared policy did not always translate into the actual relocation of the 
immigrants north to Manitoulin Island. Though the Saginaw Ojibwe, for instance, reportedly 
initially “expressed a willingness” to settle on Manitoulin Island, John Keating – one of the 
Indian department superintendents – accompanied them north in July 1839 only after 
overcoming “a considerable degree of hesitation” on their parts to move there. Keating attributed 
this to “the Americans & I daresay some others” who he believed had “been tampering with the 
Indians and produced in some a disinclination to go by informing them that they could get no 
leather for mocassins & that the inhabitants of the Island were in a state of starvation.”795 Though 
the Indian department agents assumed the trip would be the group’s final migration to 
Manitoulin, these Saginaw Ojibwes did not stay on at the island after the delivery of presents but 
returned to Michigan. They appeared among another larger group of immigrant Ojibwes and 
Pottawatomies who again made the trip with Keating the next summer.796 Such trips occurred 
within a general atmosphere of Anishinaabe reluctance to concentrate on Manitoulin.797  
Some groups managed to make other arrangements for themselves, and thus avoid 
resettlement on Manitoulin. In 1839, a band of Pottawatomies held a council with the First 
Nations leaders on Walpole Island, who proceeded to give them a tract of land on the Chenail 
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Ecarte reserve, and subsequently offer the same to another group of Pottawatomies.798 Others 
also managed to remain nearer to Sarnia to reside with friends and kin in the London district.799 
While the Indian department agents applauded the “laudable desire” of First Nations people “to 
assist their naked and destitute Brethren” when it involved their moving to an already designated 
Indian reserve, for groups that did not have such an invitation, the only option – as far as the 
government was concerned – was to move to Manitoulin.  
The government’s imperative that the incoming American Indians move to Manitoulin 
therefore meant that the immigrants were, at least ostensibly, to become the recipients of British 
endeavors to “civilize” and Christianize them. Though Francis Bond Head had envisioned 
Manitoulin as a reserve of pristine wilderness, where “the red children of the forest” could lead 
an existence unblemished by the malevolent forces of “civilization,” Thomas Anderson’s 
original formulation of a the reserve as a place to undertake the government’s civilizing mission 
subsisted and then prevailed with Head’s departure. In June 1839, for instance, Jarvis outlined 
his plans that each immigrant family be placed under Anderson’s supervision at Manitowaning, 
be given “a Lot or Piece of Land of sufficient extent to ensure the future support of that family,” 
and be assisted “in the construction of their houses” and in clearing the land for cultivation.800 
Though the Indian department touted the Island as a reserve for any First Nations people who 
chose to live a “civilized,” agricultural lifestyle, they gave the incoming Anishinaabeg no other 
options for village sites. In May 1840, on hearing the reluctance of the immigrants to proceed to 
Manitoulin, Jarvis wrote that the immigrants “must not expect to be assisted by Government” 
unless they proceeded there. Though he characterized that the “Establishment” on the Island as 
having “been formed at very great expense and upon an extensive scale for the relief and 
                                                
798 William Jones to Jarvis, 13 November 1839, NAC, RG 10, vol. 71. 
799 Jarvis to Harrison, 25 September 1840, RG7 G7, vol. 2. 
800 Jarvis to Macaulay, 7 June 1839, NAC, RG 10, vol. 503. 
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Accommodation of such Indians as may not have fixed residences and who are desirous of being 
civilized and assimilating their habits to those of white men,” it was clear that, without other 
means of support or options, the immigrants would have little choice but to proceed to the island, 
however “desirous of being civilized.” Jarvis thus wished that the responsible Indian 
superintendents “would distinctly give [the Indians] to understand that at this station alone will 
they be assisted by the Government on the cultivation of the soil.”801 Without other options but 
“the cultivation of the soil,” the immigrants had no other prospective destinations.  
Though the Anishinaabeg who left the U.S.-claimed side of the Great Lakes region 
mostly did so to escape the pressures associated with the U.S. removal policy, many also faced 
further coercive restrictions when they arrived on the British side. Indeed, the policies of both the 
U.S. and British governments seem to have fed into the fears and insecurities about removal that 
were palpable in stories circulating in the region. In Upper Canada, both First Nations people and 
Indian department officials remained informed about what was (or was believed to be) going on 
in the United States. Thomas Anderson, for instance, heard that a group of 400 Pottawatomies 
who spent the winter of 1838 in Upper Canada, reportedly “returned to Chicago and St. Josephs 
in Lake Michigan and were immediately sent across the Mississippi”; Anderson had “not heard 
of their return from banishment.”802  
It was not just stories of forced removals on the U.S. side that fed the atmosphere of 
anxiety and uncertainty; there was clearly also an ongoing distrust of British government 
intentions. For instance, though Keating blamed the Saginaw Ojibwes’ hesitations to go to 
Manitoulin in the summer of 1839 on the mischief of Americans, anxious conjectures about 
                                                
801 Jarvis to [no recipient recorded], 9 May 1840, NAC, RG 10, vol. 73. 
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removal of Menominee’s band. See Satz, "Indian Policy in the Jacksonian Era: The Old Northwest as a Test Case," 
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being sent to the island seem to have been circulating in Upper Canada since Francis Bond 
Head’s loudly announced removal policy and deceptive strategies to gain land surrenders. The 
Saugeen Ojibwes, who had been especially aggrieved by Head’s negotiating tactics, expressed in 
a petition to Arthur their fears and anxieties: “we have been very weak-hearted since we heard 
that our removal to distant and barren wilds was contemplated where we are fully satisfied we 
must suffer all the privations of a wandering life, and soon leave our poor children, without the 
inheritance, which we at the hands of our father possess, in penury and want.”803 Within an 
atmosphere where policies touted as “voluntary” threatened to entail compulsion, government 
agents’ intentions on both sides of the frontier appear to have contributed to Native peoples’ 
fears and anxieties about the future.  
But in contrast to Head’s original announcements about Manitoulin as the future home of 
all the Province’s First Peoples, the government ultimately designated it for people who, like the 
immigrants from the U.S. side, had no alternate home in Upper Canada. Responding to petitions 
such as that of the Saugeen Ojibwes’, Jarvis attempted to allay fears by defending Head’s 
original removal policy, stating that circulating reports that Manitoulin Island was an 
environment of “barren rocks,” unable to support human settlement, were based on the mistaking 
of the islands of the north eastern coast of Lake Huron for “the Great Manitoulin Island.”804 He 
also refuted the implicit suggestions that force had been contemplated to effect the policy, stating 
that “Sir Francis never used nor did he ever intend to use compulsion with the Indians to effect 
the Subject” of removal. Reframing Head’s original formulation to suit to imperatives of the 
civilization policy, Jarvis represented that the previous lieutenant governor had “merely invited 
[the Indians] to adopt the Island as a permanent residence and as an inducement promised the 
                                                
803 Petition of the Saugeen Ojibwes, enclosed in W.M. Harvard to Arthur, 10 July 1838, NAC, RG 10, vol. 68. 
804 Jarvis to Jarrison, 10 June 1839, NAC, RG 10, vol. 503. 
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assistance of Government, in building Houses, clearing Land and providing them with moral and 
religious instruction.” He also noted that though Head had “recommended the various resident 
tribes remove to the Island . . . not one of them ever did, but on the contrary they are all at this 
present time residing in their respective villages and to all appearances happy and contented.” 
The island had instead become a residence for people, not from “the Surveyed and settled parts 
of the Province,” but for families “who formerly had no fixed place of residence.” This would 
now also include the “large number of Indians from the United States,” who had recently 
“arrived in the Province,” and who were “ever on their way to Manitoulin with the intention of 
remaining there under the protection of the British Government.”805 For the British, Manitoulin 
Island had become a place through which the Province could absorb the incoming Anishinaabeg. 
 The Anishinaabeg who moved into Upper Canada from the U.S. side entered another – 
albeit differently constituted – coercive political landscape. Though Indian department officials 
wrote of such movements as an escape from U.S. coercion to an “Asylum” under “the protection 
of the British Government,” the British government attempted to proscribe the bounds of this 
“protection” to fit within their policy of “civilizing” and Christianizing the Province’s First 
Peoples.806 Though Christianity and “civilization” in themselves were not necessarily abhorrent 
to First Nations people – a number of whom were already Christian and partook in many aspects 
of so-called “civilized” life – the policy imperative was nevertheless based on the British 
government’s desire to end the expense of presents. In doing so, officials would abrogate the 
still-existing British-Indian alliance, renewed annually through the diplomatic rituals undertaken 
during delivery of presents. For many of the immigrants, who no had sought to avoid removal to 
a strange country west of the Mississippi by taking refuge in their own region under the 
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protection their “Great Mother,” a primary expectation was that the alliance would continue, as 
promised, once they moved within the British Dominions.  
 And yet, within this regional political ferment, British agents found themselves both 
unwilling and unable to immediately discontinue giving presents. While Arthur, for instance, 
seemed to prioritize maintaining peaceful relations with the United States, he nevertheless had to 
weigh this imperative against that of maintaining the British government’s faith with the 
American Indians and First Peoples. As he wrote to Lord Russell regarding the sensitive issues 
surrounding the discontinuance of presents to “visiting Indians,” “it is of the utmost importance 
that the faith of the Government should be Kept.”807 The same concerns that local British agents 
had in the late 1820s regarding the abrogation of presents continued in the early 1840s. Despite 
the continuing hopes of the Treasury department in London that colonial administrators in 
Canada effect the discontinuance of presents, William Hepburn – a member of the Bagot 
Commission – expressed in 1843 the “conviction that good Faith, Justice an Humanity alike 
forbid the discontinuance of the Presents until the Indians shall be raised to a capacity of 
maintaining themselves on an equality with the rest of the Population of the Province.”808 
Although expressed predominantly in terms of British good will towards the First Peoples, such 
a statement also alludes to the likelihood that no British official wanted to face the shame and 
dishonor of not fulfilling their promises their Native associates. In spite of all demographic 
pressures of an expanding settler-colonist population, and the actual goals of the British 
                                                
807 Arthur to Russell, 4 May 1840, NAC, RG7 G7, vol. 2. 
808 William Hepburn to sir Charles Bagot, 26 January 1843, NAC, RG 10, vol. 6. The Bagot Commission articulated 
many of the elements of Indian policy in Canada, up to and beyond Confederation. Though they confirmed First 
Nations’ right of occupancy and claim to compensation for land surrender, they proposed to end Indian land use 
practices and reduce the government’s financial (and other equitable) obligations to Native peoples: Miller, 
Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: 132-34. See also John Leslie, "The Bagot Commission: Developing a Corporate 
Memory for the Indian Department," Historical Papers 17, no. 1 (1982). 
 334 
civilization policy, Native peoples themselves nevertheless managed to pressure the British to 
continue fulfilling the obligations imposed by their alliance. 
 U.S. Indian policy provided a useful element in this dynamic. In pledging allegiance to 
their “Great Mother” and expressing displeasure with the Americans, Native peoples flattered the 
British in a way that made it hard to renege on their obligations. Though Arthur himself did not 
openly criticize U.S. Indian policy, lower-level officers in the Indian department did. For 
instance, when Keating wrote to Jarvis from Port Sarnia in June 1839 to blame “the Americans” 
for the Saginaw Ojibwes’ reluctance to proceed to Manitoulin Island, he attributed American 
interference to the idea that “they evidently see with fear and jealousy the Indians to whom they 
have behaved so ill flocking to the land where they well know they will meet with kindness and 
protection.”809 For agents such as Keating, belief in their own benevolence, contrasted to the 
Americas, was seemingly a source of pride and honor. So despite the nexus of U.S. and British 
pressures with which the Anishinaabeg had to contend, and the restrictions that both 
governments’ policies placed upon their movements and choice of residence, the U.S.-British 
border dynamics helped them pressure the British to continue fulfilling – at least in the 




To a large extent, British policy towards the First Nations reflected the shifting sands of 
political and economic expedience. During the rebellion British officials courted and flattered the 
First Nations as allies, but afterwards, with the threat of rebellion ended, attempts to treat them as 
purely civil subjects again predominated. Arthur’s views on Indian policy exemplified this 
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approach. Despite his praise of First Nations soldiers’ “sagacity and gallantry” during the Patriot 
War, he subsequently reverted to more overtly paternalistic language, and revealed his ultimate 
goal to implement plans similar to those he had attempted for the indigenous peoples in Van 
Diemen’s Land. He believed that the “Indians . . . should be kindly persuaded to give up their 
wandering course of Life in pursuit of game, and led to follow Agriculture for their support.” 
And with the threat of rebellion in the past, he seems to have quickly forgotten (or perhaps he 
never fully realized) the crucial military role that the First Nations had played in defending his 
government. After commissioning a report on the state of the Indian Department, he concluded 
that – because the responsibilities of the Indian Department had become different from “those 
which originally engrossed its attention,” and had apparently come to involve “the important and 
interesting duty” of “watching over the rural and social advance of the remnant of savage pagan 
tribes” – that the department should be separated from the (military) Commissariat and become 
“one of the leading Civil branches of the Colonial Service.”810 Arthur however had no chance to 
implement these recommendations before he left Canada in March 1841, his position as 
lieutenant governor of Upper Canada having been made redundant with the adoption of Lord 
Durham’s recommendations – made in response to the rebellions – to unify the Canadas and 
implement responsible government.811 
 Yet First Nations people would continue to carve out a place for themselves, both in spite 
of, and with an awareness of, the paternalistic and supremacist presumptions held by British 
agents such as Arthur. Like many Ottawas who remained in Michigan, Peter Jones and 
Shawundais’s people, for instance, chose to adopt a so-called “civilized” appearance and lifestyle 
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and the Christian religion.812 Yet their vision for their own, and their people’s future did not fit 
that expounded by Arthur. Though they adopted many trappings of a “civilized mode of life,” 
they continued to fight to determine their own political futures as separate peoples, rather than 
amalgamate into the broader British population as individuals. Most importantly, they wanted to 
do this on their homelands. 
 For some of the peoples of the Great Lakes whose main land holdings lay on the U.S. 
side of the frontier, particularly among the Pottawatomies, U.S. government policy left 
decreasing opportunities to remain in their current homelands. During the removal era, the U.S. 
government effected (and in many cases coerced) wholesale extinguishments of Indian title so 
that by 1842, U.S. agents had managed to negotiate for the surrender of virtually all the 
remaining large tracts of Indian land in the Old Northwest.813 For those who decided, within the 
scope of limited options, to move to Upper Canada, their so-called “asylum” in British-claimed 
territory did not mean freedom from coercion. Indeed, British pressure for the Native immigrants 
to move to Manitoulin meant that many became the projected recipients of Upper Canada’s own 
removal policy. Although regional political dynamics allowed Native peoples at least 
temporarily to enforce upon the British their own understandings of an equitable fictive-kinship 
alliance through the exchange of presents, they also found themselves in an ambivalent 
relationship with the British government. Through effecting the continuation of presents to 
peoples residing on the British side of the border, they managed to maintain the advantages of an 
alliance. But they fought to achieve this against the push back of British agents who sought to 
abrogate this expensive practice by treating First Nations people as individual subjects rather 
than valued wartime allies.
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Conclusion 
Paternalist Reckonings and Innocent Masculinities 
 
 The five Anglophone men, all of whom presided over, or advocated for, the “removal” of 
indigenous peoples, exercised a paternalistic form of authority: they sought to control indigenous 
people and to justify this by claiming that they acted for indigenous people’s own good. In doing 
so, these men either failed to recognize or blatantly disregarded indigenous people’s 
subjectivities and agency. While in relation to their own societies, the men’s power was 
ostensibly based on the delegated authority of the U.S. government or British crown, they 
presumed the right to exercise this delegated authority over indigenous peoples based on their 
self-proclaimed superiority – and that of their nation – to indigenous peoples. The paternalist 
language these men used to describe their “moral” duty towards indigenous people was therefore 
not simply a cover for malevolent subjugating practices; this language was both constitutive and 
representative of the power they sought to assert. By defining indigenous people as a “moral” 
problem or duty, they represented themselves as having a moral obligation either to save them, 
or to solve the problem signified by their existence on lands earmarked for American or British 
colonization. In seeking to save indigenous people through “civilizing” and converting them to 
Christianity, or moving them away from civilization’s apparently destructive inevitable spread, 
these men defined their conduct towards indigenous people as benevolently inspired. Even Lewis 
Cass, who, in his controversial 1830 North American Review article used profoundly derogatory 
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racialized language to describe “the Indians,” still articulated the discursive foundations of 
Indian removal as the discharging of the U.S. nation’s “moral” duty to American Indian peoples.  
 In making these pronouncements, Cass openly declared his support for the Jackson 
administration’s removal policy. Though politically committed to the Democratic vision of a 
republic of (white, male) self-sufficient landholders, his fluctuating statements about Indian 
policy show that his pronouncements were motivated more by the shifting sands of partisan 
politics than deeply held convictions. In an 1827 article he rejected the policy touted by President 
Monroe to remove “the Indians” west of the Mississippi – though he referred to the plan “as an 
evidence of the feelings of the American government, and of their earnest desire to discharge 
with fidelity a great moral debt.” But when a strong (albeit still nascent) partisan divide emerged 
over the issue of removal during and after the 1828 elections, Cass ultimately chose his side.814 
The consistency in Cass’s Indian policy lay not in religious or philosophical absolutes, but in a 
practical commitment to facilitating the territorial expansion of the U.S. nation.  
In his 1826 North American Review article, Cass had implied that the surrender of 
American Indian men responsible for the “murder” of “U.S. citizens” was part of the apparently 
inevitable submission of “the Indians” to U.S. sovereign jurisdiction. Such claims reflected the 
political reality that Cass sought to achieve, rather than the on-the-ground realities of the Upper 
Great Lake’s political landscape. However, while he was ultimately not always successful at 
asserting even a façade of U.S. control, his approach – represented, for instance, by his pursuit of 
the Lake Pepin killers and his staging of a ceremonial emasculation at Butte des Morts in 1827 – 
sheds light on how one man could be instrumental in advancing the cause of U.S. expansionism. 
During the 1820s, even peoples such as the Ojibwes of Lake Superior, who lived far afield from 
the frontiers of U.S. settler invasions, had to deal with an expansionist nation in the form of its 
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committed agents, such as Cass. Cass, in particular, sought to impose a dictatorial and 
supremacist paternal authority over American Indian peoples in preparation for the apparently 
inevitable extension of U.S. sovereignty over Indian land. American Indian peoples therefore had 
to defend themselves against the aggressive diplomacy of Cass, who fought hard to make the 
apparently inevitable, a prospective reality. It is no small wonder that Cass loomed large in the 
1820s Great Lakes region, not just as a physical presence, but also in the intelligence that 
circulated across the U.S.-British defined border. 
However, Cass’s support for Indian removal in the context of this project – where his 
story sits alongside that of four other white men who seemingly based their policies towards 
indigenous people more on religious or philosophical absolutes than political pragmatism – 
comes to hold more of an outlying than exemplary position. Cass, the consummate Jacksonian, 
appears more as a fringe-dweller of a paternalist order based on evangelical Christian (or in 
Head’s case Romantic) notions of paternalist obligations. Cass nevertheless acknowledged (at 
least implicitly) the overriding “moral” concerns of friends such as McKenney and opponents 
such as Jeremiah Evarts, and thus sought to represent the government’s removal policy as one of 
simultaneous benefit to the U.S. nation and the Indian peoples themselves. Though Cass’s 
rhetoric – like that of Andrew Jackson himself – appears to have been disingenuous, it also 
signified a political landscape in which the U.S. government not only had to treat with American 
Indian peoples as sovereign nations in order to make the removalist vision a reality, but also had 
to neutralize their evangelical opponents, who opposed removal on the basis of both legal 
commitments and broader paternalist moral duties. Though his own support for removal was 
perhaps not based on such strongly held religious or philosophical convictions, and was less 
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sincerely “benevolently” inspired, Cass nevertheless used the language of a paternalism born of 
evangelical Christianity to portray his own authoritarianism as benevolent.  
 In contrast, George Arthur, Francis Bond Head, Charles La Trobe, and Thomas 
McKenney based their justifications for removal on sincerely held beliefs about their 
government’s moral duties towards indigenous peoples. Yet however benevolently inspired, 
these men’s assertions of authority were no less authoritarian than those of Cass. For instance, in 
Van Diemen’s Land and the Port Phillip district respectively, Arthur’s and La Trobe’s 
humanitarian visions translated into coercive programs to subject indigenous peoples to the 
foreign rituals of the British common law, and to proscribe a “civilized” Christian future that 
denied indigenous people their own cultural institutions and political personhood. As discussed 
in chapter three, Arthur’s authorization to remove the survivors of the “black wars” off the Van 
Demonian mainland went expressly against the wishes of the indigenous people themselves. La 
Trobe’s attempts “to remove” and exclude Kulin people from Melbourne (discussed in chapter 
five) struck at the heart of Kulin cultural institutions and thus contributed to the escalating 
conflict in the district between indigenous people and colonists. Similarly, McKenney’s views on 
Indian policy in the United States, though expressive of a heart-felt wish to save his Indian 
“children,” also assumed a very marked authoritarian edge. Although he premised his support for 
removal on the fact that he believed it would be “voluntary,” such voluntariness needs to be 
understood within the scope of his paternalist views on U.S.-Indian relations. Like Head in 
Upper Canada, McKenney presented himself as the omniscient father, whose children held an 
imperative duty to follow his benign dictates. 
 For both Head and McKenney, the theater of Great Lakes Indian diplomacy provided a 
stage on which to perform these paternalist beliefs and desires. Head could play his coveted role 
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of father to his “red children of the forest,” and McKenney could similarly bestow his earnest 
benevolence upon his “Indian children” (while perhaps also admiring the men’s mature 
masculine forms). Yet for the Native peoples of the region, the diplomatic protocols represented 
a particular understanding of what relations between themselves and the Americans or British 
should entail. The kinship designation of “father” denoted the expectation that American and 
British agents would reciprocate Native generosity (for entry onto indigenous lands and into 
indigenous economic and social relations) with their own acts of generosity and mercy.  For the 
First Nations-British alliance in North America, these expectations of reciprocity would continue 
to hold currency – albeit to an increasingly limited extent – into the 1840s, despite British 
attempts, beginning in the 1820s and continuing into Arthur’s administration, to discharge their 
“moral” duty to the First Peoples through a different paternalist conception of morality: that of 
“civilization” and Christianity.815 
 Even Cass during the 1820s, with his machinations to assert U.S. sovereignty and 
attempts to undermine what he perceived as British influence, still had to work within the 
protocols of Great Lakes diplomacy. Working within these protocols, Cass sought to assert a 
paternal authority that often breeched the bounds ascribed to a fictive “father.” He instead 
heralded an absolutist and supremacist model of masculine power, in which U.S. sovereignty 
was to reign supreme over abrogated indigenous sovereignties. But as discussed in chapter one, 
his failure to subject the Ojibwe suspects of the Lake Pepin deaths to U.S. legal jurisdiction, for 
instance, highlighted that even illusions of absolute sovereignty could not be achieved without 
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the consent of the region’s peoples who would not submit willingly to his version of supremacist, 
masculine authority.  
 Although much less consciously and calculatedly, McKenney, Head, and Arthur all 
similarly subverted these protocols, imbuing them with a new version of authoritarian 
paternalism. McKenney unconsciously highlighted this process in his 1846 Memoirs. In these 
musings on the state of U.S.-Indian relations, McKenney infused the old diplomatic language of 
metaphorical kinship with the decidedly more contemporaneous language of Christian paternal 
benevolence. McKenney thus wrote, with regret, about what he saw as “the apathy that pervades 
the councils of this great nation” upon the subject of Indian relations. “And where,” he asked 
“shall be found a solution of the almost universal indifference with which a great portion of our 
race, Christian, as we profess to be, listen to the wails that reach them from the wilderness 
homes of these abused and cast-off people? The cry from the forests, from the beginning, and 
that which is heard to this hour, and which has never been hushed for over two hundred years, is, 
‘PROTECT US – PROTECT US – PITY AND SAVE US!’ But where are the practical responses that 
show that this cry has even been properly regarded?”816 Directly quoting the metaphoric 
language of Great Lakes diplomacy, in which Native speakers would couch their requests by 
asking for their “father” to “pity” them, the literally minded McKenney imbued the language 
with his own understandings of the necessary paternal relations between the U.S. government 
and its American Indian “children.” In this rendering, a metaphoric assertion of older diplomatic 
codes became pleas for acts of evangelical Christian “benevolence.”  
While indigenous people continued to imbue this language with their own meanings, 
these protocols nevertheless provided fertile ground for men such as McKenney and Head to 
perform their own visions of fatherly benevolence. As with Cass’s attempts in the 1820s, their 
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versions of paternal authority could never be fully imposed without the consent of their 
“children.” Yet, by infusing the language with their own understanding of paternal moral duties, 
these men created an increasingly unbreachable divide between their expectations and those of 
Native peoples. For all these men, paternal duties entailed a unilateral assertion of their own 
vision for indigenous people’s futures. They therefore represented a turning away from an 
indigenous-defined system of paternal relations based on reciprocity and mutual mercy and 
forgiveness. 
 Although indigenous-colonist relations in Van Diemen’s Land and Port Phillip did not 
have the same long diplomatic history, in both locations Arthur’s and La Trobe’s respective 
humanitarian visions shut out possibilities for integrating indigenous-defined expectations of 
reciprocity in return for the colonists’ expropriation of indigenous land and other resources. 
Arthur, for instance, failed to recognize the need to negotiate with the delegation of Oyster Bay 
people who arrived in Hobart in the wake of Musquito’s arrest. Fifteen years later across the 
Bass Strait, La Trobe would, despite the initial hopes of the Wurundjeri leader, Billibellary, be 
completely blind to Kulin expectations of reciprocity, established with the “Batman treaty.” Like 
McKenney and Head, both Arthur and La Trobe translated indigenous people’s words and 
actions in line with their own visions for ideal relations. For Head, this was a vision for their 
pristine future on Manitoulin Island, away from the polluting and destructive influences of 
“civilization.” For the other three men, this vision was for indigenous people to follow their 
“benevolent” dictates, and become “civilized” Christians. 
 While all these men justified removal as the righteous and benevolent fulfillment of their 
society’s “moral” duty to indigenous peoples, their justifications in fact perpetuated schemas of 
morality that erased indigenous people’s individual subjectivities and collective personhoods. 
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There was therefore always necessarily a marked discord between what these men wrote about 
indigenous people and the realities of indigenous people’s lives. Stripped of their humanity, 
indigenous people appear principally as the objects of these men’s visions. In their writings these 
men therefore revealed the coercive implications of their “benevolent” designs. They also 
unwittingly provided insights into how important their own masculinities were in their 
projections of indigenous people’s futures. As discussed in chapter three, although these men 
justified removal as part of their moral duty to save indigenous people, their writings reveal that 
perceptions of “moral” dangers – other than those they made explicit – may have contributed to 
their advocating for the stark segregationism of removalist policies. They reveal, furthermore, 
how important their abilities to play a particular masculine role were to their projections of 
indigenous peoples’ futures. For Arthur, this was the role of the sincere humanitarian conciliator; 
for La Trobe, the morally virtuous “civilized” mentor; for McKenney, the sexually pure father 
figure; and for Head, the heroic savior of his “red children of the forest.” Even for Lewis Cass, a 
committed egalitarian republican, when it came to dealing with Native American peoples, he 
took a decidedly hierarchical approach to power, playing the role of an authoritarian patriarch.  
  Though all deeply implicated in efforts to subjugate indigenous peoples, these men 
nevertheless consistently positioned themselves as innocent of any wrongdoing.817 They saw 
themselves as separate from both the natural and manmade forces that supposedly worked to 
harm indigenous people. They were thus not complicit in the allegedly inevitable spread of 
“civilization” that threatened to annihilate indigenous people. And their good intentions 
apparently meant that they were above the fray of any immoral conduct on the part of their 
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fellow Americans or Britons. Arthur and La Trobe, for instance, blamed escalating indigenous-
colonist conflicts on the “lower-class” stockmen and the indigenous people themselves. While 
Cass, with his commitments to egalitarian republicanism, never placed himself above the 
“frontiersmen” with whom he identified politically (instead consistently blaming American 
Indians and the British for any violence), McKenney identified himself as a benevolent Christian 
American, distinctly separate from perpetrators of frontier violence.  
 Yet despite these men’s ostensibly divergent political ideologies, and the different 
cultural contexts in which they exercised their authority, they nevertheless imposed on their 
dealings with indigenous peoples a fundamentally similar paternalist conception of morality. 
Moreover, they mobilized this paternal relational order to portray as just, necessary, and natural 
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